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Abstract
Current UK abortion law has been subjected to extensive feminist critique because of
the relationships that it constructs between healthcare professionals (HCPs) and
women with unwanted pregnancies. The law allows HCPs to opt out of abortion
provision on the grounds of conscience, implying that it is not something which they
have an automatic duty to provide to their patients. It also gives doctors the authority
to decide whether an abortion can legally take place, thus suggesting that women’s
reproductive decisions should be regulated by medical ‘experts’. However, little is
known about how HCPs who are involved in twenty-first century UK abortion
provision define their relationships with their patients in practice. My thesis makes
an important empirical contribution by responding to this gap in the literature and
exploring the subjectivities which these HCPs construct for themselves and their
pregnant patients.
I address this issue by analysing Scottish HCPs’ interview accounts of their
involvement in (or conscientious objection to) abortion provision, using conceptual
tools provided by Science and Technology Studies (STS) and feminist theory. I begin
by utilising HCPs’ discussions of the practice of ‘conscientious objection’ as a means
of exploring how they define the boundaries of their professional responsibilities for
abortion provision. I then move on to address HCPs’ accounts of their interactions
with women requesting abortion, and analyse how they define legitimate or ‘expert’
knowledge in this context.
A key conclusion of the thesis is that HCPs do concede some authority to women
with unwanted pregnancies; this is revealed by their reluctance to suggest that they
have the right to prevent individual women from accessing abortion. At the same
time, I argue that the legitimacy granted to pregnant women by HCPs is limited. My
analysis reveals that, in constructing knowledge claims about the use of abortion,
HCPs co-produce troubling definitions of femininity, socio-economic class, age and
ethnicity. I develop a strong critique of this process, and highlight its potential
implications for women’s experiences in the abortion clinic. However, I conclude
that this situation cannot be addressed by simply attacking the practices of HCPs as
individuals. Rather, it is necessary to understand and critique the limitations of the
discursive context in which HCPs are working, because this context shapes the
subjectivities available to pregnant women and HCPs.
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Chapter One: Why healthcare professionals and
abortion, now?
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have seen considerable media and parliamentary debate about the terms
of UK abortion law. Currently, abortion is regulated by the 1967 Abortion Act, as
amended by the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. This legislation
states that abortion is only legal if two doctors agree that it is necessary on one of
four grounds, all of which refer to the health of the pregnant woman or that of her
fetus. It thus defines the decision to terminate a pregnancy as one which depends
upon the knowledge of medical experts, rather than pregnant women. As well as
giving doctors the right to decide whether an abortion should take place, the law
gives them the right to refuse to become involved in abortion provision on the
grounds of personal conscience, thus distinguishing abortion from most other
medical treatments (Sheldon, 1997).
Feminist scholars (e.g. Brookes, 1988; Fyfe, 1991; Boyle, 1997; Sheldon,
1997; Lee, 2003b) have criticised UK abortion law on two related grounds. In the
first place, rather than granting women a positive right to abortion, it allows doctors
to control the terms on which the procedure is provided. Secondly, by defining
abortion as a deviant reproductive act that must be regulated by medical experts, the
law co-produces problematic constructions of femininity (Boyle, 1997; Sheldon,
1997). It positions motherhood as the normal outcome of pregnancy and
simultaneously suggests that women are not reliable judges of the circumstances in
which they should become mothers (Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997).
While feminist critiques have highlighted important problems with the
framework of UK abortion law, little is known about how healthcare professionals
(HCPs)1 define their role(s) in twenty-first century abortion practice. What
1 While the law grants decision-making rights only to doctors, nurses also play an important role in the
provision of abortion. They are involved in interviewing and counselling patients, as well as in
providing the procedure and, like doctors, can also exercise their legal right to opt out of abortion
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subjectivities do they delineate for themselves, and for their pregnant patients? What
are the implications of this process for women who are, or could become, pregnant?
My thesis sets out to address these questions, by analysing Scottish HCPs’ interview
accounts of their involvement in (or conscientious objection to) abortion provision,
using conceptual tools provided by Science and Technology Studies (STS) and
feminist theory.
The following chapter explains my rationale for this research in further detail.
It begins by outlining some of the critical events in the recent history of UK abortion
law, in part because this provides important background information for the chapters
which follow. However, through this discussion I also aim to illustrate that the
history of the regulation of abortion in the UK can be written as an account of
increasing parliamentary deference to medical experts. Drawing on this discussion,
as well as an examination of the existing empirical literature, I offer further
justification for my decision to study contemporary HCPs’ accounts of their role in
abortion provision. I also explain why it is particularly important to conduct this
research using the theoretical lens supplied by STS. I then move on to outline the
structure of my thesis, and list the specific research questions which I aim to address.
I conclude the chapter by highlighting some of the difficulties that I have faced in
attempting to find a ‘feminist’ language through which to write about this research
topic.
1.2 A recent history of UK abortion law
Numerous historians and sociologists have analysed the processes which led to the
construction of current UK abortion law (Macintyre, 1973; Brookes, 1988; Keown,
1988; Fyfe, 1991; Newburn, 1992; Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997; Halfmann, 2003;
Davis & Davidson, 2006). While the precise details of their accounts vary, one
overarching theme which unites them is an agreement that the UK medical
profession has played a significant role in shaping the terms of abortion legislation.
Rather than simply repeating other authors’ chronological descriptions of the law’s
work on the grounds of conscience. My use of the term ‘HCPs’ is thus intended to acknowledge the
role of both doctors and nurses in abortion provision.
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history,2 the following discussion focuses on two ways in which the medical
profession is held to have influenced the parameters of UK abortion law.
1.2.1 The protection of medical discretion over abortion decision-
making
The 1967 Abortion Act is often portrayed as a permissive law which ‘legalised’
abortion in the UK3 (Newburn, 1992). However, rather than completely
decriminalising abortion, the Abortion Act in fact clarified the grounds on which
doctors could legally carry out the procedure (Fyfe, 1991).
In pre-1967 Scotland, abortion was an offence under common law, “subject
to an ill-defined exception for abortions necessary to preserve the mother’s life or
health” (Gordon, 1978: 812). Because of this ambiguous definition, in Scotland
doctors could (at least in theory) provide the procedure legally before 1967, if they
were acting in good faith in the interests of their patients (Davis & Davidson, 2006).4
In contrast, in England abortion had been criminalised by statute law from 1803
onwards (Brookes, 1988). The 1861 Offences Against the Person Act made it illegal
for any person to attempt to procure or provide an abortion at any stage of gestation
(Brookes, 1988; Keown, 1988; Fyfe, 1991). However, Keown (1988) suggests that,
even in the more restrictive context of pre-1967 English abortion law, informal
deference to medical discretion characterised the regulation of abortion. He provides
evidence to suggest that doctors believed abortion to be a legal practice if their
clinical judgment deemed it to be necessary. He also points out that several judges
supported this view by stating that doctors acting in the best interests of their patients
need not fear prosecution.5
2 A time line summarising major events in the history of UK abortion law is provided in Appendix A.
3 In using the term, ‘UK’ I am (perhaps problematically) excluding Northern Ireland, where the 1967
Abortion Act does not apply. Abortion in Northern Ireland is regulated by the pre-1967 legislation
and, as a result, abortion is almost unavailable to women in this part of the UK. A similar situation
exists in the Republic of Ireland.
4 As Davis and Davidson (2006) point out, this did not translate into the widespread provision of the
procedure by doctors. In most areas of Scotland, gynaecologists were reluctant to perform abortions in
the absence of “medical emergency” e.g. risk to the life of the pregnant woman.
5 Brookes (1988) highlights the contrast between the way in which doctors and non-professional
abortionists (who were often women acting to help other women for minimal fees) were treated by the
court; the latter were prosecuted more often and received harsher sentences.
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Concern about loss of control over the criteria for legal abortion was central
to the medical profession’s response to parliamentary attempts to clarify and
liberalise abortion law during the 1950s and 1960s (Macintyre, 1973; Brookes, 1988;
Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992; Halfmann, 2003). Although the profession was
divided concerning the circumstances in which abortion was justifiable, it was united
in its insistence that only doctors possessed the expertise necessary to decide when
abortion was the correct course of action (Macintyre, 1973). The medical
profession’s desire to protect its own autonomy can be illustrated by its response to
two grounds for the procedure that were originally included in the Private Members’
Bill which David Steel introduced in his attempt to liberalise abortion law in 1966:
c) that the pregnant woman’s capacity as a mother will be severely
overstrained by the care of a child or of another child as the case may be;
or
d) that the pregnant woman is a defective or became pregnant while
under the age of sixteen or became pregnant as a result of rape. (Quoted
in Newburn, 1992: 143)
Many members of the medical profession viewed these clauses with hostility
because, as well as making no specific reference to ‘medical’ knowledge, they
outlined very precise grounds upon which an abortion would be legal. It was feared
that as a result of this, women would be able to ‘diagnose’ themselves as entitled to
legal abortion, and that doctors would be confronted with massive patient demand for
the procedure (Macintyre, 1973; Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992; Halfmann, 2003).
Even doctors who supported the liberalisation of abortion law and provision objected
to the inclusion of explicitly ‘non-medical’ indications for abortion in the proposed
legislation (Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992; Davis & Davidson, 2006). From their
perspective, abortion was always a question of medical judgments concerning a
woman’s ‘health’, and they interpreted this term broadly to include the assessment of
the social circumstances in which she was living (Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992;
Davis & Davidson, 2006).
Subjected to extensive lobbying by medical organisations, David Steel seems
to have been convinced by this second viewpoint (Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992;
Davis & Davidson, 2006). He removed clauses c and d from the Bill, replacing them
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with a general reference to the ‘environment’ of the pregnant woman. With some
modifications (which are described in section 1.2.2), the resulting legislation
continues to regulate the provision of abortion in the UK:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty
of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is
terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith –
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical and mental health of
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than
if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would
involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of
subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the pregnant
woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment. (The Abortion
Act 1967)
Sheldon (1997) suggests that, in addition to the pressures placed on Parliament
by the medical profession, the legalisation of abortion as a ‘medical’ issue can also
be viewed as an active attempt to gain control over women’s reproductive behaviour.
From the 1930s onwards, the Abortion Law Reform Association had campaigned
vociferously for women’s right to control their own bodies through legal, safe
abortion. Their campaigns heightened public awareness of the numbers of women
dying annually through illegal abortions performed by individuals without medical
training (Brookes, 1988). However, Sheldon argues that, rather than reflecting
support for women’s reproductive autonomy, parliamentary support for abortion law
reform in 1967 represented an attempt to deal with the unregulated basis of the pre-
1967 situation. She suggests that the deaths of wives and mothers through unsafe
abortion represented a threat to the institution of the family, and that the prevalence
of illegal abortion was perceived as a threat to the authority of the State. Given these
concerns, the solution was not to give women the power to make their own decisions
about abortion, but to attempt to regulate their behaviour more effectively through
the medical profession:
A dark mass of unknowable female criminality which had been perceived
as profoundly threatening to the existing social order (and, in particular,
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to the family) is thus brought into the open, and isolated in the bodies of
individual women, where it can be contained, monitored and controlled.
The problem of abortion is changed from one of widespread and
unquantifiable deviance, to one of isolated, identifiable and treatable
individual deviants. (Sheldon, 1997: 29 – emphasis in original)
Similar accounts are also provided elsewhere in literature addressing this topic. For
example Keown describes “the statutory transfer of abortion from the court to the
consulting room” (Keown, 1988: 165) and Fyfe suggests that the Abortion Act can
be construed as “a shift of the patriarchal power relationship between the legal and
medical professions; an exchange of women (or control over reproduction) from the
former to the latter” (Fyfe, 1991: 166).
While the framework of the 1967 Abortion Act may have enshrined medical
expertise as the basis for determining whether an abortion should take place, it also
defined abortion as an unusual medical intervention, which requires legal oversight
(Sheldon, 1997). In other words, while it granted doctors power in relation to women
with unwanted pregnancies, it also meant that medical discretion became regulated to
an unusual degree. No doctor can act alone with regards to abortion; two medical
practitioners must agree that the procedure is necessary, and they must indicate this
agreement by signing a legal document called Schedule 1 (see Appendix B) 6.
Schedule 1 is then kept in the patient’s notes and is used as the basis for completing
Schedule 2 (commonly referred to in practice as the ‘notification form’ – see
Appendix C). Schedule 2 is completed by the operating physician and must be sent to
the Chief Medical Officer within seven days of the abortion. It details the names of
the operating physician, the two doctors who signed Schedule 1, and the place where
the abortion was carried out,7 as well as several pieces of information about the
woman undergoing the abortion, e.g. marital status and obstetric history. In addition
to indicating the ground under which the abortion was carried out, the doctor who
6 Appendix B provides a copy of Schedule 1of the Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991. These
regulations are the Statutory Instrument currently used to enact the 1967 Abortion Act (as amended by
the 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act) in Scotland. A separate Statutory Instrument
applies to England and Wales. Schedule 1 of these regulations is in fact a sheet composed of two
sides, Certificate A and B. Certificate A is the one that is normally completed, whereas Certificate B
applies in the case of emergency operations and only requires one doctor’s signature. Because it
involves an emergency situation, Certificate B does not have to be completed prior to the abortion.
7 The procedure is only legal if carried out on government-approved premises.
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completes this form must give a brief statement of “the main indication” for the
procedure.
Although these documents appear to render doctors unusually accountable for
their work, in his analysis of the working of the Abortion Act from 1967 to 1982,
Keown (1988) suggests that its apparent legal restrictions on medical discretion do
not interfere in any way with clinical freedom. He points out that, while Schedule 1
may ensure that a second doctor’s opinion is obtained before any abortion, it does not
in fact require that the doctor in question sees the patient; s/he simply has to agree
with the first doctor’s assessment. Additionally, although Schedule 2 is sent to the
Chief Medical Officer, Keown argues that, because “notification is made to the CMO
on a doctor-to-doctor basis rather than to, say, the police, any suspicion of
criminality which might arise from the form is less likely to be followed up”
(Keown, 1988: 132). Sheldon (1997) reaches a similar conclusion in her analysis of
legal cases relating to the Abortion Act, and suggests that doctors seem to be almost
immune from prosecution in this area of medical practice. She points out that the
only requirement which doctors must fulfil in order to comply with the terms of the
legislation is to act “in good faith”, and that it is extremely difficult to prove non-
compliance with this requirement in court.
Sheldon also concedes that the Abortion Act’s deference to medical
discretion, along with the court’s refusal to interfere with this discretion, has had
broadly beneficial implications for British women’s access to abortion:
Britain was among the first western countries to legalise abortion and the
medical framework adopted by the law helped to minimise potential
opposition and political controversy. Since 1967, doctors have grown
increasingly liberal in the provision of abortion and the courts have
refused to check this development. (Sheldon, 1997: 152)
At the same time, she draws attention to two problems with the framework of
abortion law which were highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, namely, its
problematic constructions of femininity and the potentially powerful position that it
allows doctors to occupy in relation to women requesting abortion. In addition to
these problems, Sheldon (1997) highlights the phenomenon of entrenchment,
whereby a tradition of legal deference to medical expertise concerning abortion pre-
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frames public debate on the issue, making it difficult to discuss abortion as anything
other than a matter for medical judgment. In the following section, I will address
feminist critiques of this phenomenon, as well as illustrating their relevance to
contemporary discussion of the subject in the UK. Through this discussion I will
reveal that public discourse concerning the regulation of abortion continues to
construct the medical profession as a source of enormous epistemological authority.
This highlights the importance of exploring whether HCPs involved in contemporary
abortion practice are constructing similarly authoritative positions for themselves in
relation to their pregnant patients.
1.2.2 The definition of the fetus
Historical accounts of the development of UK abortion law suggest that a second
critical way in which Parliament has deferred to the judgment of the medical
profession is in its attempts to define the legal status of the fetus. In this section I will
provide an historical overview of this phenomenon, and will also draw attention to
feminist critiques of the ways in which medical definitions of the fetus have come to
dominate public debate about abortion in the UK. In order to illustrate the continuing
relevance of these critiques, I end this section by considering extracts from a recent
parliamentary debate about abortion, which took place during the passage of the
2008 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.
Before the nineteenth century, abortion in England was regulated under
common law and was an offence only after ‘quickening’, i.e. the point at which
pregnant women become aware of fetal movement (Keown, 1988). This distinction
was associated with the belief that only after a fetus became ‘animated’ was it
morally significant (Keown, 1988). However, Keown argues that, by the beginning
of the nineteenth century, doctors had begun to challenge the idea that quickening
marked a significant point in fetal development, which, they argued, should instead
be viewed as a continuous process following conception (see also Brookes, 1988).
He suggests that medical opinion may have been reflected in the Act that first made
abortion a statutory offence in England (The Malicious Shooting or Stabbing Act,
1803) which stated explicitly that abortion was an offence both before and after
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quickening (albeit a lesser offence before this point). As the nineteenth century
progressed, Parliament continued to support the medical professions’ view of fetal
development. The 1837 Offences Against the Person Act made no use of the
quickening terminology, and removed any distinction between pre- and post-
quickening abortion from the law (Keown, 1988).
Fyfe (1991) suggests that the removal of quickening terminology from
abortion legislation is symbolic of a broader shift which took place during the
nineteenth century. Along with other feminist scholars (see Chapter Two) she
suggests that, as biomedical accounts of reproduction gained greater authority,
women’s embodied accounts of this process became de-valued and their control over
their own reproductive bodies was diminished. She cites the 1929 Infant Life
(Preservation) Act8 as further evidence of this trend (see also Brookes, 1988). This
piece of legislation was primarily intended to close a loophole in existing abortion
law, which had allowed a fetus to be legally destroyed during birth (Brookes, 1988).
It achieved this by creating the new (and more serious) offence of ‘child destruction’,
to be applied to the abortion of fetuses capable of being born alive.9 On the basis of
medical consensus, this capacity was stated to be presumed from twenty-eight
weeks’ gestation onwards (Brookes, 1988). Fyfe suggests that this Act was
significant because it singled the fetus out “as a potential victim in need of state
protection” (Fyfe, 1991: 164), and introduced the notion that a fetus which doctors
deemed capable of being born alive was a distinctive legal entity.
Fyfe suggests that the 1967 Abortion Act reiterated the view that medical
expertise should determine the status accorded to the fetus. In the first place, it stated
that:
Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of the Infant Life
(Preservation) Act (protecting the life of the viable fetus). (The Abortion
Act 1967, section 5, paragraph 1)
8 Like other statutory abortion laws prior to 1967, this Act did not apply to Scotland.
9 It also contained a defence against the crime of child destruction, in cases where this act was
performed in “good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother” (The 1929 Infant
Life (Preservation) Act, paragraph 1 [1]).
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In doing so, it made abortion beyond twenty-eight weeks’ gestation illegal, and
entrenched the notion that medically defined fetal viability was a legally significant
point in time (Fyfe, 1991). Additionally, as Fyfe points out, the Abortion Act
extended the medical profession’s right to define the meaning of the fetus by making
medical assessments of fetal health an explicit criterion for legal abortion (Abortion
Act 1967, clause 1b – see p.8).
Almost as soon as the Abortion Act had been passed it was subjected to
extensive critique, and the anti-abortion movement mobilised around attempts to
restrict it via a series of Private Members’ Bills throughout the 1970s and 80s
(Keown, 1988; Newburn, 1992). Several of these aimed to reduce the upper time
limit on legal abortion from twenty-eight weeks’ gestation,10 and in recent decades,
the question of appropriate ‘time limits’ on abortion has become the most pervasive
feature of public debate about its regulation.
As the Science and Technology Subgroup (1991) point out, the most striking
aspect of ‘time limit’ debates is the way that they are dominated by discussion of the
status of the fetus. They illustrate this argument through their analysis of David
Alton’s Abortion Amendment Bill, which was introduced to Parliament in 1987 and
sought to dramatically lower the legal time limit on abortion from twenty-eight to
eighteen weeks’ gestation. Alton’s principle argument was that medical advances in
the care of premature babies had reduced the point of fetal viability far below the
twenty-eight week limit set in the 1929 Infant Life (Preservation) Act, and that the
point of viability was more accurately placed at eighteen weeks. However, although
the Alton campaign introduced the notion that ‘late’ abortions after eighteen weeks’
gestation were particularly problematic, Steinberg (1991) suggests that the
campaign’s rhetoric revealed an “intent to erode the social legitimacy of abortion at
any stage” (Steinberg, 1991: 179). In addition to the specific argument about fetal
10 The question of the upper time limit on abortion was also considered as part of a three year
Government Committee enquiry (1971-4) chaired by Justice Elizabeth Lane, which was set up in
response to critiques of the 1967 Abortion Act (Davis & Davidson, 2006). Desire for regulatory
restriction and clarification of the upper time limit was a key feature of the Scottish medical
profession’s evidence to the Lane Committee (Davis & Davidson, 2006). As Davis and Davidson
point out, because the 1929 Infant Life (Preservation) Act did not apply in Scotland, at this time there
was no upper time limit in Scottish abortion practice.
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viability, Alton and his supporters also drew more broadly upon medical discourses
about fetal development, in order to construct the fetus in utero as a human baby
deserving of protection by law (Franklin, 1991).
A critical point revealed by the Science and Technology Subgroup’s analysis
is that MPs who opposed Alton let the “fetal-centred” (Steinberg, 1991: 179) nature
of his arguments about abortion go unchallenged. Rather than introducing alternative
discourses concerning the rights or needs of women, Alton’s opponents suggested
that eighteen weeks was an unrealistic estimate of fetal viability, which the medical
profession in the late 1980s placed at twenty-four weeks. While they may have
questioned Alton’s proposed time limit, they thus accepted his premise, i.e. that there
is a category of ‘late’ abortion which should be discussed on a different basis from
‘early’ abortion (Steinberg, 1991).
Alton’s opponents also argued that a lower legal time limit would prevent
doctors from offering abortion in cases where prenatal diagnostic testing revealed the
presence of fetal abnormality (Franklin, 1991; Steinberg, 1991). Such testing can
generally only be conducted towards the end of the second trimester of pregnancy.
By relying on this argument, Alton’s opponents again accepted Alton’s framing of
the debate because they conceded that ‘late’ abortions require special circumstances
to be justifiable (Steinberg, 1991). Additionally, in defining these circumstances
entirely as a matter of medical experts’ assessments of the status of the fetus, they
concurred with Alton that abortion law should be determined by “medical judgments
and technical possibilities or limitations, not women’s needs or lives” (Science and
Technology Subgroup, 1991: 214).
Although the Alton Bill was ultimately unsuccessful, Sheldon (1997) argues
that the Science and Technology Subgroup were right to be concerned about the
future legacy of the narrow framework in which it was debated. Amendments to the
1967 Abortion Act were subsequently attached to the 1990 Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act. Echoing the debate about the Alton Bill, parliamentary discussion
of these amendments was framed almost exclusively in terms of medical knowledge,
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and was focussed upon the status of the fetus (Sheldon, 1997). The legislation that
was ultimately passed decoupled the 1967 Abortion Act from the 1929 Infant Life
(Preservation) Act in order to reflect medical consensus that fetal viability was most
accurately placed at twenty-four weeks’ gestation (Sheldon, 1997). As a result of this
legislation, abortion is currently legal in the UK under the following conditions:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty
of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is
terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical
practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith –
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that
the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped.
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would
involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or
(b) of subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the pregnant
woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment. (The Abortion
Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990).
The 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act thus entrenches two key
assumptions about abortion that were visible in previous laws and parliamentary
debates on the subject. Firstly, it assumes that, after a point in gestational time which
the medical profession demarcates as significant, the fetus gains a distinctive status
in relation to the woman who is pregnant. Secondly, it assumes that the abortion of
this legally distinctive fetus requires more ‘extenuating’ circumstances, the existence
of which is to be determined by doctors (grounds b, c and d).
The vast majority of abortions which take place in the UK each year are
conducted under clause ‘a’, which is the only clause to which the twenty-four week
time limit applies. In recent years, there have been calls for further legislative
restriction of these ‘clause a’ (often informally termed ‘social’) abortions on the basis
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of advances in medical knowledge about fetuses and premature babies. The move for
restriction seems to have gained momentum in part because of fetal ultrasound
footage that was released to the media by Professor Stuart Campbell in June 2004.
Using 4-dimensional imaging technology (which generates 3-dimensional images
that move in ‘real’ time), Campbell claimed to have uncovered the “complexity” of
fetal behaviour in utero. As evidenced by the following quotation from the
Guardian, he argued that this provided sufficient justification for the upper time limit
on abortion to be lowered:
For normal babies being terminated for social reasons it's probably
unacceptable nowadays to be terminating them much after 14 weeks.
They can suck their thumbs, they can open their eyes, they can perform
complex movements. I think it's time we got our act together. (Stuart
Campbell, quoted in Adam, 29th June 2004)
However, although these images attracted considerable media attention, full-
blown parliamentary debate about the upper time limit did not occur until 20th May
2008, during the Committee stage of the Government’s Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Bill. The debate which took place addressed a number of proposed
restrictions on abortion legislation,11 but was dominated by discussion of the upper
time limit. Six amendments were tabled in order to give MPs the opportunity to vote
on six alternatives (ranging from twelve weeks to twenty-two weeks) to the current
twenty-four week limit. Although all of these amendments were rejected, the terms
in which they were debated reveal the continuing relevance of feminist critiques of
the narrow discursive space within which abortion is discussed in the UK.
As in previous attempts to lower the time limit, proponents of restriction drew
primarily upon medical discourses in order to blur distinctions between fetuses in
11 Other restrictions discussed during this debate included an attempt to clarify (and restrict) the
grounds on which abortions could be provided, and the introduction of formal ‘consent’ procedures,
detailing information that HCPs would have to provide to all women requesting abortion (including
developmental information about fetuses). MPs in favour of liberalisation later tabled amendments to
abortion law (such as extending abortion law to Northern Ireland, reducing the number of doctors’
signatures required, and allowing nurses to perform abortions) at the Report stage of the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, which took place on October 22nd 2008. However, as a result of a
procedural motion tabled by the Health Minister, the order of the debate at the Report stage ensured
that there was insufficient time to address any amendments relating to abortion law – a move which
attracted considerable criticism from the pro-choice lobby.
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utero and babies/children. This allowed them to argue that the former deserved legal
protection:
On the question of viability, we have heard a great deal about studies of
the viability of the foetus—or the baby, in some hon. Members’
terminology; I think that I agree with that terminology. If there were any
doubt in my mind that a baby might be viable, I find it difficult to see
how the Committee would not vote to lower the limit. Viability is
everything. If even a single baby could live, with the help of modern
medical science, that baby deserves the chance to live. [Mike Penning,
Hansard Column 244, May 20th 2008]
Why 16 weeks? Scientific evidence increasingly suggests that unborn
children feel pain at 16 weeks. That is not simply a stress response; it is a
physiological response, perhaps not the same as in a fully grown adult,
but a physical and even emotional response beyond the norms of passive
reflex. Pain is felt, which is why specialist, gifted surgeons who perform
surgery on babies in the womb use anaesthetic. Now, 4D imaging reveals
that 16-week-old unborn babies are very much alive and kicking,
although their limbs are too small to be felt by the mothers. [Mark
Pritchard, Hansard Column 235, May 20th 2008]
This second quotation exemplifies feminist arguments concerning the way in which
women’s embodied knowledge of their pregnancies has become devalued in relation
to medical discourses of fetal development (Oakley, 1987; Fyfe, 1991; Duden, 1993).
Mark Pritchard positions a medical imaging technology as a source of objective
knowledge concerning the status of the fetus, and dismisses women’s embodied
knowledge of their pregnancies as inaccurate.
Interestingly, in responding to these arguments, many of those defending the
current time limit did make a concerted attempt to challenge their opponents’ “fetal-
centred” framing of the debate:
The first gross misconception is the assumption that restricting abortion
or making it illegal would in some way be pro-life. The error in that
argument is that the exclusive focus is on the foetus. The woman is
totally ignored, as if she does not count. [Chris McCafferty, Hansard
Column 236, May 20th 2008]
It is all about women’s autonomy and control over their own bodies
rather than being forced to continue with an unwanted pregnancy or to
seek an unsafe abortion, which could be the consequence. The point was
well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Chris
McCafferty): “If you don’t believe in abortion, don’t have one.” I think
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that that sums up very well what the debate is about. It is about
respecting another person’s right to choose, even if it is not a choice that
one would make oneself. [Julie Morgan, Hansard Column 269, May 20th
2008]
However, it seemed difficult for speakers to rely entirely on these woman-centred
arguments about abortion, and they turned repeatedly to the authority of medical
science in order to reinforce their defences of the current time limit on abortion.
Citing the support of major medical organisations, they argued that there was no
evidence to suggest that fetuses/premature babies could be ‘viable’ before the current
twenty-four week time limit:
Of course, I agree that legislation should always adapt to take account of
scientific and technical progress, but all the recent independent peer-
reviewed research has shown very clearly that survival at below 24
weeks’ gestation has not improved, despite advances in other aspects of
antenatal care and the care of premature babies. When the 24-week limit
was approved by Parliament in 1990, a key argument was that that was
the stage at which the foetus was considered viable. It is the considered
view of the British Medical Association, the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Nursing and the
British Association of Perinatal Medicine that there is no evidence of a
significant improvement in the survival of extremely premature babies
below 24 weeks’ gestation in the UK within the last 18 years. The recent
EPICure and Trent studies that were referred to earlier also say the same
thing. There is no significant statistical improvement in survival under 24
weeks. [Chris McCafferty, Hansard Column 239-240, May 20th 2008]
As has been suggested previously (Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991;
Sheldon, 1997), such ‘pro-choice’ arguments are disturbing for two reasons. Firstly,
because they concede ground to those who want to place fetuses at the centre of the
legislative agenda, and secondly, because they frame abortion law as something
which should automatically reflect “scientific and technical progress”. In doing so,
they suggest that, if such progress did occur in the future, then it would become
acceptable to impose restrictions on women’s access to abortion.
1.3 Why focus on healthcare professionals?
Given Parliament’s continuing deference to the voices of medical experts, why have
I decided to conduct research which focuses on the perspectives of the ‘powerful’?
Surely it is more important to engage with those who are marginalised by the
framing of abortion law and public debate in the UK, namely, women with unwanted
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pregnancies? Although I recognise the importance of making women’s needs and
lives central to any discussion of abortion, in the following section I will justify my
decision to analyse the accounts of those who are involved in its provision.
In the first place, several contemporary qualitative studies have focussed on
women’s experiences of accessing and having abortion in the UK (Lattimer, 1998;
Harden & Ogden, 1999; Kumar et al., 2004; Lee, 2004; Lee et al., 2004). Echoing
the findings of earlier studies (Macintyre, 1977; Allen, 1985), this work illustrates
that, in contrast to the law’s construction of abortion decision-making as a matter for
the judgment of doctors, women decide to end their pregnancies outside of the clinic
(Lee, 2004) on the basis of their very particular, and complex, social circumstances.
In contrast to the regularity with which qualitative researchers have asked
women to explain their reproductive decisions and experiences, in recent decades
HCPs have rarely been asked to account for their practice in UK abortion clinics.
This research thus sets out to address an important gap in the empirical literature.
However, in doing so, it does not set out to ‘amplify’ the voices of HCPs, but rather
to critically explore the implications of their accounts for women’s access to, and
experience of, abortion. It is precisely because these actors are granted such authority
over the regulation of abortion in contemporary public discourse that it is vital to
understand the roles which they construct for themselves in practice.
Studies of women’s experiences in the abortion clinic highlight the positive
behaviour of some HCPs, but also draw attention to the negative impact that the
behaviours of doctors and nurses can have upon patient experiences. One problem
that emerges repeatedly is that women requesting abortions feel “over-counselled”
and questioned by HCPs about decisions which they have reached for themselves in
non-clinical settings (Macintyre, 1977; Allen, 1985; Harden & Ogden, 1999; Kumar
et al., 2004; Lee, 2004). In light of this, a key motivation for this research was to
explore whether insights into this problem could be generated by approaching it from
an alternative angle, i.e. by analysing the ways that HCPs are positioning themselves
in relation to their pregnant patients.
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A crucial feature of my analysis of HCPs’ accounts is that I am drawing on
the theoretical resources provided by Science and Technology Studies (STS). While
there is considerable debate about the origins, methods and aims of STS, this
interdiscipline converges around an important principle, namely that
technoscientific12/medical ‘facts’ or ‘truths’ are not determined by the material
world, but are produced through human13 activity. Based on this central insight, STS
has revealed the processes by which technoscientific/medical facts are constructed in
a wide variety of locations, including laboratories (e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1986
(1979); Knorr-Cetina, 1999), the clinic (e.g. Berg & Mol, 1998; Mol, 2002), in
scientific literature (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Latour, 1987), or during
controversies that develop within the scientific community (e.g. Collins, 1981; Pinch,
1985) and which also extend far outside of it through public debates about various
technoscientific/medical innovations (e.g. Kerr et al., 1997; Wynne, 2001). Although
it has long been impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of this extensive
body of research (Pickering, 1992), collectively, STS’s case studies demonstrate that,
while technoscientific/medical knowledge may appear ‘factual’ in retrospect, its
treatment as such is the product of earlier processes of negotiation. In highlighting
the role of human practice (or ‘the social’) in the production of
technoscientific/medical knowledge, STS has also illustrated how the definition of
what is to count as ‘factual’ (i.e. expert/authoritative) knowledge is interwoven with
particular definitions of the society that we inhabit.
This argument is outlined in further detail in Chapter Two, which provides a
more precise account of the theoretical resources that have shaped my analysis.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, the critical point is that, rather than
12 The term ‘technoscience’ was first employed by Latour (1987), who rejects the idea that ‘science’
and ‘technology’ are easily distinguishable categories; indeed, he suggests that their treatment as such
is the outcome of the ways in which technoscience is practiced. Likewise, I employ this term in order
to signal the messiness of the boundaries of what is to count as ‘science’ or ‘technology’. However,
pragmatically speaking, this expression is also useful as shorthand in order to avoid the cumbersome
listing of ‘science, technology and medicine’ (Latour, 1987).
13 Several schools of thought would insist that nonhuman actors should also be included in STS
analyses of the production of technoscientific/medical knowledge (e.g. Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987;
Latour, 1988; Haraway, 1991; Haraway, 1997). This issue will be considered in detail in Chapter
Two.
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reinforcing the epistemological authority granted to practitioners of
technoscience/medicine in public fora, STS makes it possible to question and
destabilise this authority. This is because it has revealed that knowledge claims made
by practitioners of technoscience/medicine are as amenable to sociological analysis
as any other kind of knowledge claim. By addressing my empirical research
questions through this theoretical framework, I aim to conduct a critical analysis of
HCPs’ accounts of abortion provision, which asks questions about the implications
of their knowledge claims for women who are, or could become, pregnant. Through
this approach, as well as by drawing on existing literature which has explored
women’s experiences in the abortion clinic, I will ensure that questions about
women’s needs and lives remain central to my analysis.
Although I am approaching HCPs’ accounts of UK abortion practice using a
novel theoretical perspective, it would be wrong to suggest that this is a ‘new’
empirical area of qualitative research. It is perhaps more accurately described as one
which has become rather unfashionable and, hence, neglected. During the 1970s and
80s there seems to have been considerable interest in understanding how the 1967
Abortion Act was working in practice, and several qualitative studies addressed
HCPs’ perspectives on this issue (e.g. Horobin, 1973; Aitken-Swann, 1977;
Macintyre, 1977; Ashton et al., 1980; Allen, 1985). The very different theoretical
perspectives, design and aims of these studies, as well as the socio-historical context
in which they were written, often makes direct comparison with my own findings
very difficult. However, these earlier studies formed an important source of
background information during the design of my project, and where relevant, in the
empirical chapters that follow I draw attention to the relationship between these
studies and my own findings. I also consider links between my findings and those of
qualitative studies which have researched the perspectives of HCPs involved in
abortion provision in other countries, in particular, the US (e.g. Joffe, 1986; Roe,
1989; Simonds, 1996; Lazarus, 1997).
Another important empirical resource is provided by Davis and Davidson’s
(2005) analysis of the Scottish medical community’s reaction to the immediate
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aftermath of the 1967 Abortion Act. This work reveals the importance of studying
HCPs’ reactions to the subject positions that appear to be created for them by UK
abortion law. Davis and Davidson point out that, while Parliament may have granted
considerable ‘power’ to the healthcare profession, it also gave it explicit
responsibility for abortion provision. Following the passage of the Abortion Act,
HCPs were confronted with unprecedented numbers of requests for the procedure,
which suggests that, in spite of the Act’s deference to medical authority, patients
believed the procedure to be legal, and available on request (Davis & Davidson,
2005). This massive increase in patient demand not only placed a structural-level
strain upon gynaecological services, but also forced HCPs to manage responsibility
for abortion provision on an individual level (Davis & Davidson, 2005). Many
doctors argued that they were being forced to negotiate a situation where patient
requests for abortion bore no resemblance to the grounds on which their clinical
judgment deemed the procedure to be ‘necessary’, and therefore legal (Davis &
Davidson, 2005). Davis and Davidson reveal the creative ways in which individual
HCPs sought to avoid dealing with this situation by devolving responsibility for (and
thus, authority over) abortion decision-making (see Chapter Five). Their analysis
illustrates that, even in the early years of its operation, HCPs did not simply accept
the roles which the Abortion Act constructed for them.
A final, more contemporary, body of qualitative research which relates
closely to the empirical topic of my thesis concerns HCPs’ encounters with so-called
‘new’ reproductive technologies (NRTs). Of particular relevance is work that has
addressed HCPs’ involvement in the provision of prenatal screening and diagnostic
services, which intersect implicitly and explicitly with the provision of abortion. This
intersection arises because most of the fetal abnormalities diagnosed in utero cannot
be treated, and the abortion of affected fetuses is the only ‘option’ which HCPs can
offer to their patients. The dilemmas which HCPs face during the provision of
prenatal testing are addressed by Williams et al. (2002d; 2002c; 2002b; 2002a) and
Farsides et al. (2004), and the issue of HCPs’ involvement in abortion in cases of
fetal abnormality is considered by Statham et al. (2006) and Graham (2006).
However, while these studies form a useful point of reference in the chapters that
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follow, their focus is very different from my own. Abortion on the grounds of fetal
abnormality is, comparatively speaking, an unusual procedure,14 which is carried out
following diagnostic testing provided as part of antenatal services. In other words
(and somewhat paradoxically), it only takes place when a woman has first decided
that her pregnancy is ‘wanted’, by entering into a programme of antenatal care. In
contrast, although my analysis touches on the issue, my concern is primarily with
abortion in the absence of diagnosed fetal abnormality, which tends to be accessed
through a different system of healthcare provision (see Chapter Three).
1.4 Thesis outline
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, this thesis sets out to explore Scottish
HCPs’ accounts of their involvement in (or conscientious objection to) abortion
provision. In response to feminist concerns about the way in which UK law frames
the relationship between HCPs and women with unwanted pregnancies, it asks the
following key research question:
 What subjectivities do HCPs delineate for themselves and for their pregnant
patients?
This, in turn, is broken down into three more specific sub-questions, which are
addressed in the empirical chapters:
 Do HCPs place limits upon their own/their colleagues’ ‘rights’ to make use of
the conscience clause? If so, how, and what are the implications? (Chapter
Four)
 How do HCPs’ accounts of their interactions with their pregnant patients
relate to the expert-lay relationships constructed by UK abortion law?
(Chapter Five)
 What, if any, claims to expert knowledge are articulated by HCPs? (Chapters
Five, Six, and Seven)
14 Only 1.2% of all the abortions which took place in Scotland in 2008 were carried out for this reason
(Information and Statistics Division Scotland, 2008).
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As indicated earlier, the thesis begins by providing a more precise account of
the theoretical resources from STS which have shaped my analysis (Chapter Two).
Chapter Three extends this discussion by explaining how these theoretical
perspectives relate to the methodology of the thesis, in particular, my use of
discourse analysis as a method of data analysis. This chapter also justifies other key
methodological choices that I have made, such as the decision to use semi-structured
interviews to generate data, and to situate the research in Scotland. Additionally, it
provides important background information about the context in which my
participants work.
The main body of the thesis is comprised of four empirical chapters. In
Chapter Four, I consider how HCPs relate to the law’s suggestion that they have the
legal right to opt out of abortion provision on the grounds of conscience. I argue that
HCPs’ discussions of the practice of ‘conscientious objection’ represent an
interesting site at which to explore how they define the boundaries of their
professional responsibilities for abortion provision. During this analysis, I draw
attention to differences in the ways that ‘conscientious objection’ is constructed by
those who are involved in, and those who opt out of, abortion provision.
Chapter Four also illustrates that, when HCPs who are involved in abortion
provision position themselves in relation to those who conscientiously object to the
practice, they construct abortion as a normal and legitimate part of their work as
HCPs. This analysis forms a useful point of contrast to the subsequent empirical
chapters, which explore how HCPs position themselves in relation to their pregnant
patients. I reveal that, in this second context, HCPs do not always construct abortion
as a legitimate course of action.
Chapters Five to Seven centre on HCPs’ definitions of the knowledge
relevant to decisions about the use of abortion and explore the subjectivities that
these definitions construct for women who are, or could become, pregnant. Chapter
Five considers how HCPs relate to the law’s apparent definition of abortion decision-
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making as a process that entails their expert judgment. I reveal that HCPs articulate
three key subject positions for themselves, through which they claim varying degrees
of expert (i.e. authoritative) knowledge in relation to their patients. Although
individual HCPs favour particular subject positions, they also switch between them
in different discursive contexts, and I suggest that there are particular contexts in
which HCPs are more likely to position themselves as ‘experts’, who should assess
(and potentially, alter) women’s reproductive decisions.
The two remaining empirical chapters go on to explore these contexts in
greater detail. Chapter Six focuses on the relationship which HCPs construct between
different methods of fertility control, and argues that HCPs’ definitions of acceptable
reproductive behaviour co-produce definitions of the kinds of people who should,
and should not, be reproducing. Chapter Seven addresses the issue of gestational
timing and explores the claims to expertise which HCPs mobilise when they question
the acceptability of providing abortion to patients at later stages of gestation. Finally,
Chapter Eight moves on to draw together the central conclusions of the thesis and
outlines its key contributions. In this chapter I will also reflect critically on the
limitations of my analysis and outline potential avenues for future research.
1.5 Negotiating a terminological minefield
Numerous STS scholars have revealed the important role played by practices of
textual representation in the generation and negotiation of knowledge claims (e.g.
Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Latour & Woolgar, 1986 (1979); Latour, 1987; Ashmore et
al., 1995). Clearly, this applies to social scientific texts as much as scientific ones,
and when writing about a topic that is as politically important as abortion it becomes
necessary to choose one’s words particularly carefully. In the following discussion I
address this issue and explain the reasoning behind some of the terminology which I
have used in this thesis.
Essentially, all of these choices stem from an attempt to write about abortion
in a way that makes “women’s needs and lives” (Science and Technology Subgroup,
1991: 214) central to the analysis, without suggesting that abortion has a simple,
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universal meaning for all women. Nevertheless, although I have tried to be very
careful about the words that I use, perhaps the most important point to take away
from this discussion is that there is no straightforwardly ‘feminist’ language through
which to write about this topic. In part this is because, as Simonds (1996) notes, so
many of the words associated with abortion seem to belong to those who want to
restrict or otherwise regulate women’s reproductive behaviour. However, it is also
because of my awareness of the way in which feminist discourse can become
subverted by those with oppositional political goals. As the Science and Technology
Subgroup (1991) point out, discourse used to support women’s access to abortion
(such as the argument that it is “a woman’s right to choose”) can and has been re-
appropriated by those who oppose the practice (e.g., through the argument that
“fetuses have rights too”). Clearly, this raises broader questions about the potential
ramifications of engaging in and publishing ‘feminist’ research on the subject of
abortion, which I return to in the final chapter of this thesis.
One of my key decisions regarding language is that, for the most part, I use
the word ‘abortion’ rather than ‘termination’. Although my participants did use both
of these words, they clearly preferred the latter, or else used its abbreviated form
“T.O.P.” (termination of pregnancy). This preference is also visible in the medical
literature on this subject and, arguably, represents an attempt to frame the practice as
a technical procedure rather than a political or ethical issue. As I have indicated
through the preceding discussion, one of my key aims in this thesis is to problematise
narrowly technicist framings of abortion, which is why I favour the word ‘abortion’.
The dangers of homogenising ‘women’ as a category of persons, and of
suggesting that abortion has universal implications for all women are highlighted in
Chapters Two and Six. Nevertheless, there are times in the analysis that follows
where it becomes necessary to find practical, shorthand ways of referring to the
group of patients that HCPs interact with in the abortion clinic. One expression
which I use is ‘women requesting abortion’, on the basis that the literature suggests
most women decide upon this course of action before they enter the clinic, and that
they only approach HCPs to ask for access to the procedure (Allen, 1985; Kumar et
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al., 2004; Lee, 2004). However, in order to acknowledge that some women may be
less certain of their decisions than others when they enter the clinic, I also use the
expression ‘women with unwanted pregnancies’. Through this expression I mean to
indicate that, at this particular point in her life a woman does not want to be
pregnant, and it as a result of this situation that she is in the clinic.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the phrase ‘unwanted
pregnancy’ is an analyst’s category which does not necessarily capture the
complexity of women’s reproductive decision-making. This problem is highlighted
by studies which have explored the terms that women use to define their own
pregnancies. Fischer et al. (1999) suggest that some of their pregnant participants
could not relate to this term because the idea that a pregnancy could be “unwanted”
was incompatible with their identity as mothers, or as potential mothers. Likewise,
Barrett et al. (2002) found that women who had decided to have abortions were often
reluctant to apply the term “unwanted” to their own pregnancies because, they
argued, their pregnancies were wanted, but were also impossible at this particular
point in time.
The non-neutrality of the language which surrounds abortion becomes most
obvious when it comes to attempts to find words for the entities that are aborted.
Several of the conscientious objectors that I interviewed argued that any word other
than ‘baby’ was merely euphemism, and represented a refusal to acknowledge that
abortion involves the destruction of a human person. Other HCPs talked about
‘fetuses’, ‘babies’, ‘products of conception’, ‘the contents of the uterus’ and ‘the
pregnancy tissue’, sometimes with clear preferences but often using these terms
interchangeably. Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘fetus’ to refer to the entity
which exists in utero, or which has been aborted whilst in utero. I use the term
‘baby’ to refer to an entity which has been born and exists independently of a
woman’s body. These separate terms are not chosen arbitrarily, but are intended to
emphasise the critical difference in the physical and social location of these entities.
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Chapter Two: Theoretical positionings
2.1 Introduction
The discussion in the previous chapter revealed that one form of specialist
knowledge, medical expertise, has become central to the way in which abortion is
debated and regulated in the UK. I suggested that this continuing deference to
medical expertise makes it important to understand how contemporary British HCPs
construct their role in decisions about abortion provision. I argued that, by utilising
STS theory, it would be possible for me to conduct an analysis of HCPs’ accounts
without reinforcing the epistemological authority which is granted to these
professionals in public fora.
The first section of this chapter takes this issue as its point of departure and
addresses the tools which STS has used to theorise the construction of expert
knowledge, explaining why some of these are particularly useful in the context of
this thesis. The second section of the chapter then goes on to highlight the
importance of combining this approach to the study of expertise with the analytical
focus provided by feminist STS.
The discussion in the first two sections of the chapter addresses the
production of knowledge as the outcome of human action. However, in the final
section of the chapter I go on to explain why, in the context of this thesis, it is
necessary to create space to conceptualise the non-human, or material, world as an
active participant in this process. I argue that Haraway’s (1991; 1992; 1997) work
makes it possible to create this conceptual space, whilst remaining focussed upon the
political outcomes of human interactions with the material world.
2.2 STS and the deconstruction of scientific authority
2.2.1 The politics of expertise
As Barnes and Edge (1982) point out, speakers of established scientific facts are
granted extraordinary authority in contemporary western society. Recognising this,
STS has often drawn attention to the political dimensions of scientific knowledge
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production, and the ways that this process marginalises the perspectives of those who
cannot claim to speak as scientific ‘experts’ (e.g. Nelkin, 1992 ; Jasanoff, 1995;
Irwin & Wynne, 1996b). Such political dimensions are obvious when science enters
the courtroom; the establishment of a witness’s status as an ‘expert’ determines who
is a speaker of scientific truth, with immediate repercussions for both plaintiffs and
defendants (Jasanoff, 1995).
The politics involved in defining what is to count as expert (i.e.
authoritative/legitimate) knowledge also become particularly visible during public
controversies that intersect with technoscience and medicine. STS analyses of such
controversies have challenged the widespread assumption that negative public
reactions to scientific institutions result from publics’ lack of scientific knowledge –
the so-called “deficit model” of public understanding (Irwin, 1995). Employing the
insights of STS, critical Public Understanding of Science (cPUS) problematises the
deficit model and its reliance upon a simplistic, de-contextualised understanding of
both science and its’ publics (Irwin & Wynne, 1996a). Although cPUS takes science-
public relationships as its empirical focus, it has generated broader theoretical
insights concerning the ways that the definition of relevant knowledge or ‘expertise’
can reinforce existing power relations by delineating the epistemological resources
that can be used to interpret particular issues.
One of the central arguments of cPUS is that, while the value commitments
of various publics are used by policy-makers and scientists as evidence of their
irrationality and thus inability to engage with scientific facts, the framing of public
issues in terms of scientific ‘facts’ itself embodies commitments to specific values, or
ways of living. Wynne (2001) illustrates this argument in the context of policy
responses to the widespread public rejection of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs). He reveals how attempts to engage in dialogue with publics about this issue
proceed from the assumption that the only important risks of GMOs are those which
science can predict. As Wynne points out, this assumption represents a commitment
to a particular model of society, in which human manipulation and control of the
environment is seen to be an achievable and desirable goal. However, this
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commitment is rendered invisible by the representation of the scientifically-defined
risks of GMOs as objective, and as separable from publics’ concerns about this
innovation (Wynne, 2001). When this dual move (framing in terms of scientific
knowledge, and the denial of the contextual nature of this knowledge) is instead
made visible, opposition to GMOs can be explained in terms of publics’
understandings of the way in which “prescriptive ontologies of human relations,
human subjects and society” (Wynne, 2001: 479) are being imposed upon them, in a
manner that they are relatively powerless to contest.
In the chapters that follow, I will draw on the insights of cPUS (and
particularly the work of Brian Wynne), in order to explore how HCPs’ definitions of
relevant knowledge (or ‘expertise’) about abortion co-produce particular
understandings of society. The idiom of co-production is now widely employed
within many strands of STS as:
…shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and
represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the
ways in which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material
embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of
forms of social life; society cannot function without knowledge any more
than knowledge can exist without appropriate social supports. (Jasanoff,
2004: 3)
As I suggested above, the particular value of cPUS is its relational focus (Irwin &
Wynne, 1996a). Unlike a great deal of work within STS, it decentres scientific
framings by positioning them in relation to alternative forms of understanding.
Simultaneously, by retaining an awareness of the wider policy context in which
scientific voices are granted legitimacy as experts, cPUS remains sensitive to the
power relations which render other perspectives illegitimate.
Both of these points are clearly illustrated by Wynne’s (1996b) now classic
study of Cumbrian sheep farming in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster.
Because of the high-level of radioactive rainfall in this area of the UK, restrictions on
the movement and sale of lambs were introduced on the advice of government
scientists, in order to prevent radioactivity ingested by lambs spreading to humans.
These restrictions were initially introduced as a temporary measure; scientists
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insisted that radioactive isotopes in the grass would eventually become locked up in
the soil, and would thus no longer be available for ingestion by the lambs. However,
when this failed to occur, the ban was extended indefinitely (albeit over a smaller
area) and it was eventually discovered that scientists had been working with the
wrong type of soil in modelling the movement of isotopes. Wynne reveals how, from
the perspective of the farmers, this was simply one of a series of incidents where
scientists made exaggerated and ultimately false claims to be able to predict and
control the hill farming environment, with serious implications for farmers’
livelihoods. Wynne also demonstrates that, in their determination to conduct
laboratory-style experiments, government scientists persistently ignored farmers’
advice concerning crucial aspects of this environment, e.g. about the behaviour of
sheep. Scientists thus failed to acknowledge the assumptions about prediction and
control that were embedded in their own approach to the production of knowledge.
Simultaneously, they imposed these assumptions on farmers, who were relatively
powerless to challenge them. In doing so, Wynne argues, they alienated those who
they were supposed to be helping:
...the typical scientific idiom of certainty and control was culturally
discordant with the farmers, whose cultural ethos routinely accepted
uncertainty and the need for flexible adaptation rather than prediction and
control. (Wynne, 1996b: 26)
Crucially, in developing his critique of the imposition of scientific frameworks
of understanding, Wynne does not deny that scientific knowledge is a useful and
important resource. To illustrate the ontologies performed by scientific knowledge
claims is not to suggest that such knowledge is somehow false (Wynne, 2002).
Rather, it is to draw attention to the fact that, like any form of knowledge, it is
developed within a particular context, and co-produces commitments to a particular
kind of society (Wynne, 2002). Highlighting this means that, instead of taking
scientific knowledge and its commitments as an automatically superior framework
of meaning, it becomes possible to acknowledge and discuss a diversity of
understandings of issues such as environmental ‘risk’ (Wynne, 2002), or, in the case
of this thesis, abortion.
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2.2.2 A new approach to expertise?
While they acknowledge the value of the approaches considered in the previous
subsection, Collins and Evans (2002) have recently argued that STS needs to move
beyond deconstructing scientific claims to expertise. They suggest that this move is
necessary because, while STS has revealed that the designation of ‘expert’ status is a
social process with political ramifications, it has so far failed to offer any means of
identifying those who have legitimate claims to this status. They advocate the
development of a theoretical approach which would allow STS to make normative
claims as to who possesses the expertise necessary to contribute to “technical
decision-making”. They use this term to describe:
Decision-making at those points where science and technology intersect
with the public domain because the issues are of visible relevance to the
public: should you eat British beef, prefer nuclear power to coal-fired
power stations, want a quarry in your village, accept the safety of anti-
misting kerosene as an airplane fuel, vote for politicians who believe in
human cloning, support the Kyoto agreement and so forth. (Collins &
Evans, 2002: 236)
However, in responding to Collins and Evans, Wynne (2003) points out that
their normative theory of expertise automatically co-produces normative definitions
of the policy decision-making process. By focussing on the expertise required for
“technical decision-making”, Collins and Evans reinforce assumptions central to UK
policy culture, namely, that when it comes to issues involving science and
technology, the most crucial questions are ‘technical’ ones. Moreover, Collins and
Evans argue explicitly that such questions can be addressed separately from
‘political’ or ‘ethical’ questions. As outlined above, Wynne has shown that it is
precisely this prescriptive process of issue definition which closes down space for
discussion and generates public resentment.
Wynne’s (2003) critique of Collins and Evans’s approach to expertise also
resonates with the arguments that I set out in Chapter One. Drawing on feminist
critiques I suggested that a central problem with UK abortion law and debate is that it
takes technical questions about the current status of medical science as the only
relevant starting point from which to discuss issues such as the upper time limit on
abortion (Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991; Sheldon, 1997). This technicist
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framing has led to a focus on medical questions concerning the survival rates of
premature babies, and has made it very difficult to discuss abortion as a question of
gender politics. In this context, adopting Collins and Evans’s (2002) attempt to
define new boundaries around what is to count as technical expertise would simply
perpetuate the assumption that such “technical decisions” are what is at stake.
Given that the definition of expert knowledge inevitably co-produces
“prescriptive ontologies of human relations, human subjects and society” (Wynne,
2001: 479), my thesis deliberately eschews any attempt to classify or measure claims
to expert knowledge. Instead, I will explore the construction of expertise, i.e. the
knowledges which HCPs’ designate as authoritative/legitimate, and the realities that
are performed through this process.
2.2.3 Expert-lay asymmetries?
However, a recent critique of cPUS, and in particular, the work of Brian Wynne,
raises questions about my use of this work to explore the accounts of those working
within the institutions of technoscience/medicine, e.g. HCPs. Durant (2008) suggests
that, in contrasting the behaviour and understanding of members of scientific
institutions with their publics, Wynne posits an essential difference between two
types of actor. Members of scientific institutions are critiqued for their inability to
recognise the social commitments which are co-produced by their knowledge claims,
and which they impose on the public (Durant, 2008). In contrast, publics are
constructed as actors who are intrinsically more reflexive about the basis and
commitments of their own, and other actors’, knowledge (Durant, 2008).
In his response to Durant, Wynne (2008) contests the suggestion that he
claims any essential difference between the reflexive capacities of scientists and
other publics. In the first place, he suggests that Durant has misinterpreted the
primary focus of his critique. He draws a distinction “between “science” as research
scientific knowledge-culture, and “science” as aspirant public authority knowledge”
(Wynne, 2008: 24). He notes that, while he has always recognised that his work
addresses the latter cultural form of science, critics such as Durant conflate the two,
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thus ignoring a vast body of STS literature which has illustrated the complexities,
tensions and enforced reflexivity generated by involvement in day-to-day scientific
practice. Focussing on this distinction, Wynne implies that his critiques of the
unreflexive imposition of scientific framings upon publics do not centre on the
individuals working within scientific institutions. Rather, they aim to draw attention
to the way in which, without any debate, science is simply treated as a de facto
resource for policy decision-making (Wynne, 2008).
However, Wynne also argues that, in comparison to members of scientific
institutions, lay actors are far more likely to reflect upon the socially contingent basis
of their own and other actors’ claims to knowledge:
In the situations where I have analyzed public-science interactions, in all
of which cases science was being enacted as attempted but contested
public authority, over far more than scientific propositions alone, the
relative extent of self-reflexivity was, as I described it – much greater for
the powerless publics on the receiving end, than it was for the scientists
embedded as they were as agents in the institutional nexus of policy,
science advice, political economy, and power. But this does not mean
this difference was a reflection of essential qualities of their subjects. Just
to clarify, I would continue to assert this difference, but not remotely as
the claim which Durant takes it to be, a claim of intrinsic ontological
difference of reflexivity between scientists and publics. Instead I cleave
to just what I stated it to be in the “buried” footnote: actors’ reflexivity as
a function of their situational power and related social-institutional
conditions. (Wynne, 2008: 24)
Like feminist standpoint theorists’15 claims that those who are most oppressed by
structuring systems of inequality can visualise these structures most clearly, Wynne’s
assertion that actors’ reflexivity is a function of power relations is very tempting.
However, Haraway (1991) has revealed the dangers involved in pursuing this line of
argument. As she points out, claims concerning the clearer vision of the ‘oppressed’
perpetuate the problematic belief that there is one form of vision that enables its
possessor to see the world as it ‘really’ is. Aware that any claim to absolute
objectivity can ultimately become a tool of oppression, Haraway (1991) introduces
the term “situated knowledges” in order to emphasise the partial basis of all
15 A critical overview of feminist standpoint theory is provided by Harding (1986).
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knowledge claims; these are inevitably produced by somebody, situated
somewhere.16
Haraway’s (1991) work forms a useful corrective to Wynne’s tendency to
suggest that lay actors’ social positioning provides them with privileged
epistemological insights. However, her analysis is also attractive because it insists
that emphasising the situated basis of all knowledge claims is not synonymous with
political relativism. Rather, situating knowledge claims ensures that we engage in
“power-sensitive […] ‘conversation(s)’” (Haraway, 1991: 195), by recognizing the
location of particular speakers, and thus their potential to impose their definitions of
reality upon others. In the following discussion I will go on to explain why, in
addition to this aspect of Haraway’s work, I have used other key insights from
feminist STS in developing a theoretical framework through which to analyse HCPs’
accounts.
2.3 Medical practice as the (re)production of gender? Insights
from feminist STS
As outlined above, many STS researchers have addressed science and technology
and their role within society as political issues, with cPUS providing particularly
useful analytical tools in this respect. However, from the late 1970s onwards,
feminists have argued that technoscience/medicine is implicated in understandings of
sex and gender,17 in ways that impact disproportionately on the lives of women.
While some examples of this type of research were highlighted in Chapter One (e.g.
the ways in which medical knowledge has been mobilised in attempts to limit
women’s access to abortion), in the following discussion I clarify what I mean by
claiming to adopt ‘feminist STS’ as a theoretical lens through which to analyse
HCPs’ accounts of abortion practice.
16 The partiality of my own perspective will be discussed as a topic in its own right in Chapter Three.
17 In employing the terms ‘sex and gender’, I do not mean to essentialise either of them, and recognise
that both sexed bodies and gender identities are now treated by gender theorists as performative
accomplishments (Butler, 1990), rather than as fixed attributes of human beings.
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Before beginning this discussion, it is important to explain and qualify my
decision to adopt the term ‘feminist STS’. I am using this term as a broad label to
encompass a diverse literature that shares a particular orientation to the study of
technoscience/medicine, i.e. as socially and historically specific practices which are
amenable to gender-sensitive analysis. However, I recognise that this is my own
categorisation, and that the literature discussed here is the product of a number of
fields of academic research. As such, it is important not to overemphasise its
homogeneity (McNeil, 2007). Additionally, I acknowledge that some of the authors
cited would not describe themselves as practitioners of feminist ‘STS’. In part this is
a reflection of the ambiguous boundaries of STS, as well as the various names this
type of research goes by (e.g. science studies, history of science/medicine,
social/cultural studies of science, technology studies etc.).18
Although this field of scholarship has explored many forms of technoscience
and medicine, it has often addressed medical practices that are centred upon
women’s reproductive bodies. In the first sub-section below, I outline some of the
central narrative threads which run through feminist research on this topic, in order
to exemplify the theoretical argument that medical practice is produced by, and
productive of, understandings of sex and gender, in ways that have particularly
significant consequences for women. The second half of the discussion then goes on
to explore some tensions in this body of feminist literature, and reflects on the
significance of these tensions in the context of this thesis.
2.3.1 Shared understandings
One central and recurring theme within feminist STS is the way in which scientific
authority rests on claims to be able to represent nature, in terms that are saturated
with cultural understandings of gender. For example, in The Death of Nature,
Merchant (1982) reveals the significance of the way that the seventeenth century
Scientific Revolution redefined the symbolic meaning of nature in western culture.
From being viewed as an active, nurturing (female) force, nature became
18 As Law (2008) notes, it is important not to dismiss the significance of these alternative
designations, which are often used to signal nuances in theoretical and/or methodological approach.
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reconstituted as a passive (female) object, to be explored and improved upon by
(male) scientific enquiry (Merchant, 1982). Likewise, Jordanova describes the rise of
the Enlightenment view of progress during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
in which “human history, the growth of culture through the domination of nature,
was represented as the increasing assertion of masculine ways over irrational,
backward-looking women” (Jordanova, 1989: 37). She reveals how gendered
symbolism permeated the pursuit of scientific and medical knowledge, which was
repeatedly characterised as the scrutiny and control of female nature by a male
gaze.19
Merchant (1982) also argues that changing conceptualisations of nature were
central to the way in which the male medical profession managed to expand its
practice into an area previously designated as ‘women’s work’ – midwifery – during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She describes how nature/culture,
female/male dualisms were employed by male medical practitioners in their attempts
to discredit and displace female midwives: “the midwife symbolised female
incompetence in her own natural sphere, reproduction, correctable through a
technology invented and controlled by men – the forceps” (Merchant, 1982: 155).
As McNeil (2007) points out, the invention and use of forceps in childbirth
has itself become routinised as a starting point in feminist narratives about how,
alongside the professionalisation of medicine, women’s reproductive bodies became
subject to increasing technological intervention over the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Such narratives often highlight the discrepancy between the treatment of
men’s and women’s bodies, and suggest that the association of nature with women’s
bodies has positioned them as natural objects of scientific enquiry and medical
intervention (e.g. Jordanova, 1989; Jacobus et al., 1990; Oudshoorn, 1994;
Oudshoorn, 2003). This discrepancy is rendered particularly clear by Moscucci
(1993), in her history of the way that gynaecology (‘The Science of Woman’)
emerged as a medical specialism in the UK. Strikingly, she begins this history by
19 However, Jordanova also recognises the instability of this kind of dualistic thinking, which is full of
tensions, not least because ‘nature’ is a symbolic resource that can be drawn upon in multiple, often
contradictory ways (Jordanova, 1989: 41-2).
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pointing out that, even today, there is no corresponding medical specialism
concerning the ‘science of man’.
In studying the practices of gynaecology as an emerging medical specialism,
many feminist historians have argued that such practices were themselves significant
in re-defining the meaning of women’s bodies. By the close of the nineteenth
century, these were treated as intrinsically pathological entities dominated by the
activities of their reproductive organs (Douglas Wood, 1974; Smith-Rosenberg,
1974; Ehrenreich & English, 1979; Showalter, 1981; Digby, 1989). Moscucci (1993)
suggests that these developments in medical practice reflected and reproduced
prevailing anxieties about the structure of society. Concerns were emerging about the
large workforce required to support Industrialisation, leading to greater scrutiny of
women’s health and the process of reproduction (Moscucci, 1993). Additionally,
inequalities between men and women had become increasingly hard to reconcile with
the liberal values of the Enlightenment (Moscucci, 1993), as evidenced by the
emergence of the ‘first wave’ of feminism in the second half of the nineteenth
century. This movement questioned the inevitability of women’s confinement to the
domestic sphere. In contrast, the ‘discoveries’ of medical science represented a
means of understanding the different roles of men and women in terms of natural,
dichotomous differences between two types of sexed bodies, with women’s
reproductive organs preventing them from entering the workplace or higher
education (see also Smith-Rosenberg, 1974; Ehrenreich & English, 1979; Digby,
1989).20
Interestingly, Boyle (1997) suggests that a long history of scientific attempts to
define women’s ‘difference’ from men is reflected in the framework through which
abortion was legalised in the UK in 1967. At this time, doctors were predominantly
male, and it was they, rather than women, who were depicted as responsible and
rational concerning decisions about abortion:
20 Several authors have noted the class biases intrinsic to this definition of women’s health. It clearly
applied only to women of the middle and upper classes because “a continuing need for the hard
physical labour of working class women made their exclusion from the ‘female equals frailty’
equation socially desirable” (Digby, 1989: 214).
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Women’s lack of moral judgment, their emotionality and their psychic
and physical delicacy were therefore part of a unified system of thought
in which woman’s ‘body’ was – and is – a signifier of the negative (right-
hand) poles of culture-nature, reason-emotion, strength-weakness, active-
passive. It was this theoretical unity which enabled many participants in
the abortion debates to bypass the sensitive issue of women’s status as
moral agents, but nevertheless to remain within a construction of woman
as weak and as not to be trusted with the abortion decision. (Boyle, 1997:
43)
However, while the prominence of women’s reproductive bodies in medical
discourse is a feature of much feminist historiography of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, research addressing contemporary medical practice is often
concerned with the erasure of women’s bodies and needs from dominant discourses
about conception, pregnancy and childbirth. A major focus of such research is the so-
called new reproductive technologies (NRTs), a term which has “emerged as a
collective designator of the range of reproductive technologies that became available
from the 1960s onwards” (McNeil, 2007: 73) in western countries. Although this
literature has explored a range of technologies, including hormonal contraceptives
and abortifacients, ‘assisted’ conception,21 prenatal screening and diagnosis
(PNS/D),22 fetal surgery, and hospitalised childbirth, it seems to centre upon three
related themes, as follows.
Firstly, in many cases, concerns have been raised about the interests served by
the design, control and implementation of NRTs, and the marginalisation of women’s
needs and voices throughout this process (e.g. Clarke, 2000). While these
technologies are often introduced as a means of improving reproductive ‘choice’,
feminist critiques emphasise that, in a context where women continue to have
primary responsibility for childcare, these technologies may simply introduce new
21 This term has been used to refer to a variety of procedures used to treat male and female infertility,
ranging from simple techniques like donor insemination to more invasive ones such as in vitro
fertilisation (IVF).
22 I use the term prenatal screening to refer to the less invasive processes (e.g. blood tests and fetal
ultrasound) which are used initially to assess a pregnancy’s ‘risk’ of producing a baby with particular
health problems. Prenatal diagnosis refers to techniques then used to provide a more definitive
diagnosis, which are often more invasive and associated with a risk of miscarriage (e.g. amniocentesis
or chorionic villus sampling). As Rapp (2000) points out, even diagnostic technologies can only
provide limited information; in many cases they tell prospective parents nothing about the quality of
life associated with particular conditions (e.g. Down’s syndrome).
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forms of gendered responsibility. This critique has been particularly marked in the
case of PNS/D (e.g. Rothman, 1988; Lippman, 1991; Ettorre, 2000). Few of the fetal
‘abnormalities’ detected in utero through PNS/D can be treated, which means that
the only options are to terminate the pregnancy, or continue with the knowledge of
the diagnosis, and the lack of social support available to those living with disabilities
(e.g. Rothman, 1988; Lippman, 1991; Shakespeare, 1998; Ettorre, 2000). In spite of
this, these technologies have become routinised as part of antenatal care – a setting
which focuses on women’s obligations to ensure fetal ‘health’ (Press & Browner,
1997). Lippman argues that:
…to the extent that she is expected generally to do everything possible
for the fetus/child, a woman may come to “need” prenatal diagnosis […]
With prenatal diagnosis presented as a “way to avoid birth defects,” [sic]
to refuse testing, or perceive no need for it, becomes more difficult than
to proceed with it. This technology perversely creates a burden of not
doing enough, a burden incurred when the technology is not used.
(Lippman, 1991: 28)
Within this context, critics of PNS/D argue that the routinisation of these
technologies has restricted, rather than increased, women’s reproductive choices. In
her analysis of this process, Ettorre (2000) points to the wider interests that are
served by restricting women’s ability to ‘choose’ to give birth to disabled babies,
who will require extra social, economic and medical support.
A second manner in which NRTs are said to reinforce existing gendered
divisions of labour around reproduction is the ways in which they, almost
universally, place a greater burden on women’s, as opposed to men’s, reproductive
bodies. This issue is often highlighted by feminist literature which has addressed
IVF, a physically demanding and invasive technique which is applied to the bodies
of women, but which is often used to address problems with men’s fertility (Franklin,
1997; van der Ploeg, 2001; Thompson, 2005). It is also a central theme in literature
which has addressed the development of new contraceptive technologies, particularly
hormonal contraceptives. The female pill is popularly celebrated as a technology
which has given women ‘control’ over their own fertility. However, the routinisation
of the female pill and the subsequent development of hormonal contraceptives
targeted towards women’s bodies, has led to a strong association between femininity
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and responsibility for contraception, along with its associated health risks
(Oudshoorn, 1994; Oudshoorn, 2003). As Oudshoorn (2003) demonstrates
convincingly, the rigidity of this gendered association has created barriers to the
development of contraceptive technologies for men.
A third theme which emerges from feminist engagement with NRTs is the
way in which technologies applied to women’s reproductive bodies have focussed
attention away from these bodies and their material labour, and towards the
‘products’ of this labour (Martin, 1989), i.e. embryos, fetuses and babies. The
discussion in Chapter One suggested that one way in which the development and use
of NRTs has led to the erasure of women from discussions of pregnancy is through
the dismissal of women’s embodied accounts of this process. For example, Duden
reveals that, in eighteenth century Europe, women’s experiential knowledge was
central to medical understanding and treatment of pregnancy. Particular importance
was attached to ‘quickening’ (i.e. the point at which a pregnant woman becomes
aware of the fetus moving inside her) as the only reliable means of determining
whether conception had taken place (Duden, 1993; Duden, 1999). In contrast,
modern obstetrics no longer relies on women’s accounts of their embodied
experiences because ultrasound has given physicians direct access to the fetus
(Duden, 1993; Duden, 1999). In Chapter Seven of this thesis, I will describe how the
HCPs that I interviewed also used ultrasound imaging as a means of asserting their
authoritative status as ‘experts’, who are better placed than pregnant women to
assess the significance of the fetus.
Feminist concerns about the erasure of women’s bodies from discussions of
pregnancy and childbirth have been directed towards a range of NRTs which address
the fetus as an object of medical attention in its own right. However, of all the
technologies directed towards the fetus in utero, fetal ultrasound has undoubtedly
attracted more feminist attention and critique than any other. 23 In her seminal essay
23 Other examples include PNS/D and fetal surgery. Feminist critiques of the latter practice centre
upon its experimental status, as well as the way in which it positions pregnant women as
obstacles/containers which must be breached to facilitate treatment of the fetus in utero (Casper, 1998;
van der Ploeg, 2001; Williams, 2005).
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on this topic, Petchesky argues that “fetal imagery epitomizes the distortion inherent
in all photographic images; their tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits wrenched
out of space and time” (Petchesky, 1987: 62). She critiques the dominant visual
representation of the fetus24 as “solitary, dangling in the air (or in its sac) with
nothing to connect it to any life support system but ‘a clearly defined umbilical
cord’” (Petchesky, 1987: 61). In other words, fetal images erase the pregnant woman,
thus allowing us to forget that the fetus exists only because of her body. This process
of erasure has been pivotal in the anti-abortion movement’s attempts to represent the
fetus as an individual deserving of protection, and thus to impose restrictions on the
behaviour of women who are, or who could become, pregnant (Petchesky, 1984;
Petchesky, 1987; Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991; Daniels, 1993; Hartouni,
1997; Sheldon, 1997; Stabile, 1998; Zechmeister, 2001; Hopkins et al., 2005).
2.3.2 Productive tensions
Although the previous discussion presented a uniform ‘picture’ of feminist STS
approaches to reproductive medicine, there are many important tensions within this
body of literature. To a certain extent, these tensions can be situated historically, as
the product of transitions between second-wave feminist theory, and the
poststructuralist/postmodernist feminist approaches that emerged from the 1990s
onwards (Thompson, 2005), as well as in relation to developments in the ways that
STS has approached its subject matter. However, as McNeil (2007) points out,
attempts to provide overarching accounts of the history of a field often obscure the
diverse voices which have contributed to it, as well as concealing ongoing debate and
dissent. Mindful of this insight, in the following discussion I do not claim to provide
a definitive account of ‘the history’ of feminist approaches to the subject of
reproductive medicine. Instead, by engaging with some of the tensions which
characterise this body of literature, I clarify how I intend to draw on ‘feminist STS’
as a theoretical approach to the analysis of HCPs’ accounts of abortion practice.
24 It should be noted that Petchesky’s critique refers both to the images produced through fetal
ultrasound, as well as to other forms of fetal imagery, for example, pictures of aborted fetuses.
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The complexities of ‘critique’
A common feature of earlier feminist historiographies of reproductive medicine (e.g.
Douglas Wood, 1974; Barker-Benfield, 1977; Ehrenreich & English, 1979), as well
as research addressing NRTs (e.g. Arditti et al., 1984; Corea, 1988) is that they tend
to produce top-down accounts, wherein medical knowledges and practices are seen
to result from the medical profession’s or the State’s patriarchal, misogynist interests
in controlling women’s reproductive behaviour. An obvious problem with this mode
of critique is its representation of the relationship between HCPs and their patients.
HCPs are depicted as agents acting on behalf of a monolithic and deliberately
oppressive institution, in relation to which women have only one identity: as its
victims.
In contrast, more contemporary feminist work has argued that it is necessary
to consider the creative, as well as oppressive, implications of reproductive medical
practices. Such practices do not impose straightforward limits or constraints on the
forms of existence open to women, but also generate new forms of existence with
which individual women engage actively, and reflexively (Sawicki, 1991; Riessman,
1998; Rapp, 2000; Thompson, 2005). In highlighting the agency and voices of
women who engage with reproductive medicine (e.g. through the use of NRTs),
feminists have also had to take seriously the ways in which it is “about dreams as
well as oppression, and about women’s aspirations as well as those of male doctors
and scientists” (McNeil, 2007: 71 - emphasis in original).
In line with this more nuanced approach to women’s encounters with
reproductive medicine, contemporary literature has also tended to move away from
critiquing the medical profession as a monolithic institution united by patriarchal
interests (Thompson, 2005). Thus, for example, feminist scholars have drawn
attention to the varieties and complexities of reproductive medical practices, and
have highlighted controversies within medical communities both past and present
(e.g. Moscucci, 1993; Theriot, 1996; Casper, 1998; Clarke, 1998).
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McNeil’s (2007) reflections on contemporary feminist approaches to
technoscience and medicine illustrate that this shift towards engagement with the
complexities of technoscientific/medical practice is not simply confined to studies of
reproductive medicine. In highlighting this trend, one of the examples that she cites
is Mol’s (2002) ethnography of the diagnosis and treatment of lower-limb
atherosclerosis. Mol argues that major insights and possibilities are lost when social
researchers position doctors as objects to be studied and critically judged from afar,
rather than as academic colleagues with whom it is possible to engage in positive and
productive dialogue.
Related arguments concerning the insights generated by a move away from
critique in favour of closer ‘understanding’ are also articulated by Graham (2006),
who makes this point in her analysis of sociological approaches to the medical
profession. Graham is concerned that overly critical sociological analyses make it
impossible to capture and theorise the emotional complexities of certain areas of
medical practice. She advocates the adoption of a more “compassionate” approach in
order to understand how doctors manage to “participate in unpleasant, distressing or
even abhorrent tasks” (Graham, 2006: 44), such as the performance of feticide25 in
cases of fetal abnormality.
This kind of compassion and understanding is often expressed by researchers
who have explored HCPs’ and scientists’ views about working in controversial areas
of reproductive medicine, such as prenatal diagnosis (Williams et al., 2002a;
Williams et al., 2002b; Williams et al., 2002d; Williams et al., 2002c; Farsides et al.,
2004) and embryo diagnostics and research (Wainwright et al., 2006; Ehrich et al.,
2007; Ehrich et al., 2008). Rather than developing a critical analysis of the accounts
of these practitioners, this body of literature draws attention to the complexity of
their day-to-day work, arguing that such work generates ethical and emotional
dilemmas that are rendered invisible by the simplistic terms of public debate. Related
arguments have been made by researchers in the US, who argue that HCPs’ concrete
25 Feticide is a procedure often performed before abortion at later gestations of pregnancy. It refers to
the ultrasound-guided injection of potassium chloride through the pregnant woman’s abdomen into
the fetal heart, to stop it beating before the abortion.
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experiences of abortion provision are not captured by the polarised terminology of
the US abortion debate (Roe, 1989; Simonds, 1996).
However, as McNeil (2007) cautions, there is a serious danger that, in
attempting to empathise with and understand existing cultures of
technoscience/medicine, feminist researchers will simply align with them. In other
words, they may lose the critical ‘outsider’ perspective that is required in order to
argue for political change (McNeil, 2007).
Throughout the chapters that follow, I will highlight and attempt to negotiate
the risks posed by the alternative temptations of “critique and enmeshment” (McNeil,
2007: 146). I aim to find a position from which to remain sensitive to the contexts
from which HCPs are speaking, without becoming so “enmeshed” in this context that
the possibility of productive political critique disappears from view.
Destabilising essentialisms
The discussion in section 2.2.1 revealed how the treatment of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’
as essential, dichotomous categories forms part of a system of dualisms which have
long been used to naturalise hierarchical differences between men and women
(Harding, 1986; Haraway, 1991). However, some of the earlier feminist literature on
‘gender’ and ‘science’ makes use of these dichotomous categories as explanatory
analytical resources, thus perpetuating the situation which it sets out to critique. For
example, when Merchant (1982) highlights the historical exclusion of women from
science, she does so by depicting science as an intrinsically ‘masculine’ project
whose goal is the domination of nature and women. In doing so, she reifies numerous
problematic dichotomies such as feminine/masculine, and nature/culture (Faulkner,
2001).
Recognising this difficulty, and responding to insights from gender theorists
such as Judith Butler (1990), contemporary feminist studies of
technoscience/medicine tend to avoid reifying or essentialising categories of meaning
such as ‘nature’ or ‘gender’ in favour of exploring how these categories, and their
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political effects, are constructed, or ‘performed’ in practice (e.g. Haraway, 1991;
Faulkner, 2001; van der Ploeg, 2001; Roberts, 2007). Crucially, this approach
undermines the power of appeals to ‘nature’ or ‘biology’ as explanations for the
differential treatment of men and women, by revealing the constructed character of
such essentialist categorisations. In doing so, it also highlights the possibility that we
could construct the world very differently.
The problems generated by reifying particular categories of meaning are
evident in some of the existing feminist literature which has addressed abortion law
and provision in the UK. For example, although Boyle provides an important critique
of the way that the Abortion Act frames abortion as a matter for the expertise of
medical professionals, she does so by arguing that “…the abortion decision clearly
involves factors beyond the medical” (Boyle, 1997: 63). Similarly, Sheldon suggests
that “the actual decision whether or not a given pregnancy should be terminated is
not normally one that requires expert medical advice, or the balancing of medical
criteria” (Sheldon, 1997: 25). Although these authors are attempting to undermine
the legitimacy of medical expertise by highlighting the ‘other’ factors relevant to
abortion decisions, such reification of what is to count as ‘medical’ or ‘technical’
expertise is ultimately counterproductive. By failing to interrogate the classification
of what is to count as ‘medical/technical’ knowledge as a social process with
political effects, they imply that practitioners of science and medicine do possess a
sphere of authoritative knowledge which is not amenable to feminist critique. In light
of this problem, and the insights of feminist STS, my thesis will instead explore how
what is to count as ‘medical’ or ‘technical’ about abortion is constructed by those
involved in its provision.
Feminist attempts to destabilise essentialisms and binaries often seem to
resonate with the approach advocated by Actor-Network Theorists. While an
enormous body of literature could now be considered as part of ‘Actor-Network-
Theory’ (ANT), this tradition began with the work of Latour and Woolgar (1986
(1979)), Latour (1987), Callon (e.g. 1986), and Law (e.g. 1986). An important move
made by ANT is that, rather than asking ‘why’ certain knowledge claims are treated
47
as scientific facts, it asks ‘how’ this is achieved (Law, 2008). This represents an
alternative focus to the Strong Programme of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
(e.g. Bloor, 1976), which defines the status of ‘society’ and then uses this to explain
the content of scientific knowledge/practice. As Callon and Latour (1992) point out
in their debate with Collins and Yearley (1992), the latter type of causal explanation
artificially separates ‘society’ and ‘nature,’ and unreflexively privileges sociologists’
knowledge of society as a basis for explaining scientists’ knowledge of nature. They
suggest that studies of scientific knowledge production should instead address how
this process reconfigures the world, so that what is held to be ‘natural’ or ‘social’ is
altered (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Callon & Latour, 1992).
By eschewing the reification of ‘nature’ and ‘society’ as binary analytical
resources, in favour of understanding the processes through which certain versions of
reality become performed as ‘natural’ (i.e. scientific) fact, ANT seems highly
compatible with feminist concerns. However, as Haraway points out, ANT theorists
(as well as other STS scholars) 26 sometimes seem to operate with troublingly narrow
concerns about the realities performed through technoscientific/medical practice:
Correctly working to resist a “social” explanation of “technical”, [sic]
practice by exploding the binary, these scholars have a tendency covertly
to reintroduce the binary by worshipping only one term – the technical.
Especially, any consideration of matters like masculine supremacy or
racism or imperialism or class structures are inadmissible because they
are the old “social” ghosts that blocked real explanation of science in
action. (Haraway, 1992: 332, n14).
Through its technicist focus, this type of analysis ignores an issue which has long
been central to feminist STS scholarship, namely, the ways in which “systems of
exploitation might be crucial parts of the “technical content” of science” (Haraway,
1992: 332, n14).
Theorising fetal/pregnant bodies
In highlighting the contingencies of categories of meaning which are normally taken
for granted as ‘natural’, contemporary feminist studies of reproductive medicine have
26 It should be noted that Haraway does not actually refer to the term ‘ANT’ in her critique but rather
to the work of STS authors who are associated with this approach, such as Latour.
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engaged fruitfully with feminist theories of the body (e.g. Butler, 1990) in order to
destabilise its treatment as a fixed material entity determined by ‘biology’ (Wajcman,
2000). This perspective has been employed by feminists who have challenged
biomedicine’s claim to ‘know’ the fetal body by revealing the different fetal bodies
which have materialized across different cultures (Conklin & Morgan, 1996; Casper,
1998) and time periods (Duden, 1993; Duden, 1999; Morgan, 1999). For example,
Duden (1993; 1999) demonstrates that the fetal patient/person of biomedical
discourse was simply not part of the experience of an eighteenth-century pregnancy
in the west:
What we today perceive as an abortion, a ‘miscarriage’, or the premature
birth of a fetus, then in the eighteenth century, could be perceived as
emitting bad blood, the birth of a mole, a moon-calf, as ‘cleansing’ of the
womb, or as healthy flux against unhealthy stoppage. (Duden, 1999: 16)
As described above, Duden (along with other feminist theorists) also positions the
emergence of the modern fetal body as part of a process which has led to the
denigration of women’s embodied knowledge of their pregnancies.
However, Michaels (1999) suggests that Duden’s account contains an
unacknowledged asymmetry in its treatment of fetal vs. women’s bodies, and that
this asymmetry is characteristic more generally of feminist approaches to pregnant
embodiment. She suggests that, in deconstructing the modern fetus, feminists often
have an unacknowledged goal, which is to reveal contemporary fetal bodies as
somehow “less real” or “more contingent” than pregnant women’s bodies. She
argues that this position is epistemologically unsustainable because, once it is
accepted that embodiment is culturally and historically specific, both fetal bodies and
women’s bodies must be understood in terms of this context-specificity; the latter
cannot be treated as any less ‘constructed’ than the former (Michaels, 1999). A
similar point is made by Petchesky (1987), when she suggests that women’s
embodied experiences of contemporary western pregnancy (or abortion) are partly
produced through the experience of living in a society which also contains the
individualised, free-floating fetus of ultrasound imagery (see also Morgan, 1996).
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Recognising this point, in the chapters that follow I will try to avoid the
temptation to apply the constructivist tools of STS in a selective or asymmetric
manner. As Haraway (1997) points out, accepting the contingency of all forms of
embodiment (and likewise, claims about what is ‘real’ or ‘natural’), need not detract
from the possibilities of engaging politically with the ways in which bodies are
produced, and the forms of existence which become possible (or impossible) through
their production:
These ontologically confusing bodies, and the practices that produce
specific embodiment, are what we have to address, not the false problem
of disembodiment. Whose and which bodies - human and non-human,
silicon based and carbon based - are at stake, and how, in our
technoscientific dramas of origin? (Haraway, 1997: 186 – emphasis in
original)
Universal ‘woman’?
A central move that is made by postmodernist feminist theory is to highlight the
difficulties involved in treating ‘women’ as a homogeneous category of persons who
have a shared experience of oppression. As Haraway (1991) points out, feminist
projects which start by assuming women’s sameness are often attempts to obscure
highly salient differences produced by the intersection of multiple structuring
systems of inequality (see also Harding, 1986; Butler, 1990). The significance of this
point has not been lost on feminists studying NRTs, and other reproductive issues,
and is reflected in their attempts to engage with the nuances and complexities of
reproductive politics.
For example, in an edited collection of essays, Ginsburg and Rapp highlight
the processes through which “some reproductive futures are valued while others are
despised” (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995: 3). Similarly, Hill Collins (1998) reveals that
contemporary family planning policies in the US are geared towards the
reproduction of some forms of life, and not others.27 She argues that, while wealthy
white women are encouraged to bear and raise more children, white working class
women are frequently persuaded to give up their babies for adoption by white middle
27 For an earlier analysis of this phenomenon see Petchesky (1984).
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class families (Hill Collins, 1998). Simultaneously, working class African-American
women are generally offered no reproductive ‘choices’ other than sterilisation and
long acting contraceptives such as Depo-Provera (Hill Collins, 1998). Roberts
(1998) illustrates that similarly discriminatory reproductive policies are part of the
US judicial system. Focussing on pregnant crack cocaine addicts who are prosecuted
for endangering their fetuses, she questions the law’s claim to be concerned with
fetal well-being. She points out that the pregnant addicts who are prosecuted are
disproportionately black and poor, and suggests that their prosecution is a form of
punishment for their decisions not to have abortions. In other words, these women
are being punished because they have persisted in their attempts to become mothers
(Roberts, 1998).
In view of such insights, in the analysis that follows, I aim to avoid
suggesting that “women” are somehow a universal, homogeneous, category of
person, or that the practice and control of abortion has any one, straightforward
meaning. Instead, I will focus on the various forms of subjectivity for “pregnant
women” that HCPs’ claims to expertise make possible. This includes paying
attention to the distinctions which are made between the desirability of different
kinds of “reproductive future” (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995) – a topic which is the
primary focus of Chapter Six.
2.4 Making space for materiality
Constructivist approaches are clearly indispensable tools for feminist theory in its
attempts to destabilise essentialisms, and to underline the potential for political
change. However, to suggest that the production of reality is entirely dependent on
human action, “is to place humans above all other entities, including the living and
non-living, and to position the non-human world as passive” (Roberts, 2007: 23). It
is precisely this positioning which has allowed science and medicine to claim the
authority to represent the ‘truth’ about the world, in ways that have been problematic
both for women and many other entities (Haraway, 1989; 1991).
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In addition to the problems posed by positioning the world as a passive
resource for scientific representation, there are two further reasons why, in terms of
the aims of this thesis, it is necessary to create space to conceptualise reality as
something more than the outcome of human negotiation. Firstly, it is unlikely to have
gone unnoticed that, throughout the preceding discussion, I have simultaneously
referred to the socio-historical contingency of bodies, whilst taking it for granted that
there are only certain kinds of bodies which can become pregnant. In making the
second, apparently contradictory, move, I am arguing that there are limits to the
possibilities of bodies, and that these can have major consequences for the lives of
particular people. However, in order to avoid suggesting that these limits are
straightforwardly fixed or knowable, I require a theoretical basis from which to hold
the constructedness/materiality of bodies together simultaneously.
Such a perspective is also necessary for a second reason. In order to develop
an account which is sensitive to the lived contexts in which HCPs work, I cannot
treat the targets of this work (e.g. pregnant women, cervixes, legal documents,
fetuses) as infinitely malleable human constructs. To do so would make it impossible
to gain any analytical purchase on the ways in which HCPs’ encounters with material
entities are implicated in their depictions of their involvement in abortion practice.
Fortunately, because “science and technology are contexts in which human
agents conspicuously do not call all the shots” (Pickering, 1993: 562), STS has often
confronted and created space for the nonhuman world in its theory. While many
scholars have addressed this issue, it is perhaps best known as a central component of
Actor-Network Theory (ANT). However, in the remainder of this discussion, I will
argue that, while ANT’s inclusion of nonhuman actors is undoubtedly useful, I prefer
Haraway’s (1991; 1992; 1997) explicitly feminist approach to engagement with the
nonhuman world.
Once more, it is necessary to proceed with caution. Any attempt to
summarise and critique the enormous and diverse body of writing that has become
contemporary ANT cannot hope to do justice (and is likely to do violence) to the
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nuances of this theoretical approach. As a result, it is necessary to qualify my
misgivings concerning ANT by noting that these are directed primarily towards the
tradition as it originally emerged in the work of Latour and Woolgar (1986 (1979)),
Latour (1987), Callon (e.g. 1986), and Law (e.g. 1986).
In studying the practices by which particular realities are produced, ANT (as
indicated by its name) relies on the concept of networks of interaction between actors
which, when done in particular ways, produce particular effects. In exploring these
networks of association, ANT deliberately avoids making analytical distinctions
between humans and nonhumans (e.g. machines, instruments, animals etc.); all are
viewed as potential agents in the webs of interaction through which realities are
performed (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Latour, 1988).
ANT undoubtedly makes a radical and theoretically interesting move by
bringing nonhuman activities into its analyses. However, as Casper (1994) points
out, in making this move, ANT theorists often seem unconcerned about the
responsibilities of humans, who are in a position to define the status of nonhumans,
and the roles that they play in the production of technoscienctific/medical
knowledge. In other words, by treating all actors equally, ANT neglects critical
political and methodological questions concerning human involvement in the
representation of nonhuman actors (a similar point is made by Collins & Yearley,
1992).28 Whether nonhumans are being described as agents, whose ‘interests’
scientists must ‘translate’ into their own (e.g. Callon, 1986) or are being ‘discovered’
as the cause of a particular problem by a scientist, a remarkably similar account
emerges (Collins & Yearley, 1992). In both cases the actions of the nonhuman world
are depicted as something that can be accessed and described by humans. There is no
28 It should be noted that, although they critique the same issue (ANT theorists’ claims to access and
describe the actions of nonhumans), Collins and Yearley’s (1992) concerns are very different from
those of Casper (1994), and thus, my own. Collins and Yearley are keen to ensure that particular
disciplinary boundaries are maintained, on the basis that this is the only way to protect the cognitive
authority of STS practitioners. They argue that, by bringing nonhuman actors into its analyses, ANT
de-centres the role of humans in the production of technoscientific/medical knowledge and thus
undermines STS practitioners’ unique claims to expertise, i.e. to be able to reveal that scientific
knowledge is socially determined. At the same time, they suggest that only scientists are qualified to
investigate the action of nonhuman entities/nature. As Callon and Latour (1992) point out, this line of
argument reifies a binary split between the ‘social’ and ‘natural’ worlds, and reinforces scientists’
authority to speak about the latter.
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acknowledgement of the fact that these descriptions are acts which impose specific,
human, definitions upon the world (Casper, 1994).
In contrast, the work of Donna Haraway provides a very different
conceptualisation of humanity’s relationship with the nonhuman world.29 Haraway
argues that, to avoid treating this world as an object ripe for scientific representation
(and thus, human exploitation), we must acknowledge “the agency of the world”
(1991: 199), and its frequent refusal to comply with human desires and aims:
Richly evocative figures exist for feminist visualizations of the world as
witty agent. We need not lapse into an appeal to a primal mother resisting
becoming resource. The Coyote or Trickster, embodied in American
Southwest Indian accounts, suggests our situation where we give up
mastery but keep searching for fidelity, knowing all the while we will be
hoodwinked […] we are not in charge of the world. (Haraway, 1991:
199)
Haraway’s approach thus de-centres human agency by arguing that we should
develop a humbler, more respectful attitude towards the capacities of the “trickster”
world that we inhabit. By treating “the world as witty agent” Haraway (1991; 1992)
insists simultaneously that nonhumans are active beings who must be respected as
such, and that there is no way for humans to encounter or represent their activities in
any final, ‘objective’ form, because “the world” will always elude them. In other
words, she acknowledges that human meanings concerning the nonhuman world that
they live in are inevitably contingent.
Her position on this issue is also clear from her use of the term “material-
semiotic actors” as a means of signalling:
the object of knowledge as an active, meaning-generating axis of the
apparatus of bodily production, without ever implying immediate
presence of such objects or, what is the same thing, their final or unique
determination of what can count as objective knowledge at a particular
historical juncture. (Haraway, 1991: 200)
Like ANT’s integration of nonhuman actors into its analyses, Haraway’s term
“material-semiotic” creates space for the interaction of the material and discursive
29 My use of Haraway’s work is indebted to insights gained from reading Roberts (2007), which
enabled me to understand Haraway’s theorisation of materiality in relation to a concrete empirical
context.
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(or, nonhuman and human) in the production of what is to count as reality. However,
unlike many ANT theorists, Haraway insists that the study of this process should be
oriented towards a concern with the kinds of realities that are produced, as well as an
acknowledgement of human responsibility for this process. Her work consistently
addresses questions of power, and the possibility of interacting with the world in
ways that result in less human/non human suffering: “lives are built; so we had best
become good craftspeople with the other worldly actors in the story. There is a great
deal of rebuilding to do” (Haraway, 1992: 300).
By creating space for the actions of the material world, Haraway’s work
circumvents the problems that I outlined in the introduction to this section. It allows
me to claim that bodies are socio-historically contingent productions that cannot be
encountered ‘outside’ of human discourse, whilst acknowledging that these entities
are simultaneously produced by material activities outwith human control. It also
enables me to consider the material world as an active presence in the abortion clinic,
without suggesting that HCPs’ interactions with this world provide them with
objective insight into its meaning. This argument becomes particularly important in
Chapter Seven, where I consider HCPs’ accounts of their interactions with aborted
fetuses. In this context, creating space for materiality allows me to treat the
significance which some HCPs seem to invest in their physical encounters with these
entities with respect. Nevertheless, Haraway’s emphasis on the situated and elusive
basis of human interactions with the material world prevents me from suggesting that
HCPs (or indeed, I) possess privileged knowledge concerning the meaning of these
entities. Additionally, her focus on the political outcomes of human interactions with
material-semiotic entities enables me to ask questions about the subjectivities made
possible for pregnant women through HCPs’ accounts of their interactions with fetal
bodies.
However, I deliberately use the term “material-semiotic” entities, rather than
actors throughout this thesis in order to respect the active existence of “the world”,
without imbuing it with qualities such as subjectivity or agency which are associated
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with the term ‘actor’.30 In doing so, I take note of Casper’s arguments concerning the
dangers posed by attributing liberal theories of human agency or subjectivity to
contested entities such as fetal bodies:
As a pro-choice feminist from a nation where abortion is one of the most
contentious and divisive issues in the public arena, where the fetus has
emerged as a major cultural icon (Petchesky, 1987) at the hands of
antiabortion forces granting it personhood, and where abortion doctors
are now being murdered by “pro-life” terrorists, I am quite resistant to
engaging in any practice that grants agency to the fetus. Yet as an analyst
of social life, I remain committed to understanding the meaning that my
informants attach to this contested material and symbolic entity. (Casper,
1994: 851-2)
2.5 Conclusion
Although this chapter has explored a range of STS literatures, the theoretical
approaches that have informed this thesis have one important theme in common. This
is the analysis of technoscience/medicine as key sites in the negotiation of what is to
count as authoritative (i.e. ‘expert’) knowledge about the world, and a concern with
the way in which this process defines the forms of existence open to humans and/or
non-humans.
The preceding discussion has revealed the specific theoretical resources that
will be used to approach the empirical analysis in the following chapters. These
chapters will focus primarily upon the ways that HCPs define the knowledge which
is relevant to decision-making about abortion, thus illustrating what HCPs depict as
‘expertise’ in this context. Drawing on the insights provided by cPUS, and
particularly the work of Brian Wynne, I will explore the “prescriptive ontologies of
human relations, human subjects and society” (Wynne, 2001: 479) co-produced
through this process.
Crucially, I am combining Wynne’s work with the theoretical focus provided
by feminist STS. In the first place, Haraway’s (1991) theorisation of situated
30 As Roberts (2007) points out, Haraway also recognises these problematic associations. She suggests
that she prefers the term ‘actant’ to ‘actor’, because the former is simply associated with ‘activity’,
whilst the latter carries the difficult connotations of human agency associated with liberal thought
(Haraway, 1992: 331 n.11).
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knowledges provides a useful corrective to Wynne’s tendency to portray lay actors
(i.e. those who are not recognized as legitimate ‘experts’) as more capable of
generating ‘reflexive’ knowledge by virtue of their social positioning. More broadly,
feminist STS analyses serve as an important reminder that the construction of
expertise is often a process with gendered implications. This perspective enables me
to focus upon the construction of expertise about abortion as a process that has
particularly significant consequences for the forms of existence open to women who
are, or could become, pregnant.
At the same time, feminist analyses of the multiplicity of women’s
encounters with reproductive medicine also point to the dangers involved in making
statements which imply that the implications of HCPs’ definitions of abortion are in
any way straightforward or universal. These dangers will be born in mind throughout
the analysis that follows, and the complexities of reproductive politics are addressed
explicitly in Chapter Six.
Finally, as described in the last section of this chapter, I will draw upon
Haraway’s (1991; 1992; 1997) theorisation of materiality in order to make space for
the material world in my analysis of HCPs’ accounts. For the majority of the thesis
this argument remains implicit, because the practices which HCPs describe centre
primarily upon their verbal and/or emotional interactions with their patients or their
colleagues. However, it becomes very important in the final empirical chapter, which
as indicated above, attempts to conduct a sensitive analysis of HCPs’ accounts of
their physical encounters with aborted fetuses. Crucially, Haraway’s work ensures
that, in keeping with the rest of the thesis, my analysis of these accounts remains




Methods are not a way of opening a window on the world, but
a way of interfering with it. (Mol, 2002: 155)
3.1 Introduction
Having outlined my rationale for this study, and explained the theoretical resources
that I am drawing upon, this third chapter moves on to describe the methods through
which I generated my empirical data. I begin by providing an account of my decision
to use semi-structured interviews as a method of data collection. Following this
discussion I go on to explain how I defined and recruited a sample of HCPs to the
study, and also provide key background information about the system of abortion
provision in central Scotland. In the third section of the chapter I describe the process
through which interview transcripts were produced and analysed. To conclude the
discussion, I move on to address questions of research ethics, and consider my own
position in relation to the HCPs who participated in my study.
3.2 Choosing interviews as a research method
In many ways, semi-structured interviews represented the most obvious data
collection method through which to address the research questions outlined in the
preceding chapters. This type of interview provides the opportunity to engage in
detailed conversations (Kvale, 1996) with individual HCPs, and to explore their
accounts of their involvement in abortion provision in considerable depth. However,
there are several alternative data collection methods which I could have employed in
this research project. In the following section I discuss these alternative methods, and
explain why interviews were chosen in preference to them.
One alternative to an interview-based study of HCPs’ discourse would have
been to use participant observation to write an ethnography of HCPs’ involvement in
abortion decision-making. Through participant observation, I could have watched
and listened to the discursive practices which HCPs actually engage in as they
interact with their patients. In contrast, by drawing on interview data, I am limited to
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exploring the ways that HCPs retrospectively represent their interactions with their
patients to me, a professional ‘outsider’.
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that, as a method of data collection,
participant observation generates many of the same limitations as semi-structured
interviewing. Like interviews, participant observation produces data concerning
participants’ discursive practices. The ability to observe these practices in a less
artificial setting does not grant the analyst superior insight into what these practices
mean or why individuals engage in them (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Additionally, the
participant observer, like the interviewer, is still implicated in the practices which
research participants engage in. In other words, if I had sat in the room during
abortion consultations, or ‘hung out’ on a hospital ward, my presence would still
have impacted on the data produced.
However, a critical difference between participant observation and semi-
structured interviewing is that, in the context of this study, the former method posed
ethical and logistical difficulties which made it untenable. The most fundamental of
these problems was that it would not have been possible to observe HCPs’ abortion
consultations without also observing their patients. When I embarked on this project,
I was not convinced that the insights into HCPs’ practice which might be gained
from this method of data collection would have justified my intrusion at what is
potentially a very stressful time in these women’s lives. In particular, I was very
aware of my own inexperience as a researcher and felt that I lacked the skills
necessary to negotiate the more sensitive situations that would undoubtedly arise
through participant observation. Added to this was the knowledge that gaining
ethical approval for a project which impacted upon patients as well as HCPs would
be extremely difficult.
Even if I had managed to gain ethical approval for participant observation,
logistical problems with this research method would still have posed major
difficulties. As described below (section 3.3), GPs are the main gatekeepers to
abortion services in Scotland and, for this reason, they represent an important group
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of participants. However, unless they are conducting a specialised clinic (e.g.
diabetes, baby clinics etc.) GPs do not have any advance notice of the nature of their
consultations. As a result, attempting to conduct observations of GP abortion
consultations would have meant waiting at a GP surgery until the participating doctor
came across a woman requesting the procedure (some GPs informed me this occurs
less than once a month). This GP would have then have had to obtain their patient’s
consent for me to be able to sit in during the consultation and observe/record it. This
second problem, of obtaining a sufficient number of consenting patients, would have
remained even if I had attempted to observe consultations at a hospital outpatient
clinic dedicated to abortion provision.
At the same time, my decision to make use of interviews should not be
viewed simply as a negative choice based on the difficulties involved in participant
observation. As suggested in the introduction to this section, this was also a positive
choice based on the interventions that interviews make possible. The dialogical
aspect of interviewing proved vital in allowing me to probe the limits of the
discursive possibilities open to participants as they described particular topics. It also
allowed me to introduce a broader kind of dialogue, for example by asking HCPs to
respond and to engage with recent public debates about abortion. The importance of
this approach is highlighted in several of the empirical chapters that follow, and
arguably, would not have been available to me if I had conducted this study as a
more passive ‘observer’ of HCPs’ practice in the clinic.
Nevertheless, there is an alternative research method which would have
allowed me to engage in this kind of dialogue and which might have made a useful
contribution to the analysis. Initially, I had envisaged that my research would take
place through two phases of fieldwork. The main phase, of approximately forty semi-
structured interviews, was conducted as planned. However, I had intended to go on
to use the data from this phase of fieldwork as the basis from which to run follow-up
focus groups with HCPs. As well as giving HCPs the opportunity to respond to my
analysis of the interviews, these focus groups would have provided an alternative
context in which to explore HCPs’ discursive practices. Although interviews and
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focus groups both rely upon conversation as a method of generating data, in focus
groups HCPs would have been engaging in discussion with their colleagues as well
as with me. Williams et al. (2002c) suggest that HCPs may become less reticent
about discussing controversial practices (such as deviation from the goal of non-
directive counselling) in a focus group setting. They argue that, in this context, HCPs
feel reassured and supported by the fact that the difficulties and dilemmas they
encounter in their work are echoed by their peers.
In spite of the potential insights that would have been generated through
focus group research, I decided not to proceed with this additional phase of data
collection for two reasons. Firstly, because the data generated through the forty-two
interviews that I conducted was so rich and complex that it represented a
considerable analytical challenge in its own right. Secondly, I was aware of the major
practical difficulties that would have to be overcome in order to organise focus
groups with busy HCPs. As will be described in section 3.3, it often proved difficult
to persuade HCPs to find the time for one-to-one interviews. When I discussed the
possibility of participating in focus groups, most argued that it would be almost
impossible for me to schedule an event that required multiple HCPs to be in the same
place at the same time. However, in the conclusion to this thesis (Chapter Eight), I
return to the issue of focus group research as a potential means of taking the findings
of this project forward in future work.
3.3 Defining and recruiting a sample of HCPs
Like decisions about data collection methods, decisions about the construction of
research samples cannot be separated from the goals of a particular social research
project. In quantitative studies, the aim is to be able to make statistical
generalisations from the sample selected for study to its parent population. Such
generalisations concern the statistical probability that a phenomenon measured in the
sample will be present in its parent population. In order to facilitate this type of
analysis, members of the parent population must be selected for study through
probability sampling, which means they are “chosen at random and have a known
probability of selection” (Ritchie et al., 2003: 78). In contrast, qualitative research
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samples are chosen to facilitate an in-depth understanding of a particular
phenomenon, within a specific context (Ritchie et al., 2003). As a consequence,
questions about the extent to which this sample is statistically ‘representative’ of a
broader population are both irrelevant and inappropriate (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003;
Ritchie et al., 2003).
This thesis aims to develop a detailed analysis of the discourses employed by
a sample of Scottish HCPs during 2007-8, as they described their involvement in (or
conscientious objection to) abortion provision. Each of the forty-two HCPs who
participated in the study interacts regularly with women requesting abortion (or at
least, with colleagues who provide the procedure) outside of the interview setting.
On this basis I would argue that individual HCPs’ discursive practices are interesting
and significant regardless of how ‘prevalent’ particular practices are within the wider
community of HCPs.
However, although it would be inappropriate to talk about the
‘generalisability’ of my findings in the conventional, quantitative sense of this term, I
would like to be able to suggest that my analysis of HCPs’ discursive practices is
relevant beyond the immediate context of the forty-two interviews that I conducted.
In order to make this suggestion, it becomes necessary to address the relationship
between my sample of interviewees and its ‘parent’ population, i.e. HCPs in the UK
involved in abortion provision. In the context of this analysis, key questions about
this relationship concern the way in which the sampling process may have shaped the
range of discursive practices that I was able to explore. Did this process lead to the
recruitment of an unusually ‘homogeneous’ group of HCPs, thus restricting my
ability to address the diversity of subjectivities which HCPs construct for themselves
and their pregnant patients in the UK in the early twenty-first century? This issue is
considered in the remainder of this section, which provides further information about
the selection of my sample of research participants. Ultimately, however, as with any
measurement, the answer to what is to count as a ‘diverse enough’ qualitative sample
of HCPs remains a matter of social convention.
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3.3.1 Why Scotland?
Although abortion laws are uniform across Scotland, England and Wales, there are
extreme regional differences in provision. Following the passage of the 1967
Abortion Act, fears that NHS provision would prove inadequate led to the
establishment of an independent sector of abortion clinics in England and Wales
(Abortion Law Reform Association, 1997). For the most part, this independent sector
consists of abortion charities, whose low prices have made it hard for a profit-making
sector to become established (Abortion Law Reform Association, 1997). Although
these charities play a vital role for women with unwanted pregnancies, their very
existence means that local health authorities in England and Wales have choices
about the extent to which they provide abortions through NHS services. Although the
majority of abortions provided annually in England and Wales are NHS-funded (89%
in 2007), more than half of these are provided by the independent sector under NHS
contracts (Department of Health, 2008). There is also extreme geographical variation
in the relationship between the NHS and the independent sector. For example, 87%
of all abortions in Sheffield in 2007 were provided on NHS premises, whereas in
Doncaster this figure was 4%, with 93% being carried out by independent agencies
under NHS contracts, and 3% being paid for privately (Department of Health, 2008).
Conducting my research in a setting with such a variable NHS/independent
system of abortion provision would have introduced layers of complexity that would
have been difficult to accommodate within an exploratory, qualitative project. In the
first place, it would have been necessary to address the basis of local decisions
concerning the level of NHS vs. independent agency/private abortion provision.
Research by the Abortion Law Reform Association in 1997 (which is, admittedly,
now outdated) points to the potential complexity of such decisions. They uncovered
major regional variation in the local ‘cultures’ of gynaecology units and their
associated health authorities; these differed in the extent to which they viewed
abortion provision as a core part of NHS gynaecology services (Abortion Law
Reform Association, 1997). Such local contexts would have to be taken into account
in exploring the discursive practices of HCPs, a process which would have become
still more complicated if I had wanted to interview HCPs working within more than
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one health authority. Additionally, I would probably have had to widen the scope of
my research in order to address and compare the accounts of HCPs working for the
NHS and independently/privately.
In comparison to England and Wales, on the surface, Scotland offered a less
complex and more geographically uniform ‘culture’ of NHS abortion provision
within which to base a qualitative study. The majority of abortions in Scotland have
always been carried out on NHS premises (Abortion Law Reform Association,
1997), and 99.3% were provided in this manner in 2007 (Information and Statistics
Division Scotland, 2008). This different system of abortion provision is reflected in
the absence of the two major UK abortion charities (bpas and Marie Stopes
International) from Scotland. The bpas (British Pregnancy Advisory Service) is the
UK’s primary charitable abortion provider but its only presence in Scotland is one
referral clinic in Glasgow, through which women can be referred down to bpas
clinics in England for the procedure.31 There are no Marie Stopes clinics in Scotland.
Arguably, the absence of an independent abortion sector in Scotland makes this
an ideal setting within which to address my research questions. Unless they are
willing and able to travel long distances, Scottish women are acutely dependent on
the practices of NHS gatekeepers for their access to abortion. In this context, it seems
particularly important to understand how HCPs’ construct the meaning of UK law,
which appears to grant complete discretion over abortion decision-making to doctors.
At the same time, I acknowledge that the decision to restrict my study to the Scottish
context of abortion provision ultimately contains a trade-off, in terms of the potential
relevance of the study beyond this context. I will return to this issue in the
concluding chapter of this thesis.
Within Scotland, I further confined my research to the area known informally
as the ‘central region’, which is the most densely populated and includes the major
Scottish cities, as well as rural areas. This region was selected on the basis that it
would provide access to a large and diverse potential pool of participants, whilst
31 For Scottish women, the nearest bpas clinics that actually provide abortions are those based in
Liverpool, Leeds or Doncaster.
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being easily accessible by public transport. In the following discussion, I will go on
to describe how I defined and recruited a sample of HCPs from within this
geographical region.
3.3.2 Which HCPs?
My decision to interview GPs, gynaecologists and gynaecology nurses was based
upon my research questions, which primarily concern HCPs’ relationships with
women requesting abortion. In Scotland, these are the three key groups of HCPs who
are involved in the pathways through which women access the procedure (see Figure
1, below). By the end of my fieldwork I had constructed a research sample from
these three groups; its final composition included twenty GPs, twelve gynaecologists
and ten gynaecology nurses.32 Inevitably, the generation of this sample occurred in a
slightly messier fashion than is implied by the prescriptive summaries which appear
in research design textbooks. In spite of this, the discussion that follows attempts to
provide an overview of the sampling process, as well as reflecting upon some of its
limitations.
Abortion provision in central Scotland
Before outlining the characteristics of my sample, it is necessary to provide some
further information about the organisation of abortion provision in central Scotland
(see Figure 1, below). In addition to being referred by their GP, women can access
NHS abortion through community sexual health clinics, which are sometimes also
termed ‘family planning’ or ‘well woman’ clinics. These clinics are staffed by a
range of HCPs including GPs (who often run such clinics in addition to their general
practice work), as well as by gynaecologists and gynaecology nurses who have
chosen to specialise in community gynaecology. The availability and organisation of
these clinics varies with geographical region, as does the service which they provide.
32 Throughout the thesis I use the terms ‘gynaecologist’ and ‘gynaecology nurse’ to highlight the
specialist status of these HCPs. However, while my participants did describe their specialism in this
way, they also used the word ‘gynaecology’ interchangeably with many other terms such as ‘sexual
health’, ‘reproductive health’, ‘obstetrics and gynaecology’, ‘women’s health’ and so on. My decision
to utilise one term to describe this specialism of medicine is largely a pragmatic one, based on the fact
that gynaecology was the term that was employed most consistently.
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In terms of their involvement in abortion provision, sexual health clinics
seem to operate on much the same basis as the GP referral system. In other words,
following a consultation with a member of clinic staff, women are given an
outpatient appointment at the nearest hospital. Here they will receive an ultrasound
scan to date their pregnancy, and will have a second consultation with a
gynaecologist and/or a gynaecology nurse. It is during this consultation that the
decision whether to make use of medical or surgical abortion methods is made.
Women are then given a date for the procedure. This basic process was repeated
across all of the hospital sites I visited. The only exception occurred in one city,
where the community sexual health clinic enabled women to be referred directly for
the procedure, cutting the hospital outpatient consultation from the referral pathway.
In this case, women decided on their method of abortion at the sexual health clinic. If
they chose to undergo a medical abortion, clinic staff administered the first drug
necessary for this process, and the second stage was then completed in hospital (see
Figure 1, below).
A detailed description of the methods which can be used to terminate a
pregnancy follows this chapter. However, for the purposes of this discussion, it is
sufficient to note that abortions can be conducted using either surgical or medical
(i.e. pharmacological) methods. In Scotland, surgical abortions are usually carried
out on day surgery units under general anaesthetic. They are provided by
gynaecologists, with assistance from nurses. Medical abortions are induced using the
drugs mifepristone and misoprostol, and the patient is conscious throughout the
process. Apart from prescribing the drugs, every aspect of a medical abortion can be
supervised by nursing staff, i.e. doctors are not involved unless there is an
emergency. Although the procedure is always supervised by nurses, the precise
organisational location of medical abortion provision seems to vary considerably
from hospital to hospital. At some sites, these procedures take place in specialist
clinics staffed by nurses for whom it is the sole part of their job, whereas in other
cases they take place on general gynaecology or obstetric wards.
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Figure 1: Key abortion pathways in central Scotland
GP consultation Sexual health clinic
consultation
HOSPITAL APPOINTMENT 1
Ultrasound scan to date pregnancy
Consultation with gynaecologist and/or
gynaecology nurse
Decision to go ahead/Decision about method
Before proceeding, Schedule 1 (Certificate A)
must have been signed by two doctors.
SURGICAL (suction
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APPOINTMENT 2





Patient goes home for 36-48
hours.
APPOINTMENT 3 (nurses)
Vaginal pessaries of misoprostol are inserted (dosage and
frequency varies with gestation).
Under 9 weeks’ gestation, stay in clinic 4-6 hours.
Second trimester, stay in clinic until abortion complete.
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As the key gatekeepers to NHS services, GPs occupy a particularly important and
potentially powerful position in relation to women with unwanted pregnancies. For
this reason, I was very interested in their accounts of their practice, and conducted
around half of the total number of interviews with this group of HCPs. All of the GPs
were recruited using letters of invitation/information packs (see Appendix D), but the
basis on which I contacted individual GPs varied. Three of the GP participants were
recruited through personal contacts, which allowed me to conduct my earliest
interviews in a slightly more relaxed and informal setting. Two were recruited
deliberately on the basis of information obtained from other participants (i.e.
snowball sampling). In one case this was to ensure that the sample contained a GP
who had been active for many years in pro-choice campaigns, and in the other it was
to recruit a GP who opted out of abortion provision on the grounds of personal
conscience.
The remaining fifteen GPs were recruited simply on the basis of information
available in the public domain (e.g. on NHS Scotland websites). Letters and
information packs were sent out to a sample of 148 GPs that was constructed
purposefully (Ritchie et al., 2003) to ensure that an equal number of men and women
were contacted, in a range of geographical locations.33 These locations were selected
in order to ensure diversity in the likely socio-economic characteristics of GPs’
practice populations, to ensure that some rural areas were included in the study, and
to include GPs who interacted with different hospitals. GPs were asked to complete
and return an expression of interest form to me, indicating whether or not they
wanted to take part in a digitally recorded face-to-face interview, at a time and
location of their choosing.
During the process of recruiting GPs, I realised that I would have to be
content with a great deal less than the hour-and-a-half of their time which I had
initially asked them for in the information pack. Several forms were returned stating
“Yes – but I can only give you X number of minutes”. On this basis, I changed the
33 These letters were sent out in four separate batches, rather than simultaneously.
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wording of the information pack, to indicate that I was entirely flexible, and would
adapt to the amount of time that GPs had available. In most cases, the resulting
interviews lasted around forty minutes.34
The final sample of GPs contained nine men and eleven women, ranging in
age from thirty-one to sixty years old. Two stated that they held conscientious
objections to abortion, and three claimed varying degrees of activity as part of UK-
based pro-choice campaigns. Many others suggested that the issue of abortion was
not one which they expended a great deal of thought or time upon, beyond their
encounters with patients. For example, several ended the interview by saying that
they had found it interesting to talk to me because “this is an issue I rarely think
about”. Others stated that they were interested in contributing to my findings because
abortion is not a topic that is discussed in the workplace, and they wanted to find out
“how other people practice”. In a couple of cases, GPs stated that they had agreed to
take part simply because my information pack happened to arrive on the same day
that they had seen a patient requesting an abortion.
Overall, the GP participants came from sixteen different practices located
within two health boards and, collectively, interacted with three different hospitals.
The majority (fifteen) sent their patients to the key hospital where I conducted
several of my subsequent interviews with gynaecologists and gynaecology nurses.
However, GPs’ precise organisational locations seemed to have very little impact on
their interview accounts of their work. I feel relatively confident in making this claim
because in several cases I interviewed more than one GP from the same practice.
Even when they worked within the same building, individual GPs constructed their
involvement in abortion provision entirely differently from one another.
In spite of the diversity of the accounts of abortion provision provided by
GPs, by the time I reached the twentieth interview, it was clear that no new issues or
34 During the earliest phase of my fieldwork I conducted one telephone interview, to see whether this
might work as an alternative data collection method. However, this interview only lasted ten minutes
and I decided not to pursue this approach. I realised that, once I was physically inside their consulting
rooms, GPs were prepared to give me much more of their time. The shortest face- to-face interview
was twenty-five minutes, and the longest lasted for an hour and a half.
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questions were arising from the data, and that it was time to move on to another
group of HCPs. In many qualitative research textbooks, this would be deemed
“theoretical saturation” i.e. a point beyond which further empirical research is no
longer fruitful. However, I remain sceptical about this term because it seems to me
that it is always possible that another interview might generate new analytical
themes. In the case of my own research, this seems particularly likely, because of an
obvious limitation in the process through which I generated my sample. The fifteen
GPs successfully recruited through unsolicited letters of invitation were the end
result of 148 such letters being sent out. In other words, I was only able to interview
roughly 10 % of those whom I contacted using this method. It is possible that those
who did agree to participate were in some crucial way qualitatively different from
those who did not, and that I reached “theoretical saturation” with a sub-group of
highly ‘atypical’ GPs.
Nevertheless, there are two aspects of the interview data which make this
limitation less troubling than it first appears. Firstly, even if they do share some
unknown characteristic which distinguishes them from GPs who did not take part,
major variations emerged between the accounts of participating GPs. This produced
a rich and diverse body of data for analysis. Secondly, in terms of their accounts of
abortion decision-making, the range of discursive practices which GPs engaged in
mapped closely onto the range which emerged from my sample of gynaecologists
and gynaecology nurses. The fact that a shared range of discursive resources seem to
be available to these different groups increases my confidence that my findings
might resonate with the wider community of HCPs involved in abortion provision in
central Scotland.
The Gynaecologists
The names and workplaces of GPs are readily available in the public domain, which
makes them relatively easy to contact (if difficult to recruit). In contrast, the names
and contact details of gynaecologists are much more difficult to access. For this
reason, my sample of gynaecologists was constructed entirely by snowball sampling.
When I first began this phase of recruitment I drew on one personal contact, as well
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as recommendations from GPs. Following initial interviews with gynaecologists I
was able to continue ‘snowballing’ by asking gynaecologists to recommend the
names of other potential participants. When I had obtained the name and contact
details of a potential participant I sent them an information pack, as well as a
personalised letter of invitation explaining (having first obtained permission to do so)
that I was writing at the recommendation of their colleague, Dr X. This method of
recruitment produced a much higher response rate; almost all of the gynaecologists
that I contacted in this manner agreed to participate. It is difficult to know whether
this is because they were particularly interested in the subject, or had more time than
GPs, or simply because I was approaching them with better credentials.
The final sample of twelve gynaecologists contained six men and six women.
They were aged between thirty-five and fifty-seven years old, and were at various
stages of their career (most were Consultants, but some were Specialist Registrars).
Three of these participants worked in community sexual health clinics. However,
while this work involved them in counselling and referring patients for abortions,
they had previously worked in hospitals where they had regularly performed surgical
abortions. Perhaps as a result, their accounts of their experiences and practice were
not markedly different from those of the other nine gynaecologists I interviewed,
who worked in hospitals. Collectively, these gynaecologists were recruited from five
different hospitals, across two health boards. Unless they held conscientious
objections to abortion (which two of them did), their work involved them in
outpatient consultations with women requesting the procedure (see Figure 1), and/or
carrying out surgical abortions.
As described above, there was considerable overlap in the discursive
practices of gynaecologists and GPs, and as a result of this, a point of “theoretical
saturation” was reached much more quickly with this group of doctors. The only
major new analytical issues which emerged during these interviews were the ways in
which gynaecologists described performing surgical abortions, and the time limits on
the procedure that were in place at individual hospitals (see Chapters Five and
Seven). Like the GP interviews, my interviews with gynaecologists tended to last
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around forty minutes (the shortest being twenty-five minutes and the longest lasting
for one hour).
The Gynaecology Nurses
Gynaecology nurses play two major roles in abortion provision. Firstly, as described
above, they are almost entirely responsible for medical abortion provision.35
Secondly, in both sexual health clinics and hospital outpatient clinics, nurses are
often trained to counsel/interview women with unwanted pregnancies. At several of
the hospitals that I visited, a system had been set up whereby nurses used a pro-
forma to interview patients, thus obtaining sufficient information from them for an
‘overseeing’ doctor to be able to sign Schedule 1/Certificate A.
However, recruiting nurses to my study proved to be the most challenging
aspect of my research. My initial attempts to ‘snowball’ these participants using the
methods that I had employed with the gynaecologists were met either with no
response, or with replies that stated nurses’ refusal to participate. As a result, many
of the interviews that I conducted with nurses were the outcome of a rather more
direct system of ‘snowballing’, which raises ethical questions and is considered
further in section 3.5, below. On several occasions, when I had finished interviewing
hospital gynaecologists, they took me to outpatient clinics or to the wards where
medical abortions were provided in order to introduce me to their nursing colleagues.
Through these introductions, I managed to conduct five short (c. twenty minute)
interviews with gynaecology nurses. On the basis of information obtained during
interviews with gynaecologists and nurses, I was later able to recruit an additional
five nurses via letters of invitation. This second set of interviews lasted between forty
minutes and an hour-and-a-half.
35 Although the Abortion Act indicates that a pregnancy can only be terminated by “a registered
medical practitioner”, a House of Lords ruling in 1981 clarified that “provided a doctor prescribed the
treatment for abortion, remained in charge and accepted responsibility throughout, and provided that
the treatment was carried out in accordance with his directions, the pregnancy was ‘terminated by’ a
registered medical practitioner within s.1 of the Act, even though the treatment was carried out by a
nurse” (Keown, 1988: 130).
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Unsurprisingly, given that the nursing profession is overwhelmingly female,
all of my ten nurse participants were women. They were aged between thirty-seven
and sixty-one years old, and worked in a variety of aspects of abortion provision.
One nurse worked in a community sexual health clinic, where she was involved in
counselling patients and referring them to the hospital. One worked in a hospital
outpatient clinic, where she chaperoned the patients for ultrasound scans, as well as
during any medical examinations. Six were, or had previously been, involved in
providing medical abortions (although in several cases their current work focussed
primarily on interviewing, counselling, or chaperoning patients). One nurse worked
on a gynaecology ward where medical abortions were provided but described herself
as someone who made use of her legal right to opt out of this practice on the grounds
of conscience. The final nurse participant worked in a day surgery unit where
surgical abortions were provided.
3.4 Data analysis
3.4.1 Discourse analysis, in theory
In keeping with the theoretical framework and research questions developed in the
previous chapters, my analysis of the interview data asks questions about the realities
that are constructed through HCPs’ accounts of their involvement in (or
conscientious objection to) abortion provision. In addressing HCPs’ interview talk as
a practice which actively constitutes reality, my analysis of this data is best
characterised as a form of ‘discourse analysis’ (hereafter DA). DA represents a
particular theoretical orientation towards data; it focuses on the constitution of reality
through discourse. However, as Wetherell (2001) argues, although discourse analysts
share this core theoretical focus, it is important to acknowledge that a number of
distinctive approaches to DA exist, which are informed by very different research
traditions.
Within STS, a particular form of DA was developed in the 1980s by Gilbert
and Mulkay (1984), as a means of dealing with scientific discourse. The following
discussion begins by summarising the key features of this approach to data analysis,
as well as acknowledging its shortcomings. I then go on to argue that some of the
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problems with Gilbert and Mulkay’s approach are circumvented by the work of
Potter and Wetherell (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992), and
explain the elements of their approach that I am drawing upon. However, I conclude
this section by highlighting continuing points of divergence between DA as it is
formulated by these authors, and my own work. Having explained how I am
conceptualising the meaning of my interview data, I then move on to describe the
process through which this data was generated and analysed in practice.
Gilbert and Mulkay
In developing their approach to DA, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) criticise the
tendency of earlier STS literature to use scientists’ accounts of their work as a means
to a particular end, i.e. to produce a definitive version of “what really takes place” in
the laboratory and then to develop sociological explanations for ‘why’ these things
happen. They argue that, rather than being used as an analytical “resource” in this
manner,36 scientific discourse should be treated as the “topic” for analysis. This shift
in focus means that their analysis addresses the ways in which discourse is organised
to produce particular versions of ‘reality’.
Gilbert and Mulkay illustrate this approach with reference to several forms of
scientific discourse, including formal biochemistry research literature, pictorial
representations of biochemical processes, and transcripts based upon their interviews
with a particular research network of biochemists. Their analysis attempts to uncover
uniformities (for example, particular ways of describing experiments) within these
different forms of scientific discourse, and to relate these “interpretative regularities”
to the contexts of their production (e.g. formal research literature vs. informal
conversation).
Throughout their analysis, Gilbert and Mulkay argue that variability within and
between scientists’ accounts of the same phenomena is a valuable means of
understanding how discursive resources are used and organised in practice. For
36 It should be noted that this characterisation (or perhaps, caricature-rization) of the existing literature
is disputed (e.g. Shapin, 1984).
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example, they reveal that, when drawing on the “empiricist repertoire”, scientists
describe experiments in terms which imply that they are simply accessing facts about
the world. At other times, scientists draw on the “contingent repertoire” and describe
their work in terms which emphasise how it is influenced by human agency. Gilbert
and Mulkay argue that these repertoires are drawn upon and combined selectively in
order to reinforce individual scientists’ own ‘expert’ status, and to discredit the status
of their scientific opponents.
Given that their approach is grounded in arguments concerning the context-
specificity of discursive practices, Gilbert and Mulkay acknowledge that the context
of the social research interview setting must shape the production of their
participants’ accounts.37 However, at the same time, it is clear that they want to use
interviews to explore a social world which exists beyond this immediate context (a
goal that I share in making use of this research method). They suggest that studying
the discursive practices which scientists engage in as they describe their work in
face-to-face interviews provides insights into the everyday discursive practices which
they engage in beyond the interview setting. This argument, and an
acknowledgement of the assumption that it rests upon is stated explicitly in a related
piece by Potter and Mulkay:
Although we have abandoned the traditional assumption that we can infer
from interview talk what actually happens in the social realm under
investigation, we are nevertheless continuing to assume that we can, in a
more restricted sense, generalise from interviews to naturally occurring
situations. For we are assuming that the interactional and interpretative
work occurring in interviews resembles to some degree that which takes
place outside interviews. (Potter & Mulkay, 1985: 269)
In other words, these authors are suggesting that it is possible to use interviews to do
more than study the conversational interactions which take place between
interviewer and interviewee. They suggest that the study of interview discourse can
form part of a more macro-level sociological project, namely, “to identify recurrent,
regularly used, and in this sense collective, cultural resources which are embodied in
and visible in participants’ discourse” (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984: 140).
37 The argument that interview accounts are the product of the interaction which takes place between
interviewer and interviewee has been articulated by numerous qualitative researchers (e.g. Kvale,
1996).
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However, while they address scientists’ discursive practices as the product of
“collective cultural resources”, the collective that Gilbert and Mulkay are concerned
with is that of the scientific community. As a result, they do not consider the broader
social dynamics of scientists’ discursive practices, for example the fact that, in
relation to members of non-scientific communities, their voices are granted far
greater authority (Kerr et al., 1997). Indeed, they state explicitly that:
We will not try to explain the nature of scientific discourse by presenting
it as an outcome of the actions of dominant social groups. Nor will we try
to establish connections between scientific discourse and the wider
structure of society. These analytical objectives resemble those
characteristic of most traditional sociological research and are
unacceptable to us for much the same reasons. (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984:
16)
Clearly, this narrow focus raises a number of problems when viewed against the
backdrop of the theoretical framework and research questions developed in the
preceding chapters.
Potter and Wetherell
In contrast, the approach to DA developed in the work of Potter and Wetherell (e.g.
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) provides a broader, more
power-sensitive analytical focus. These authors demonstrate that the kind of DA
advocated by Gilbert and Mulkay is also relevant to the field of social psychology.
In common with a large body of constructivist work within social psychology (e.g.
Gergen & Davis, 1985), one of their central aims is to destabilise the idea that there
is an essential ‘self’ waiting to be uncovered through psychological analyses of
‘attitudes’ or ‘perspectives’, and to emphasise instead how identities are constructed
through discourse. In the remainder of this section I will highlight several important
elements of their approach which have informed my conceptualisation and analysis
of the interview data, as well as noting how my methodology diverges from their
work.
However, before doing so, it is important to acknowledge that, in discussing
Potter and Wetherell’s ‘approach,’ I am referring to a large body of writing, which
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spans a long period of time. This work includes several different forms of DA, some
of which seem more akin to conversation analysis, e.g. a fine-grained analysis of the
processes through which identities are negotiated during conversational exchanges
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996; Wetherell, 1998). However, in other cases,
Wetherell and Potter address longer segments of text (e.g. an individual’s interview
account of their experiences) as a means of exploring how individuals construct
identity (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Reynolds & Wetherell, 2003). As indicated by
the discussion earlier in this section, my own DA takes place at this second level of
analysis.
As noted above, a distinguishing feature of Potter and Wetherell’s approach
to DA is that, in contrast to Gilbert and Mulkay, they acknowledge the broader
dynamics of the social contexts in which individuals construct particular identities.
For example, they point out that the construction of identity is often a statement
about who can claim a particular social status and, as such, it may be bound up with
the perpetuation of oppressive power relations (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell
& Potter, 1992). Clearly, adopting this explicitly political approach to DA would
allow me to explore how HCPs construct their own status in decision-making about
abortion, as well as considering the broader understandings of society that are co-
produced through this process, and the implications of these understandings for
women who are, or could become, pregnant. Indeed, other STS researchers have
demonstrated the compatibility of this kind of DA with analyses of how individuals
construct their authority to speak about technoscientific issues, in ways that
marginalise particular voices (Kerr et al., 2007).
In order to depict identity construction as an active and flexible process,
Potter and Wetherell often employ the term ‘subject positions’ in their work. This
term signals the way in which, rather than possessing identities, individuals achieve
particular subject positions such as that of ‘expert’ through their discourse (Kerr et
al., 2007). It also points to the relational character of identity construction; in
constructing a particular subject position, individuals are always positioning
themselves in relation to other possible identities, and are thus making statements
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about these identities (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In the analysis that follows, I have
adopted this term, as it seems to provide a useful means of conceptualising how
HCPs are constructing their own and others’ (e.g. mine or patients’) identities as they
account for their practice. However, its precise origins remain ambiguous; like the
term ‘discourse analysis,’ the concept of ‘subject positions’ has been employed by
researchers within a number of distinctive analytical traditions.38
As indicated in Chapter Two, this thesis aims to integrate critical approaches to
the construction of expert authority with a sensitivity to the contexts from which
HCPs are speaking. In view of this, another important feature of Potter and
Wetherell’s DA is that, in addressing the social dynamics of discursive practice, they
acknowledge that the actions of individual speakers are shaped by the contexts in
which they speak. This view of the creative/constrained process of identity
construction is particularly well articulated in their interview-based study of racism
in New Zealand:
Identity is not formed from scratch every time a person speaks.
Continuity comes from what we described as the sedimentation of
discursive practice over time. Identity can only be constructed from those
narratives which are available, and discursive practice, as we noted,
intertwines with other social practices. Those enmeshed in one set of
social relations will thus construct identities from rather different
resources than those enmeshed very differently. (Wetherell & Potter,
1992: 78-79)
The importance of this perspective is clear when it comes to analysing problematic
discursive practices such as racism (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). On the one hand,
individuals can be called to account for engaging in discursive practices which have
extremely troubling implications for the lives of other people (Wetherell & Potter,
1992). On the other hand, racist accounts can also be viewed as the effect of a
broader set of practices which, historically, have limited the discursive resources
available for constructing human identity (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). When these
limits are highlighted, the primary target for critique becomes the society which
38 For example, compare Harre et al.’s micro-level analyses of “positioning” as a regular mechanism
which operates within conversation (Davies & Harre, 1990; Harre & van Langenhove, 1991) , with
Wetherell’s (1998) discussion of how “subject positions” are employed by post-structuralists, and
Edley’s (2001) linkage of “subject positions” to the work of Althusser.
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generates them and racism is seen as a political problem which can be tackled and
changed (Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
Clearly, this approach also circumvents the pitfalls of some of the earliest
feminist critiques of reproductive medicine that were highlighted in the previous
chapter. While individual HCPs can be called to account for problematic discursive
practices, these practices are not viewed as the product of fixed patriarchal or
misogynist ‘attitudes’. Rather, they are evidence of the discursive resources available
for discussing abortion provision within a social research interview setting in the UK
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. When conceptualised in this way,
interview conversations become a means of exploring and critiquing the limitations
of these resources. Additionally, the possibility that HCPs might one day engage in
different kinds of discursive practices remains central to the analysis.
The discursive ‘context’ which Wetherell and Potter address in their analysis of
racist accounts is a very broad one, and incorporates the ways that Pākehā and Māori 
relationships have developed historically in New Zealand. However, from the
quotation above, it is obvious that their approach makes it possible to consider the
discursive possibilities open to individuals in a much more immediate sense than
this, i.e. as shaped by the specific sets of social relations in which individuals are
enmeshed in their everyday lives. Because of this, it seems appropriate to use DA to
understand HCPs’ interview accounts as intertwined with the discursive resources
generated through the day-to-day experience of being involved in (or opting out of)
abortion practice. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the social relations under
consideration here are not simply those which HCPs engage in with other human
actors, but include their encounters with a range of “material-semiotic” entities such
as legal forms, surgical equipment and fetuses.
In spite of the value of Wetherell and Potter’s conceptualisation of interview
data, it remains important to acknowledge differences between their work and the
approach which I have adopted in this thesis. These differences stem primarily from
(what I would identify as) a gap between Wetherell and Potter’s conceptualisation of
79
interview data, vs. the types of analyses which they often provide in practice. For
example, in theorising how reality is constituted through discourse, they argue that it
is important not:
...to make the process seem necessarily deliberate or intentional. It may
be that the person providing the account is not consciously constructing,
but a construction emerges as they merely try to make sense of a
phenomenon or engage in unselfconscious social activities like blaming
or justifying. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 34)
However, because their analyses are primarily illustrations of the ways that
individuals achieve particular rhetorical effects through their speech, Wetherell and
Potter often do imply that people’s accounts are the outcome of deliberative planning
towards specific rhetorical goals. This aspect of Wetherell and Potters’ work means
that they potentially ignore the most interesting aspect of their interviewees’
discourse, namely, that regardless of the rhetorical ‘effects’ highlighted by the
discourse analyst, individuals’ interview accounts may simply reflect the ways in
which they routinely make sense of their lives. In the analysis that follows I will try
to overcome this problem. Although I will pay attention to the rhetorical dimensions
of my participants’ accounts, I will also remain open to the possibility that the
discursive practices which HCPs engage in during interviews are simply routine
methods of sense-making, which are highly meaningful to them beyond the context
of the interview.
As noted previously (p. 77), Potter and Wetherell also claim to theorise the
speaking subject as simultaneously creative (agential) and constrained (structured).
However, because they focus their analyses on individuals’ uses of discourse, it is the
former construction of the subject which dominates their accounts of human action.
In my own work, I aim to engage more explicitly with the notion that individuals are
limited by the discursive resources available to them.
This aim is linked to my decision to avoid using one of the key terminologies
employed by Potter and Wetherell. These authors utilise the expression
‘interpretative repertoires’, rather than ‘discourses’, to signify “broadly discernible
clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often assembled around
metaphors or vivid images” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90). While speakers are said
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to be constrained by the fact that interpretative repertoires are not infinite, the
analysis is directed towards the creative ways in which these repertoires are
employed in practice. Potter and Wetherell’s preference for this term represents an
attempt to distinguish their work from Foucauldian analyses, which they criticise for
treating discourses “as potent causal agents” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 90) which
produce human subjectivities. They argue that this top-down treatment of discourse
results from the fact that Foucauldian analysts address ‘discourse’ in an abstract
sense without ever engaging with the ways in which people use discourse in day-to-
day practice. However, although this is an important point, it once more signals
Wetherell and Potter’s commitments to exploring discourse as something which
people use, as opposed to something which shapes the possibilities of human
subjectivity. As highlighted above, one of my concerns about their work is that it
sometimes over-emphasises the freedom of the speaking subject. For this reason, I
have chosen to use the term ‘discourse,’ rather than ‘interpretative repertoire’ in my
own analysis.
3.4.2 DA in practice 1: Generating and analysing interview transcripts
Potter and Wetherell argue that DA provides a theoretical orientation towards data,
rather than a prescriptive ‘method’ of analysing it (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 175). It
is in this sense that I have found it useful to draw on elements of their approach, i.e.
as a means of conceptualising the meaning of my interview data. In contrast, the
following discussion provides an account of the method through which this interview
data was actually generated and condensed in order to facilitate my analysis of it.
The analysis was informed primarily by my research questions, as well as by the
theoretical framework described in Chapter Two.
As explained in the previous section, advocates of DA, like many other
qualitative researchers, stress the active role of the interviewer as well as the
participant in generating interview accounts. From this perspective, the questions that
I asked my participants during interviews are very important. Recognising this, I
spent a considerable length of time constructing a topic guide before entering the
field. This guide was developed on the basis of discussions with researchers who had
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conducted studies in related empirical areas, as well as on the basis of my reading of
the existing literature. Although specific topic guides were constructed for each
group of HCPs (see Appendix E),39 they all centred on key descriptive questions
about HCPs’ work practices, and ended with a discussion of relevant questions that
had recently been debated in the media. Beneath each of the main questions was a
list of potential follow-up points. As my research progressed, and a series of clear
themes began to repeat themselves across the interviews, this list was altered
accordingly in order to ensure that critical themes were explored with every
participant.
To some researchers, my lengthy topic guide probably appears unusually
detailed, and perhaps resembles that expected of a ‘structured’ rather than a ‘semi-
structured’ interview. However, the detail of the topic guide aided the interview
process on several levels. In the first place, it meant that if I froze up with nerves
(particularly during the early interviews) I had follow-up questions available at my
fingertips. The fact that I had thought about how to word the questions in advance
also meant that, while the precise details of the conversations altered, I asked the
critical questions in roughly the same way in all of the interviews, thereby making it
easier to compare participants’ responses.
However, although interviews were loosely structured around the key
(numbered) questions, it is important to note that they rarely followed the precise
format of this guide. My aim in all of the interviews was to begin with an open-ended
question, which provided HCPs with enough space to bring up and discuss topics
that they considered relevant, and to construct their own narrative and agenda.
During the interview, I then asked progressively more specific questions in order to
address my own research interests. I made every effort to word these more specific
questions so as to give participants the greatest possible freedom to respond to them,
i.e. I endeavoured not to ‘lead’ HCPs into providing particular answers. However,
any question inevitably frames the answer which is given to it in some way, even if
39 For the most part, I went into interviews without knowing whether an HCP would identify
him/herself as a ‘conscientious objector’ who opted out of abortion provision. For this reason I had to
take two versions of each topic guide into every interview.
82
this is just to highlight a particular topic as something that is of interest to the
researcher.
In the chapters that follow, I have explicitly acknowledged my own role in
the generation of interview data by prefacing participants’ responses with my
questions,40 where appropriate. On many occasions, HCPs gave lengthy responses,
and there are cases where it seemed inappropriate to present extracts of their talk as a
direct response to an easily identifiable ‘question’. Nevertheless, even in these cases,
HCPs’ accounts must still be understood as shaped by the dynamics of the social
research interview. In addition to the specific characteristics that I, personally,
brought to this interaction (see section 3.6), it is widely acknowledged that the act of
asking interview participants to describe particular actions/beliefs can be perceived
as an attempt to interrogate these actions/beliefs. In other words, interviewers’
questions may encourage participants to try and present themselves as ‘moral’ beings
who act in accordance with perceived social norms. Viewed in this way, interviews
become an opportunity to witness the construction of such norms, e.g. what is to
count as ‘acceptable’ abortion practice.
Following the generation of interview data, the transcription of digital
recordings itself forms another key stage in the analytical process. Although the
interviews were transcribed verbatim, there are clearly a number of possible
interpretations of this term. Potter and Wetherell suggest that, “for many sorts of
research questions, the fine details of timing and intonation are not crucial” (1987:
166). As my research questions concern the ways in which subjectivities are
constituted through HCPs’ accounts rather than, for example, the fine-grained
mechanisms through which conversational turns proceed, I have chosen not to
include this level of detail. This decision was also influenced by the practical
consideration that such detail would add months to what was already (given my
inexperience) a very lengthy process. Finally, as Potter and Wetherell also note, the
inclusion of such details “can interfere with the readability of the transcript” (1987:
40 When I list more than one response to the same (or a similarly worded) question, I have only
included the question once.
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166) and detract from the meanings conveyed by the data when presented in a more
simplified form.
Having transcribed the data, the next stage involved constant re-reading of
the transcripts, and the condensation of the data through coding, in order to make it
more manageable. The development of codes was informed by my research
questions, and the coding process was aided by the use of the qualitative data
management package NVivo 7. Once the data existed in a more manageable format,
a more detailed categorisation and analysis of the broad codes was conducted. This
primarily involved looking for patterns in the ways that HCPs talked about particular
issues (e.g. decision-making about abortion or conscientious objection). It also
involved paying close attention to the way in which such issues were variably
constituted, either between or within participants’ accounts. This aspect of the
analysis was informed by the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) and Potter and
Wetherell (1987), who argue that exploring variability between and within
participants’ accounts provides fruitful insights into the ways in which discursive
resources are utilised.
A final issue which is important to consider in any discussion of data analysis
is the means by which this process can be critically assessed. Potter and Wetherell
argue that, although DA represents a theoretical orientation to analysis rather than a
prescriptive method, it remains possible to assess such analyses for their ‘rigour’. In
particular, it is possible to examine the extent to which analyses take account of and
explain examples which do not apparently ‘fit’ into the theoretical framework which
is being developed (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The extent to which such deviant
cases are accounted for is, more generally, considered to be an important criterion of
the robustness of a piece of qualitative research (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). Another
criterion which is also widely used in assessing a qualitative analysis is the extent to
which it reflects participants’ own ‘realities’ (Lewis & Ritchie, 2003). While this
term can be variably interpreted, in the case of DA this involves providing evidence
that the contradictions and variability identified in participants’ talk are significant
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not simply for the analyst but also for those engaged in these discursive practices
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987).
3.4.3 DA in practice 2: Beyond transcripts
As noted in section 3.4.1, an attractive feature of Potter and Wetherell’s work is that
it allows the discourse analyst to consider the role of the discursive ‘context’ in
which interviews are conducted. This argument is made explicitly in Mapping the
Language of Racism, where they suggest that, in some research projects, there is a
need to develop an “ethnographic understanding” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 102-4)
of the research context in which particular texts (e.g. interview transcripts) are
produced. In the case of their research, this was necessary because they wanted to be
able to integrate the ways that their participants talked in interviews with Wetherell’s
native understandings of the ways that such discourses functioned within New
Zealand society.
Likewise, while my analysis draws primarily on interview transcripts, I have
also found it important to move beyond the limits of these texts. In the case of my
research this is because of the aim which I have described previously: to explore the
implications of HCPs’ accounts whilst remaining sensitive to the contexts of their
production. In developing an ethnographic understanding of this context, I have
relied upon several years spent following media and parliamentary discussions of
abortion in the UK, and the analysis of secondary literature concerning the history of
abortion law and practice in the UK (see Chapter One). A particularly important
resource is provided by the Hansard transcripts of the House of Commons debates
about abortion which took place during the passage of the Government’s Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in 2008. As Sheldon points out, parliamentary
debates represent useful data because:
…speakers are inevitably aware that what they say (especially on a topic
of popular interest such as abortion) will be recorded, read and possibly
reported in the media. As such, there is every incentive to speak to the
spirit of the times, to try to tap into and to give voice to a perceived
popular morality. (Sheldon, 1997: 34)
Because of the opportunity provided by this resource, I supplemented my analysis of
the interview transcripts with an analysis of the Hansard transcript of May 20th, 2008,
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which was the date that MPs debated amendments to abortion law. Extracts from this
debate were addressed in Chapter One, and are also considered (where relevant) in
several of the empirical chapters that follow.
My understanding of the ‘context’ in which my participants are working has
also been transformed through my own experience of conducting interviews with
HCPs, as well as reflecting upon and writing about this process. In particular, the
visibly emotional ways in which some HCPs spoke about their practice shaped my
understanding of their experiences of this practice, and thus the immediate ‘contexts’
from which they were speaking.
Reference to an understanding of the emotions of participants is a well-
known rhetorical device used to imply that an interviewer or analyst has some kind
of privileged access to the inner ‘realities’ of those whom they study (Silverman,
2001). However, by bringing my interpretation of the emotions displayed by my
participants into the analysis that follows, I am not attempting to make any such
claim. As Wittgenstein (1972) demonstrates, what we take to be a display of a
particular emotion (e.g. ‘joy’ or ‘pain’) occurs on the basis of our interpretations of
public signs (e.g. words or other bodily signals). For example, we may respond to a
person who cries as though they were suffering in some way, but this is because
particular public signs (e.g. certain words, tears, a trembling lip) are socially
designated as evidence of pain. Witnessing and interpreting the emotional signs
displayed by others gives a researcher no more direct insight into participants’
intangible private feelings or thoughts than any other medium of communication.
At the same time, in revealing the conventional character of emotional
display, Wittgenstein (1972) also illustrates that signs other than words are a routine
and important means through which we do communicate (Hallowell, 2006). For
example, when somebody cries, I will try to comfort them; when a person’s voice
rises in a certain way in response to something that I have said, I understand that I
have made them angry. In other words, while emotional display should not be
privileged as an unmediated gateway into people’s inner worlds, it is undoubtedly an
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important and meaningful dimension of social life. Moreover, it is one which has
been too often neglected in STS, which, by focussing on the generation and
contestation of technoscientific knowledge, has often ignored the different, e.g. non-
cognitive ways in which people relate to technoscience and medicine (McNeil,
2007). Accordingly, in the analysis that follows I will draw upon my ethnographic
understanding of the conventional aspects of emotional display, and explore emotion
as one of several forms of data generated in these interviews.
3.5 Obtaining ethical ‘clearance’
My project was subjected to a process of ethical review before I began to contact any
HCPs. According to the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees
(RECs), my study should, in theory, have required approval from an NHS REC
because I wanted to recruit participants on the basis of their professional role as NHS
practitioners. However, advice was sought from my local NHS REC, who read an
outline of my study and stated that it did not require this level of ethical approval.
On this basis, the project was instead reviewed under the terms of the
University of Edinburgh’s School of Social and Political Studies research ethics audit
process. Completion of an ethical self-audit confirmed that the project did not raise
any unusual ethical issues, beyond those which can be addressed by good social
research practice. Such practice typically involves procedures to ensure (as far as
possible) participant anonymity and confidentiality (Lewis, 2003). In view of this, I
produced codes for participant identities41 and used these to ensure that interview
transcripts and digital recordings could not be linked directly to participants.
Information required to decode participant identity was stored in a separate location
from the interview data (both were kept in locked storage cabinets).
However, the possibility that interview data might be attributed indirectly to
participants is a more complex problem (Lewis, 2003). Several HCPs were acutely
41 These codes indicate the ‘type’ of HCP (i.e. GP, Nurse, Consultant, Specialist Registrar) being
interviewed, plus a number. My decision to use a numerical system to distinguish participants was
based on the idea that numbers feel more anonymous than pseudonyms. As described below, several
of my participants were very concerned about the possibility that they might be identified, and they
seemed to be reassured when I said that they would be distinguished on the basis of numbers.
87
anxious about being identified, on the basis that their work as abortion providers
might result in their being targeted by anti-abortion activists. Because of their
concerns, in transcribing the interviews I have erred on the side of caution in making
decisions about whether to omit particular details. For the same reason, I have also
decided not to specify the precise geographic areas in which my research took place.
Another central tenet of ‘good’ social research practice is that participants are
given the opportunity to make an ‘informed’ decision about whether or not they wish
to take part (Lewis, 2003). In my study this process was facilitated by giving each
participant the opportunity to read a written summary of my research (see Appendix
D). This included information about the empirical questions that I wanted to address,
as well as an outline of what participation would involve, and the measures in place
to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Additionally, at the beginning and end of
each interview, I gave participants the opportunity to ask questions about my
research. They were also asked at the outset whether or not they objected to my use
of a digital voice recorder (only two participants refused – see below).
All participants were asked if they would be happy to sign a written consent
form stating that they agreed voluntarily to take part in my research, that they
understood what was involved and that they were happy for me to use the data
obtained. When I first began my fieldwork, I asked HCPs to sign this form at the
beginning of the interview. However, this request often got the interview off to a bad
start because, I subsequently realised, HCPs resented being asked to ‘consent’ to a
completely unknown intervention. In view of this problem, I started to begin all
interviews by telling HCPs that I had a consent form with me and that, if following
the interview they were comfortable with the discussion, I would ask them to sign it.
This alternative approach appeared to work much more smoothly but led me to
wonder who was benefiting from the process of obtaining written consent. I now
have a drawer full of signed forms symbolising HCPs’ ‘informed’ and ‘voluntary’
participation, but I remain unconvinced that asking them to give me their signatures
helped to make this process any more informed, or voluntary. More generally, the
suggestion that ethical difficulties in social research can be resolved through
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techniques such as written consent seems acutely problematic in light of sociological
critiques of the way that scientists and HCPs rely upon this procedural approach to
ethics (e.g. Corrigan, 2003; Tutton & Corrigan, 2004).
In spite of my scepticism about the purpose of obtaining written consent, the
process of interviewing doctors generated few ethical dilemmas for me, personally.
This is because, in most cases, the dynamics of these interviews were such that I
often felt doctors had a great deal more control over the situation than I did. In
contrast, recruiting and interviewing nurses was an entirely different experience. As
described in section 3.3, several nurses were invited to participate directly by
doctors, who took me to meet their nursing colleagues following their own
interviews. When these nurses said “Yes of course, she can talk to me now”, my
eagerness to obtain nurse participants probably meant that I did not reflect enough on
whether or not I should conduct these interviews. Subsequently, I have become
concerned about whether these nurses ‘really’ wanted to take part in my research, or
whether they were doing so because they perceived the invitation as a directive from
doctors.
However, in all cases, once the doctors in question had left the room, I gave
nurses the opportunity to change their mind, and made it clear that I had no problem
in leaving the hospital without the interview. As in all of the other interviews, I gave
them a verbal and written summary of my research, and allowed them to ask me any
questions that they wanted. Finally, it was clear that nurses did feel able to ‘say no’
to research interventions with which they were uncomfortable, because on two
occasions they agreed to participate but refused to be recorded.
3.6 Engaging in reflexivity?
Social scientists are often instructed (and spend a great deal of time encouraging
others) to ‘be reflexive’ about their claims to knowledge. However, as Lynch (2000)
points out, there are multiple definitions of reflexivity; like any form of other social
action, its designation as ‘successful’ will depend on the context in which it is
performed (e.g. the expectations of a particular disciplinary audience). Lynch
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outlines a typology of ‘reflexivities’ and identifies six different uses of the term,
which are further divided into sub-types. One of these, “methodological self-
consciousness”, is the form of reflexivity often advocated by qualitative research text
books, which “instruct students to be conscious of their own assumptions and
prejudice, and to focus upon uncertainties, possible sources of bias,” etc. (Lynch,
2000: 29), which impinge upon the knowledge claims that can be made.
To a certain extent this is the approach to reflexivity that I have implemented
throughout this chapter, by describing how my methodological choices have shaped
the meaning of my data. From here I could move on to add a long list of the personal
characteristics that may have impacted on the dynamics of the interviews, as well as
upon my analysis of them. I could cite my (relative) youth and inexperience as an
interviewer, the fact that I am female, white and from a middle-class background.
However, while these things are undoubtedly important, there are no ‘rules’ to
indicate where this process of self-examination should begin and end (Lynch, 2000).
Should I go on to draw attention to the anxiety that I feel (and probably display)
when I enter any medical consulting room, and describe how this relates to my own
history with the healthcare profession?
While there are undoubtedly problems involved in drawing boundaries
around the scope of such ‘reflexivity’, a more troubling ambiguity concerns the
underlying purpose of this process. Like Haraway (1997), I worry that, behind the
injunction for the researcher to consider how their person impacts upon the research
process lurks the assumption that, once identified, this impact might be measured and
somehow removed. This returns us to the search, familiar from scientific discourse,
for an undistorted account of the ‘object’ of study. This assumption is fundamentally
incompatible with the stance central to STS research, i.e. that all knowledge claims
are inseparable from the social context in which they are produced. It is also
antithetical to the goals of feminist research which, by emphasising the situatedness
(Haraway, 1991), and thus partiality of all knowledge claims, aims to avoid silencing
those whose alternative situation produces very different kinds of ‘truth’. An
insistence on the embodied, and thus always partial, basis of ‘knowing’ is also vital if
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researchers are to be held accountable for their research interventions, and the kinds
of world which these support (Haraway, 1991).
An alternative approach to the issue of ‘reflexivity’ is advocated by scholars
such as Woolgar (e.g. 1988) who have illustrated how STS’s mode of analysis can be
applied to STS texts. Following this approach, I could turn this concluding
discussion into an analysis of the ways in which, through the construction of this
methodology text, I have positioned my thesis as a ‘robust enough’ piece of research
that accords with the conventions typically used to assess qualitative studies.
Moreover, I could repeat this process in each of the empirical chapters that follow,
using DA to reflect upon the ways in which I try to ensure that the reader is
convinced by my own DA of HCPs’ accounts, and so on ad infinitum. However,
while I acknowledge that the analysis which follows is certainly amenable to this
kind of deconstruction, like Haraway (1997), I would argue that this version of
reflexivity is unnecessarily paralyzing. Recognizing that all claims to knowledge are
partial should not mean losing sight of the possibility of constructing different and
better kinds of world through research interventions.
In taking responsibility for this particular research intervention, I want to
situate the partial truth that follows as a feminist project, that sets out to use the tools
of STS to critically explore the forms of existence that HCPs’ discourse make
possible for pregnant women. This aim was initially based upon the (probably naive)
hope that, through this kind of analysis, it might be possible to engage in further
dialogue with HCPs involved in abortion provision in the UK, and improve the
experiences of pregnant women in the clinic.
However, this wider ethical purpose raises questions about the information
that I provided to my participants. Although I outlined the empirical questions that I
was interested in (see Appendix D), I did not state that I was relating to my
participants’ answers from a critical ‘feminist perspective’, or suggest that I was
interested in (at least potentially) generating changes in their practice.
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Arguably, however, it would have been impossible for me to explain my
‘position’ as a feminist researching the healthcare profession when I constructed my
information pack. This is because my approach towards HCPs has not remained
static, but has been affected by my experience of conducting and writing about this
project. As I indicated in Chapter Two, the analysis which follows this chapter
represents my attempt to construct a critical, yet sensitive and hopefully productive
relationship with the HCPs whom I interviewed. In the concluding chapter of this
thesis, I will return to this issue and will reflect upon the further interventions that the
approach adopted in this thesis might make possible (or impossible) in the future.
As outlined in Chapter One, my analysis of the empirical data begins in
Chapter Four, which addresses HCPs’ discussions of the practice of ‘conscientious
objection’. I argue that these discussions represent an interesting site at which to
explore how HCPs define the limits of their rights to act as individuals, vs. their
responsibilities to their patients and their colleagues as members of the healthcare
profession. In the three remaining empirical chapters I then move on to address the
central topic of the interviews, namely, HCPs’ accounts of their interactions with
their pregnant patients. In Chapter Five I explore HCPs’ accounts of their
involvement in abortion decision-making, and compare these accounts to the expert-
lay relationships which are constructed by the terms of the Abortion Act. In Chapters
Six and Seven I focus in detail upon some of the key claims to expert knowledge that
are articulated by HCPs, and explore the “prescriptive ontologies” (Wynne, 2001:
479) which are co-produced by these claims.
Rather than moving straight into an analysis of my empirical data, this
methodology chapter will be followed by a brief intermission, in which I provide
some important background information concerning the abortion procedures which
my participants are discussing in the chapters that follow. I would argue that an
awareness of these procedures is essential both in order to comprehend the
terminology employed by HCPs, and to understand the material practices to which
they are referring. At the same time, the act of producing and including such a
description in this thesis is extremely problematic, for several reasons.
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Firstly, in order to produce this description, I have had to rely upon the
accounts of my participants (along with guidance from Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2004), treating these accounts as a resource in
order to define the work practices which are involved in abortion procedures.
Necessarily, this involves the temporary suspension of the analytical approach
outlined in this chapter, in which the ways that HCPs account for particular practices
are treated as a topic for analysis. Treating HCPs’ accounts as a resource in order to
generate a coherent description of abortion methods also leads to a second problem;
it suppresses variation between accounts, falsely implying that all HCPs narrate these
events in the same way.
In Chapter Seven I will attempt to rectify this problem, by turning HCPs’
accounts of abortion methods back into a topic for analysis. In doing so, I will
analyse the realities which HCPs construct as they define particular abortion
methods, and will also emphasise that HCPs do not produce a single narrative
concerning these methods. However, arguably, this analysis cannot compensate for
an additional problem with my decision to include a ‘description’ of abortion
methods in this thesis. The act of outlining the work practices involved in abortion
procedures involves talking about women’s bodies, as well as those of their fetuses.
To attempt to construct a single definition of this process seems to me to be an
incredibly violent act, which silences women’s situated definitions of their
experiences of abortion. This silencing is, arguably, made worse by the fact that the
‘experiences’ of women and their fetuses during abortion procedures are regularly
appropriated by anti-abortionists (Steinberg, 1991). In Chapter Seven, I make an
attempt to compensate for this troubling aspect of the following description by
drawing attention to literature that has addressed women’s own accounts of medical
abortion procedures.
In light of the problems generated by my description of abortion methods, I
have found it difficult to accommodate it as part of the main text of this thesis.
Instead, this description occupies an uneasy position outside of this text as necessary
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‘information’, which simultaneously produces a particular version of reality and
frames the reader’s perspective on the empirical data which follows. As such, it also
serves to highlight an important tension that emerges from my participants’ accounts.
As I will acknowledge in the chapters that follow, HCPs must fulfil their legal
obligations to gain informed consent from their patients before performing any
procedure. However, in doing so, they inevitably impose particular definitions of
abortion upon women with unwanted pregnancies.
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Intermission: Methods of abortion
As indicated in Chapter Three, an abortion can be
conducted using either medical (i.e.
pharmacological) or surgical methods. The Royal
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (2004)
outlines the potential for both medical and surgical
abortion techniques to be used across all (legal)
gestations of pregnancy. However, my data suggest
that, in Scotland, local practice is to use
particular methods at particular stages of
gestation.
Medical abortion
Medical abortions are conducted between
approximately six to nine weeks’ gestation, and this
method is also used for abortions at upwards of
thirteen weeks’ gestation. The HCPs that I
interviewed suggested that, in the interim period
(nine to thirteen weeks), surgical abortion is
preferred because it has a higher success rate than
medical abortion.
The medical method of abortion involves several
stages, and visits to hospital (see Chapter Three,
Figure 1). Patients are conscious throughout the
procedure. On the first visit, they are given
orally-administered mifepristone, a drug that blocks
the actions of the hormone progesterone. By blocking
the action of progesterone, mifepristone causes the
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lining of the uterus to start disintegrating and
also softens the cervix. In rare cases, mifepristone
will induce abortion, and women are warned of this
possibility before being sent home. However, in most
cases, women have to return to the hospital forty-
eight hours after taking mifepristone, and then they
are given a vaginal suppository of misoprostol. This
drug is a prostaglandin which induces cervical
dilation and uterine contraction, thus helping the
pregnancy tissue and fetus to be expelled through
the vagina.
In most hospitals, women undergoing first
trimester medical abortion remain at the clinic for
observation and nursing assistance for four to six
hours, within which time they will, in most cases,
expel the fetus. Women are provided with cardboard
bedpans and use these when going to the toilet so
that nurses can check whether or not the fetus has
been passed before patients leave the clinic.
Second trimester medical abortions are lengthier
than first trimester ones, and often involve an
overnight stay. The total number of misoprostol
suppositories, and the frequency with which they are
administered, increases with the gestation of a
pregnancy. Additionally, whereas the uterine
contractions involved in first trimester medical
abortions were described to me as being like “bad
period cramps”, second trimester medical abortions
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can involve much stronger, and thus more painful,
contractions (particularly later in the second
trimester). In other words, as the length of
gestation increases, and the fetus becomes
progressively larger, women’s bodies become more
actively involved in its expulsion. They are offered
pain relief up to and including morphine.
Patients often require a great deal of support
from staff during second trimester medical abortion,
particularly at the point when the fetus is being
delivered. Staff informed me that they encourage
women “not to look” at this point, and that they
remove the fetus quickly in order to prevent women
being distressed by an entity which, although very
small and incompletely developed, could be
considered “baby-like”. For this reason, as well as
the higher risk of complications developing, women
are kept in the clinic until the abortion is
complete.
As described in Chapter Three, although doctors
prescribe the drugs, it is nurses who supervise
medical abortions. This involves administering the
drugs, providing assistance to women undergoing
abortion and disposing of the fetus, plus other
pregnancy tissue (e.g. the amniotic sac/placenta)
following the procedure. As noted above, later
medical abortions necessitate a greater amount of
staff involvement, particularly at the point of
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delivery where, as well as assisting the patient,
the nurse must cut the umbilical cord and ensure
that the placenta is delivered.
Procedures for fetal disposal vary from hospital
to hospital. However, in general, pregnancy tissue
produced through first trimester medical abortion is
packaged for incineration (although my nurse
participants were keen to reassure me that it is
always kept separate from other forms of hospital
‘waste’). At later gestations, fetuses are packaged
individually in small boxes (referred to as “white
baby coffins” by some nurse participants). Most
hospitals dispose of these fetuses through cremation
via arrangements with local funeral
directors/crematoriums (patient consent is obtained
for this).
I was also told that, with the prior consent of
patients, fetuses produced through medical abortion
are sometimes used for research purposes rather than
being incinerated/cremated. The collection and use
of aborted fetuses in stem cell research has been
studied by Pfeffer and Kent (Pfeffer & Kent, 2007;
Pfeffer, 2008; Pfeffer, 2009).
Surgical abortion
As noted above, surgical abortion is the main method
used to terminate a pregnancy in Scotland from nine
to approximately twelve weeks’ gestation. It is
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rarely performed above gestations of about thirteen
weeks. The reasons for this time-limit on the
provision of surgical abortion are considered in
Chapter Seven.
Before a surgical abortion, suppositories of
misoprostol are used to soften and open women’s
cervixes. The primary technique involved is the use
of a suction curette to remove the fetus/other
pregnancy tissue from the uterus under vacuum
aspiration (the use of forceps is also sometimes
required). Theatre nurses dispose of this tissue
(ultimately, for incineration) following the
procedure.
At all of the hospitals I visited, surgical
abortions were performed on a day case basis (i.e.
as part of the day-surgery workload), under general
anaesthesia. I was told that the only exceptions to
this would be if a woman had health problems which
made her unsuitable for day surgery; in this case
she would be admitted to a gynaecology ward.
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Chapter Four: “It’s like being a chest physician and
saying you don’t do asthma”- Conscientious
objection and the boundaries of professional
responsibility for abortion.
4.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter One, the 1967 Abortion Act marked abortion out from most
other medical procedures (Sheldon, 1997) by giving HCPs the right to refuse to
become involved in its provision on the grounds of conscience:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any
duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement,
to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a
conscientious objection… (2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section
shall affect any duty to participate in treatment which is necessary to save
the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental
health of a pregnant woman. (The Abortion Act 1967)
However, in their analysis of the aftermath of the 1967 Abortion Act in Scotland,
Davis and Davidson (2005) highlight the tensions and complexities generated by the
operation of this clause in practice. While the right of individual HCPs to opt out of
abortion provision was seen as something which should be protected, it was not
always easy to accommodate alongside the provision of an NHS abortion service
(Davis & Davidson, 2005). In this chapter I will build on this work by exploring how
the meaning of “conscientious objection” is constructed in the context of
contemporary Scottish abortion practice.
The analysis that follows is informed by the theoretical framework outlined in
Chapters Two and Three, but draws particularly on Gieryn’s insights concerning the
ways in which scientists delineate the boundaries of their professional practice. As
Gieryn describes it, such “boundary-work” involves:
the attribution of the selected characteristics to the institution of science
for the purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes
“non-scientific” intellectual or professional activities. (Gieryn, 1983:
791)
Using a number of case studies Gieryn reveals that the definition of the boundaries of
‘science’ has major political repercussions. For example, groups of scientists often
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try to define the boundaries of their work in such a way that potential competitors are
prevented from defining their work as ‘scientific’ (Gieryn, 1983). Being unable to
lay claim to the authoritative status of ‘science’ can put such competitors at a major
disadvantage, for example, by making it impossible for them to gain financial
support for their work.
As Gieryn (1983) notes, the concept of boundary-work is relevant in contexts
other than the delineation of what is to count as ‘science’, because it is a ubiquitous
rhetorical strategy through which specialist groups try to demarcate and thus
legitimate the basis of their ‘professional’ status. In the discussion that follows I
argue that, as HCPs articulate the meanings of conscientious objection, they engage
in important boundary-work. Through this process they define the parameters of the
activities which members of the healthcare profession can legitimately engage in
with respect to the provision of abortion.
However, before beginning my analysis, it is important to explain how my
use of the term “boundary-work” differs from the recent development and use of this
concept by Wainwright et al. (2006) in their analysis of embryonic stem cell
researchers’ accounts of their practice. Like abortion, embryonic stem cell research is
frequently discussed as a controversial practice which intersects with questions
concerning the beginning of life, and the legitimacy of human intervention in this
process. In their analysis, Wainwright et al. concentrate on the research practices
which are demarcated as ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ by their participants. They argue that this
process of demarcation represents a distinctive form of “boundary-work,” which they
term “ethical boundary-work”.
Wainwright et al. suggest that the introduction of this new terminology is
necessary because, when stem cell researchers draw boundaries around more and less
acceptable practices (e.g. by distinguishing different sources of embryos), this:
is not about differentiating science from non-science, but rather, about
drawing boundaries between what is ethically preferable. (Wainwright et
al., 2006: 739)
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However, an alternative approach to their findings would be to suggest that their
participants are demarcating the types of work that can legitimately be conducted as
part of “embryonic stem cell research”. As such, it is possible to understand their
participants’ accounts of good research practice simply as “boundary-work” in the
original sense outlined by Gieryn, i.e. as the demarcation of limits around activities
which can/should be conducted by members of a profession.
In order to argue that their participants are engaging in a different kind of
demarcation activity called “ethical boundary-work”, Wainwright et al. first assume
what it normally means to differentiate ‘science’ from ‘non-science’. In other words,
they define the meanings of both ‘science’ and ‘non-science’ in advance of their
analysis. That they are working with these kinds of analytical assumptions is
suggested very strongly in the introduction to their paper, where they argue that they
will show how “non-science, in the form of ‘ethics’, is becoming an integral part of
maintaining the image of science” (2006: 735). Such an approach is incompatible
with that advocated by Gieryn who, like many STS researchers, focuses upon the
way in which the meaning of “science” is accomplished in practice. As he points out:
Because of considerable material opportunities and professional
advantages available only to ‘scientists’, it is no mere academic matter to
decide who is doing science and who is not. (Gieryn, 1983: 781)
Likewise, in this chapter I argue that the demarcation of limits around the activities
which HCPs can legitimately engage in as members of the ‘healthcare profession’
has major implications both for their own and their patients’ experiences of abortion
provision.
The discussion that follows is divided into three parts. In the first section I
explore two discourses through which conscientious objection is constructed as a
legitimate practice, and reveal that HCPs who are involved in abortion provision
characterise this legitimacy very differently from those who opt out. In the second
section, I illustrate an alternative discourse, through which HCPs reject conscientious
objection as a practice which is incompatible with their work as HCPs. In the final
section, I go on to illustrate how these seemingly incompatible discourses are
brought together by individual HCPs. I suggest that, by exploring this process, it is
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possible to see where HCPs demarcate limits around the right to conscientiously
object to abortion, and thus the fundamental responsibilities which HCPs have for
abortion provision as members of the healthcare profession.
4.2 Legitimating conscientious objection
One of the few analyses which has addressed the issue of conscientious objection in
UK abortion practice within the last two decades is provided by Roe et al. (1999).
Their paper begins by framing the issue of conscientious objection as a particular
kind of problem:
Concerns that a dwindling number of younger doctors are both fully
trained and willing to provide abortions when they qualify prompted the
London-based Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) to carry out a
two-part national survey to determine the extent of this problem. (1999:
98)
Based on this concern, they survey the views of consultants and trainee doctors in
obstetrics and gynaecology, and try to establish the extent to which abortion
provision is viewed as an integral part of training in this specialty.
Throughout Roe et al.’s analysis it is assumed that only certain individuals can
legitimately make use of the conscience clause and opt out of abortion provision:
Most consultants (86 per cent) thought that trainees who opted out of
abortion training conscientiously objected to abortion on religious or
moral grounds. Even so, many consultants thought there were other
reasons why junior doctors opted out of abortion training, which gave
considerable cause for concern. (1999: 100)
In response to these concerns, the authors recommend that junior doctors who make
use of the conscience clause should be obliged to declare “their reasons” (1999: 104)
for their objection. In doing so, they imply that it is possible to distinguish reasons
for opting out of abortion provision which are legitimate from those which are not.
However, rather than adopting this assumption, in the following sections, I address
this issue as a topic for analysis. How are ‘legitimate objections’ to abortion
constructed by HCPs?
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4.2.1 The Othering of ‘genuine’ objections
Echoing Roe et al. (1999), several of the HCPs I interviewed expressed their
suspicions that not everybody who opts out through the conscience clause holds a
‘genuine’ conscientious objection to abortion:
But there are, there are one or two there at [hospital]. And, and some of
them are truly conscientious objectors. Some of them used to do
abortions and then, on the road to Damascus they decided that they didn’t
want to do abortions any more and I’m slightly suspicious that it’s
nothing to do really with conscientious objection, it’s just that, you know
there is this view among gynaecologists that women having, women
coming for abortion are undeserving and that everybody else that they
see is far more deserving of their time um than women coming for
abortion and they resent the fact that the operating lists are fill up, filled
up with people having an abortion when they, that means that people
with post menopausal bleeding or infertility or something have to wait
longer for their operation. [Consultant 4, female]
Interviewer: And you said that it’s registrars and um SHOs, does that
mean that it’s increasingly people coming from uh sort of, the next sort
of generation of doctors that are opting out?
Participant: Ah… I get that impression, it’s based on no hard evidence.
I: Yeah, sure.
P: But I get that impression that there’s more. Now whether that’s
because actually it’s just out of laziness and they don’t want to be
involved cos ‘oh it’s a hassle’, don’t know. Certainly in [city A] I
remember a story that [a doctor] who [omitted for anonymity] said to me
one time that, you know exactly this situation in [city A] there were a
couple of registrars who refused to be involved with terminations in the
gynaecology wards at [hospital]. Uh and they said, ‘that’s fine, when
you’re on you can be on call for the labour ward and whoever’s on labour
will be on call for gynaecology’. They soon changed their minds about
their social [laughs] um, their position on that! Because, in fact it’s much
harder work to be on call for labour than it is for gynaecology.
I: Right, ok.
P: So people’s minds can be changed. So that’s, see that’s naughty. If it’s
just out of laziness then that’s naughty that’s uh, um so you know it’s,
but you can’t prove anything.
I: No.
P: But there are people who, you know, for religious views or moral
views – that’s fine, that’s cool. What I don’t like is inconsistency.
[Consultant 7, male]
In this and the previous quotation, as well as in the analysis performed by Roe et al.
(1999), boundary-work is used to distinguish cases of ‘genuine’ conscientious
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objection from situations in which HCPs are making an illegitimate use of the
conscience clause. Through this process, a definition of ‘genuine’ conscientious
objection, and thus legitimate use of the conscience clause, emerges. Both Consultant
4 and Consultant 7 highlight the importance of consistency; a ‘genuine’ objection is a
perspective that you either possess or you do not. As a result, suspicions are
automatically generated by those who appear to ‘switch sides’. Additionally, each of
these HCPs refers to religious belief as a circumstance in which conscientious
objection to abortion is ‘genuine’. Consultant 7 concedes that those who possess
“religious views or moral views” can legitimately opt out of abortion provision.
Likewise, through her Biblical reference to St Paul’s revelation “on the road to
Damascus”, Consultant 4 seems to imply that the development of a real
‘conscientious objection’ to abortion requires conversion to religious belief.
However, her sarcastic tone signals her scepticism concerning those HCPs who
suddenly decide to stop being involved in abortion provision. She suggests that,
rather than undergoing revelations of religion, these doctors hold inappropriate
beliefs about the deservingness of abortion patients.
The distinctive “personal” views of ‘conscientious objectors’ were also
emphasised by HCPs who were unusually tolerant of those who opted out:
I: And so how do you feel about people who decide to um opt out the,
you know, through the conscience clause?
P: I think that’s, that’s for them, yep. If uh, if they make it clear to uh, uh
their patients that uh they have a, that’s their, their personal feeling and
view and I, I wouldn’t want them to uh uh do something that would
conflict heavily with their own conscience. [GP16, male]
I can see that people have, you know, to wrestle with their conscience
about lots of different things and um ah, and if that’s part of their
religion, or a part of the way they think about things or view things then,
I don’t think there’s a lot you can do to change it. I don’t think people do,
I don’t think people hold that opinion to make life diffi-specifically to
make life difficult for someone, I think that is just the way they, the way
they feel yeah. [GP6, female]
Although HCPs often suggested that conscientious objection to abortion is an
automatic corollary of “having religion”, my data suggest that the relationship
between religion and the practice of conscientious objection is very complex. Several
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of the HCPs I interviewed did not identify as conscientious objectors but did identify
as members of faith groups (including the Catholic, Methodist and Anglican faiths).
Additionally, one of the ‘conscientious objectors’ stated that she did not belong to
any religious faith.
Whether or not they make explicit reference to the importance of religious
belief, these extracts all construct genuine conscientious objection to abortion as an
intrinsic and inalterable part of certain HCPs’ identities. Through this discourse,
conscientious objection to abortion becomes characterised almost as an affliction, or
a condition which certain individuals have ‘got’, and which must therefore be
tolerated by other HCPs. In other words, this stance is constructed as Other than the
norm. Simultaneously, participation in abortion provision becomes normalized and
HCPs do not have to reflect upon or justify their own involvement in this practice.
4.2.2 Opting out: Enacting morality
Those HCPs who objected to abortion also depicted these objections as distinctive
personal viewpoints that make it impossible for them to be involved in its provision.
However, while the extracts above construct genuine objection to abortion as a
passive part of HCPs’ identities that forces them to opt out, those who identified as
conscientious objectors depicted their use of the conscience clause as a deliberate
moral act:
P: Um, I’m totally against abortion.
I: Ok
P: Um I, I suppose it’s all to do with when one accepts when life begins.
And if the concept of life begins at the point of conception then whatever
you do after that has to be wrong. In my view. Um while recognising that
uh there are certain circumstances where one can be sympathetic to the
plight of certain patients um you know, that, that is how, that’s the view
that I hold and will not waver from that.
[GP20, male, conscientious objector]
In this extract GP20 portrays himself as someone who works hard to enact his
personal moral beliefs; he will not “waver” in spite of the temptation to be
sympathetic towards his patients. However, while he depicts the belief that life
begins at conception as one that he must honour through his practice, he does not try
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to assert this as an absolute truth. His acknowledgement of the situated basis of
perspectives concerning when life begins is interesting when contrasted with the way
in which anti-abortion groups portray the immorality of abortion as objective ‘fact’,
and seek to convince others of this perspective (e.g. Petchesky, 1987; Franklin, 1991;
Hopkins et al., 2005).
A similar account is produced by GP7, who locates his beliefs about abortion
within his Christian faith, and goes on to argue that, in spite of his sympathy for his
patients, he cannot personally sanction the practice:
Um I, you know I think it’s recognising this is a, a life um ok a, you
know, a, a fetus at six, six weeks it certainly has the potential to be a
human, it may not at that stage display all human traits but it certainly
will, will develop into one and to, to, I don’t believe then it’s necessarily
our choice to, to, to, to give and take away life in a sort of God-like
fashion um and that um, you know, so that relates to sort of euthanasia,
that relates to, to um sort of termination and, you know, the care of the
vulnerable, and the unborn I would say would be the most vulnerable um
is, is, is um something that that, you know, I can’t in due conscience
sanction and that is partly rooted in my, I suppose my Christian faith that
I believe that there’s a sanctity of life. Um, I can understand why a lot of
the reasons and be sympathetic towards a lot of the reasons where
women come and say I really just think I couldn’t cope with another
child, but um I don’t think morally I can sort of say that that can then
justify what’s basically terminating a, a, a life. [GP7, male, conscientious
objector]
As in the previous extract, the impression is created of a personal belief which, rather
than being passively possessed, is lived out through conscious moral reasoning and
action.
In addition to constructing abortion as a practice which is incompatible with
their own beliefs about when life begins, GPs 7 and 20 also developed critiques of
the grounds on which the procedure is carried out in the UK. In other words, they
positioned their use of the conscience clause as a moral act which does not simply
dissociate them from the practice of abortion per se, but from a situation in which
patients try to access the procedure for ‘objectionable’ reasons:
I have to say with all, with my experience of general practice etc., that
most patients’ need for abortion is convenience rather than any sort of,
you know, great medical problem related to them. You know it’s a, it’s a,
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it’s an inconvenience to be pregnant for whatever uh reason that may be.
Um so there’s no major issues to do with mother’s health.
[...] I’m Catholic um and I suppose I was born Catholic, I suppose, I
suppose that’s been one of the stones, the, the foundation stones of my
life. Um, so I’ve always had that view if you like, I suppose. Um but, and
maybe that colours my mind as to some of the, the apparent trivial
reasons that people seek abortions for. You know, one can, you know,
when the, when the Abortion Act was coming through there was all this
about ‘oh, mothers being ill’ and all this kind of business. I’ve, I’ve still
to find a mother whose life has depended on an abortion.
[GP20, male]
… I don’t think morally I can sort of say that that can then justify what’s
basically terminating a, a, a life. Um, it’s always a grey area, you know,
so there are, you know, and the, the law was set up with these sort of,
these more in mind, you know, where the woman was at a high risk of
death or um because of a continuing pregnancy. Um the basis of the law,
that you’ve, you’ve highlighted42 in a sense is the statistical anomaly that
basically is used to justify abortion on request is that, yeah, I mean
statistically you are more likely to die in a childbirth, however low that is
in this country, than you are in having a termination. So, that is
statistically true, but not in a sense in the spirit of the law in which it was
written, in my understanding of it. Um, you know, my understanding is
that was written in a sense for people who were really going to have a
very severe problem with bleeding or high blood pressure or something
like that, by going through a childbirth. Whereas, it’s sort of written that,
well statistically, there is a very small chance you might die in
pregnancy, there’s always a small, small, small, small amount of women
who do. So, and that’s how it’s justified um. [GP7, male]
Both of these GPs engage in boundary-work to distinguish situations of ‘medical
need’, from the grounds upon which abortions are generally carried out. GP7
contrasts his own interpretation of the “spirit” of the Abortion Act (i.e., that a
pregnancy should pose a “severe” risk to a woman’s physical health before an
abortion is justifiable) with an alternative argument that, because a woman is
statistically more likely to die through childbirth than abortion, the latter is always
justifiable. He discounts the legitimacy of this second argument by dismissing it as a
technicality which is used to get around the “spirit” of the Act. In doing so he also
manages to discount the women who do die annually through childbirth.
42 During this part of the interview, GP7 was pointing to the information sheet which I had given him
prior to the interview (see Appendix D).
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However, a more troubling feature of GP7’s account is that, like GP20, he
reduces the question of the justifiability of abortion to an issue of doctors’
assessments of immediate physical danger. In arguing that abortions are not
justifiable in the absence of such medically defined ‘need’, both of these GPs suggest
that women should be able to accommodate their “inconvenient” pregnancies rather
than ending them. This argument makes the work of pregnancy, childbirth and
motherhood invisible, and implies that any other “aspirations which women might
have are of no value beside the opportunity to become a mother” (Boyle, 1997: 39).
Although these two GPs implied that HCPs who ‘opt in’ are not necessarily
regulating the provision of abortion satisfactorily, they did not explicitly condemn
the actions of their colleagues. In contrast, Consultant 8, who opted out of abortion
provision through the conscience clause, criticised the “liberal” attitude of those who
are involved in abortion provision:
I would argue that there’s a lot of evidence that doctors are in that way eh
less if you like ethically bound than their community because by and
large, philosophically they tend to be a liberal group of people and
therefore perhaps to an extent tend to be more liberal in the application of
the Abortion Act than numbers of members of society might wish. And
in fact, that’s born out by a number of recent studies showing that, that
the general population, many of the general population feel that, in
quotes “abortion is too easy” [...] So they’re not particularly ethical, if
that’s the right phrase – it’s not actually – but for want of a better one at
the moment. The best example of that is that I have a, an interest in, in,
and I don’t want to go into emotive language but the medical profession
in the Nazi era was particularly interesting. And the highest per capita
professional membership of the Nazi party in 1934 were doctors. Isn’t
that interesting? [Consultant 8, male, conscientious objector].
Comparison between the liberal provision of abortion and the Holocaust in Nazi
Germany is a well known feature of anti-abortion rhetoric. Indeed, before the
passage of the Abortion Act, doctors opposed to the legislation argued that, by
forcing the healthcare profession to ‘take life’ at the direction of the State, it would
equate with Hitler’s programme of eugenics (Macintyre, 1973; Davis & Davidson,
2006). However, what is interesting about Consultant 8’s critique is that it is not
directed towards the State, or to the law, but rather towards the healthcare profession
itself.
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Freidson (1970) argues that medicine’s legitimacy as a self-regulating
profession is dependent on its claim to ‘ethical’ practice. In contrast, Consultant 8
suggests that moral integrity or ‘ethics’ is not something which is integral to the
profession of medicine. Rather, he implies, the majority of those who practice
medicine are “liberal” (or morally lazy) in character. By implication, the capacity for
moral thought is limited to a minority of individuals, such as Consultant 8.
While Consultant 8 suggested that the liberal views of the medical profession
were the sole cause of an objectionable system of abortion provision, Nurse 10 was
keen to emphasise the contribution made by women requesting the procedure, who,
she argued, “abuse” the NHS:
The system is abused. The system is grossly abused. They should only be
allowed one – it’s not a means of contraception.
[…]
Abortion is too easy. There is a place for abortion but I think it’s abused.
The service is grossly abused. What it was designed for [the law] and
what it’s doing is two different things. [Nurse 10, female, conscientious
objector]43
Throughout the interview, she returned repeatedly to the issue of this “gross abuse”
of the service by a particular group of patients, the same ones “who keep coming
back” for abortions. In doing so, she constructed her use of the conscience clause as
an act that prevents her from becoming complicit with women’s immoral uses of
abortion.
However, Nurse 10’s critique of the current status of abortion provision in the
UK also concerned the ways in which those who opt out of the system are treated by
their colleagues. She argued that she had to suffer endless, indirect “stick” for her
refusal to administer “the miso or the miffy” 44 to medical abortion patients, as
evidenced by her colleague’s constant questioning of her position on abortion – “why
don’t you agree with it?” etc. She suggested that one of the reasons that she was
subjected to this questioning was because her colleagues believed that she was trying
43 All comments from Nurse 10 are approximately verbatim. She did not mind me taking notes, but
did not want to be tape-recorded.
44 “The miffy” is mifepristone, the oral tablet given to women to cause the tissue in the uterine wall to
disintegrate. “The miso” is misoprostol, a prostaglandin which is given to women as a vaginal
suppository forty-eight hours after they have taken mifepristone.
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to avoid work. However, she also argued that her colleagues’ resentment stemmed
from the fact that many more HCPs possess the belief that abortion is wrong than
practice their objections:
Every nurse has got a right and can exercise that right, but it’s extremely
difficult. Young girls [nurses] are coerced into doing it. They’re annoyed
with themselves and take it out on me because they didn’t have enough
backbone to exercise their rights. [Nurse 10, female, conscientious
objector]
Throughout her account, Nurse 10 implied that disagreement with abortion was a
widespread, rather than a minority perspective. Simultaneously, she distinguished
herself from her morally lazy colleagues, claiming that the latter group lacked the
strength (or “backbone”) to put this disagreement into practice.
Nurse 10’s portrayal of herself as someone who overcomes difficulties to
enact her objection to abortion clearly echoes the accounts of GPs 7 and 20, who
stressed that they have to struggle against their natural sympathies for their patients
in order to live up to their moral convictions. However, although it is important to
acknowledge the rhetorical power of this kind of accounting, it is also vital to pay
attention to a key point raised by these HCPs; individuals’ relationships with one
another and with patients may impact upon their ability to opt out of abortion
provision.
The importance of workplace relationships is emphasised by Davis and
Davidson (2005) in their analysis of the operation of the Abortion Act in the Scottish
medical community in the years following its introduction. They contrast the
inclusion of a legal clause to protect the rights of individual HCPs with the reality of
gynaecological work, which (particularly for nurses), 45 tends to be conducted as part
of a team rather than as an individual activity. Within this context, individual HCPs
were reluctant to opt out, because of the fear that they would become extremely
45 Bolton (2005) suggests that the emotionally difficult and stigmatised nature of gynaecological
nursing (which can involve dealing with miscarriage and gynaecological cancers as well as abortion)
means that gynaecology wards tend to be characterised by an unusually close-knit, mutually
supportive workplace culture. While she does not address the issue, it seems likely that, if
gynaecology nurses deal with the difficulties of their work by operating as a ‘collective’, then major
tensions could be created if individuals are seen to be placing an additional burden on the rest of the
team. Additionally, such ‘individual’ action would, presumably, transgress the ‘collective’ culture of
gynaecology nursing.
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“unpopular” with their colleagues (Davis & Davidson, 2005). As I will reveal in the
following section, this argument was also mobilised by some of the HCPs whom I
interviewed, who constructed ‘conscientious objection’ as a desired but impossible
course of action.
However, an additional issue which emerges from Nurse 10’s account is the
potential for workplace hierarchies to become interwoven with individuals’ ability to
enact their objections to abortion. Whilst complaining that the more junior nurses
lack “backbone”, she simultaneously described these trainees as people who are
“coerced” into participating in abortion provision. Later in the interview, she
suggested that senior staff deliberately kept trainee nurses uninformed about their
right to opt out because of the pressure that conscientious objection could place on
the provision of abortion services. In other words, the ‘right’ to opt out may only
exist if you are, firstly, aware of its existence, and secondly, if you also feel
empowered to exercise it. While a consultant gynaecologist can make it known that
he will not see patients requesting abortions, the situation of a trainee nurse or a
junior doctor is likely to be very different.
In comparison to the four other conscientious objectors I interviewed,
Consultant 9 appeared to be unusually tolerant of the ways in which others acted in
relation to abortion. I end this section with a quotation from his interview in order to
highlight the contrast between his account and those described previously. Although
he described abortion as a practice which he felt unable to take part in, he did not
suggest that he was in a position to define what it should mean for other HCPs, or for
pregnant women:
But I, I think there, lots of people would say there is a need for the
service. And, just as I want my uh uh ideas and thoughts respected I have
to respect what other people feel about this so. So, so I have no, no
particular problem if that’s what the majority want. So long as I am not
forced to take part in it. [Consultant 9, male]
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4.3 An ‘impossible’ option
In describing the practice of conscientious objection, several HCPs who were
involved in abortion provision suggested that it is an option which is, or should be,
impossible. For example, Consultant 5 talked at length about how “difficult” it must
be “not to do abortion”, if you are a gynaecologist:
Um, it’s a, I, as I said it is possible for people now to opt out, they can do
um. But um it is the, it is an important part of um reproductive health um
I think that it must be difficult to, to be, I think it must be difficult not to
do it. Um, but um I think gynaecology and gynaecology people are quite
accommodating and it is possible for others not to, to do it. But it is very
important and um, you know, it affects so many women. And in other
parts of gynaecology, you know, women coming with miscarriage, many
of them will have had a, it may be an unintentional pregnancy that’s
ended in miscarriage or they may have had unwanted pregnancies in the
past. And similarly in infertility so um I think it must, it would be
difficult to hold those views and to, and to work in gynaecology but it,
but you can! [laughs] [Consultant 5, female]
Throughout her account, Consultant 5 engages in boundary-work which locates
abortion firmly within the parameters of routine gynaecological practice. She argues
that abortion is “an important part of reproductive health”, which is the primary
concern of gynaecologists. She also emphasises the overlap between patients who
have unwanted pregnancies and those who are treated by conscientious objectors in
other areas of gynaecological practice, for example, infertility patients. In doing so,
she implies that HCPs who opt out of abortion and work in this specialty fail to
understand the nature of gynaecological practice, and the responsibilities of
gynaecologists towards their patients.
The construction of conscientious objection as an ‘impossible’ option was most
often employed by HCPs who worked within gynaecology. Interestingly,
gynaecologists sometimes argued that HCPs who did not work in their own specialty
could hold conscientious objections to the practice:
Some people will discuss it, refer, sign, but wouldn’t actually do the
abortion. And, and that’s ok – for GPs. My personal view is that, if
you’re going to be a gynaecologist, abortion is such a big part of the
gynae workload, you shouldn’t do gynaecology if you don’t do abortion.
It’s a bit like being a chest physician and saying ‘sorry I don’t do
asthma’. Um I don’t think that actually you should have the right to opt
out as a gynaecologist. I think if you don’t approve of abortion, do
something else. [Consultant 4, female – emphasis added]
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In this extract Consultant 4, who earlier questioned whether HCPs who opt out
always hold genuine objections (see p.103), suggests that, even when an objection to
abortion is genuine, the practice of conscientious objection is not legitimate within
the specialty of gynaecology. She argues that to be a gynaecologist and to practice
conscientious objection to abortion is as ludicrous as being a chest physician who
refuses to treat asthma patients. As in the previous extract, abortion provision is
located firmly within the boundaries of ‘gynaecology’.
The workload produced through abortion provision was a major feature of
accounts in which the practice of conscientious objection was portrayed as
incompatible with gynaecological work. For some HCPs, this workload was
constructed as a burden which they wished that they did not have to deal with (an
issue which is discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight). Nevertheless, when I
suggested that it might be possible for them to opt out through the conscience clause
they argued that this is not a “real” option because abortion is part of the specialty
they have chosen to work in:
P: I mean if I didn’t um if someone said I didn’t need to do them then I’d
be very happy. But it’s part of obstetrics and gynaecology unfortunately
so.
I: Um I suppose, in theory, you um some people do opt, opt out of, of
providing um um terminations through the um conscience clause.
P: Mmm
I: Um, is that something, I mean how do you feel about the conscience
clause?
P: Um, it’s diff – it’s difficult. I mean I totally understand why people
don’t want to do it. But when you go into obstetrics and gynaecology it is
actually – not a major part of it – but it is a part of um the specialty. And
the trouble is, when people opt out it means that other people have to do
more. Um so I think, I don’t know, you’d probably find that um some
people feel slightly aggrieved that because other doctors just decide they
don’t want to do them they end up getting, getting landed with, you
know, double the amount on their lists. [Specialist Registrar 1, male]
I: Sure. Um and you said that you um if you had the, the choice you
would not maybe be involved in it?
P: Yeah
I: Um cos in theory, people um do have the choice – I, I mean in theory.
P: Yeah
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I: But what do you think about that?
P: Yeah, the the, the theory, the theory of that is then it then falls to your
colleagues.
I: Mmm, yeah.
P: And, and I would never put anybody in a, in the the situation. [Nurse
1, female]
In describing the ‘impossibility’ of opting out, these two HCPs make a similar
argument to those conscientious objectors who suggest that the ‘right’ to opt out is
one which is difficult to exercise in practice (see section 4.2.2). However, rather than
simply focussing on these accounts as evidence of the potential difficulties which
HCPs may face in attempting to enact their legal rights, it is also possible to consider
their more positive implications. Specifically, when HCPs portray conscientious
objection as an impossible option, it could be argued that they are situating
themselves as relational actors, who have important obligations to their colleagues
and/or to their patients. As Lazarus (1997) points out, when opting out of abortion is
discussed merely as an issue of individual rights, we cease to pay attention to the
relevance of these obligations. In a study of doctors who were training in an
obstetrics/gynaecology programme in the US, she criticises the narrow focus of these
HCPs:
When residents think of ethical considerations they generally think of
their own beliefs and values, in terms of their own autonomy. “Will I do
abortions? Under what circumstances? How much will I participate in the
process?” Rarely do they think in terms of “what do I [much less ‘we’]
owe this patient?” (Lazarus, 1997: 1422)
In contrast, HCPs working in central Scotland seem much more prepared to position
abortion within this second framework, wherein it becomes an obligation that falls to
those who choose to work within this specialty.
While this is an encouraging aspect of the interview data, it is clearly vital to
reflect upon the fact that, by depicting abortion work as a normal part of the work of
gynaecology, HCPs who are involved in abortion provision are able to criticise the
actions of conscientious objectors. In doing so, they can legitimate their own
involvement in abortion provision as the only morally acceptable course of action
available to someone working in the specialty of gynaecology. Moreover, when
HCPs construct conscientious objection as a desired but impossible course of action
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(e.g. Specialist Registrar 1 and Nurse 1), they are able to portray themselves as
individuals who endure hardship in order to fulfil their obligations to others.
The accounts described in this section construct conscientious objection as a
practice which is incompatible with the specialty of gynaecology. However, several
participants suggested that opting out of abortion should not be an option for any
HCP, with GP15 stating this particularly strongly:
I: Um and the um, you said that it really pisses you off that some people
[doctors] have a hang up about it?
P: Oh, absolutely, yeah! Absolutely! You know, get on their soapbox
and lecture young kids about, you know, all the religious nonsense and so
on. So I do not believe it’s their place to do so. So, on you go.
I: Ok. Um and uh I suppose related to that, you know, there’s the
conscience clause that exists – this is one of the few areas of medical
practice where you can opt out.
P: Yeah, absolutely.
I: So what do you think about that?
P: Well it’s there to pacify those that like to get on their soapbox really
isn’t it? But uh I do not believe it’s their place to do, get on their soapbox
really so, there we are.
I: Ok, um-
P: See we wouldn’t have all these problems if we didn’t have religion!
[laughs] Load of nonsense. [GP15, male]
As in the accounts outlined in section 4.2.1, conscientious objection is depicted as
synonymous with religious belief. However, in this case, the GP does not tolerate the
rights of individual HCPs to exercise such beliefs by opting out of abortion
provision. Rather, he suggests that the practice of religion cannot be accommodated
as part of the practice of medicine.
4.4 The boundaries of ‘conscience’
The preceding discussion implies that there was a clear distinction between those
HCPs who accepted that conscientious objection to abortion could be a legitimate
practice (section 4.2) and those who did not (section 4.3). However, in the vast
majority of the interviews, HCPs drew on a combination of the two discourses
outlined in section 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. In other words, they depicted the
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practice of genuine conscientious objection as legitimate, whilst simultaneously
suggesting that it is problematic.
These accounts of conscientious objection were routinely constructed through
what Wetherell and Potter term “the concession/criticism disclaimer format” (1992:
153). They identify this as one strategy that New Zealanders use to criticize the
behaviour of public protesters, whilst depicting their critique of protesters as
moderate, and thus reasonable. This process typically involves “a limited concession
of the legitimacy of protest, followed by the postulation of the limits of legitimacy
around the rights of others” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992: 153). Likewise, in many
HCPs’ accounts, the practice of conscientious objection was first accepted, and then
qualified by statements which delineated the acceptable boundaries of this practice:
I: Sorry the, you know, the conscience clause, you can in theory opt out
of provision. So how do you feel about that being a possibility, that
people can say-
P: Well, if that’s what they have to do, that’s what they have to do. I
wouldn’t particularly want to work with people like that. Um we have
from time to time had registrars who didn’t want to see women
requesting terminations and um they, they just have to be sure that they
can pass somebody on to somebody who will discuss it with them. And
that there isn’t any time wasted. Cos that, that’s really the problem, that
um a lot of time can pass while doctors, you know, make up their minds.
[GP14, female]
In this extract, GP14 makes it clear that she understands some people may “have” to
opt out. However, having made this concession, she goes on to demarcate clear
boundaries around the kinds of opting out which are possible. She does this by
highlighting the responsibilities which GPs who object to abortion have towards their
patients; they cannot block or delay women’s access to the procedure.
It is possible to argue that the “concession/criticism” format is simply a
rhetorical strategy which HCPs use in order to legitimate their own positions as
individuals involved in abortion provision. Through this strategy they can appear
respectful of other people’s “moral views”, whilst simultaneously criticising the
position of those HCPs who choose to opt out. However, this explanation does not
capture the way in which some HCPs seemed to literally experience the idea of
conscientious objection as ‘acceptable’ and ‘impossible’ at the same time:
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Well I think, I think you can’t make practitioners do something that they
fundamentally believe is against their culture, their religion or whatever.
So as long as that opt out conscience clause doesn’t actually make it
difficult for a woman to access a termination and, and also making sure
that that practitioner doesn’t enhance or increase a woman’s distress by
telling them that they’re not prepared to do it um so I think that again it’s
about how you do things. So actually, ‘I’m really sorry but you know my
I,’ I mean I don’t know how you would say it actually but you know ‘I -
because of my religious faith you know this is just one of the things that I
find difficult and um that’s just my own personal view so I want to help
you and what I’m going to do is get my colleague to see you and we’ll
sort that out now or however.’ So I think, I think um, I think it’s a
difficult one. Um I don’t know that you could be that dogmatic about
saying practitioners just have to toe the absolute line here. But I don’t
know where you draw the line because, you know, say you’ve got a
gynae nurse who says, ‘I’ll do every other procedure but I’m not gonna,
or I’ll assist at every other procedure but I’m not going to assist at a
termination’. And it’s almost like, if you feel like that maybe you
shouldn’t be working in this area um and certainly we wouldn’t have
anybody here who would be able to opt out with their conscience, you
know, because of their conscience um so I don’t know. Maybe I’m kind
of sitting a bit on the fence a bit. [Nurse 7, female – emphasis added]
In the italicised sections of this account, Nurse 7 accepts the practice of
conscientious objection, constructing it as something necessitated by the
“fundamental beliefs” of individual HCPs. However, she also positions this practice
as a potential threat to patients, and suggests that it is irreconcilable with the work of
gynaecology. At the end of her account the tension between these two discourses has
become so obvious that she acknowledges and apologises for her failure to reconcile
them.
The attempts that HCPs made to accommodate tensions between these two
discourses represent an interesting starting point for further analysis. This is because,
as they negotiated these tensions, they placed limits upon the forms of opting out
which individual HCPs can legitimately engage in. Simultaneously, they were
defining the aspects of abortion provision which lie fundamentally inside the
boundaries of ‘healthcare’, i.e. the activities which HCPs are obliged to engage in
because they are members of the healthcare profession. Unsurprisingly, every HCP
delineated these boundaries slightly differently. However, across the interview
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transcripts it is also possible to discern a bottom line beyond which the rights of
HCPs to opt out of abortion were rejected by all of my participants.
Within gynaecology, the ‘limit of conscience’ was placed at saving the life of a
pregnant woman. This is illustrated in the following quotation from Consultant 7,
who begins by saying that opting out is “absolutely fine”, but goes on to amend this
by demarcating a point where HCPs’ obligations towards patients override their right
to opt out:
I: Ok. Um and the other thing was there’s been a bit of discussion about
the conscience clause that allows people to opt out of being involved in
termination provision, and how you feel about the fact that people can
choose to not get involved with the service?
P: Oh, that’s absolutely fine by me. Oh, we have lots and increasingly
unfortunately which is a pain from a service provision point of view,
registrars and SHOs who are saying ‘we do not want to be involved with
this, we’re not going to sign anything’. We, if a patient is bleeding
heavily and the registrar or an SHO refuses to be involved because she’s
had a social termination then I’ll bloody have him against the wall for
that because that’s contravention of the GMC kind of guidelines. They’re
there to provide healthcare for patients, no matter what their views are.
And if the patient is bleeding heavily they have to, you know, resuscitate
that patient no matter that she’s having a procedure they don’t agree with
socially or um morally. [Consultant 7, male]
As illustrated in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, the Abortion Act also
demarcates emergency situations as a context in which HCPs’ rights to
conscientiously object no longer apply. Interestingly, however, Consultant 7 does not
cite this legislation. Instead, he refers to the healthcare profession’s own guidelines
as evidence that HCPs would be breaking a formalised professional rule if they failed
to provide care for a patient in an emergency situation. In doing so he reiterates that
this is a matter of professional obligation; HCPs are there to provide care to patients
in an emergency situation.
Both of the conscientious objectors in my sample who worked within
gynaecology appeared to agree that they had an obligation to provide assistance to
their colleagues if something went wrong during the process of an abortion, and a
woman’s life became endangered as a result. For example, Consultant 8 states that:
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My only involvement for example, would be if a woman was undergoing
and the process was underway, and she developed a complication which
might seriously impair her wellbeing or life. In which case there’s no
hesitation in undertaking whatever has to be done. But I wouldn’t have
started it. [Consultant 8, male, conscientious objector – emphasis added]
However, it should be noted that, while they concurred about this overall bottom
line, my sample only contained two gynaecologists who made use of the conscience
clause. Disturbingly, Nurse 6 suggests that other HCPs working in the specialty of
gynaecology do not always recognise this limit on the exercise of personal
conscience:
From the nursing side as well um I think for working [indirectly] in
services fine, but I do think that it gets taken a bit far sometimes. And the
same with hospital doctors as well that they’ve gotta realise that if
somebody’s in an emergency situation they cannot conscientiously object
and that actually taking somebody’s blood pressure, is not performing an
abortion, you know. And so why, why would you, you know, say ‘I don’t
want to’. […] And again if I do get an emergency situation where
somebody’s haemorrhaging and I need people to come and help quickly,
you don’t want people standing outside the door going ‘oh, well...’
[Nurse 6, female]
Legally, the scenario which Nurse 6 describes should never arise, because HCPs do
not have the right to conscientiously object to any aspect of medical treatment
“which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of a pregnant woman” (The Abortion Act 1967). In spite of
this, an interesting point that emerges from her account is the ambiguity of what is to
count as “performing an abortion”. Nurse 6 describes the difference between
measuring a patient’s blood pressure and actually performing an abortion as self-
evident. However, just as the Abortion Act does not define what it means to hold a
“conscientious objection” to abortion, it also fails to specify what it means to
practice this objection and, correspondingly, what it means to perform an abortion. It
simply says that, in the absence of emergency, HCPs are under no obligation “to
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act”. Farsides et al. (2004) point to
this ambiguous situation in their analysis of HCPs’ perspectives about working
within the field of prenatal screening. They argue that HCPs who work in this area,
and who personally disagree with the practice of abortion, “must define for
themselves what counts as an action contributing to the performance of a
termination” (Farsides et al., 2004: 507), and opt out accordingly.
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While GPs are unlikely to encounter a pregnant woman in an emergency
situation, the interviews reveal another important consensus about the limit beyond
which their rights as individuals cease, and their obligations as HCPs become
paramount. As indicated by the quotations earlier in this section, HCPs concurred
that GPs had an obligation to facilitate, even if indirectly, their patients’ access to
this procedure:
I mean I don’t think you can expect a doctor if they’ve got a, if it’s
against their moral judgment, you couldn’t expect a doctor to sign the
form. But what I would expect a doctor to do is to make sure the patient
then saw somebody that could offer that service. [GP9, female]
This obligation was also echoed by the two GPs in my sample who described
themselves as holding conscientious objections to abortion:
Uh that does not mean to say that I don’t uh shall we say enable patients
who want to have an abortion to take advantage of other doctors’ position
which would be radically different from mine. [GP20, male,
conscientious objector]
Um so in a sense I, I recognise I have a duty under sort of GMC
guidelines that if someone requests a termination they should be able to
see someone about that. [GP7, male, conscientious objector]
HCPs’ consensus concerning the professional responsibilities of GPs is interesting,
particularly in light of the fact that there is legal confusion about whether or not GPs
have an obligation to facilitate women’s access to abortion (see Sheldon, 1997).
However, while they may have agreed about this fundamental limit on their
rights as individuals, the extent to which these two ‘conscientiously objecting’ GPs
were willing to become involved in facilitating their patients’ access to the procedure
was very different. GP20 said that he provides his patients with the phone number of
a family planning clinic:
I mean I give them a phone number uh and I say, you know, phone them
up and um, as far as I know, other than perhaps those who’ve changed
their mind, they’ve all gone through that, that process. [GP20, male,
conscientious objector]
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In contrast, GP7 said that he refers his patients on to the hospital, but does so
without signing Schedule 1 of the Abortion Act.46 He was adamant that this still
constituted conscientious objection, and said that he told his patients and his
colleagues what he was doing:
P: It’s standard practice well a GP would sign what would be one
signature and the hospital would do the other signature, [I usually then
put a kind of note to say um] ‘I have not completed this form da da da for
reasons of personal conscience’ um and there’s always two doctors in the
clinic in the hospital and they would just co-sign it.
I: Has that ever caused you any problems?
P: Well no-one’s ever got back to me and saying that’s, that’s, ‘what are
you doing, you’re causing hassle’. I usually say to, to the ladies at the
time ‘I’m very happy to refer you, but for reasons of personal conscience
I, there’s a form that needs signed and I won’t be signing it, but there are
doctors in the hospital who will sign it for you. [GP7, male, conscientious
objector]
He acknowledged that other GPs who share his views might not be able to
enact their objections in the same way, and that they would send their patients
away to see another HCP. However, he argued:
I feel at least by doing what I do I have the option to discuss the issue
and, and maintain some sort of relationship with the patient. [GP7, male,
conscientious objector]
Thus, like many other HCPs, GP7 also places limits on the possibilities of “opting
out”, and rejects some forms of this practice because they are too disruptive to his
relationship with his patients. His ability to enact his conscientious objection through
his refusal to sign the Certificate A undoubtedly has material implications for his
patients, who will not experience any delay in obtaining a hospital appointment. In
contrast, after going to see GP20, patients will have to phone up and make a further
appointment at the family planning clinic and then attend this appointment before
gaining access to hospital services.
During my interviews with GPs 7 and 20, another critical distinction
concerning the boundaries of conscience/healthcare emerged. GP20 argued that,
46 As described in Chapter One, the grounds under which an abortion is carried out are recorded via
two documents. The first is Schedule 1 (see Appendix B), which interviewees referred to as
‘Certificate A’, or ‘the green form’.
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because he believes that life begins at fertilisation, it is impossible for him to
participate in the prescription of emergency contraception:
Well, it all gets back to the point of, point of life and whether she’s
pregnant or not – ‘but I’m just doing it cos I’m not pregnant!’ Well why
are you wanting emergency contraception? So I would offer them uh
alternative choices, you know, and you can buy it over the counter, you
go to A and E, go to family planning. So, there are at least three
alternatives uh for anybody to actually, to actually do if they wanted it.
[GP20, male, conscientious objector]
While GP20 is keen to emphasise the other choices that are available to women
seeking emergency contraception, it is important to locate these choices within their
social context. Without a GP prescription, emergency contraception can cost
upwards of £20 from a pharmacist (and, in any case, cannot be bought over the
counter by those who are under sixteen years old). When it is considered that patients
may be living out of easy reach of either family planning or an Accident and
Emergency department, and that emergency contraception is a time-limited drug,47
the choices open to them appear rather more restricted.
In contrast, the lack of alternatives which are open to his patients are
emphasised in GP7’s account of his decision to provide emergency contraception to
his patients:
I: Um uh, do you prescribe emergency contraception?
P: I do at the moment. Again, that was a bit of a sort of a dilemma I’ve,
I’ve kind of faced uh as to, to, to what to do. Initially I made a choice of
I’m not happy with that, when I was in the hospital. Cos again there was
the choice of not having to do it, someone else can do it then. As a GP
I’ve sort of taken the choice I will do that, partly because it’s not always
easily available to sort of say go and see somebody else, you know, if
you’re the only doctor there and it’s now six o’clock. [GP7, male,
conscientious objector]
However, as well as arguing that his obligations to his patients restricted his
ability to exercise his objection to abortion/emergency contraception, GP7 also
drew broader boundaries around the point at which ‘life’ begins than GP20:
Um um and I suppose my view of it, it sort of, you know when somebody
is pregnant, at six or seven weeks pregnant it’s, it’s um, there’s no
ambiguity as to you know, that this is a fetus with viability vs. a sort of a
47 It can be taken within seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse, but its efficacy in preventing
pregnancy starts to decrease after the first twenty-four hours.
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kind of a, a pre-implanted uh zygote [laughs] basically. Um so, the
potential for life is, is overwhelmingly different between the sort of
something that’s kind of at the two cell stage versus a six week sort of
pregnancy with a, with a heart-beat. So, it’s possibly the lesser of two
evils, um, I think. [GP7, male, conscientious objector]
The use of biological discourse to differentiate acceptable from unacceptable
interventions into embryonic/fetal development is well known from public debates
about abortion (Franklin, 1991; Sheldon, 1997) as well as embryo research (Mulkay,
1997; Franklin, 1999; Parry, 2003). In Chapter Seven, I will go on to illustrate that,
while they do not share GP7’s stated “conscientious objection” to abortion, many of
the other HCPs that I interviewed made very similar uses of biological discourse in
order to demarcate a point in time beyond which abortion becomes unacceptable.
Arguably, the only difference between their accounts and GP7’s is that they are
referring to later thresholds in gestational time.
The major differences between the accounts of GP7 and GP20 raise questions
about my labelling of “conscientious objectors” as a distinctive, homogeneous group
of HCPs, easily separable from the rest of my sample by virtue of their ‘objection’ to
abortion. In many ways, this is a perfectly legitimate characterisation because, unlike
the other HCPs I interviewed, the five HCPs whom I have termed “conscientious
objectors” responded to my opening question (see Appendix E) by making some
statement about the fact that they used the conscience clause, or opted out. However,
the contrast between GP7’s and GP20’s accounts reveals variation both in terms of
what it means to practice a “conscientious objection” to abortion (i.e., not signing a
legal form vs. not referring a patient), as well as the precise act which is being
objected to (i.e., the destruction of a six/seven week fetus vs. any interference in the
development of a fertilised egg).
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have illustrated that HCPs draw on one of two discourses to
construct conscientious objection as a legitimate practice. I have also argued that the
discourse which individual HCPs employ in legitimating the practice of
conscientious objection is linked to whether or not they are involved in abortion
provision. HCPs who participate suggest that there are certain individuals who
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possess ‘genuine’ objections to abortion as an intrinsic part of their identity, often
attributing this to religious belief. In doing so, they position conscientious objectors
as individuals who are different from the norm, but who must be tolerated and
allowed to opt out. In contrast, HCPs who identified as conscientious objectors
legitimated the practice of opting out very differently. They represented their use of
the conscience clause as the enactment of an important moral belief, and emphasised
that this process is sometimes made difficult by relationships with patients or
colleagues. Additionally, they often developed critiques of the behaviour of those
who did not abstain from involvement in abortion, including other HCPs and/or
women who request the procedure.
In section 4.3 I revealed that, just as some conscientious objectors criticised
others for their involvement in abortion, several of those who were involved in
abortion provision (particularly those working in gynaecology) developed critiques
of HCPs who made use of the conscience clause. This second group of HCPs
engaged in boundary-work, through which conscientious objection became defined
as a theoretical right which cannot legitimately be enacted in practice because of
HCPs’ obligations to one another and to patients.
Collectively, the data considered in sections 4.2 and 4.3 points to the
contemporary relevance of Davis and Davidson’s (2005) insights concerning the
tension between the existence of a legal ‘opt out’ clause for individual HCPs vs. the
social context in which this clause is being enacted. Both HCPs who opt in and those
who opt out often depict the possibility of utilising this clause as something which is
shaped by workplace relationships (whether with patients or colleagues). Nurse 10’s
account also draws attention to the possibility that HCPs’ ability to opt out may be
differently influenced by these relationships, for example, senior staff may have a
greater potential to determine their own involvement in abortion provision than
trainees.
However, while HCPs’ accounts of the social shaping of ‘conscientious
objection’ are undoubtedly interesting, I have also emphasised the rhetorical
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dimensions of accounts in which HCPs are contrasting their own behaviour with that
of colleagues who behave differently. Whether they are describing the practice of
‘opting in’ or ‘opting out’, HCPs could be said to be engaged in attempts to represent
their own behaviour as morally superior, e.g. by emphasising the hardships which
they face in order to ‘do the right thing’ (however this is defined).
In the final section of the chapter I went on to illustrate that, in most cases,
HCPs who are involved in abortion provision draw on a combination of the
discourses described in sections 4.2 and 4.3 in order to represent conscientious
objection as a practice which is simultaneously ‘legitimate’ and ‘impossible’. I
argued that HCPs’ attempts to reconcile these discourses represent a useful site at
which to explore the elements of abortion provision which are located as an intrinsic
part of ‘healthcare’, from which HCPs cannot opt out because of their obligations to
their patients. Although the boundaries of ‘healthcare’ vary across the transcripts, a
clear consensus does emerge concerning the absolute limit of conscience. HCPs
involved in gynaecology cannot refuse to participate in treatment which is necessary
to save a pregnant woman’s life, and GPs must help to facilitate, even if indirectly,
women’s access to abortion.
At the same, my data also suggest that, in spite of this broad consensus,
individual HCPs retain the freedom to delineate the boundaries of ‘healthcare’ in
ways that have troubling implications for their patients. The comparison of the
practices of two GPs who conscientiously object to abortion illustrated the potential
variability in the ‘healthcare’ which may result from this process. In one practice,
patients will receive emergency contraception and, if they request an abortion, they
will receive an immediate referral to hospital. In another, they will not receive
emergency contraception and, if they request an abortion, they will have to see
another doctor at a family planning clinic before being given a referral to hospital.
A final issue which emerges from this chapter is that, when HCPs who are
involved in abortion provision position themselves in relation to conscientious
objectors, they tend to define abortion as a practice which is a normal and legitimate
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part of their work. However, in the following chapters I will reveal that a very
different picture emerges when these same HCPs describe their interactions with
pregnant women. In this alternative context, ‘abortion’ often becomes differentiated
as several kinds of practice, not all of which are constructed as acceptable.
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Chapter Five: Knowing women? Accounting for the
decision to terminate a pregnancy
5.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter One, feminist critiques of UK abortion law often centre on the
requirement for two doctors to agree that a woman has grounds for an abortion
(Brookes, 1988; Fyfe, 1991; Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997; Jackson, 2000; Lee,
2003b). Both Boyle (1997) and Sheldon (1997) argue that this requirement rests
upon and perpetuates the problematic constructions of femininity which dominated
the parliamentary debates leading up to the partial decriminalisation of abortion in
1967. In separate analyses of these debates, they criticise the way in which pro-
liberalisation discourse depicted abortion as the last resort available to women whose
unwanted pregnancies placed them in ‘desperate’ circumstances. Although the
portrayal of women’s desperation evokes sympathy, it simultaneously frames the
experience of being a woman with an unwanted pregnancy as one of overwhelming
distress. Both authors point out that this framing overlaps dangerously with the anti-
liberalisation position, which depicted women seeking abortion as impulsive, and
incapable of making moral judgments. The law which resulted is suggestive of the
resonance between these two positions. Women are neither burdened with or allowed
responsibility for abortion because this decision is located with the medical
profession, who are portrayed as having access to the knowledge and reason that
women requesting the procedure lack (Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997).
In addition to critiquing the way in which UK law and debate constructs
abortion and femininity, Sheldon (1997) suggests that the Abortion Act’s deference
to medical expertise facilitates the deployment of power over women in the clinic.
Based on an analysis of existing literature (concerning women’s experiences of
requesting abortion, empirical studies of abortion decision-making, medical reports
etc.), she identifies several levels of “control” made possible by the terms of the
Abortion Act. Three of these are created by the fact that two doctors’ signatures are
required to make an abortion legal. “Decisional control” (Sheldon, 1997: 58) refers
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to the power which doctors are given to grant or refuse a woman’s request for
abortion. Sheldon argues that this level of control then makes women with unwanted
pregnancies particularly vulnerable to two other types of control which are routinely
exercised during medical consultations.48
In order to illustrate the first of these, which she terms “normalising control”
(1997: 67), Sheldon draws on Foucault’s (1991) concept of “normalizing judgment”.
In contrast to the simplicity of judgments such as guilty/not-guilty, the plurality of
‘norms’ open up infinite avenues for the operation of power. As there is not simply
one ‘norm’ but rather “degrees of normality” (Foucault, 1991: 184), the possibilities
for classifying ‘deviations’ and punishing/treating them are endless. Sheldon’s
concern with the operation of this mechanism of power relates to the process of
medical interviewing which women must undergo in order to access an abortion:
Here, there is the requirement that the woman open herself to the medical
gaze and reveal quite intimate details of her personal life in order to
justify her request and convince the doctor, as it is the doctor’s
interpretation of her life experiences which will be valid for all official
purposes. The very way that the law is phrased seeks to make every
aspect of the woman’s life and ‘actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment’ relevant to her application. Indeed, it imposes the medical
surveillance and control as a duty. (Sheldon, 1997: 68)
Sheldon also identifies a second type of control that is intensified by “decisional
control”, namely “paternalistic control” in which “the sympathetic doctor imposes
his own views” (1997: 149) about what is in a woman’s best interests. However, it is
difficult to understand why she identifies this as a separate analytical category from
that of “normalising control”; both refer to a process in which HCPs measure
abortion requests against particular standards, and respond accordingly.
Writing in 1997, Sheldon acknowledges the limitations of the empirical
material available to her (drawn primarily from the 1970s and 80s), and the
48 The dynamics of medical consultations have been studied extensively by medical sociologists, who
have illustrated how asymmetric power relations are maintained between doctors and their patients.
Although this body of literature is too large to summarise adequately, some examples include Fisher
(1984), West (1984) and Silverman (1987). As a field of theory, medical sociology is characterised by
many of the same tensions as those considered in section 2.3 of Chapter Two, for example, concerning
the extent to which patients co-operate with, rather than being oppressed by, doctors’ attempts to
exercise power over them (for an overview see Lupton, 2003).
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difficulties of drawing conclusions about the operation of power in contemporary
abortion practice, because “it is inconceivable that medical practice and opinions will
not have been subject to some change over the past years” (1997: 53). Indeed, more
recently, Lee (2003b) has reviewed changes in abortion counselling policy and
argues that they reflect a significant shift away from the assumptions about
femininity and abortion that are embedded in the law. In the 1970s, Department of
Health guidelines advocated the provision of counselling to all women requesting
abortion, who “remained constructed in a way similar to that in legal debate, as
vulnerable when pregnant and in need of guidance” (Lee, 2003b: 540) from HCPs. In
contrast, contemporary guidelines provided by the Department of Health and the
Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists emphasise that only a minority of
women will experience difficulties making the decision to terminate a pregnancy,
and most will not “ need to undergo significant interventions or engage in a
particular kind of discussion in order to decide whether to have an abortion” (Lee,
2003b: 542).
Lee also draws on ten semi-structured interviews with abortion counsellors
working for non-NHS abortion providers in England, in order to argue that this shift
in policy is reflected in abortion practice. Echoing contemporary counselling policy,
the abortion counsellors that she interviewed were clear that pregnant women were
capable of reaching their own decisions about abortion, and that, for most women,
this decision is made by the time they approach abortion services (Lee, 2003b). This
finding mirrors research that has explored women’s experiences of abortion, which,
as outlined in Chapter One, reveals that the vast majority of women make their
decision long before they approach the clinic (Allen, 1985; Kumar et al., 2004; Lee,
2004). Likewise, when explaining how the subject tends to come up in a
consultation, the HCPs in my sample painted a very similar picture, arguing that
women simply ask directly for an abortion, or for ‘help’ with a pregnancy that they
have defined as problematic before they reach the consulting room.
On the basis of her findings, Lee (2003b) argues that abortion policy and
practice is now in conflict with the law which regulates abortion. She concludes that,
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“Britain needs to have a law that provides for abortion on request” and that “this case
is made not only by feminist academics, but more and more by the reality of abortion
provision” (Lee, 2003b: 553). However, rather than talking to HCPs, Lee interviewed
counsellors, who are trained to prioritise client autonomy and self-determination. She
herself seems to acknowledge the contingency of her conclusions about abortion
provision when she notes that the extent of the shift in practice that she describes
“may vary depending on the geographical location of the provider, whether it is an
NHS or specialist unit, and also on the gestation of the pregnancy” (Lee, 2003b:
549). In this chapter, I examine the way that HCPs working for the NHS in Scotland
account for abortion decision-making and argue that, in this context, they do not
uniformly reject the law’s assumption that they are ‘experts’ in relation to women
requesting the procedure.
The discussion that follows draws on the analytical approach to expertise and
discourse outlined in Chapters Two and Three, and explores expertise as a subject
position which is accomplished through talk, and which can be considered in terms
of its immediate and wider discursive implications (Kerr et al., 2007). Using this
approach, I attempt to convey the key types of discursive work which HCPs engage
in as they account for their involvement in the decision to terminate a pregnancy. The
discussion highlights three broad subject positions which emerge from the data, and
reveals how each constructs a different relationship between HCPs and women with
unwanted pregnancies.
To some extent, each of the three subject positions described can be considered
as the preferred strategy of accounting adopted by a subset of HCPs. However, the
reason that it is impossible to simply associate individual HCPs with individual
strategies of accounting is that, in most of the interviews, they distinguished different
kinds of decision about abortion, and, in doing so, switched subject positions in
relation to their pregnant patients. I draw attention to this phenomenon in the final
section of the chapter, where I also reflect upon Sheldon’s (1997) concerns about the
operation of power in the abortion consultation. I reveal that, although they often
position themselves as experts who can assess women’s decisions about abortion,
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HCPs try to avoid claiming absolute “decisional control” over whether or not an
abortion can take place. Nevertheless, the ways in which they claim to manage the
outcome of decisions that their assessment has rendered problematic resonate
strongly with Sheldon’s suggestion that the abortion consultation is a site at which
pregnant women are subjected to “normalising control”.
5.2 Demarcating legitimacy: Denying responsibility
One striking feature of HCPs’ accounts was the regularity with which they refuted
the suggestion that they could legitimately play a role in decision-making about
abortion. The following discussion examines three key discourses that HCPs used to
position themselves as illegitimate decision-makers in comparison to women
requesting abortion. These discourses are considered individually for the sake of
simplicity, but in reality, they were often combined in HCPs’ accounts.
5.2.1 “Discourses of ignorance”
In a small number of cases, HCPs’ denials of legitimacy were couched in terms of a
comparison between the status of the knowledge which they possess as HCPs, and
the knowledge which women requesting abortion have access to:
But yeah I think, I mean and part of my sort of thing about saying I
would find it very difficult to um turn down a, a request for a termination
is, is partly based on that. Why would I know better than the woman
whether or not she should have a pregnancy? I, I don’t see that I would
have any specialist knowledge or experience that would equip me better
than her to know if she should have a baby or not. [Consultant 3, female]
P: And I think possibly years, when I, when I worked a few years back,
um I mean that was how the clinic was run, I was just a sort of junior
member of staff, d’you know what I mean? Um and so maybe I was just
a bit more naive about it all and, and maybe felt I had more, had more
you know, that was more - I had to sort of find out what was going on in
the, women’s lives. Whereas I kind of more feel like you can’t possibly,
you know, in, in a twenty minute, half-an-hour consultation, know the
huge number of reasons and the complexities of women’s lives as to
what’s brought them, do you know what I mean?
I: Yeah
P: To this point. And it’s pretty insulting to assume that you can, you
know, so yeah. [Nurse 6, female]
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Michael (1996) argues that these kinds of denials of knowledge cannot be treated
simply as evidence of a knowledge deficit. Rather, “discourses of ignorance” are
actively constructed, defining both the status of the speaker and their relationship to
other sources of knowledge (Michael, 1996). Based on an analysis of the way that
individuals describe their ignorance about ionising radiation, he identifies three key
“discourses of ignorance” through which his interviewees constructed their
relationship with scientific knowledge, two of which are particularly relevant to this
discussion. Firstly, when drawing on a discourse of ignorance as a “deliberate
choice” (Michael, 1996: 119), some individuals argued that they choose not to learn
the scientific ‘facts’ about radiation because these just obscured the crucial issue, i.e.
that radiation poses a danger to the public. In defining their ignorance, these speakers
thus re-define what is relevant to the discussion of ionising radiation and make a
political challenge to the legitimacy of scientific framings. In contrast, when drawing
on a discourse of ignorance as a “division of labour” (Michael, 1996: 118) some
individuals argue that it is not their job (or their responsibility) to know the scientific
facts about radiation.
In the extracts above, Consultant 3 and Nurse 6 draw on a discourse of
ignorance as a “deliberate choice” by suggesting that, when it comes to abortion
decisions, they cannot occupy a more knowledgeable position than that of a woman
with an unwanted pregnancy. In doing so they reframe the decision to terminate a
pregnancy as something which is not amenable to their assessment; this decision
rests upon a woman’s understanding of what an unwanted pregnancy means in the
context of her own life.
However, the identification of those who possess legitimate knowledge also
automatically defines the labour involved in decision-making. If women are the only
people who can know whether an abortion should take place, then HCPs cannot and
do not have to be concerned with this knowledge:
I: Sure. Um, and some of the people that I’ve spoken with have said um
sort of what you’re saying - that you could see it as the, the woman’s
decision as termination is effectively on demand. Um but that, they
would see it as the woman’s decision because she’s the person who kind
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of has the expertise to assess her own situation. And I’m just interested
what you think about that argument?
P: Yeah that’s, you know, what - the decision for that woman is right for
her at that time. If it happens, if she got pregnant unwittingly two years
later, the decision might be quite different because her circumstances will
have changed in that time, or could have changed in that time anyway.
And, so what’s right in one situation isn’t necessarily right in another.
Now, you know, none of us have crystal balls so we have to um go with
what the patient says, you know. [Consultant 7, male]
Crucially, by producing this “division of labour”, HCPs’ discourses of ignorance as a
“deliberate choice” also allow them to deny responsibility for the decision to
terminate a pregnancy.
5.2.2 A discourse of women’s suffering
The literature reviewed in the introduction suggested that, during the passage of the
1967 Abortion Act, pro-liberalisation arguments about the suffering of women with
unwanted pregnancies led to a focus on their emotionality, lack of rationality, and
thus ultimately their ‘protection’ through a law which grants “decisional control” to
doctors (Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997). In this section, I will reveal that, when they
positioned themselves as illegitimate decision-makers in comparison to women with
unwanted pregnancies, several HCPs also drew upon a discourse of women’s
suffering. However I will point to an important distinction between HCPs’ use of this
discourse, and the way that it was employed in the parliamentary debates that
preceded the Abortion Act. In HCPs’ accounts, women’s (alleged) emotional
involvement in abortion decision-making was not portrayed as something which
renders them in need of ‘protection’ by HCPs. Rather, it was used to position women
as legitimate and authoritative abortion decision-makers:
I worked at [family planning clinic] for [number of] years so I was seeing
women requesting an abortion throughout that time and if there’s one
thing that drives me completely scatty about the anti-abortion argument
is when they, the anti-abortionists use comments like uh well women
take it lightly, or they don’t care or um they use it as contraception or
whatever. And I’ve, I’ve I think I hardly ever met a woman who didn’t
think about it very deeply, and I mean it was, you know, your average
woman would come having given it considerable thought. Um I’m not
saying I never met a woman who was very casual about it but, even then,
in my experience, women who are very casual about it had to deal with
stuff at some point even if it was later. But it just, it is a very very
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profound and deep um decision and, if a woman’s reached that decision,
it may have only taken her a day, but it still involves profound uh
feelings and thoughts. And who the hell are we to say ‘I know better,
you’re wrong’. [GP18, female]
In an analysis of the way that emotion is mobilised as a persuasive device by the
anti-abortion movement, Hopkins et al. (2005) argue that, while ‘emotionality’ is
often contrasted pejoratively with ‘rationality’, discourses of emotion can sometimes
be used to persuade audiences of the objectivity of a particular position. Precisely
because emotion is seen to exist in a separate realm from rational debate, it is harder
to contest and “can be construed as ‘unmediated’ and ‘authentic’” (Hopkins et al.,
2005: 395). Likewise, in this extract, the “profound feelings and thoughts” which
GP18 suggests are part of a woman’s decision to have an abortion are depicted as
something which makes it impossible for GP18 to contest this decision.
Although GP18 remained vague about the nature of the “profound feelings”
which are generated by the decision to end a pregnancy, her argument that even
“women who are very casual about it had to deal with stuff at some point”, implies
that the experience of making this decision is a not a pleasant one. The suggestion
that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is intrinsically difficult was made more
explicitly by other HCPs:
I wasn’t always aware but eventually did become aware that um you can
say anything you like in a, in a discussion or an argument but until
you’ve actually been in that situation yourself. Until you’ve actually
thought ‘gosh I might be pregnant’ and realise, you know, then you
realise what that’s like and, and you start thinking about ‘well what shall
I say to my mum and dad? What shall I say to my granny!’ You know,
um the reality does cast a different light on it. And that, that’s something
that I’ve often heard from young women. You know, ‘oh! I’ve always
thought this was wrong!’ you know or ‘I’ve always said I would never
have a termination but I just can’t see any way out now’. So I, I you
know, I do think that people who haven’t been in that situation, and
particularly men, have limitations really when it comes to talking about
it. [GP14, female]
Brown and Michael (2002) suggest that, while emotions in general represent a
powerful rhetorical resource, the display of pain and suffering is particularly
effective in conveying the ‘authenticity’ of a point of view. They develop this
argument by illustrating the way in which scientific institutions have responded to
the public’s increasingly vocal expressions of mistrust about their activities.
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Although one obvious solution to this lack of trust is for institutions to render their
decisions transparent, Brown and Michael point out that the contextual nature of
what is to count as ‘transparency’ means that its extent can always be called into
question. Because of this, institutional representatives must convey their
trustworthiness by relying on the establishment of their emotional ‘authenticity’ as a
substitute for the limitations of factual transparency. This authenticity is “signalled
by the agonistic difficulties of ‘making tough decisions’, of being seen painfully to
ponder over antagonistic positions, agonising over one course or another” (Brown &
Michael, 2002: 261), i.e. the use of conventions which signal suffering or pain. In the
extract above, GP14 draws upon similar conventions in suggesting that women are
torn between and forced to reconcile competing perspectives concerning abortion
when they decide to end their pregnancies. She suggests that, by virtue of the fact
that they occupy such a difficult position, these women’s voices are imbued with a
greater authority when it comes to deciding (or even simply talking) about abortion.
However, while such accounts may legitimate the perspectives of women with
unwanted pregnancies, they simultaneously reinforce the association between
abortion and women’s suffering which, as outlined above, is a framing which has
long dominated public discussion of abortion in the UK. The persistence of this
framing was visible during the Committee Stage of the Government’s Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in 2008. Those defending women’s access to
abortion relied heavily on the argument that it is an agonising decision, made by
desperate women who should be treated with compassion:
Far from reducing the frequency of unwanted pregnancies and abortions,
restricting abortion forces women to resort to illegal and mostly unsafe
abortions, which endangers their health and their lives. That is why
virtually all developed countries legalised abortions in the previous
century—because they could no longer accept the tragic suffering and
loss of their female population. If women have no access to legal
abortion, they resort to illegal means. Women will go to any lengths and
will take any risk to end an unwanted pregnancy—and “any” means
exactly that […] What I am saying is that putting restrictions in the way
of women who have already made a difficult and, as my hon. Friend the
Member for Crosby (Mrs. Curtis-Thomas) said, traumatic decision—she
used that word about three times—is just prolonging the agony. Doing so
is cruel and unnecessary. [Chris McCafferty, Hansard Column 236-239,
May 20th 2008]
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As well as critiquing this kind of discourse for its equation of emotionality and
femininity, Boyle (1997) points out that it individualises, rather than politicises, the
‘need’ for abortion. The suggestion that abortion is necessary to relieve individual
women’s suffering makes it very difficult to discuss it as a social justice issue, “a
positive and enabling condition for full human participation in social and communal
life” (Petchesky, 1984: 378). However, Boyle also acknowledges that the
mobilisation of this negative legitimatory discourse by pro-choice groups may be a
strategically important response to the anti-abortion movement’s insistence that
women have abortions for unnecessary, frivolous reasons (see Chapter Four).
Additionally, she notes that it may have been the only response “available in a
context which lacked – and still lacks – positive discourses for women’s rejection of
motherhood” (Boyle, 1997: 45).
The absence of such positive discourses often seemed to visibly constrain
HCPs as they accounted for their practice. On several occasions HCPs literally
stopped themselves mid-sentence in order to re-describe women’s experiences in
more ‘appropriate’ language. For example:
Um so the most common presentation I would have to say is um some-
somebody coming in, realising they’re pregnant. Um most people seem
to have an idea where they want to go with the pregnancy even to begin
with, in the, there are a few people that actually sway back and forth I
have to say. But most people will want a termination or – I shouldn’t say
want because nobody really wants a termination – um but no most people
who know that this is where they’re going to go are upset in some form
or another. You know, they may not be crying upset but, you know, it’s
it’s upsetting in some way, either because of the partner situation or
because [inaudible word] at the thought of the loss of a child or um. So,
so you know, you very seldom get somebody bouncing in saying ‘oh! I
want to be referred’ you know. [GP10, female]
In trying to describe the certainty which some women experience concerning the
decision to terminate a pregnancy, GP10 suggests that abortion is something that
they know they ‘want’. However she quickly corrects this suggestion, and goes on to
testify to the various ways in which the fact that it is impossible to ‘want’ an abortion
causes women to suffer. As in the accounts described above, the impression which is
created is that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is intrinsically distressing.
However, the difference is that, whereas the accounts above seem to make use of a
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discourse of suffering, GP10 seems to find it impossible to talk about abortion
decision-making in any other way. As the discussion in section 5.5 will demonstrate,
the difficulties involved in discursively separating the legitimacy of abortion from
women’s suffering also has important implications for those who request the
procedure.
5.2.3 A discourse of ‘woman’s choice’?
When drawing on discourses of ignorance or suffering, HCPs constructed their
position of illegitimacy in abortion decision-making with reference to the fact that
they are not the person who is experiencing an unwanted pregnancy. This experience
is said to provide women with privileged insights or ‘expertise’. However, in other
cases, HCPs rejected “decisional control” over abortion on the basis that women
should automatically have ownership over decisions about their own bodies:
I: Ok. Um, you said you saw your role as a sort of facilitator. Um I’m not
trying to put words in your mouth I just want to know if this is what I’ve
understood – does that mean that you see the decision as being, as
women’s, women making the decision?
P: Absolutely. Yeah, women. It’s, the decision is the woman’s decision,
it’s not my decision. And if she comes in here and says ‘this is what I
want to do, I’ve had a discussion with’, whoever she wants to discuss it
with, or me if she wants to discuss it further then I’ll pass on what she
wants to do. But it’s not my role to make her decision for her.
I: Could you say a bit about why you see it as being the woman’s
decision to make?
P: Well she’s the one that’s pregnant! [laughs]
I: Ok.
P: Absolutely, and it’s her decision to make. It’s not her husband’s,
partner’s, boyfriend’s, whatever else decision to make, it’s her own
decision to make. And I firmly hold that view, so. [GP15, male]
I: Could you say a bit about why you see it as being the woman’s
decision, you know if she wants a termination and she just feels…?
P: Well I don’t believe that life begins at conception, you see, I I think
that life is life when it can exist as autonomous or uh from you know
another human being um so, in my view it is a woman’s body and it’s a
woman’s choice and just through the, you know, that’s all very high
brow. But I, I think at the end of the day, if you look at it from a pure
practical point of view, it’s the woman that’s going to get stuck with the,
with the situation so um until the system works better and until the, the
men take more responsibility I think that’s entirely a woman’s choice
um. [GP10, female]
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Interestingly, GP10 combines an ‘individual/biological’ argument concerning
women’s rights to bodily self-determination with the alternative, ‘social’ argument
which feminists have used to advocate women’s reproductive freedom (Petchesky,
1984), namely, that in comparison to men, women bear a disproportionate share of
the burden of childcare.
However, more often, HCPs’ representations of abortion as ‘woman’s choice’
seemed to be articulated as part of a discourse of ‘patient’s choice’. In other words,
rather than depicting abortion as a political issue, HCPs constructed a model of
medical practice which, regardless of context, prioritises patient autonomy. In doing
so, they suggested that it is never part of their job to make decisions for their
patients:
I: And how does the role that patients - ok so in the case of termination
it’s, you say it’s the woman’s decision. And how does that compare with
the role that patients play in making decisions about other kinds of
medical procedures?
P: Well, I really feel that patients have to take a greater responsibility for
what they do and don’t do. And I give them the information and they
choose to ignore it, accept it or whatever um so. So, basically it’s a bit
like [what] I would practice anyway. [GP15, male]
I: Um, could you say a bit about why you see it as the woman’s decision?
P: Because I suppose that’s the way I practice medicine. I always feel
very much I’m, I’m an informer and I give people information in order to
help them make choices about their health and illnesses and things um.
But also um because I don’t want the woman to come back a few months
down the line and say ‘you made me have a termination’ or ‘ you made
me not have a termination, it’s your fault I made the wrong decision’ um
and that’s that’s not, not what I’m there for mmm. [GP11, female]
The emphasis which HCPs placed on patient choice is unsurprising given that, “the
primacy of patient autonomy has emerged as a central theme within medical law”
(Jackson, 2000: 468) in recent years.49 Moreover, as noted by numerous medical
sociologists, western medicine is increasingly characterised by the expectation that
individuals should be more concerned with, and take greater responsibility for, their
own health (e.g. Lupton, 1995; Petersen & Lupton, 1996).
49 The priority granted to this principle is central to the closely related practice of prenatal screening
and abortion for fetal abnormality (e.g. Williams et al., 2002c), in spite of the fact that the pregnant
woman is entirely absent from the legal clause which regulates this particular practice (Scott, 2005).
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When considered in this broader context, it is clear that a discourse of
‘woman’s choice’ does not necessarily pose any challenge to HCPs’ status as
professionals; the centrality accorded to this principle is simply represented as a
feature of normal medical practice. Crucially, this discourse allows HCPs to locate
all responsibility for abortion decisions with individual pregnant women, without
suggesting that their patients have privileged insights when it comes to making such
decisions.
5.3 Becoming insignificant: Dispersing responsibility
In their analysis of the impact of the 1967 Abortion Act on the Scottish medical
community, Davis and Davidson (2005) highlight the possibilities which existed for
HCPs to minimise their personal responsibility for decisions about abortion. This
sometimes involved the active manipulation of the system of abortion provision to
ensure certain outcomes, whilst ensuring that they were personally distanced from
these outcomes. For example, GPs could engage in strategic referral practices which
ultimately prevented women from accessing the procedure, gynaecologists could
claim their waiting lists were too long to see individual patients, and Consultants
could impose blanket policies about the acceptance/rejection of abortion requests on
the rest of their staff (Davis & Davidson, 2005). Forty years on, it is hardly
surprising that such practices do not feature in HCPs’ accounts. However, Davis and
Davidson also illustrate how GPs in particular were able to make a more passive use
of the system of abortion provision:
…he could obligingly refer patients to a local hospital but, rather than
make his own recommendation for or against the procedure, write a
neutral letter committing himself to no decision and thus evading
responsibility for whatever would follow. (Davis & Davidson, 2005: 301)
Likewise, the discussion in the remainder of this section will reveal that HCPs in
contemporary Scotland continue to draw discursively on structural aspects of
abortion provision, in order to position themselves as subjects whose responsibility
for decisions about abortion forms a small part of a wider system.
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In England, the existence of private and charitable abortion providers means
that, if they can afford to do so, women can self-refer to these services, by-passing
the primary care system. However, as described in Chapter Three, the absence of
such clinics in Scotland means that women are dependent on NHS abortion services,
which can only be accessed following referral by a GP or community sexual health
clinic. In general, this means that they will have to have two consultations (one in
primary care and one at the hospital) before being given an appointment for the
procedure.50 During interviews, GPs often utilised this situation to characterise the
decision to terminate a pregnancy as something that extends into a future which
exists beyond their consulting rooms:
And if they, if I’m going to refer them on to the hospital I often point out
that they can still change their mind about that decision right up to the
last minute. And me referring them, or them agreeing with the doctor that
they’re going to go ahead and arrange a date for termination does not tie
them into anything, right up to the last minute. Um cos people often do
change their minds. They change their minds between me referring them
to the hospital and them being seen, and they change their minds in
between them being seen and actually having the procedure. Um and I
think they need to know that they’ve got that possibility as well. [GP17,
female]
Unlike the accounts considered in the previous section GP17 raises, and has to deal
with, the possibility that women may change their minds about the best outcome of
their unwanted pregnancies. She manages this problem by constructing the decision
to terminate a pregnancy as a process that encompasses a series of consulting rooms,
and thus an extended period of time. In doing so, she reveals the opportunities for
women to change their minds, and simultaneously highlights the fact that her action
in referring somebody is not synonymous with an abortion.
Interestingly, those working in the hospital outpatient clinics where women
have their second consultation also drew on structural aspects of abortion provision
to distance themselves from the decision to terminate a pregnancy. Unsurprisingly,
rather than describing the decision as something which will occur at some point in
50 In recent years, community sexual health clinics in some NHS Boards have developed arrangements
with local hospitals, enabling women to be given direct access to the procedure from the community
without a separate outpatient consultation at the hospital.
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the future, they emphasise the time and events which have transpired before women
reach their own consulting rooms:
P: I think I spent a lot more time initially um asking them more about
their decision, checking the decision was ok. But I think now I almost
feel that that’s, you know, there’s so much opportunity to talk about it
that, you know, as long as I’m sure in the few minutes that I talk to them
about it I don’t pry too much about why they’re doing it or what brought
them to make that decision.
I: Yeah. Yeah, that’s something I’m quite interested in cos um some of
the GPs I’ve spoken to have said that they see decision-making taking
place more in secondary care – and some of them have said it takes place
in primary care. So I’m just interested how you see the relationship
between the first consultation and the second consultation that women
will have?
P: Um, I think it’s very variable. I think, I suspect you’re right, I think
some GPs maybe, you know, feel that we’ll then go and spend a lot of
time talking to them about how, how they came to their decision. And,
but I think the good thing about having – a lot of people talked about not
having two doctors – I think the good thing about it is that you know that
they’ve gone and discussed it, even if it’s just for a few seconds they’ve
discussed it with someone, and then there’s been a time period usually
for a few days or a week so they, before they have to then discuss it again
and I think that time period’s probably quite important to allow them to
think about things. Cos, you know, you can talk to a patient for an hour
and that’s not necessarily going to get you any further forward with them,
I think that they’ve got to go away and think about it themselves.
[Specialist Registrar 1, male – emphasis added]
In this extract, not only is the structure of abortion practice used to introduce the
dimension of time to decision-making, but, additionally, the law is invoked as
another layer of structure, which ensures that this temporal dimension is kept in
place.
By emphasising the multiple safeguards and exit routes which are built into
abortion practice, HCPs do not simply minimise their own role in abortion decision-
making. At the same time, they construct women requesting the procedure as
individuals who (at least potentially) require protection from themselves.
Nevertheless, in the accounts presented so far in this section, it is the time and space
created by medical practice which enables women to reach the right decision, rather
than any expertise on the part of HCPs. In contrast, some HCPs who engaged in the
dispersal of responsibility attached great significance to the fact that their patients
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will encounter other members of the healthcare profession before accessing the
procedure:
I: Um I was going to ask if you always refer a woman on if she’s
requesting a termination, or if there’s any cases where you say no or?
P: Never said no, I think, I’d, I, I’d always refer them on because they, I
think they go through the same process again, I don’t know what they do
in the gynae clinic but I think they go, do the same process again, you
know, that they usually see them in the gynae clinic and then give them a
date then. So I know it’s a kind of a second, a second line so I’d always
refer them on. I don’t think I’d say, I’d say, I’d say no to someone.
[GP13, male]
Who is it that makes the decision in practice? Yeah. Um I, in a, in a sense
although I am a gatekeeper um I am also a kind of signposter in that, in a
sense um many people that, who are wanting a termination have to go
through some facilitator. And I will facilitate getting them from where
they are uh to the person that can do it. Um, so I suppose in a sense the
decision is between them and the person that actually does, you know,
particularly with a, a surgical procedure, but in a sense the same kind of
ethical decisions lie with a medical procedure. If you are um terminating
a potential life, that’s a fairly big issue and therefore um, if you are
directly responsible for doing it I think it’s appropriate that that person
um agrees that they feel that this is the right thing to do. [GP1, male]
In these extracts, GPs position HCPs who work in hospitals as obstacles which
women have to overcome before being given access to an abortion. While GP13 is
vague about the nature of this “second line”, GP1 states explicitly that the doctor
who carries out the abortion must judge and agree with a woman’s request for the
procedure. In doing so, he simultaneously distinguishes his own identity from that of
a doctor who is “directly responsible” for abortion, and suggests that women do not
automatically make the “right” decisions by themselves.
5.4 Assessing women’s decisions: Embodying responsibility
During the interviews HCPs often pointed out that, as with any other medical
intervention, they have a legal obligation to ensure that their patients are making
“informed” decisions about abortion. However, as argued in Chapters Two and
Three, the definition of relevant ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ is never neutral
because this process inevitably asserts a particular version of reality. This is
particularly obvious in public discussions of abortion, where those opposed to the
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practice insist that women who undergo the procedure are doing so in ignorance of
‘the facts’. This argument was mobilised during the passage of the 2008 Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, when anti-abortion MPs tabled an amendment in
an attempt to make it mandatory for HCPs to provide certain information to women
requesting abortion. In doing so, they engaged in the well-known anti-abortion tactic
(Petchesky, 1984) of subverting feminist arguments about women’s “right to
choose”, by emphasising women’s “right to know the facts” about abortion:
Having an abortion is a very serious undertaking, and women who have
had one rarely ever mention it again. I suppose that for many it is
something that they would prefer to forget, but even for them, echoes of
that day will live with them for ever. Some will come to bitterly regret
their decision. Some women will invariably develop depressive anxiety
or other mental health disorders as a direct result of a five-minute
decision. The new clause seeks to ensure that women presenting
themselves for an abortion are given the sort of information that women
should have had since the introduction of the law. I am arguing that at
least five days before a woman finally makes any decision to have an
abortion, a doctor should be required to offer her counselling and the
details of the embryonic and foetal development of her baby at two-
weekly intervals. She should also have information about the physical,
psychological and psychiatric risks associated with the termination of
pregnancy, including a description of the methods of termination of
different types of pregnancies and any risks associated with those
methods. Finally, the woman should have a right to know about adoption
services and other sources of help and advice, including information on
any disability or abnormality from which the pregnant woman’s embryo
or foetus is at risk of suffering if born. [Claire Curtis-Thomas, Hansard
Column 228, May 20th 2008]
In this extract, the information that is portrayed as relevant to the decision to
terminate a pregnancy encompasses medical definitions of embryonic/fetal status, as
well as the risks of undergoing abortion.51 A pregnant woman’s situated
understanding of what a pregnancy means to her is not acknowledged as important
‘information’. Indeed, Claire Curtis-Thomas suggests that the perspective of a
pregnant woman who requests an abortion is not simply irrelevant but is also
dangerous; such women should be prevented from acting until they have been
subjected to a particular kind of medical enlightenment.
51 Lee (2003a) provides an in-depth analysis of the anti-abortion movement’s use of arguments
concerning the damage that abortion poses to women’s mental health.
144
Rather than contesting this construction of pregnant women, or pointing out
that definitions of the ‘facts’ of abortion are inevitably situated, those MPs who
opposed Curtis-Thomas’s amendment depicted it as a cruel piece of legislation which
would unfairly “burden” women:
Does the hon. Lady accept, first, that the existing consent forms and
information sheets approved by the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists provide information about the risks associated with
abortion and as much information as the woman needs? Secondly, does
she accept that it cannot be right to force doctors to give information that
a woman says she does not want because she would find it distressing?
Does the hon. Lady accept that the role of the doctor is not to hector or
impose on women burdensome information, which they do not want to
know, about the methods of abortion? That does not happen in any other
form of medicine, and it should not happen in the one that we are
discussing. [Evan Harris, Hansard Column 228, May 20th 2008]
Through this discourse, MPs essentially accepted the premise of their opponents’
criticisms of the current system of abortion provision, i.e. it is only doctors who
possess relevant knowledge about the meaning of abortion, and they choose to shield
pregnant women from certain aspects of this knowledge.
In contrast to this public depiction of informed decision-making about
abortion, several of the HCPs I interviewed problematised what was to count as
relevant ‘information’. For example, in the following extract, Nurse 7 tries to
reconcile an obligation to ensure that women have been allowed to consider certain
options with her acknowledgement that, for somebody who is requesting an abortion,
certain options may simply not exist:
I would say, obviously ‘it sounds like you’re really very certain but for
the purposes of um referring you I do need to just check out with you that
you’ve kind of considered all your options and that another option would
be – well you’ve got three options. Either to continue with the pregnancy
um to terminate the pregnancy, and the other one would be that you
could continue with the pregnancy and consider adoption.’ And usually
what happens at that point is a woman will react in terms of saying ‘I just
couldn’t go through with continuing with the pregnancy to then have the
baby adopted’. And and I might then say well ‘yeah I think that’s what a
lot of women in this situation uh tend to say but for the purposes of
making sure that you’re well aware of all of your options that’s just why
I wanted to mention it.’ Cos sometimes I think women find that a bit
insensitive. They might perceive it as being a bit insensitive. [Nurse 7,
female]
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However, although some HCPs reflected upon the contingent basis of what counts as
informed decision-making, in many cases they took particular definitions of this
process for granted. In the remainder of this section, I will provide examples which
illustrate this point. I will suggest that, through these accounts, HCPs were
positioning themselves as experts who can and should assess women’s decisions
about their pregnancies.
Like Nurse 7, GP14 stressed the importance of ensuring that women are
given the opportunity to consider the different options available to them. However,
unlike Nurse 7, she did not suggest that the treatment of these options as objective
‘facts’ might be perceived as insensitive by her pregnant patients:
I kind of talk through the, the – there’s basically there’s, there’s three
options. If you’re already pregnant you’ve got three options. One to have
a termination, two to have the baby and three um and this doesn’t
commonly happen nowadays um to give the baby up for adoption.
Obviously it still happens sometimes but it’s not a common thing. And
um what, what you need to talk through is um even although the woman
may feel it’s perfectly obvious what she wants to do, you need to spend a
bit of time talking through each one um because I want to be sure that
she was making a decision that she had actually thought through and was
reasonably confident about. Because you can’t change your mind
afterwards. [GP14, female – emphasis added]
Interestingly, although this account is structured around the provision of certain
information to pregnant women, its central point is that GP14 is able to make an
informed decision about her patients’ choices (“I want to be sure”). Rather than
simply informing women that they have three ‘options’, she suggests that talking
through each of these is necessary because this process allows her to become certain
that they have “thought through” their decisions. She went on to construct her desire
for this certainty in relation to the problematic futures which become possible when
women do not think things through:
Because you can’t change your mind afterwards. Um and, and I think it’s
quite helpful to think about, you know, the next twenty years because if
you have the baby and bring that baby up, it’s actually going to be more
than twenty years that they’re going to be your responsibility at least one
way or another. But you know, you, you’re certainly [as I say] thinking
about eighteen-twenty years. And a, a lot of younger women do rather
think that it’s a matter of bringing them up, getting them through school
and then that’s it. Um which isn’t, isn’t really the reality of life in Britain
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now. Um so thinking through the next twenty years um. After every
pregnancy there is a risk that you might not get pregnant again. And that
goes for full term pregnancy or miscarriage or termination, there’s
always a risk that you might not get pregnant again. And - so you have to
kind of bear that in mind, that there is a possibility this might be your
only chance. And um you know, how you would feel if, when you, you
know, years later you decide you want to have children and you stop
using contraception and you don’t get pregnant, how you would feel
then. [GP14, female]
GP14 was extremely unusual in focussing explicitly on the regrets which result
from the wrong decisions being made about a pregnancy per se. In the majority of
cases, HCPs focussed on the difficult futures which become possible because women
do not “think through” their decisions to terminate their pregnancies:
I: Do you get some women who will come in and they’re pretty sure
already that’s, you know, what the, what they want to do?
P: Yes, but you get people who come in all the time pretty sure that this
is the condition that they’ve got uh at the end of the day they don’t have
the medical training so they mightn’t be aware of the alternatives um.
Um so it’s, while you have to respect if it’s a considered decision, part of
being a considered decision is that they’re aware of the options and have
thought through.
I: And when you say uh aware of, of the options and the alternatives,
what kind of alternatives are we talking about?
P: Well they, they may or may not be aware that there are adoption
agencies and things who could make this a very smooth and
straightforward process for them. Um or that their own personal
circumstances which may appear disastrous from their subjective point of
view, perhaps a more objective reading of it is, well actually the situation
mightn’t be as bad as you think. […] Sometimes they can be spot on, you
know, maybe it isn’t the right time for them to be proceeding with a
pregnancy. But again, rather than just sign a bit of paper it’s important
for, for both of us, the doctor and the patient that we’ve explored these
things, a consensus has been reached. [GP12, male]
In both this and the previous extract, women with unwanted pregnancies are
represented as decision-makers who are potentially unreliable if left to their own,
subjective, devices. Because of this, the certainty which women claim about their
decisions cannot be taken for granted, necessitating HCPs’ assessments of whether a
decision has been “thought through”. Although these HCPs do not go as far as
suggesting that they decide whether an abortion should take place, their accounts
thus recreate the kinds of anxieties about women’s decision-making abilities which
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resulted in the terms of the current law, and which continue to dominate public
discussion of the subject in the UK.
Parallels can also be drawn between these accounts and the ways in which
scientists have been found to emphasise the irrationality and illegitimacy of non-
scientific perspectives as they attempt to shore up their own positions of authority
over contested technoscientific issues (Wynne, 1996a; Kerr et al., 1997; Wynne,
2001). A particularly useful point of comparison is provided by literature which has
analysed the way in which genetics professionals account for their work. Kerr et al.
(1997) argue that, given the public controversies (e.g. fears concerning genetic
discrimination) which surround their practice, geneticists must carefully negotiate
their responsibilities towards their publics in order to maintain their status as
legitimate experts. In this context, the demarcation of a specific and limited sphere of
responsibility becomes strategically advantageous (Kerr et al., 1997). For example,
by highlighting their duty to educate the public concerning the ‘facts’ about genetics,
scientists can define the relevant facts in terms of their own knowledge and enhance
their professional status, whilst presenting themselves as individuals who act
responsibly (Kerr et al., 1997).
To a certain extent, HCPs’ attempts to define abortion decisions which have
been “thought through” can be interpreted in light of these findings. By constructing
the decision-making process as something which they are in a privileged position to
assess, HCPs are able to present themselves as ‘experts’ in relation to their pregnant
patients. Simultaneously, they gain control over the extent to which they can be held
accountable for their patients’ decisions, and thus abortion. Their responsibilities are
fulfilled by their attempts to make sure that abortion decisions are “thought through”
on the basis of (what they define as) the correct information.
However, it is important to be cautious in drawing comparisons between
scientists’ rhetorical negotiation of their responsibilities towards distant publics, and
the explicit responsibilities which HCPs have for their patients’ future well-being. In
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many of the interviews, the immediacy and significance of these responsibilities
dominated HCPs’ accounts:
Um because I think, if the patient herself is certain of their decision then
as far as I’m concerned, job done. I think the important thing is, is she
certain? Am I certain that she’s certain? And if she’s not what do we
need to do to make sure that I can be certain that she’s certain. Cos it’s,
it’s a one-way ticket. Once you’ve terminated a pregnancy you can’t un-
terminate it. So you need to be as sure as you can be that the woman has
made a decision with which she’s completely comfortable by the time
you commit her to whatever route of treatment you commit her to.
[Consultant 2, male]
Although Consultant 2 insists that he is able to assess women’s ‘certainty’, the
repetition of this word throughout this extract (and indeed, throughout the interview)
is suggestive of a situation in which he confronts considerable uncertainty, whilst
shouldering responsibility for the aftermath of an abortion.
As Sheldon (1997) points out, the Abortion Act could be interpreted as not
only allowing but requiring HCPs to shoulder this responsibility. As described in
Chapter One, two doctors must sign a legal document (Schedule 1) to certify that an
abortion is less risky than the continuation of a pregnancy. In some cases, HCPs
constructed their signature of this document as a significant act that makes it
essential to achieve a particular level of individual, embodied certainty that abortion
is the correct course of action:
I: Um yeah, you were talking about women’s awareness of the law I
think.
P: Right ok, yeah. So part of information giving, yeah so I mean you
have to tell them, but I usually say, you know, if, if you feel this is the
right decision for you and I agree, you know I feel that you’ve explored
all the options and you understand that, that’d be my criteria for signing
the form. And that, you know, from my point of view that they, I have to
be certain in my own mind that the woman is as certain as she can be that
this is the right way forward for her. [GP9, female]
P: Well clearly the law that surrounds it is, is important and when
patients get a bit [sniffs] ‘why are you asking me all these questions I’m
entitled to a termination’ I point out to them that no, they have the right
to ask for a termination and I have the right to make a, an informed
decision on whether I can legitimately um agree with them and sign the
form. [Specialist Registrar 3, female]
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From these HCPs’ accounts, Schedule 1 emerges as a rigid entity which forces HCPs
towards a position of ‘expert’ in relation to women with unwanted pregnancies (as
well as providing them with justification for the adoption of this position). However,
when the interview data is considered as a whole, the “interpretative flexibility”
(Pinch & Bijker, 1984) of Schedule 1 becomes clear. In the majority of the
interviews it was dismissed as a mere “legal formality” [Consultant 2], or “a bit of
paper” [GP12], which has to be signed but which does not otherwise impinge on the
actions of HCPs.
Although most HCPs attached little significance to Schedule 1, it remains
important to acknowledge that the requirement to certify an abortion might
encourage HCPs to position themselves as experts who must assess women’s
reproductive decision-making. As noted at the beginning of this section, it is also
vital to consider the role of the more general legal context in which HCPs are
working, e.g. the requirement to ensure that patients make ‘informed’ decisions
about any medical intervention. Linked to this, HCPs’ focus on the potentially
negative outcomes of abortion should be contextualised in relation to the fact that, if
women do experience difficulties following the procedure, they may require follow-
up care. This was a recurring theme during interviews with GPs, many of whom
articulated concerns about the possibility that patients would return with problems
following an abortion, and suggested that they could be blamed if they allowed a
pregnant woman to make the ‘wrong’ decision.
Nevertheless, as argued above, by claiming that they possess the expertise
necessary to assess the ‘best’ outcome of a pregnancy, HCPs are co-producing
“prescriptive ontologies of human relations, human subjects and society” (Wynne,
2001: 479). In the accounts considered in this section, this process of co-production
positions pregnant women as intrinsically unreliable reproductive decision-makers
who require guidance from HCPs. In the remainder of this discussion, and in
subsequent chapters, I will explore additional “prescriptive ontologies” that emerge
through HCPs’ claims to expertise about abortion.
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5.5 Avoiding “decisional control”
Wetherell (1998) argues that the construction and negotiation of identities should be
viewed as a continuous activity which occurs in relation to particular discursive
contexts. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that, although individual HCPs had
a tendency to draw more heavily on particular subject positions, this process was
shaped by the specific topics under discussion, including issues raised by the
interviewer, as well as those introduced spontaneously by interviewees. For example,
the discussion in section 5.2 used extracts from my interview with GP15 to argue that
he constructed abortion as ‘woman’s choice’. However, this GP also suggested that
his patients’ ownership of decisions about abortion is contingent upon the length of
gestation of their pregnancies:
I: Ok. Um and if a woman comes in requesting a termination what kind
of things would you talk about with her?
P: I have, up to twelve weeks I have basically a free open access, I’ve no
restriction at all up to twelve weeks. Um thereafter we’ll have a bit more
debate about, you know, um what she feels about it, any alternatives. Um
after sixteen weeks I have a definite embargo, unless there are medical
grounds for termination. I mean serious medical grounds as opposed to
the usual section Cs and all, you know, on the form. [GP15, male]
Distinctions based upon gestational timing were made during nearly all of the
interviews. When they discussed requests for later abortion, HCPs were far more
likely to position themselves as experts who could assess whether or not the
procedure should take place.52
However, GP15 was unusual in suggesting that he placed an outright
“embargo” on women’s access to abortion beyond a certain point in gestational time.
More often, GPs made more ambiguous claims concerning their “reluctance” to refer
women requesting later abortions. Indeed, when I later went on to probe GP15’s
description of this situation, he back-tracked, possibly because my question implied
that he gave me the ‘wrong’ answer the first time:
52 The significance which HCPs attach to gestational timing has been highlighted by several
researchers. For example, in her interview-based study of Scottish doctors’ abortion practice in the
1970s, Aitken-Swann found that many GPs would not refer women for an abortion beyond thirteen
weeks gestation, and that there was considerable variation in the gestational limits beyond which
individual gynaecologists were prepared to terminate a pregnancy. Likewise, quantitative surveys
consistently suggest that, as gestational time passes, the range of situations in which gynaecologists
are prepared to conduct abortions narrows considerably (Farrant, 1985; Savage & Francome, 1989;
Green, 1995).
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I: So would you still refer women on if they requested later?
P: If they were absolutely certain that’s what they wanted to do, yeah, I
don’t have a problem referring them on. [GP15, male]
Such back-tracking was a regular feature of the interviews, where HCPs seemed very
keen to avoid stating directly that they would refuse a woman’s request for abortion.
Thus, although they often positioned themselves as experts who can assess women’s
reproductive decisions, it seemed that HCPs did not want to suggest that they have
absolute “decisional control” (Sheldon, 1997) over whether an abortion takes place.
The following discussion explores how, in a situation where HCPs do not want
to suggest that they decide ‘for’ their patients, they account for the outcome of
abortion decisions that they have defined as problematic. Through this discussion, I
aim to do more than illustrate the micro-level discursive practices via which HCPs
negotiate responsibility for these situations during interviews. By revealing these
practices I will also demonstrate that, although they may avoid claiming absolute
“decisional control” over abortion, HCPs nonetheless suggest that attempts to
regulate women’s behaviour form a legitimate part of their work.
5.5.1 Demarcating legitimacy
In several cases, HCPs drew on a discourse of ‘woman’s choice’ in order to avoid
responsibility for decisions which they defined as problematic:
I mean there’s always the, the odd person that comes along that you
either wish wasn’t doing it, or that does change, that do change their
mind. And there are often people who come along and um I mean you
can’t pretend that your own kind of moral um sort of ethical standards
and so on don’t play a part because they inev- of course they do. Um and
it’s the sort of people who kind of, you know, their lives are ok and they
may be in a situation where they are planning a family, but just not at the
moment because it’s just not quite convenient. And they get pregnant and
they’re thinking ‘oh no I’ll just terminate it just now because next year is
when we’d planned to have our first child,’ this sort of thing. And um I
you know, you just maybe just um, you know I would never try and say
to anybody ‘no I think that’s the wrong thing to do’. I would still say,
‘well you know this is your decision to make’ um but I would maybe just
kind of question them about um you know, talk to them about how
they’re going to feel about that, about another pregnancy, about maybe
the risks involved in any kind of procedure. Um you know, I wouldn’t
kind of - what would I say to somebody like that? I’d maybe just
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question them. That, that’s all I would do, I would, I would just kind of,
you know, put, put the seeds of questions in their mind about this, and
about how they were going to feel and about whether next year it actually
was going to happen because sometimes things didn’t all turn, always
turn out as they planned um and uh you know, but then leave it up to them
because people have their own choices in life to make. [GP17, female –
emphasis added]
Here, albeit apologetically, GP17 argues that she is able to assess women’s accounts
of their reasons for abortion, and identify cases where it is not the best course of
action. Although she appears to recognise that her knowledge of whether an abortion
should proceed is situated in relation to her own “moral and ethical standards”, she
simultaneously disclaims personal responsibility for this - “you can’t pretend they
don’t play a part because of course they do”. In fact, the absence of personal
responsibility is carefully negotiated throughout the remainder of her account. While
she makes an effort to prevent what she defines as ‘bad’ decisions, it is her patients
who ultimately choose whether or not to have an abortion. The distance she achieves
through the discourse of ‘woman’s choice’ also allows her to avoid reflecting on her
own potential to shape her patients’ decisions, or their experience of abortion,
through her practice of questioning them.
5.5.2 Becoming insignificant
As described above, one important context in which HCPs suggested that they had to
assess abortion decisions is when they described requests made during the second
trimester of pregnancy. In this situation, HCPs often emphasised the insignificance of
the part that they play in comparison to other HCPs, in determining whether an
abortion takes place. Given that this is a position which is particularly easy for GPs
to construct, it is perhaps unsurprising that they often used it to deal with the case of
second trimester abortion. For example:
If somebody came to me twenty-two weeks pregnant and said um ‘I want
a termination’ uh I suspect I would probably say ‘I’m afraid you’re too
far gone’. If somebody came at… eighteen weeks um, still a pretty grey
area because they’re not very far short of possibly viable um and you’re
also into an area where it must be awful doing it. Um I suspect hmm,
what would I do in that situation? I mean thankfully again it’s not one
which has arisen. But if somebody came along at that stage um… I, I
think if somebody felt very strongly I probably would still refer them um
although as I say because I feel the ultimate responsibility lies with the
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person undertaking the procedure um, that’s where the real decision takes
place. If I say ‘yes I think you should go ahead’ and they go to see
somebody who says ‘I really don’t think it’s a good idea’ then, what I say
doesn’t really, doesn’t really count. [GP1, male]
However, during the course of my research, I became aware of another important
aspect of Scottish abortion practice which means that gynaecologists can also
‘become insignificant’ in the decision to terminate a second trimester pregnancy:
I: Sure. Um yeah, the, the issue of um women requesting terminations
later on, um if a woman is to, was to request termination sort of towards
the end of the second trimester, what might happen then? I mean-
P: Well, we have a limit here at the [hospital] of sixteen weeks’ gestation.
I: Ok
P: And that’s because, well for several reasons. Um certainly by then a
patient should be able to make up her mind, one way or the other. If she
hasn’t, and she’s ambivalent beyond that then we, then would say look
well hang on a minute there’s something not quite right here. But the
exceptions would be say a fourteen year-old or something who presents
at eighteen weeks or something - too frightened to speak to anybody, and
everything else. So everything is taken kind of on an individual basis but
by and large it’s a sixteen week limit. Beyond that, what we tend to do is
refer them to the British Pregnancy Advisory Service in [city B] and then,
if they say that’s fine they then, the patient then kind of has a mechanism
to go usually to kind of somewhere down south and have a second
trimester termination. [Consultant 7, male]
Each of the hospitals where I conducted interviews appeared to have a different
policy regarding the upper gestational limit (ranging from fifteen to twenty weeks’
gestation) at which abortions were provided. However, in all cases this limit was
placed below the twenty-four week cut-off stated in the Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act (see Chapter One). The issue of local hospital time limits upon
abortion and the possible reasons for such limits will be discussed further in Chapter
Seven. However, for the purposes of this discussion, what is remarkable is that
Consultant 7 is able to define abortions after sixteen weeks as unacceptable, whilst
simultaneously stating that “if they [bpas] say that’s fine” then there is a mechanism
for such abortions to take place in England.
The construction of later abortion as a more dubious practice associated with
the work of abortion charities rather than the NHS echoes the findings of Lee et al.
(2004). These authors conducted a large-scale study to explore national variation in
rates of teenage abortion and motherhood. Focussing on abortions in the absence of
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fetal abnormality, they surveyed the upper gestational limits of abortion provision at
twenty-one (randomly selected) NHS sites across the UK and found that:
There was a commonly perceived problem of poor access to abortion
after the first trimester, reflected in the almost uniformly low scores
achieved by all sites […] the highest cut-off point was 20 weeks. In most
sites, it was reported that abortions are not provided in NHS hospitals
from an earlier stage (between 13 and 16 weeks in most cases).
Comments made by respondents indicated that, commonly, a ‘division of
labour’ existed between NHS providers and bpas in this regard, with bpas
providing these later terminations. (Lee et al., 2004: 30)
Interestingly, my findings reveal that Scottish HCPs seem keen to stress that this
‘division of labour’ is also interwoven with national boundaries:
But uh for anything other than the fetal abnormality uh we don’t do
beyond eighteen weeks. If the patient expresses the wish to continue
down the line of termination of pregnancy we put them in touch with the
British Pregnancy Advisory Service [omitted for anonymity] and we can
usually get an appointment that week for them, we send their scans all
with them to see that they’ve done that and [the health board] has an
agreement that in most circumstances it will pay the cost for the patient.
It has to be approved theoretically but in practice I’ve never actually
known it to be turned down. Um that means of course patients have to go
outwith [Scotland], there’s no bpas set up in, in Scotland they go south of
the Border for that. [Specialist Registrar 3, female]
In other words, it is not simply abortion charities but English abortion charities that
are positioned as responsible for an aspect of abortion provision that is constructed as
problematic.
5.5.3 A discourse of (HCPs’) suffering
In section 5.2, I argued that one of the ways in which HCPs depicted women as
legitimate reproductive decision-makers was by emphasising the emotional
difficulties which women experience when they decide to end their pregnancies.
However, I also suggested that this argument is problematic because it seems to
render the legitimacy of women’s decisions contingent upon their suffering. This
contingency was made explicit by many HCPs, who highlighted the absence of
visible suffering as a criterion which leads them to question women’s decisions about
abortion.53
53 A related point is made by Joffe (1986), in her ethnography of family planning workers in the US.
She argues that counsellors’ positive experiences of their work were linked directly to their ability to
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Occasionally it, sometimes feels like it’s inconvenient and that’s what, I,
I find those quite difficult. There’s a few people who come in and it’s just
not the right time and that’s, that’s, that’s something I do struggle a wee
bit. Again, I’ll try and not make it affect the way I go about it but that’s,
that’s not so easy, mmm. [GP11, female]
Interestingly, when GP11 draws attention to women’s lack of suffering, she
simultaneously emphasises her own. She stresses the awkward position that she is
placed in by virtue of some women’s requests for abortion, which she struggles to
reconcile with her obligation to treat all of her patients equally. Like the suffering of
women in the accounts outlined in section 5.2, the difficulties which GP11 describes
imply that she is a morally responsible person who does the best job possible in
difficult circumstances.
Although accounts that draw upon discourses of suffering are rhetorically
powerful, it is problematic to suggest that HCPs’ descriptions of the emotional
difficulties generated by abortion work are merely calculated rhetorical
performances. Throughout the interview, GP11 seemed to struggle with my
questions. In answering them, she was not simply talking about emotion but was
talking emotionally (Crossley, 1998), as she constructed and tried to reconcile
conflicting obligations; to treat her patients ‘non-judgmentally,’ whilst
simultaneously assessing their requests for abortion.
Nevertheless, in acknowledging the possibility that HCPs are trying to
convey sincere emotional experiences through their interview accounts, it is
important not to obscure the political dimensions of this process. When they
emphasise the emotional difficulties that are created by their interactions with their
patients, HCPs are also defining limits around what is to count as ‘acceptable’
reproductive behaviour. Furthermore, in some cases HCPs suggested that they made
no effort to conceal their emotional reactions from their patients:
Um, but I, so, you know, I find –it’s difficult, you know, occasionally
you do get pissed off with individual women that come asking for
abortion because you kind of think ‘well, you want the pregnancy
feel that they were helping their clients, and reveals that counsellors disliked women who appeared to
be completely emotionally unaffected by their situation. She concludes that, “what the abortion
counselling situation suggests – with implications, perhaps, for other services involving morally
problematic issues – is the power of clients to grant absolution to professionals” (Joffe, 1986: 122).
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terminated this year but not next year. Um or, you’re an intelligent
woman, you had an IUD, you had it taken out cos you didn’t really like
it. And here you are back again, pregnant again, it needn’t have
happened!’ [Consultant 4, female]
While she did not suggest that she would prevent her patients from accessing an
abortion, Consultant 4’s account indicates that she leaves them in no doubt as to the
unacceptability of their behaviour.
In other cases, HCPs spoke even more directly about their attempts to change
their patients’ behaviour on occasions when it angered or distressed them. For
example, Specialist Registrar 3 described how she attempts to get patients who fail to
display sufficient emotional suffering to change their body language, and engage
with (what she defines as) the emotionally distressing nature of abortion:
There are very few people – there are some people who do a very good
um impression of being blasé, they’ll come back a second time maybe six
months apart you know ‘what are you doing to yourself?’ And I’m really
very blunt with patients about it um to the point of saying, you know ‘this
is, this is not on, you can’t do this to yourself. And please don’t do it to
me. Because hopefully you’ll never be back to see me again. But I have
to do this week in, week out and you have to recognise that it has an
impact on me as well.’ Um and you’ll then get this sort of alteration in
body language – they’ve been putting on a, a nice brave face, there’s a lot
of bravado goes on in a, a social gyn clinic [Specialist Registrar 3,
female]
Similarly, Specialist Registrar 2 described how he is angered by patients “who show
absolutely no remorse whatsoever and treat the whole process as a joke”. Initially, he
suggested that he would deal with this situation by asking these patients to leave the
clinic, and that he is prepared to occupy a position of “decisional control” in this
situation. However, when I went on to probe him further about this, he back-tracked
and suggested that it is always possible for him to ensure that women approach
abortion “seriously” enough:
P: There’s no decision-making – there’s no decision-making process
aside from which route they’re going to go down, medical or surgical.
They come to us, they’re having an abortion.
I: Unless they’re um treating it as a, a joke.
P: That doesn’t happen really.
I: Ok.
P: And the minute you, they, there are ways and means of telling, or
bringing patients to understand what they’re actually doing, which is
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terminating a life. And the minute you do that they tend to become
slightly more serious. [Specialist Registrar 2, male]
5.6 Conclusion
Many HCPs actively position women with unwanted pregnancies as legitimate
abortion decision-makers, and the general (if grudging) acceptance of this legitimacy
is suggested by their reluctance to state directly that they would refuse requests for
abortion. Simultaneously, it appears difficult for HCPs to suggest that they could
abdicate entirely from assessing the decisions which women make about abortion.
On the one hand, this difficulty must be contextualised in terms of the explicit
responsibilities which HCPs have for their patients’ future well-being. On the other,
when they suggest that the possible outcomes of their assessments include the
questioning of a decision, the expression of anger, or the ‘reminder’ that abortion
involves the death of a fetus, their accounts clearly lend support to Sheldon’s (1997)
argument that the abortion consultation operates as a site of “normalising control”.
At the same time, it is important not to concede too much authority to HCPs by
accepting their description of their ability to assess and moderate women’s behaviour
at face value. Doing so risks perpetuating HCPs’ own construction of women
requesting abortion as objects of their expert knowledge, and ignores the creative
ways in which women may fail to co-operate with HCPs’ attempts to assess their
decisions. As Lupton points out, “the patient cannot be forced to speak; he or she has
the ability to remain silent, or to lie” (2003: 127). Although the medical interview
may be an intensified site of “normalising control”, outwith this context women live
in a society which produces and polices limits on the meaning of abortion. As
outlined in Chapter One, abortion is debated extensively in public fora, albeit within
a narrow framework which does not reflect women’s reality (Lattimer, 1998).
Research exploring women’s experiences of requesting abortion suggests that their
awareness of these public framings leads them to present themselves accordingly:
Women often use these ideas to construct themselves as a particular kind
of woman who has an abortion; the good kind, the ‘responsible’, ‘fair’
kind, the justified kind with good reasons that correspond with
mainstream ideals. Abortion is constructed in British culture in such an
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overwhelmingly negative way, that many women seeking abortion try to
construct themselves as exceptional. (Lattimer, 1998: 71)
In fact, a number of HCPs acknowledged this possibility; it was a topic that was
often central to accounts in which they stressed the limits of their knowledge and
their dependency upon what pregnant women choose to tell them.
Another way in which women’s agency becomes relevant to any discussion of
“normalising control” is that (in cases other than the direct refusal of their requests)
women can ignore and even challenge HCPs’ attempts to impose a particular
definition of their situation upon them:
She (Family Planning clinic doctor) kept saying, “are you sure (of your
request to have an abortion)? Are you sure?” She said she thought I
should have another week to decide, and I said I didn’t want another
week, I’d already done that! She kept trying to push me… I quizzed her,
asked her “why do you keep doing that?” (quoted in Lee, 2004: 298)
The importance of acknowledging women’s ability to challenge HCPs’ definitions is
underlined by literature that has examined decision-making in the context of prenatal
screening programmes, which by definition normalise certain outcomes (Lippman,
1991), i.e. the detection and abortion of ‘abnormal’ fetuses. Even when bombarded
with biomedical definitions of the ‘impact’ that a certain condition will have on their
fetus’s life, women remain quite capable of countering such definitions and making
decisions based on their own, contextualised understandings of disability (Rapp,
2000).
Nevertheless, in the interests of engaging in fully “power-sensitive […]
‘conversation(s)’” (Haraway, 1991: 195), HCPs’ accounts must be situated in
relation to the fact that they are gatekeepers to the abortion procedure, and that, as
such, they have a greater potential than pregnant women to shape the discursive
limits of abortion decision-making. As GP12, who works in a socio-economically
deprived area, notes, there are circumstances in which this capacity can become
particularly accentuated:
I mean uh, I can bully my patients into respecting my opinion in a way
they [HCPs in wealthier areas] couldn’t dream of, you know ‘you’re
going to go away and think about this’. I wouldn’t like to tell somebody
who’s a rich business woman to go away and think about it, you know,
and say actually ‘you’re going to do what I tell you’. [GP12, male]
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The importance of considering the vulnerability of individual women to certain
practices is underscored by the fact that HCPs’ accounts of their attempts to assess
women’s decisions converge around criteria which do not simply depend on the
ways in which women present themselves. Computer records tell HCPs how old a
woman is, as well as how many abortions she has had previously, and even those
who lack scanning equipment can identify the later gestation cases where it is “fairly
obvious there’s a bump coming along” [GP2, male]. Furthermore, women have little
control over the assumptions which HCPs choose to make about them, for example,
concerning their socio-economic background. In the following chapters I will explore
these points of convergence between HCPs’ accounts in further detail.
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Chapter 6: Fertility, control and the delineation of
acceptable reproductive futures
By using reproduction as an entry point to the study of social life, we can
see how cultures are produced (or contested) as people imagine and
enable the creation of the next generation. (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995: 1-2)
6.1 Introduction
The discussion in Chapter Two introduced key STS approaches to the issue of
expertise. In particular, it highlighted the insights provided by Wynne (e.g. 1996b;
2001), who shows that the definition of what is to count as expert knowledge does
not simply empower those who can lay claim to this knowledge. Simultaneously, this
process of definition co-produces and imposes “prescriptive ontologies of human
relations, human subjects and society” (Wynne, 2001: 479). In this and the
subsequent chapter I provide a more detailed analysis of the “prescriptive ontologies”
that are imposed when HCPs position themselves as experts who can assess women’s
reproductive decisions. In both cases, my focus is on the forms of existence which
HCPs’ accounts make possible for women who are, or could become, pregnant.
This chapter begins by arguing that, in contemporary UK public discourse,
abortion is demarcated from contraception as a less acceptable method of fertility
control. I go on to illustrate how this distinction is perpetuated by HCPs, who portray
abortion as a course of action that their patients can and should avoid through the use
of contraception. I argue that, in describing their attempts to educate their patients
about this distinction, HCPs position the abortion consultation as an opportunity to
shape women’s future reproductive behaviour.
However, in the second half of the chapter, I argue that HCPs’ claims to
expertise concerning women’s “reproductive futures” also co-produce normative
definitions of the types of people who should become mothers, and thus, the types of
people that should inhabit the world. In addressing this issue, I build on an extensive
body of feminist scholarship concerned with the ways in which the definition of the
reproductive ‘choices’ available to women intersects with structural systems of
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inequality such as ethnicity and socioeconomic class (see Chapter Two). I illustrate
that HCPs depict women who are young, working class, or from outwith the UK as
incapable of contraceptive use and point out that, in these circumstances, they appear
to support the unrestricted availability of abortion. In contrast, I end the chapter by
outlining an alternative argument that emerges from HCPs’ accounts, namely, that
middle class women (of a particular age) are controlling their fertility too carefully,
and should be having babies rather than abortions.
These findings, whilst troubling, are perhaps unsurprising when it is
remembered that technologies of fertility control have long been framed as methods
for controlling the size and characteristics of populations. For example, although they
pioneered the idea that women should be empowered to control their fertility,
influential twentieth-century birth control activists such as Margaret Sanger and
Marie Stopes were also involved in the eugenics movement. As a result, they often
emphasised the potential for contraceptives to be mobilised as a tool for the
improvement of the ‘quality’ of the human race (Petchesky, 1984; McLaren, 1990;
Hill Collins, 1998; Ruhl, 2002). The late nineteenth/early twentieth century eugenics
movement in the US and UK portrayed the control of poor and/or black women’s
‘excessive’ fertility as essential to the health of the population, thus positioning
white, middle-class lives as the desirable future of humanity (Petchesky, 1984;
McLaren, 1990; Hill Collins, 1998; Ruhl, 2002). In doing so, it simultaneously
framed social inequalities as a matter of biological heredity best addressed through
the technological control of reproduction (Petchesky, 1984; Hill Collins, 1998).
While the eugenics movement is often portrayed as reaching its logical and
horrific conclusion through the State-sanctioned sterilization and killing of certain
categories of people in Nazi Germany, Hill Collins (1998) argues that eugenic beliefs
remain visible in contemporary family planning policies in the US (see also Roberts,
1998). As described in Chapter Two, she has revealed how such policies are geared
towards the production of white babies, who are to be raised within white middle
class families.
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Nevertheless, while my participants’ accounts undoubtedly reveal elements of
eugenicist discourse, I am not convinced that it is possible to develop a productive
critique of their practice using this terminology. Firstly, although there may be
different forms of eugenic practice, involving varying degrees of coercion, I am
concerned that the term has become symbolically inseparable from the horrors of
Nazi Germany. In other words, its deployment represents an accusation of absolute
moral reprehensibility. As Shakespeare (1999) points out, the levelling of such
accusations at the medical profession is both offensive to individual HCPs, and
ultimately counter-productive, because it allows them to refuse to engage in dialogue
with those who appear to be making such extreme allegations about their practice.54
A related problem with the term eugenics is that it “is a word with nasty
connotations but indeterminate meaning” (Paul, 1992: 665). Existing research has
revealed how this indeterminacy creates space for HCPs to evade sociological
critique. For example, by defining eugenics as the State-enforced regulation of
reproduction, genetics professionals are able to insist that when they offer pregnant
women the ‘choice’ to abort fetuses with abnormalities they are not engaged in a
eugenic practice (Kerr et al., 1998). In doing so, they are able to avoid confronting
concrete problems with the practice of prenatal screening, for example, the social
constraints which operate on individual women’s choices (Kerr et al., 1998).
Because of these concerns, in the analysis that follows, I have chosen to draw
upon Ginsburg and Rapp’s (1995) appropriation of Shellee Colen’s term – “stratified
reproduction” – as a means of signifying “the arrangements by which some
reproductive futures are valued while others are despised” (1995: 3). As a concept
developed and used by feminist theorists, this expression does not carry the
problematic baggage associated with the term ‘eugenics’.
Currently, the best-studied example of the way in which reproductive
stratification is practiced in the abortion clinic is the provision of counselling
54 It should be noted that Shakespeare does maintain that it is possible to distinguish between
different kinds of eugenics; his concern is with disability activists’ tendency to make explicit links
between HCPs’ engagement in prenatal diagnosis and the actions of doctors in Nazi Germany.
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following the diagnosis of fetal abnormality. The assumption that abortion is the best
course of action in these circumstances has become so normalized that patients are
both explicitly and implicitly directed towards this outcome by HCPs (e.g. Farrant,
1985; Rapp, 2000; Williams et al., 2002c). Disability studies scholars argue that this
process both rests upon and perpetuates the assumption that disabled lives are not
worth living (Shakespeare, 1998; Shakespeare, 1999).
In contrast, very few studies have considered how processes of stratification
enter into consultations about abortion that do not concern the issue of fetal
abnormality. A notable exception to this gap in the literature is provided by
Macintyre (1976; 1977), who studied the experiences of single women who became
pregnant in Scotland in the early 1970s. As part of her study she interviewed GPs
and gynaecologists, and discovered that women’s marital status determined doctors’
opinions of the ‘value’ of their pregnancies. In cases where women were planning to
marry their partners, doctors depicted pregnancy as unproblematic, and abortion as
an illegitimate (or even non-existent) option. However, abortion was seen to be far
more acceptable for someone who was unlikely to get married, i.e. where pregnancy
would otherwise result in the birth of an illegitimate child. In the second half of this
chapter I will argue that, although the significance of marital status may have
diminished over the past thirty years, this along with other key social systems of
stratification continues to enter into HCPs’ accounts of abortion provision in the
early twenty-first century.
6.2 A discourse of prevention
The assumption that abortion is distinctive from and less acceptable than
contraception clearly dominates contemporary public discussion of the subject in the
UK. This can be seen in the persistent media panics which follow the annual
publication of the UK abortion statistics. For example, a report concerning the 2008
statistics in The Daily Mail states:
Record numbers of women are having two or more abortions, fuelling
fears that they are increasingly seen as an alternative to contraception.
One third of terminations are carried out on women who have had at least
one before - and some have had eight or more. Some girls are on their
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fourth abortion before they reach 18, figures from the Department of
Health show. The statistics have emerged as MPs consider relaxing the
abortion laws to make the procedure easier to obtain. (Macrae, 14th July
2008)
A consensus concerning this ‘problem’ also appeared to emerge between speakers
on opposite sides of the parliamentary debate about abortion that took place during
the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill in 2008:
Is it right that Britain carries out 200,000 abortions a year—600 abortions
a day—and 6,200 of those abortions between 16 and 20 weeks? Is it right
that 4,000 women in 2006 had had four repeat abortions, that nearly
1,000 women had had more than five abortions, and that some had had
up to eight abortions, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough
(Mr. Leigh) has already pointed out? Is that what our predecessors in
1967 set out to achieve in the original Act? There have been 6.7 million
abortions in the United Kingdom since 1967. […] The Government have
an important part to play. For example, they could improve sex education
and provide better access to contraceptive services. Nearly 70 per cent. of
GPs do not offer a full choice of contraceptive methods. For too long,
contraceptive services have been seen as the Cinderella service of public
health, and I hope that all primary care trusts that are represented in this
House today will do more to improve those services. [Mark Pritchard,
Hansard Column 232-3, May 20th 2008, speaking in favour of legal
restriction]
Of course we all want to cut the number of abortions, and we want to do
so through better advice, better contraception and all the things that we
can do to prevent abortions, but there will be circumstances in which
women feel the need to go through that, and I appeal to the Committee
not to make it difficult for them. [Judy Mallaber, Hansard Column 257,
May 20th 2008, speaking against legal restriction]
While they may have disagreed about whether legal restriction would help them to
achieve their goals, MPs clearly agreed about the meaning of abortion. It is
something that can and should be prevented (or at least reduced) through the use of
contraception.
MPs and media commentators discuss abortion and contraception as though
these were two distinct practices, with intrinsically different meanings. However, the
dichotomous classification of technologies that act as contraceptives (pre-
conception) vs. those that act as abortifacients (post-conception) is easily
problematised. For example, Etienne-Emile Baulieu, the scientist who developed the
drug regime used to induce medical abortion – RU486 – argued that it, along with
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other drugs that have traditionally been defined as ‘contraceptives’, should be re-
classified as a third group of drugs termed ‘contragestives’ (Clarke & Montini,
1993). He pointed out that, along with RU486, drugs such as the pill and emergency
contraception (as well as intra-uterine devices) often act during the early stages of a
pregnancy, e.g. after conception has occurred (Clarke & Montini, 1993).
In addition to the complexities involved in classifying what is to count as a
contraceptive or an abortifacient, a brief glance at the history of the birth control
movement reveals that distinctions between the acceptability of pre- and post-
conception methods of fertility control are relatively recent. In the early decades of
the twentieth century, birth control activists such as Marie Stopes complained
vociferously about women’s inability to understand the difference between
contraception and abortion, and the fact that they regularly seemed to prefer to make
use of the latter in order to control their fertility (McLaren, 1990).55 However, as
McLaren points out, at this time many women did regard abortion within the first
three months of pregnancy as part of a spectrum of methods of fertility control,
which allowed them to regain the ability to menstruate (see also Brookes, 1988;
Fisher, 1998).56
Another historical contingency which is rendered invisible by contemporary
discussions of fertility control is the relatively recent incorporation of contraception
as a legitimate part of medical practice. In spite of the campaigns of birth control
activists, the medical profession in both the UK and the US remained extremely
reluctant to become involved in the ‘unseemly’ business of discussing contraception
(and thus, sex) with its patients until the 1960s onwards (McLaren, 1990). McLaren
suggests that the availability of a more ‘scientific’ method of contraception in the
form of the female pill was instrumental in the profession’s change of heart
concerning its involvement in this practice. Interestingly however, Davis and
55 Activists were keen to imbue the birth control movement with the legitimacy and authority of
science, as well as to gain support from the medical profession. At this time abortion was illegal, and
“conjured up the image of relying, not on the doctor, but on the neighbourhood wise woman”
(McLaren, 1990: 231). Attempts to demarcate it from the practice of contraception were thus highly
strategic (see also Petchesky, 1984).
56 As McLaren (1990) notes, it is important not to romanticize the practice of abortion, which, when
practiced illegally as it was at this time, killed and injured many women.
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Davidson (2005) also draw attention to the fact that the provision of contraception
became viewed as an urgent priority when the Scottish medical profession was
suddenly faced with responsibility for the provision of abortion in the late 1960s (see
also Aitken-Swann, 1977).57
Arguably, the provision of contraception is now far more than simply a
legitimate, or important, part of medical practice. In the extract from Mark
Pritchard’s speech above, the healthcare profession is positioned as the key
gatekeeper to contraceptive technologies, and is blamed for the numbers of abortions
which take place in the UK. As many of my participants pointed out to me, their
accountability for the prevention of abortion is made explicit through the paperwork
that has to be completed in order to facilitate a patient’s access to the procedure. On
the forms which GPs use to refer their patients, there is a section which asks whether
or not future contraception has been discussed. Likewise, when I interviewed HCPs
working in secondary care, I was shown numerous different outpatient clinic
schedules which are used to ensure that particular information is obtained from all
patients. On all of these forms, HCPs have to indicate what “future contraception”
their patients will be using when they leave the clinic. Clearly, professional as well
as public discourse about abortion is formulated in terms of ‘prevention’. This must
be borne in mind throughout the discussion that follows, where I explore how HCPs
describe their attempts to get patients to treat abortion as a ‘last resort’ method of
fertility control.
6.2.1 The ‘choice’ to use contraception?
In describing their consultations with women requesting abortion, HCPs argued that
it is important for them to ask women about their contraceptive history, in order to
establish what has “gone wrong” or “failed”:
…we would always kind of then try and, and hospitals would usually do
that too, sort of say well, ‘obviously this was unplanned, don’t want this
to happen again I’m sure, need to think about contraception,’ and we
view that as contraceptive failure, lack of contraception and, and maybe
57 This was seen to be a particularly pressing issue given that abortion was legalised at a time when
decisions about whether to provide contraception through the NHS remained at the discretion of local
health authorities; a situation which did not change until the 1970s (Davis & Davidson, 2005).
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have some sort of plan about what the follow up of that, that is. […] Cos
in a sense that’s, you know, the whole idea of choice is that, you know,
women have control over their own bodies and control over their own
sort of reproductive cycle, so again that’s partly empowering and kind of
um… and if it was an unplanned pregnancy something’s not quite gone
to, to plan really. [GP7, male] 58
This type of account, in which abortion was constructed as the result of a breakdown
in contraceptive control over pregnancy, emerged regularly during the interviews.
HCPs argued that, by establishing what has ‘gone wrong’ they can fix it through the
provision of better information or alternative contraception. This depiction of the
relationship between contraception and abortion has long been a feature of family
planning discourse, which Luker describes as “contraceptive ignorance theory”
(Luker, 1975: 18). However, in the following discussion, I argue that, as they
describe their attempts to correct their patients’ “ignorance” about contraception,
HCPs are also describing how they correct their ideas about the future reproductive
choices that are available to them.
A striking feature of the previous extract is that GP7 positions women’s
potentially pregnant bodies as a threat to their autonomy, and depicts contraceptive
technologies as a means to circumvent this threat. Although he is keen to portray
contraceptive education as a means of empowering his patients, this process involves
representing abortion as an undesirable course of action. In other words, he makes it
clear that his patients can only legitimately make use of certain kinds of reproductive
technology in order to gain control over their own bodies.
GP7’s depiction of the threat posed by ‘unplanned pregnancy’ resonates with
Ruhl’s (2002) argument that, in contemporary liberal societies, pregnancy is
understood as a state that should not occur unless it is “willed”, i.e. deliberately
chosen. Although feminists’ insistence that women should be allowed to control their
fertility has undoubtedly had positive implications for women’s lives, Ruhl argues
that the notion of planning is now so central to our understanding of pregnancy that it
58 As noted in Chapter Four, GP7 described himself as somebody who holds a conscientious objection
to abortion, but said that he operationalised this objection through his refusal to sign Schedule 1. In
other words, he still engaged in consultations with women requesting abortions, and referred them on
to the hospital.
168
has become an imperative. In this discursive context, for a woman to fail to plan her
pregnancies is to engage in irresponsible behaviour, for which she can be blamed
(Ruhl, 2002).
This notion of responsibility enters implicitly into GP7’s account, when he
constructs contraception as something that women “need” to think about. In other
cases, HCPs made this argument rather more explicitly:
I: Is um contraception something you discuss with women in the
consultation about termination?
P: Yes, absolutely, um I will always ask and again, it isn’t to make them,
make them feel bad but I always ask, you know, what, what
contraception were you using? Um, and often you get some convoluted
story of ‘well, you know I was going to start the pill but I didn’t have
time’ or, ‘um yeah I was on the pill but um’ you very very rarely see a
pure pill failure, or pure contraceptive failure for that matter. Um so I
always ask it to begin with, when you ask about getting pregnant and
that. Cos you have to establish when did it happen, and that [kind of
thing] and that’s what they used. And then at the end when, when you’ve
done, when you’ve done the referral I always say ‘well what are you,
what are you going to use after?’ And you may, you’re probably not
going to do the whole consultation then but you, I always want my ladies
to say, ‘yes I will use this after,’ and I probably wouldn’t let, I probably
wouldn’t let them get away with ‘oh I don’t know’ I would say ‘no, you
need to know’. [GP10, female]
In this extract, the question of responsibility for an unplanned pregnancy is very
carefully negotiated. Pregnancy is depicted as a failure on the part of the
contraceptive user, rather than the contraceptive technology.59 However, although
the pregnant woman has ‘failed’, this is not depicted as deliberate, immoral
behaviour; GP10 emphasises that she does not want to make her patients “feel bad”
about their situation. Instead, like many other HCPs, she depicts unplanned
pregnancy as the product of a failure of understanding. This can be corrected through
education, an important part of which involves making patients understand that
future contraception is a reproductive obligation, not a reproductive choice.
59 As Oudshoorn (1994; 1999) points out, the notion of ‘user failure’ was central during the
development of the female pill. Rather than questioning the social assumptions embedded within the
technology (e.g. that users are sufficiently ‘medicalised’ to be accustomed to taking medication as a
routine part of their daily life), when women participating in clinical trials became pregnant, this was
constructed as a matter of user failure.
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However, when HCPs drew attention to women who repeatedly ‘failed’ to
prevent themselves from becoming pregnant they often located responsibility for this
failure rather differently:60
Um if someone had or was on their third termination we would say to
them you know, we can do terminations for you, obviously. But if you’re
going to repeatedly attend for terminations some of the doctors will not
sign the forms and we need to look at your contraception – why has this
problem occurred for a third time? Or you may find ladies will attend and
they say they’ve never attended before and you look back in the notes
and there is a termination sheet in their notes. And I would just say I see
you’ve attended for a termination before and, you know, has this been a
failure – so I would say it in the nicest possible way you know for a
second one. But if we came to a third one we – I think the worst I’ve ever
seen was – [inaudible] how many did that lady have? [thinks] There was
one lady who had multiple terminations I think she was maybe on her
fourth and we said to her, you know, this is no longer acceptable. And we
can’t refuse people to have terminations but, you know, this is not just a
failure of contraception and the doctors are not duty – I’m not sure if the
doctor will sign the form, so you have to make sure that your
contraception is in place or we can’t say that we would see you back here
or be able to offer you a termination on another occasion. So it’s said in a
very pleasant way, but firm. [Nurse 9, female]
Unlike GP10, Nurse 9 is quite vague about what constitutes “contraceptive failure”;
she does not specify whether this refers to a user’s failure in understanding, or a
failure of the technology itself. However, she does suggest that there is a point
beyond which women’s repeated requests for abortion can no longer be attributed to
either kind of failure. This is evident in the contrast between the gentle and
sympathetic way that she describes treating patients who attend for a second
abortion, and her suggestion that when it comes to three or more requests for
abortion she engages in an entirely different type of interaction with her patients. At
this point abortion is defined as a deliberate, and thus unacceptable, act, and Nurse 9
makes it clear that she has to educate her patients about its unacceptability.
6.2.2 The gendering of responsibility for contraception
As numerous feminist critiques have illustrated, the decision to develop modern
contraceptives focussed on female bodies (e.g. intra-uterine devices and hormonal
60 HCPs’ concern about the problem of “repeat” abortion is as old as the legalised provision of the
procedure. During interviews with GPs and gynaecologists in the early 1970s, Aitken-Swann (1977)
found that they were often troubled by the fact that some patients kept coming back.
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methods) has provided women with more ‘effective’ methods of fertility control,
whilst generating the belief that responsibility for contraception is feminine rather
than masculine (Luker, 1975; Clarke, 2000; Oudshoorn, 2003).61 Within this context,
it is unsurprising that several HCPs articulated an explicitly gendered dimension to
the obligation to prevent further abortions:
So if you, if there was a restriction on the abortion service then people or
women, and I say women because ultimately they’re the ones that carry
the can – you can say we should be targeting men as well but you can
target men all you want, it’s not them that carry the can. If there was a
restriction on the abortion service then women would pay more attention
to their contraception. [Specialist Registrar 2, male]
In arguing that women are disproportionately burdened by pregnancy and childbirth,
Specialist Registrar 2 draws upon rhetoric that has long been used to argue for
women’s access to abortion. However, his apparent sympathy for this burden is
belied by his suggestion that women can best be helped by a punitive restriction on
the abortion service that would force them to “pay more attention” to their
contraception. Interestingly, this desire to impose restrictions on women’s
reproductive options means that Specialist Registrar 2’s account resonates strongly
with those of the conscientious objectors that I interviewed, in particular Nurse 10
(see Chapter Four, p. 109).
Within my sample, Specialist Registrar 2 was very unusual in calling for
restrictions on abortion provision as a means of forcing women to recognise their
responsibility for contraception. More often, the gendered dimensions of
responsibility for contraception were articulated more subtly through the argument
that women have to be made aware of their obligation to make use of female
methods in order to ensure that they do not become pregnant again:
P: ... I would say ‘no, you need to know’.
I: Um, what if someone says ‘I’ll use condoms’ or, or whatever, is that?
P: I would probably not be very happy with that because I would, I would
say to them, ‘that’s fine, you won’t get any sexually transmitted diseases,
but that’s for the man and you’re the woman, and you’ll get stuck with
the problem, failure rate is ten per cent, you need something else um.’
61 Petchesky (1984) argues that it is important not to produce an overly technologically determinist
account of this phenomenon. She points out that older contraceptive practices which centre on male
bodies (e.g. the condom and ‘the withdrawal method’) also require women to take responsibility for
contraception, because women often have to insist on/negotiate male compliance.
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You may not push them too much further at that point but I wouldn’t be
happy with that after a termination because, something’s gone wrong you
know. [GP10, female]
The portrayal of condoms as an ineffective method of fertility control, and the
importance of convincing women to use hormonal methods or intra-uterine devices
was widespread throughout the interviews. As the women’s health movement have
long argued, these ‘female’ methods, while more reliable in preventing pregnancy,
represent significant burdens for the women who make use of them, including
“undesirable to life-threatening side effects (from headaches to acne, obesity,
infertility and death), and lack of protection from STDs and HIV” (Clarke, 2000: 58).
6.2.3 Correcting misperceptions of contraceptive ‘risk’
In studying the reasons why women don’t make use of contraceptive technologies,
Luker (1975) argues that HCPs fail to understand the immediacy of “contraceptive
costs” for women. Such costs include those produced through the limitations of many
of the technologies, for example, the negative side effects listed above, as well as the
requirement for regular clinical check-ups. They also encompass non-technical but
equally important costs to identities and relationships. For example, as Luker points
out, to obtain/make use of a contraceptive technology involves the cost of
acknowledging to oneself and others that one is planning to be sexually active. Such
planning may be difficult to sustain following the break-up of a relationship, when
women often cease to regard themselves as sexually active.
Through her exploration of the contextualised costs of contraception, Luker
highlights the competing definitions of “contraceptive risk taking” held by women
and HCPs. She suggests that HCPs are working on the assumption that the most
significant risk of (hetero)sex is unwanted pregnancy and abortion. In comparison,
the risks of contraception are held to be minimal, and any woman who refuses to
bear these risks is either “ignorant” or “self-destructive and irrational” (Luker, 1975:
140). The central aim of Luker’s study was to destabilise these assumptions by
revealing that, when contraception is situated within the lived context of its use it
may represent a much bigger cost than abortion. When understood from this
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perspective, the decision not to use contraception can be construed as active and
entirely rational.
However, as Wynne (2001) points out, emphasising the co-existence of
different groups’ understandings of risk does not automatically destabilise the notion
that publicly recognised experts know the objective risks of a particular course of
action. Indeed, the idea that ‘lay’ people are working with their own, alternative
understandings of risk can quickly become the basis of new attempts to educate them
about the ‘correct’ (e.g. expert) ones. This phenomenon was clear during the
interviews. Many HCPs suggested that women were working with mistaken
perceptions of the risks of unwanted pregnancy, which they had an obligation to
identify and correct:
And ideally what I want is for them to be using an effective method of
contraception to prevent this happening again. And it’s an uphill struggle,
people are very unrealistic about what’s going to happen to them after the
termination of pregnancy in terms of their future relationships, quite a lot
of women say ‘well I’m never going to have sex again’, you know, which
is completely unrealistic, cos we know they’ll have sex again.
[Consultant 4, female]
They just kind of assume it won’t happen to them. Um, partner doesn’t
like using condoms or they don’t like using condoms, or they got carried
away. Um, and you can understand how these things happen but there’s
still a, a risk of pregnancy with, even if you are carried away,
unfortunately um, chance or statistics or whatever doesn’t make
allowances for you being carried away or your partner not liking
condoms you still can get pregnant. [GP3, female]
Even contextualised definitions of the meaning of contraception (e.g. as irrelevant to
current circumstances) thus become subsumed within a discourse of “contraceptive
ignorance”, in which the prevention of future abortion through education about
contraception is constructed as possible and desirable.
In informing women about the ‘objective’ risks of failing to use contraception,
some HCPs argued that they had to educate women about the ‘real’ risks of abortion.
For example, Nurse 8 suggested that some women mistakenly view the loss of love
from a partner who wants to have unprotected sex as a bigger threat than the risk of
unwanted pregnancy and abortion. Later in the interview she made it clear that she
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has an obligation to prevent her patients from continuing to view abortion as a
minimal threat:
I think we’re very sympathetic and non-judgmental, I sometimes have a
worry when people are coming back time and time again if we’re too
sympathetic and not judgmental enough. And that’s why if somebody’s
back for the third time I have no problems in saying to them ‘what’s
going on, you know, why are you doing this? You can’t keep doing this
to your mind or your body. What’s the problem here?’ [Nurse 8, female]
In this extract, Nurse 8 suggests that, because they work hard to care for women who
decide to have abortions, HCPs potentially cause it to become something which
women do not try to avoid. If this does happen, her job is to ensure that women do
not continue to experience abortion in this way, and that they understand it as an
experience which damages them both mentally and physically.
The importance of conveying the distinctive, damaging nature of abortion was
a recurring theme in interviews where HCPs highlighted the ‘problem’ of patients
who repeatedly attended for abortions:
P: Um I again feel a bit uncomfortable that a small, tiny percentage of
people seem to use it as a method of contraception. And I don’t feel
comfortable about that, because there must, there are better ways.
[laughs] Yeah.
I: When you say better ways, are they? Can you say a bit, in terms of
better, is it better in terms of women’s health or?
P: I suppose there, there are more effective ways, well I suppose
termination’s about the most effective way to not be pregnant! But um
there are more um, less damaging I suppose, physically and emotionally
um and less risky um and [as I say] prevention’s better than, yes, general
anaesthetics or, you know, whatever. [GP11, female]
Through such accounts, HCPs again attempted to maintain a clear separation
between contraception and abortion, suggesting that the latter is something which
can and should be prevented through the use of the former. However, by describing
their patients’ failure to understand that abortions should be avoided, HCPs
automatically undermined their own assertions that they possessed the facts about
this practice. In particular, if patients have to be educated that an abortion is an
emotionally damaging experience, then it is clearly possible for them to experience it
in other ways.
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This possibility seemed to be acknowledged by GP14, who suggested that
patients who have already experienced an abortion possess important knowledge,
specifically, that it is a decision and experience which is “right” for them:
P: I suppose I, I tend to ask more because, if they’ve already got
experience of it then it’s useful to know about that.
I: So if they already have experience of the, the process, does that change
what you um talk to them about then or?
P: Yeah, well, they just know a bit more what it’s like, how it feels, how
it feels afterwards um and, you know, if it’s been, if things have worked
out ok last time then you can feel fairly confident that they can make the
right decision again this time. [GP14, female]
Interestingly, this unusual framing of repeat abortion, as something which provides
women with important experiential knowledge, was one which dominated the
accounts of the US abortion clinic workers interviewed by Wolkomir and Powers
(2007). These authors reveal that clinic workers classified women who had
previously had abortions within the group of patients that they found “easiest” to deal
with. Such women were said to be less apprehensive about abortion and more certain
of their decisions, thus requiring less emotional input from clinic staff (Wolkomir &
Powers, 2007).
However, most of the Scottish HCPs that I interviewed were incredibly
resistant to any suggestion that women’s repeated use of abortion was unproblematic,
and insisted that it was an emotionally damaging course of action:
P: Um women simply don’t want um to have the whole pattern of their
lives disrupted in a way that they hadn’t bargained for, with all the
consequences. Um so most women, if it’s a second termination, they’re
as appalled um as you would expect. I can only think of, one particular
woman sticks in my mind when I was a registrar so it’s about, a trainee,
so it’s about twenty-five years ago, twenty-six years ago. And she was
definitely on her fourth or fifth termination. And I just felt deeply
irritated by her.
I: Do you think that for some women, although most women see it as,
you know, a very significant event, there are some women who maybe
don’t see it that way?
P: I think there are some women, I think she clearly, she didn’t perhaps
have the emotional depth to empathise with what she was actually doing.
[GP9, female]
Through this account, GP9 defines abortion as something which should “appal”
women who are confronted with the prospect, because it is a life changing,
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emotionally traumatic experience. In the rare cases where women request multiple
(i.e. more than two) abortions, GP9 suggests that there is something psychologically
wrong with them, rather than with her own definition of the meaning of abortion.
In drawing on a discourse of prevention, HCPs framed abortion as a course of
action that was self-evidently problematic, and which they had an obligation to
prevent through the education of their patients. This education involved providing
‘better’ information about contraception whilst instilling the idea that contraception
was a (gendered) obligation rather than a choice. It also involved ensuring that
patients understood the ‘true’ costs of abortion. However, in concluding this section I
want to draw attention to an instance in which an HCP acknowledged that her
definition of the relationship between abortion and contraception was “situated”
(Haraway, 1991), rather than objective:
I think though undoubtedly some people do use emergency contraception
and some people do use termination as a form of contraception. I don’t
know what you do about that um. You can try and persuade them that it
shouldn’t be. Um I don’t know morally what you do with people who
still don’t, you know, and still don’t take you on board about that and still
do use it as – I mean I suppose term-termination is ultimately a method
of contraception. I don’t think it should be but who am I to say that, you
know, that people shouldn’t do that? [GP17, female]
While it is entirely atypical, this extract reveals that it is possible for HCPs to
question the discourse of prevention, and to acknowledge the contingency of
the relationship between contraception and abortion.
6.3 The Othering of ‘contraceptive exceptions’
Another way in which HCPs contested the discourse of prevention was by
constructing distinctive ‘types’ of women whose repeated use of abortion was
tolerated. In most cases, the deliberate use of abortion as a method of fertility control
was linked to the ethnicity of particular women:
I: Um if the, I suppose one of the things I was wondering cos I’m kind of
interested in the relationship between contraception and termination is, is
um whether for some women maybe they see termination is that’s how
they go about controlling their fertility?
P: I think so, I think some women do. And I think that you see that
particularly in people from other cultures. I mean in China it is a form of
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contraception. So the Chinese women think nothing of it and I think it’s,
it’s quite difficult because how do you say to somebody ‘well in actual
fact this isn’t a form of contraception’ when it is in their own country? So
that, that can be a difficult one. [Nurse 8, female]
Not so much in the UK. Um in other countries it is. In China, and in the
former USSR countries that, that is. Um I don’t think that that’s how, I
think most women – perhaps in a minority of cases – but most women it
genuinely is unintended and um it’s, they’re not using it as a method of
contraception but for, for a minority yes. And they’ll be quite a mixed
bag of maybe women who are originally from other countries or have got
chaotic lifestyles or, or um extremely keen to avoid hormones.
[Consultant 5, female]
In these accounts, HCPs’ acknowledgement of the cultural relativity of the use of
abortion does not undermine their insistence that it is a less acceptable method of
fertility control than contraception. Instead, alternative uses of abortion are
constructed as a problem associated with ethnic minorities, who must be tolerated by
British HCPs.
While the deliberate use of abortion as a means of fertility control was
generally attributed to women from other countries, HCPs often drew attention to the
case of a significant minority of women who, as Consultant 5 terms it, “have got
chaotic lifestyles”. From the regular way that this terminology was employed by
HCPs, it seemed to have acquired a specific, consensual meaning:
[...] you know, there’s people who haven’t really engaged with using
very good contraception and who probably also have quite chaotic lives
um and um therefore um it’s there as a backup. [GP7, male]
If, you know if they’re very, if they’re young and or chao - and have
chaotic lifestyles then you, I feel you can’t really blame them. Some
women you do feel that they should have more sense, but I think it’s very
unusual for women to purposely use that as a form of contraception. I
think most people it just sort of hap -happens to them. [Consultant 6,
female]
The construction of certain types of contraceptive users as less capable than others is
well-known within the literature on this subject (Oudshoorn, 1994; Hawkes, 1995;
Oudshoorn, 1999). For example, in a study of family planning clinic staff, Hawkes
(1995) reveals that age and socioeconomic class are viewed as markers of
contraceptive ‘responsibility’. She points out that, even when they made requests for
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contraceptive advice, young women from working class backgrounds were
constructed as a group who are incapable of planned, ‘responsible’ sexual behaviour.
However, while the HCPs who I interviewed often represented young and/or
“chaotic” women as intrinsically incapable of utilising contraception, in the
quotations above it is clear these women are not being held to account for their
actions. Rather, they are exempt from blame because they are depicted as incapable
of preventing pregnancy.
One way of interpreting HCPs’ constructions of ‘blameless’ users of abortion
is that, through this process, they are trying to justify its provision and thus render
themselves blameless for their involvement in this work. As outlined in the previous
chapter (section 5.2.2), HCPs seemed to find it difficult to represent abortion as a
positive course of action which allows women to assert control over their own bodies
and lives. Instead, they focussed on the difficulties that women experienced in
deciding to end their pregnancies, portraying abortion as a negative ‘last resort’ used
to exit an impossible situation. I suggested that this might reflect a discursive context
which encourages HCPs to justify the provision of abortion in negative, rather than
positive terms. Simonds (1996) draws attention to a related phenomenon in the US,
where, she argues, feminists increasingly defend abortion as a necessary evil, rather
than advocating it as a political right. She suggests that this change in rhetoric may
reflect a defensive response to the success of the anti-abortion movement in the US
during the rise of the New Right in the 1980s and 90s (see also Petchesky, 1984).
However, while my participants may be engaged in similarly defensive tactics,
this interpretation of the data is somewhat undermined by the fact that many of them
constructed particular categories of people who could be blamed for failing to control
their fertility through contraception. In other words, they explicitly drew attention to
situations in which abortions were taking place on ‘unjustifiable’ grounds:
I’ve come across women, even though I wouldn’t say they go in lightly
in this decision, but I’ve come across women who’ve had three or more
terminations. And you wonder, you know, and this is people who are
older, you know, who are in their thirties, and you’re thinking, ‘couldn’t
they have a little bit more sense’, you know. [GP5, female]
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And I’m blunt with the patients about not wanting to see them second or
third times I mean we do see the occasional patient four or five times
which, by the time it gets to that stage you really just want to run away,
you don’t want to deal with a fourth or fifth time patient. And sometimes
they’re perfectly intelligent, professional people who will turn up four
and five times and you think ‘that is outrageous!’ [Specialist Registrar 3,
female]
In contrast to women who are young, or “chaotic”, those who are older, and
professional were often held to be capable of “knowing better”, and through this
knowledge, exerting control over their own fertility. In others words, only certain
types of women were constructed as rational actors capable of determining whether
or not they become pregnant through the use of contraception.
In exploring the construction of different types of contraceptive user,
Oudshoorn (1999) illustrates how concerns about contraceptive failure are linked to
concerns about the fertility of particular populations. She draws attention to the fact
that women from developing countries are characterised as unreliable contraceptive
users who are in need of longer-acting, less user-dependent methods (e.g. intra-
uterine devices or contraceptive implants). Disturbingly, the delineation of these
contraceptive capabilities and choices correlates with the construction of women
from developing countries as the population whose fertility is most in need of
regulation and limitation (Oudshoorn, 1999).
Whereas Oudshoorn highlights the limited reproductive choices offered to
women who are defined as unreliable with contraception, in the quotations provided
above HCPs suggest that unreliable contraceptive users should be given more rather
than fewer reproductive choices. Those who are young, or who have “chaotic lives”,
or who are from “other countries”, are exempt from the norm and are allowed to
substitute abortion for contraception. I would argue that HCPs’ tolerance of this
option for certain kinds of people must be seen as inextricable from the values which
they placed on these individuals’ “reproductive futures” (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995).
While this process of reproductive stratification is only obliquely implied in the
extracts outlined above, in some of the interviews it was stated explicitly:
On the other hand you see people who are having their fourth or fifth
termination of pregnancy whose lives are so chaotic, so out of control,
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um who can’t even organize their housing arrangements let alone
contraception. And, you know, you feel, well um they’re never going to
get it right and, and, you know, I think where some people feel that
repeat abortion is, is more difficult for us to deal with, in other words it’s
more difficult for us to deal with people who’ve had one termination
after another termination after another termination – everybody’s
different and some people are never going to get their lives into control
and you think, for the sake of the baby, who’s going to be um be brought
up in this completely out of control environment um then that’s fine, you
go ahead and make the arrangements for the termination of pregnancy.
But I’ve less sympathy for the woman who has had two unintended
pregnancies using natural family planning, is well educated, she can
understand what you’re trying to say and she still goes ahead and doesn’t
use an effective method of contraception and comes back pregnant for
the third time. [Consultant 4, female – emphasis added]
In this extract, Consultant 4 constructs two different kinds of uses of ‘repeat
abortion’, only one of which is deemed acceptable. While she does not use the term
explicitly, it is almost impossible to avoid reading ‘socioeconomic class’ as the key
distinction between those whose repeated use of abortion is tolerated, and those
whose use of abortion is rejected. “For the sake of the baby”, she argues, it is best
that those who live intrinsically “chaotic lives” are allowed to control their fertility
by any means possible.
A connection between socioeconomic class and the importance of the
availability of abortion was stated even more directly by GP8, who began the
interview by saying that:
P: There are a lot of unplanned pregnancies round here but a lower than
average rate of requests for termination.
I: Ok so more, more unplanned, but less terminations?
P: Yeah. And that’s, I, I think that just relates to the social class five sort
of population that we have. [GP8, female]
Throughout the interview GP8 was unusually supportive of women’s right to control
their fertility through abortion. However, this expression of support was related
directly to the fact that she was dealing with a “socioeconomic class five”
community of women who, she argued, were intrinsically less able to plan their
pregnancies than other sections of the population, with very serious consequences:
P: I’m very, I’m very interested in promoting health and I’ve worked at,
I’ve just done my baby clinic here this morning in fact. At least three-
quarters of the babies I saw today were from parents who are on our
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intensive health visitor extra-surveillance, nearly all for social reasons.
Drug abusing parents, learning disabilities, fathers who lose their
tempers, um single parents, mothers with HIV, this sort of thing, just…
And I am just so aware of how unwanted fertility is a cause of such vast
morbidity, mostly psychological but I mean you do get kids in poor
families who aren’t nourished properly round here, there is poverty round
here, I mean you don’t, you know you actually get to physically impaired
health as well as these awful, not so easy to measure but extremely
expensive to society. You know, there was something in the papers the
other day about, was it ten per cent of young people not in any
employment?
I: Could well be, these days.
P: They were costing Scotland six billion pounds a year or something.
Now you trace them back and we’re in the privileged position here of
having summaries of patients. You chart their life course and you’ll bet
your bottom dollar that something like ninety per cent of those kids,
underachieving kids will have been unplanned, unwanted pregnancies.
Now that’s not eugenics, that’s just common sense in my book. [GP8,
female]
GP8’s use of the term “unwanted fertility” throughout this extract begs an important
question. For whom, exactly, is this fertility unwanted? While she begins by
emphasising the link between the availability of abortion and patient health, it
quickly becomes clear that the health she is referring to is that of the children who
are the product of (what she defines as) a failure in fertility control. More broadly, it
seems that the health of these children is less significant in terms of the meaning it
has for these individuals and their parents than the “burden” which these people
place on society.
Another notable feature of GP8’s account is that she spontaneously invokes
the term ‘eugenics’. In doing so, she appears to acknowledge that, in suggesting that
the abortion of working class women’s pregnancies is a solution to social problems
such as unemployment, she could be accused of mobilising ‘eugenic’ arguments.
However, by utilising and then dismissing the term, GP8 insists that what she
advocates is not eugenics, thus legitimating her position as one of reasonable
“common sense”. Her account thus lends support to the argument that I made in the
introduction, namely, that the flexibility of the term ‘eugenics’ allows HCPs to evade
critique by contesting its definition.
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Like most of the other GPs that I interviewed, GP8 stressed that requests for
abortion come from the patient, i.e. consultations on the subject take place because
patients have already defined their pregnancies as problematic before they reach the
consulting room (see Chapter Five). In spite of this, I was left wondering how her
immense support for the prevention of “unwanted fertility” might translate into
practice if a pregnant patient comes to discuss the options that are available to her.
Clearly, it is important to be cautious in treating HCPs’ support of the option to
‘choose’ abortion, as a measure of their support for women’s reproductive ‘freedom’.
6.4 Defining desirable reproductive futures
In the previous section I argued that, when HCPs constructed certain groups of
women as unreliable contraceptive users whose use of abortion was tolerated, they
were (implicitly or explicitly) defining certain types of reproductive future as
undesirable. In this final section, I will strengthen my argument that HCPs were
engaged in practices of reproductive stratification by revealing that HCPs criticised
particular categories of patient for trying to control their fertility too carefully.
As Lattimer (1998) points out, women, as well as HCPs, are subjected to
dominant discourses which constitute pregnancy as something that should be planned
in order to ensure that children are born at precisely the right time in a woman’s life,
as well as into the right circumstances. In her study of women requesting abortion,
she found that they often referred to their pregnancies as wanted but impossible
because the pregnancy had not been planned and it was the “wrong time” to have a
child. However, many of the HCPs I interviewed were critical of women (or couples)
who appeared to use abortion to re-assert control over the precise timing of their
fertility. Their critiques often centred on the argument that abortion isn’t the only
reproductive option available to these people, i.e. because it is not taking place in a
situation of desperate ‘need’ it is not justified. As I argued in Chapter Five, such
critiques are troubling simply by virtue of the fact that they impose and stabilise a
negative definition of abortion as a ‘last resort’ course of action that should involve
women’s suffering. However, when these critiques are explored further, another
disturbing pattern emerges from the data; HCPs often seemed to define what is to
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count as sufficient ‘desperation’ based on their assumptions about a woman’s
socioeconomic background.
This argument was made particularly clearly by one GP, who began by
outlining his sympathy for the situation of the majority of women in his practice
population, and his support for their decisions to terminate their pregnancies:
Cos there [are] you know, a lot of unemployment, poverty, drug
dependence, violence, all of you know, all these things associated with,
with deprivation and, poor educational achievement and so on and uh, I
certainly find it quite easy to think, yes, if a woman in those
circumstances doesn’t want to bring another child into that sort of
environment then yeah, I mean I don’t have any difficulty with that
decision if they’re struggling already. Although, I could accuse myself of
being judgmental and paternalistic and what right have I got to take, to
have any view on whether a child should be born, should or shouldn’t be
born just because the circumstances in which they’re going to be born are
going to be a lot more challenging than the circumstances into which I
was born? Um it, it’s kind of reverse view of uh sort of um right to life
people who would say that a child, certainly termination shouldn’t
happen under any circumstances. And I probably, this my view is
probably shared by a lot of people that if the circumstances are going to
be, are likely to be very tough then it makes, you know this enormous
decision to have a termination very easy, certainly to sympathise with it
and things and say I’m not, I don’t want to, you know, fight for this
unborn child’s right to life when I know it’s going to be a tough one
anyway. [GP19, male]
Just as GP8 slipped from the idea that fertility might be “unwanted” by an individual
woman to the “unwanted” repercussions of this fertility for children/society, GP19’s
sympathy for the contexts in which women are struggling quickly becomes sympathy
for the suffering of their potential children, whose lives “are likely to be very tough”.
In contrast, he suggested that there is no suffering with which to sympathise
when women request abortions in better socioeconomic circumstances. In such cases,
abortion becomes a matter of mere “inconvenience”, and women should be
dissuaded from it, if possible:
I suspect if I was working in [wealthier areas of city A] or maybe in the
University Health Centre which is probably quite a, maybe a significant
issue there too I um you know I might feel differently. And certainly I
can feel my sort of moral views or prejudices or whatever you like to call
them coming through on the rarer occasions where a um professional or
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successfully employed middle-class uh well-educated patient, mother,
woman comes and I’ve got you know, got some patients like that but not,
not that many. And just wants the termination because it’s sort of
inconvenient, you know, not not the right time, doesn’t fit in with her
plans. I’m certainly aware that in those circumstances I would try… I
wouldn’t say ‘I’m not going to sign the form’ but I would probably then
make a bit more, I would make a significant effort to get her to think
through and make it clear, probably might make it clear to her that
although I would sign the form I wasn’t in myself particularly supportive
of her decision. Again that’s a judgment and some people might argue
that I shouldn’t be doing that but that’s, that’s the way I work I think.
[GP19, male]
Throughout his account, GP19 appears to reflect upon and critique the situated basis
of his belief that some types of futures should be fought for, and some should not
(e.g. “I could accuse myself of being judgmental and paternalistic”). However, such
reflexivity could also be understood as the rhetorical practice which Potter (1996)
terms “stake confession”:
Confessing stake shows that the writer is live to its relevance and is not
trying to dupe the readership. It may also work as a display of honesty
and objectivity: the author is someone who can stand outside his interests
and is well aware of their distorting potential. (Potter, 1996: 130)
As described in Chapter Three, attempts to achieve the status of ‘objectivity’ through
the confession and dismissal of personal ‘values’ are also a well-known feature of
social scientific writing.
Whatever the implications of this ‘reflexivity’, it is interesting that GP19 seems
unable to represent the circumstances in which abortion is acceptable as a simple
matter of ‘fact’. Such hesitancy was common when HCPs criticised women for
choosing abortion when they have other options available to them, and is perhaps
unsurprising when it is considered that HCPs are working in a discursive context
which prioritises patient autonomy (see Chapter Five). However, HCPs’ critiques
were consistently directed towards the same categories of people; those who had
adequate finances, were educated (and preferably) in stable relationships. Hesitant or
not, through such critiques, they made potent statements about the kinds of people
who should not have abortions, and thus the kinds of lives which should be
reproduced:
I think, I think, you know, the people I find some of the hardest people to
deal with are probably um older women, women in a stable relationship
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um, you know, who seem to have financial and um emotional support,
you know who, who choose. That’s something I, I don’t find so easy,
mmm. But again, it’s not my choice. [laughs] [GP11, female]
I: Um have you ever come across reasons that you find problematic at
all?
P: Yeah not actually in this practice funnily enough but when I was a
registrar um a very nice middle-class couple with resources and money
and the intention of adding to their family but just not at this point in
time. Didn’t suit. I found that quite challenging.
I: How did you kind of manage that, that situation?
P: It’s about five years ago now so-
I: Sorry.
P: Um but I think I just, I think you have to be honest with people and
say, if you are feeling uncomfortable and you’re happy that your
uncomfortable feeling is not something that’s so personal you know um I
think other practitioners would share that sort of slight discomfort um.
And I think it’s ok to reflect that back to a patient and say ‘I am feeling
uncomfortable about this for the following reason’. You know, not fair to
say I’m feeling uncomfortable because I’m from some religious group
and we just don’t tolerate this kind of thing, you know. You know, so I I
think in that case I said to them ‘look your reason for not wanting to
proceed with this pregnancy is something you may regret um because
you could accommodate this baby, you could look after it, you know’.
[GP12, male]
In the extract from the interview with GP12, it is notable that he distinguishes his
expert “discomfort” concerning his middle-class patients’ decision to end their
pregnancies from what would constitute an unfair judgment, namely one based in
religion and a general intolerance of abortion. When I went on to ask what had
happened to the couple in question, he said that he had refused to refer them initially,
and couldn’t remember whether or not they had eventually been given access to the
procedure. It is important to contrast this with the practice of the two GPs that I
interviewed who did hold objections to abortions based in religion (see Chapter
Four). While they may have disagreed with their patients’ actions, neither of these
doctors suggested that they had any right to prevent them from terminating their
pregnancies.
In the quotation from GP11 above, “older” women are added to the
description of those who should be having babies rather than abortions. The use of
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age as a means to stratify women into groups who should or should not become
mothers has often been critiqued by feminist researchers. One of the most well-
known examples of this form of reproductive stratification is the representation of
teenage motherhood as a pressing social problem (Phoenix, 1991; Lawson & Rhode,
1993; Ward, 1995; Luker, 1996). This type of motherhood is often depicted as
intrinsically dangerous for mother and child, and is positioned as the direct cause of
social inequalities such as poverty (Luker, 1996).62 The readiness with which HCPs
depicted abortion as an acceptable course of action for ‘the young’ (see section 6.3)
suggests that they also defined motherhood as something which should not happen
‘too early’ in a woman’s life.63 This distinction is reinforced by the emphasis which
they placed on “older” women as a group who should continue with their
pregnancies.
In drawing attention to the problem of “older” women who request abortions,
HCPs also introduced another form of reproductive stratification, by suggesting that
motherhood was a course of action that some women pursue too late:
I: And does what you, what you would have talked about with different
women, would it vary very much? I’m thinking maybe if someone’s
quite direct that this is what I want to do, I’m decided or?
P: It would probably vary, yeah. Yeah well, no, it would probably vary
more depending on their age and their circumstance. You know it would
be very different with a fifteen-year-old who clearly that was very much
the best way to go compared with somebody, you know, somebody
who’s thirty-eight who felt that this just wasn’t the right time to have a
baby or, you know, that, that sort of thing. [Consultant 6, female]
And then of course it would depend on how old they are. If we were
having this discussion with somebody who was thirty-three and they said
yes they would want to have a child in this relationship but now isn’t the
right time, I would then have an entirely different conversation about
how, ‘well thirty-three is getting on a bit and if you have this pregnancy
terminated and then you can’t get pregnant subsequently and it does get
harder as you get older, you know, why, why, why do this now and
possibly consider getting pregnant next year or the year after. There often
62 As numerous researchers have pointed out, for many teenage women living in poverty, motherhood
is the most positive and rewarding opportunity that is available to them (e.g. Macintyre &
Cunningham-Burley, 1993; Ward, 1995; Luker, 1996).
63 Interestingly, within the related context of maternity care, Breheny and Stephens (2007) have
argued that “adolescence” and “motherhood” operate as two irreconcilable discourses in HCPs’
accounts.
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is no right time to be pregnant, it’s a difficult decision to make, to, to,
that now is the time to be pregnant.’ But if somebody was nineteen I
wouldn’t have that conversation with them. Um, so it does very much
depend on what the individual and what their circumstances are.
[Consultant 4, female]
When they suggest that, in contrast to teenagers, women in their thirties should be
dissuaded from abortion, these doctors do not simply suggest that older women make
more appropriate mothers. In both extracts, they also imply that the time-frame
within which women make suitable mothers is limited.
Although the reasons for this are left ambiguous in the first extract, in the
second extract, Consultant 4 cites the time-limited nature of female fertility as the
basis for her concern about a thirty-three year-old woman who requests an abortion.
In doing so, she makes two troubling suggestions. Firstly, she implies that women do
not realise that their fertility declines with age (which seems incredibly unlikely
given that stories concerning the ‘tragedy’ of women who wait ‘too long’ to have
babies, and who must be ‘rescued’ by reproductive technologies, have become a
media staple).64 Secondly, she assumes that this knowledge is relevant to a woman
who has decided that she does not want to (or is unable to) have a baby at this point
in her life.
Nevertheless, it should be remembered that many of the HCPs who I
interviewed work in a specialty (obstetrics/gynaecology) which centres on women’s
ability to reproduce. In this context, it is perhaps only to be expected that they
articulate concerns about those who appear to be waiting ‘too long’ to start their
families.
6.5 Conclusion
The importance of contextualising HCPs’ accounts in relation to the discursive
contexts within which they are speaking is a point that I want to reiterate in this
concluding summary. In Chapter Three I suggested that one of the benefits of a
discourse analytical approach is that it makes it possible to theorise the speaking
64 For detailed analyses of the British media’s representation of this, and related, issues see McNeil
(2007) and Hadfield et al. (2007).
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subject as simultaneously creative, yet constrained by the discursive resources
available to her or him. From this perspective, the troubling “prescriptive ontologies”
which emerge through HCPs’ claims to expertise about abortion must also be viewed
as evidence of the limited and limiting resources available for ‘imagining
reproduction’ (Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995) in twenty-first century Scotland.
I began the chapter by drawing attention to the way that contemporary public
discussions of abortion frame the practice as an intervention which can and should be
prevented through the use of contraception. In this context, it is unsurprising that
HCPs perpetuated this framing of abortion, by positioning themselves as experts who
must teach their patients how and why to avoid future unwanted pregnancy.
However, I went on to illustrate that there were some situations in which
HCPs depicted the repeated use of abortion as a more acceptable practice.
I revealed that women from “other countries”, the young and (particularly) those
living in poverty were depicted as incapable or unwilling contraceptive users. I
suggested that HCPs’ tolerance of these women’s use of abortion might reflect the
negative value assigned to particular types of reproductive futures. This suggestion
gains weight when HCPs’ acceptance of certain women’s use of abortion is
contrasted with the situations in which they criticised their patients for requesting the
procedure. With disturbing regularity, HCPs argued that it was acceptable to try to
discourage financially secure (read, middle-class) women from having abortions.
This argument was also applied to those women who were said to be waiting too
long to start their families.
I have suggested that these processes of differentiation can be described as
practices of reproductive stratification, through “which some categories of people are
empowered to nurture and reproduce, whilst others are disempowered” (Ginsburg &
Rapp, 1995: 3). Through HCPs’ accounts, the reproductive opportunities available to
women become entangled with structural systems of inequality such as
socioeconomic class, ethnicity and age. However, as emphasised above, individual
HCPs are not simply creating a world where the possibilities open to women are
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structured in this way. The emergence of this world from their accounts is
simultaneously indicative, as well as an indictment of, the society within which they
are speaking.
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Chapter Seven: Timing is everything - The
reappearance of the fetus
7.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter Five, one of the contexts in which HCPs were most likely to
position themselves as experts in relation to women with unwanted pregnancies was
when they discussed requests for abortion made at later gestations. When describing
their interactions with women in the second trimester of pregnancy, HCPs were far
more likely to suggest that they would discourage or refuse a woman’s request for
abortion. In this chapter I will illustrate the claims to expertise which HCPs
mobilised as they discussed decision-making about the provision of later abortion.
As in the previous chapter, my analysis of these claims centres on the ontologies
prescribed (Wynne, 2001) when HCPs attempted to position themselves as experts in
relation to their pregnant patients.
The chapter is structured around three different claims to expertise which
HCPs made during their accounts of decision-making about later abortion. In most of
the interviews HCPs drew upon at least one of these claims, and in some cases they
combined them. Firstly, echoing public debates on the subject, some HCPs suggested
that, as gestational time passes, they automatically become better placed than
pregnant women to assess the moral significance of the fetus and the ‘necessity’ of
abortion. In other cases, they argued that, as gestational time progresses, their
knowledge of the methods involved in terminating pregnancies becomes increasingly
essential to abortion decision-making. Finally, some HCPs suggested that those who
are involved in performing later abortions possess experiential knowledge that is
relevant to decisions about how ‘late’ the procedure should be provided. My analysis
will reveal that, when HCPs frame decision-making about later abortion in terms of
each of these three knowledge claims, the lives of pregnant women disappear from
view.
While the following discussion represents a critical analysis of HCPs’
attempts to define the meaning of later abortion, I also aim to continue the approach
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developed in previous chapters by acknowledging the contexts from which HCPs are
speaking. In Chapter Two, I argued that Haraway’s (1991; 1992; 1997) work
provides a useful means of treating the material world seriously as an active presence
in human life, in a manner that also emphasises that human encounters with material
entities are always situated, and are also mediated through human discourse. This
work becomes particularly important during the final section of this chapter, which
deals with HCPs’ embodied accounts of their involvement in performing later
abortions. I will use it to treat HCPs’ accounts of their physical involvement in later
abortion work sensitively, whilst refusing to privilege their accounts as an objective
source of knowledge concerning the meanings of aborted fetuses.
As described in Chapter Two, another critical feature of Haraway’s approach
to human relationships with materiality is that she focuses on the kinds of reality that
are created through this process. Her work thus enables me to ensure that, in keeping
with the rest of the chapter, my analysis of HCPs’ definitions of their encounters with
aborted fetuses remains focussed on political questions concerning the ontologies
that this process prescribes.
As the following discussion will reveal, my participants did not collectively
agree upon a single point in time beyond which abortion suddenly becomes a
different kind of decision because it is ‘late’. This is one of the reasons why I have
chosen to employ the relational terms ‘later’ and ‘earlier’ abortions in the analysis
that follows, rather than the absolute terms, ‘late’ vs. ‘early’. However, my use of
this more ambiguous terminology also represents an attempt to undermine the
assumption that there are a distinctive set of abortions which can be classified as
‘late’ and then discussed as a qualitatively different kind of issue from ‘early’
abortion. In her analysis of the 1988 Alton Bill (see Chapter One) and the terms in
which it was debated in Parliament, Steinberg argues that Alton and his supporters
effected “a significant shift in the broader cultural meaning of abortion” (Steinberg,
1991: 178) by demarcating ‘late’ abortion as a particularly problematic practice. The
repercussions of this definitional shift are clearly visible in the terms of
contemporary media and parliamentary discussions of the subject. As described in
191
Chapter One, pro-choice MPs appear to have conceded that the legitimacy of
women’s access to ‘late’ abortion is an entirely different question from their access
to ‘early’ abortion. ‘Late’ abortion is now seldom discussed as a question of
women’s rights, and access to the procedure has become dangerously contingent on
medical professional opinion concerning the gestations at which premature babies
can be kept alive.
7.2 Expertise concerning the meaning of gestational time
The discussion in Chapter One summarised the recent history of abortion law, as
well as feminist critiques of the ways in which abortion has been debated and
legislated in the UK. As part of this discussion I highlighted two key assumptions
which underpin the amendments to the 1967 Abortion Act that were passed in the
1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Firstly, the law implies that the
status of the fetus in relation to the woman who is pregnant is dependent on medical
consensus concerning the lowest gestation at which a fetus is ‘viable’ (with medical
intervention) if born prematurely. In 1990, this consensus led to an upper time limit
of twenty-four weeks’ gestation being placed on those abortions carried out on the
grounds that:
the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of
the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family (Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, section 37, clause 1a).
There is no upper time limit on the other three grounds under which abortions can be
provided (see Chapter One, p.15). This reflects the second assumption which is
embedded within the law, namely, that ‘exceptional’ circumstances are required to
make the abortion of later gestation fetuses a legitimate course of action. In the
following section, I will illustrate how these two, interrelated arguments were
mobilised by some HCPs when they explained why gestational timing matters before
the twenty-four week limit that appears in the law.
However, before exploring the distinctive status which HCPs grant to fetuses at
later stages of gestation, it is useful to consider Franklin’s analysis of the ways in
which scientific discourses about the fetus facilitate its personification. In addressing
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the ways that these discourses have been mobilised by the anti-abortion lobby in
public debates about abortion, she argues that:
the construction of fetal ontology in the scientific literature, scientific
photography and in the anti-abortion literature invites identification with
the fetus on the basis of its morphological individuality and personhood.
(Franklin, 1991: 200)
Another key feature of scientific accounts of fetal development is that they position
the embryo/fetus as an entity which contains the biological potential to become a
human being from the moment of conception onwards. Through this narrative of
potentiality we are encouraged to view the fetus’s future as synonymous with its
present state of being. In other words, this:
…teleological construction of the fetus opens up the possibility of
identifying with its developmental personhood, its entire imagined life
course and its future as a human adult. (Franklin, 1991: 200)
Franklin argues that, through these discourses, biological explanations first eclipse
and then come to signify the social meanings of reproduction and kinship. She
highlights the individualistic definitions of these processes that are embedded in
biological accounts of fetal status. Attempts to define the fetus as a separate person
on the basis of its ‘biology’ obscure the physical relationships between pregnant
women and their fetuses, as well as their social relationships with one another and
with other human beings (Franklin, 1991).
Both of the aspects of biological discourse which Franklin identifies (i.e. “fetal
ontology” and “fetal teleology”) were central to HCPs’ claims to expertise
concerning the meaning of gestational time. However, as the following discussion
will reveal, the potentiality of the fetus was depicted as particularly significant.
7.2.1 Accounting for a twenty week time limit
As described in Chapter Five, at each of the hospitals where I conducted interviews,
a time limit below twenty-four weeks’ gestation is enforced. Women who arrive at a
hospital after its chosen cut-off point are informed that they have to travel to England
to one of the charitable abortion providers (usually, the bpas). The precise cut-off
point varies from hospital to hospital, but the highest limit that an interviewee
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reported was twenty weeks’ gestation.65 Explanations of this particular time limit
centred on the issue of fetal viability, and the inaccuracy of the ultrasound scans
which are used to date pregnancies:
…a twenty-four week fetus has, I think has to be presumed capable of
being born alive and certainly um widespread practice in this part of the
country um is that you will struggle to find a Consultant who’s willing to
terminate a pregnancy other than on the grounds of fetal abnormality, if
the pregnancy is beyond twenty weeks. Now that’s partly based around
um, a presump- our presumption of viability is about the twenty-three
week mark, yeah that’s, as far as I’m aware that is the earliest gestation at
which a baby has been born and has lived. The ultrasound scan that we
use to date a pregnancy has about a two-week error at that stage of
pregnancy. So a pregnancy which is by ultrasound evaluation twenty-
three weeks could be anywhere from twenty-one weeks to twenty-five
weeks. So I think you have to assume that a twenty-three week
pregnancy on the scan is a twenty-one week pregnancy potentially, um
and therefore we have a kind of um, by mutual agreement amongst a
group of consultants, an undertaking that we tend not to want to go
beyond twenty weeks unless as I say there um, there is a fetal
abnormality. [Consultant 2, male]
In this account, Consultant 2 constructs the measurement of gestational time as
something which is essential in order to avoid aborting a fetus that is old enough to
be kept alive (with medical assistance) ex utero. In doing so, he portrays medical
consensus, rather than the Abortion Act, as the source of authoritative knowledge
which determines the threshold in time that is deemed significant (twenty-three
weeks). However, simultaneously, he reveals the complexities involved in treating
this event as a particular, identifiable ‘point’ in time. Because the date of conception
is never known precisely (except, perhaps, to the couple in question), the ‘age’ of a
fetus is only knowable through the conventional methods used to date and thus
attribute gestational time to fetuses. Through these methods, the age of these entities
(including those which HCPs have successfully ‘kept alive’) can only ever be known
as an approximation.
Rather than drawing attention to the technical difficulties involved in
measuring the ‘point’ at which a fetus becomes an entity that might be kept alive ex
utero, it is perhaps more important to problematise Consultant 2’s assertion that this
65 This mirrors the highest time limit found by Lee et al. (2004), who surveyed the upper gestational
limits of abortion provision at twenty-one (randomly selected) NHS sites across the UK.
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measurement is relevant to decision-making about abortion. As McNeil (1991) points
out, the significance which is attributed to fetal ‘viability’ in public debates about
abortion causes our attention to shift away from the fetus’s relationship to the woman
who is pregnant. Focusing on the earliest point at which a fetus can be kept alive
using medical technology ensures that its ‘life’ is defined in terms of biological
function, rather than in terms of women’s:
…complex evaluations of their particular circumstances and of the social
sustainability of new life. Such decisions have little to do with what
medical science can sustain technologically. Saying that it is theoretically
possible to plug a 24-week old fetus into life support apparatuses is very
different from saying that you personally will take primary responsibility
for supporting – in every sense – a child through to adulthood. (McNeil,
1991: 156 – emphasis added)
It is important to note that several of my participants also questioned the
relevance of medical professional consensus concerning fetal ‘viability’ to decisions
about abortion. Like McNeil, Consultant 3 suggested that the gestation at which
fetuses can be kept alive by doctors is irrelevant to the question of whether a woman
feels able to continue with her pregnancy:
I: …there’s been a bit of debate lately about the upper time limit on
terminations-
P: Sure.
I: I just wondered if you have any opinions or views about that?
P: Um I, I suppose the, the discussion about it I think has got sort of quite
muddied and it seems to have got mixed up with viability and, and with
pregnancies now surviving, some surviving at twenty-four weeks’
gestation. I think it’s entirely different, I don’t really see that the two
things are, are part of, of the same argument […] And just thinking of
people that I’ve seen that have been at that gestation, they often have um
quite dire circumstances that are leading them to request such a late
termination. Whether it be, you know, a relationship that’s maybe split
up in, in very difficult circumstances, often maybe domestic violence in
the background, or young people that have concealed a pregnancy, or
someone that’s just been too frightened to, to acknowledge that they were
pregnant [...] So I personally would, would keep the gestation limit as it
is. [Consultant 3, female]
However, more often, when HCPs raised questions about the definition of viability,
they did so in a very different manner from the kind of feminist reframing that
McNeil advocates:
195
There’s been a lot of debate about that and I don’t do obstetrics. Or at
least I did obstetrics but years ago um so I don’t see premature babies
delivered. But a colleague who did do the clinic with us for quite some
time and who was involved in obstetrics used to say ‘don’t ask how many
babies survive at twenty-two weeks and twenty-three weeks. Ask how
many of them pick up a schoolbag and go to a normal school, healthy and
well, four or five years down the line.’ And maybe those are the
questions you ought to be asking. Because the success rate of, of keeping
very prem babies alive and normally or reasonably normally functioning,
nobody has perfect babies um but that is, is perhaps the question rather
than can they survive for six months or a year or in some damaged
fashion for a three, three or four years. Um you wonder about that. But as
I say that’s, that may change with time and… But there must be a limit
beyond which you obviously just cannot resuscitate these babies.
[Specialist Registrar 3, female]
In this extract, Specialist Registrar 3 reframes the question of viability as an issue of
the long term, rather than immediate ‘life’ potential of neonates. Interestingly,
similar moves were made by MPs who defended the current twenty-four week time
limit on abortion during the Committee stage of the 2008 Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Bill:
The current clinical evidence shows that although there have been
medical advances in caring for premature babies, only a small number of
babies born at under 24 weeks’ gestation can survive. For those that do,
there may be many questions about their quality of life—most have
severe problems—whereas the situation improves markedly at 24 to 25
weeks, which reaffirms why the limit of 24 weeks was chosen. [Dawn
Primarolo, Hansard Columns 245-6, May 20th 2008]
Like Specialist Registrar 3’s account, such defences do little to open up the
discursive space in which to talk about later abortion. This is because they fail to
challenge the assumption that medical judgments about the functionality of
fetal/neonatal bodies are the crucial basis for making decisions about its availability.
At the same time, these alternative accounts of ‘viability’ do reveal that it is a more
complex issue than “the earliest gestation at which a baby has been born and has
lived”.
Nevertheless, there are good legal reasons why HCPs may be working with
this incredibly narrow definition of ‘viability’ in practice. As noted in the
intermission between Chapters Three and Four, medical abortion induces the
premature delivery of a pregnancy. However, an issue which I did not include in this
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description is that, when conducted at later gestations, this method of abortion
sometimes produces a fetus that shows signs of ‘life’ (such as a heartbeat or
respiratory attempts). As Vadeyar et al., (2005) point out:
Legally, a fetus that is born alive becomes a child and a deliberate act
that causes the death of a child is murder, even if that deliberate act
precedes the birth. Consequently, a doctor could be accused of murder if
he performs a termination that results in the live birth of a child that is
capable of survival and the child then dies of prematurity. (Vadeyar et
al., 2005: 1159)
In other words, the legality of an abortion can, somewhat paradoxically, become
dependent on events which post-date it. It is for this reason that the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists recommend the performance of feticide (the
ultrasound-guided injection of potassium chloride into the fetal heart to stop it
beating in utero) before abortions carried out beyond twenty-one weeks and six days
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2001; Vadeyar et al., 2005).
This is treated as the conventional limit of clinical viability, i.e. it is the threshold
above which a fetus is deemed capable of independent survival with medical
assistance if it shows the ‘life’ signs mentioned above, upon delivery (Vadeyar et al.,
2005). Feticide ensures that a medical abortion cannot produce a fetus showing these
signs, and means that HCPs are not faced with the professional/legal obligation to try
to keep it alive.
However, although an entirely legal method of abortion (feticide, plus
medical abortion) is available for pregnancies that are dated as being between twenty
and twenty-four weeks’ gestation, this method does not appear to be utilised in
Scotland. Rather, a ‘margin of error’ system is employed to ensure that Scottish
HCPs cannot ever become involved in the abortion of a fetus that is more than
twenty-two weeks’ old. If an ultrasound scan indicates that a woman is twenty
weeks’ pregnant66 or more, then she is directed to a charitable abortion provider in
England.
66 Given the two-week error in scanning mentioned previously, ‘twenty weeks’ implies that the
woman in question is somewhere from eighteen to twenty-two weeks’ pregnant.
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As well as drawing on arguments concerning the distinctive status of post-
twenty week fetuses, Consultant 2 also invokes the idea that the abortion of these
fetuses requires unusual circumstances to be justifiable (see p.193). In describing an
exception in cases of fetal abnormality, he echoes the distinction made by the 1990
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, which removed an upper time limit on
abortions in situations where there is “a substantial risk that if the child will be born
it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped” (clause 1d). In recent years, this exception has generated considerable
legal and media controversy, with disability rights activists arguing that it represents
discrimination against disabled fetuses, and devalues disabled lives (see Statham et
al., 2006 for a review of this controversy).67
However, as feminist scholars have long argued (Science and Technology
Subgroup, 1991; Sheldon, 1997), special case arguments about fetal abnormality are
not simply problematic because of the way that they construct disability.
Additionally, these arguments contribute to the belief that decisions about later
abortions should be based upon HCPs’ definitions of fetal status, rather than upon
individual women’s understandings of what their pregnancies mean.
7.2.2 And, by extension…
My analysis of Consultant 2’s account of the twenty week time limit at his hospital
has revealed how he mobilises both of the assumptions about later abortion which
underpin the twenty-four week time limit in current UK law. Later abortions are held
to be problematic because of the status of later gestation fetuses, and only HCPs are
qualified to define the exceptional circumstances (such as the diagnosis of fetal
abnormality) where the abortion of these fetuses becomes justifiable. In the
remainder of this section, I will briefly illustrate how other HCPs mobilised identical
67 HCPs involved in termination for fetal abnormality also recognise that this is a potentially
discriminatory distinction, but argue that it is important to be able to provide abortions at later
gestations on these grounds (Statham et al., 2006). This is because most diagnostic tests cannot be
carried out until well into the second trimester, and the imposition of a twenty-four week limit on
these decisions would force patients to make them very rapidly (Statham et al., 2006). Additionally,
the likely severity of some fetal conditions cannot be properly assessed until the third trimester of
pregnancy (Statham et al., 2006).
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arguments when they explained why abortion becomes a problematic decision at
gestations far below twenty weeks. In doing so, I want to highlight the major
ramifications of debating and legislating later abortion within a narrow discursive
framework which grants authority to HCPs’ definitions of fetal status.
In many HCPs’ accounts, fetal viability was characterised as a much blurrier
and more ambiguous threshold, which was expanded to encompass the time period
during which a fetus approaches a point where it might be capable of independent
life:
I: Ok. Um and you said that um it would, that it’s up to about
twelve/fourteen weeks it’s um pretty much open access. But um could
you explain why it becomes a bit less so after that time period.
P: Um, I suppose, I suppose it’s just as the, as the fetus gets closer
towards viability. I mean I know fourteen/sixteen weeks they’re not –
and we would usually, certainly when I did the TOP clinic, usually
women would have a termination up to twenty weeks, um but certainly
around nineteen/twenty and above then, then. And it’s to do with, it’s to
do with viability, yeah. [Consultant 6, female]
I think there’s no doubt that uh the longer time goes on uh the more uh
uh a fetus uh becomes, uh the closer it comes to, to viability uh the less
uh the less you wish to interfere, mmm. [GP16, male]
When I went on to try and clarify the kind of timescale that this second HCP was
referring to, he said that the later abortions which concerned him were those
occurring after roughly the first twelve weeks (i.e. the first trimester) of pregnancy.
Arguments concerning the lack of justification for the abortion of later
gestation fetuses were also central to these and several other HCPs’ accounts. In
many cases, it seemed that they were not criticising the weakness of women’s
grounds for abortion per se, but rather their grounds for having failed to request the
procedure at an earlier point in gestation. In other words, the fact that women ‘allow’
gestational time to pass before requesting an abortion became treated as evidence
that the procedure is not really necessary:
I think as I say, because abortion is so readily available and publicised
and, you know, such easy access and certainly in this hospital,
particularly, the service here is incredibly well-run and organised. And I
don’t think there’s any reason why people shouldn’t come up earlier on
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in their pregnancy, and make their decision earlier on in their pregnancy.
Except in the rare occasions. [Specialist Registrar 1, male – discussing
his reservations about abortions beyond the first trimester]
And I, yeah, I suppose part of the logic is that in this city, there is, for
most women there is quite easy access to termination, and so you, you
feel for most women they should have been able to get here, you know,
unless there are unusual circumstances by fourteen weeks really, so. But I
suppose that, I mean I suppose that’s a bit judgemental. But that - you
wonder how seriously, well I don’t know – you just feel a bit more
uncomfortable as, as the gestation gets, gets later. [Consultant 6, female]
Concern about how “serious” women are when they request abortion later in
pregnancy was expressed by a number of HCPs. Some argued that this would lead
them to assess their patients’ decisions much more carefully than they would if a
request for abortion was made earlier in pregnancy.
However, GP16 took this argument a step further, and suggested that, when
women allow too much gestational time to elapse before requesting an abortion, it is
safe to assume that they do not really want the procedure:
P: Really uh in my experience um the only reason for people presenting
late is because something has been found on a, on a scan or a MAFP
check which means that uh there’s serious trouble anyway. And in that
situation uh you’d go ahead and refer. Uh but in other situations, people
who let a pregnancy go on and on or they uh fail to come to a decision uh
in a way subconsciously they’re making their decision.
I: Mmm. So they’re, by, by letting the pregnancy go on they’re?
P: They’re, they’re saying, well um uh ‘I don’t want to end it,’ mmm.
[GP16, male]
In this, as in the extracts considered above, there is no sense that, just as pregnancy
takes place over time, a woman’s circumstances and feelings about (not to mention
her awareness of)68 her pregnancy might also change. GP16’s reluctance to
acknowledge this possibility is particularly interesting, because he does suggest one
particular set of circumstances where a pregnancy might run into the kind of “serious
trouble” that justifies later abortion, i.e. because of the results of diagnostic tests. In
68 Studies which have explored women’s reasons for requesting abortion later in pregnancy suggest
that many women simply do not realise that they are pregnant at an earlier point in gestation
(Robotham et al., 2005; Ingham et al., 2007). Amongst the factors which might make it more difficult
to recognise a pregnancy are a history of irregular menstruation, or using hormonal methods of
contraception, which can produce erratic bleeding, and also make it less likely that a woman will
suspect pregnancy because she believes she is having ‘protected’ sex (Robotham et al., 2005; Ingham
et al., 2007).
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contrast to a woman’s own understanding of her pregnancy, the knowledge generated
through medical testing is presented as an entirely straightforward and legitimate
basis from which to proceed with an abortion at this point in gestation.
In some cases, HCPs engaged in more explicit boundary work and set up a
direct contrast between “medical” (or justifiable) and “social” (or unjustifiable)
grounds for later abortion.
I: So what’s kind of the latest that you will refer women on for, for a
termination?
P: I don’t think you can answer that question.
I: No, ok sure.
P: Um for a so-called social termination oh, I’d be reluctant to do it any
later than sixteen weeks, possibly earlier. Um but I mean, clearly if there
were dreadful birth defects found on an ultrasound scan or something
then it’s a completely different kettle of fish.
I: And um, ‘social’ uh terminations what, how do you kind of um I’m
just trying to understand what that term means cos I’ve heard it from
quite a few people.
P: Well, there are a, a group of terminations performed for pregnancies
that are, are not proceeding as, as as would normally be anticipated, so
there’s going to be disastrous fetal anomalies and it would be wrong to
push somebody towards the end of a longer gestation for all kinds of
reasons of physical delivery uh injury to the mother, psychological
reasons uh where you wouldn’t want that pregnancy to go ahead, so you
know dreadful chromosomal abnormalities, or something like that. And
those things [inaudible word] be picked up early in pregnancy. Um
whereas a social termination, if you’re looking for an off the top of my
head definition, a pregnancy that would have produced a healthy baby if
it had been left to its own devices probably, in all probability. But the
environment that the baby’s going to be delivered into is maybe going to
be less than ideal. [GP12, male]
In separating the ‘social’ from the purely ‘medical’ in this way, GP12 does not have
to address the way in which the ‘social’ is inextricable from the medical practice of
prenatal diagnosis. This practice rests upon and perpetuates the construction of
disability as a medical problem for individuals to deal with through the abortion of
affected fetuses, and silences questions about society’s collective responsibilities for
the support of the disabled (Lippman, 1991; Shakespeare, 1998).
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As described in Chapter Five, GPs tended to avoid stating directly that they
would refuse to refer a patient who requested an abortion. However, when GP12 says
that it would be wrong to “push” a woman to continue her pregnancy if she was
carrying a fetus with an abnormality, he seems to imply that, if her fetus is “healthy,”
such “pushing” becomes acceptable. In several of the interviews GPs produced
similarly ambiguous, and troubling, accounts of their interactions with women
requesting later abortion. This often left me wondering whether some patients are
being dissuaded from abortion, or even being refused access to the procedure by
GPs. Women who reach a hospital after its local gestational cut-off point will at least
be given the opportunity to access a charitable abortion provider in England. In
contrast, those who are prevented from accessing secondary care facilities by a GP
may have no other option than to carry their pregnancies to term. Alternatively (and
ironically), if they do eventually manage to gain access to the procedure, this process
will inevitably be delayed by encounters with GPs who dismiss them for being ‘too
late’.
7.3 Expertise concerning the method of later abortion
As described in the introduction to this chapter, in nearly all of the interviews, HCPs
suggested that decisions about later abortions were qualitatively different from
decisions about earlier abortions. However, their explanations for this difference did
not always involve claims to expertise about the status of the fetus. In this section I
will reveal that some HCPs’ concerns about later abortion centred entirely upon the
woman in question. I will illustrate how HCPs construct the method used to
terminate later gestation pregnancies as a course of action that is potentially more
physically and emotionally damaging than carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term.
Through this analysis I will argue that, as they mobilise claims to expertise about the
‘risk’ posed by this procedure, HCPs again impose particular definitions of the
meaning of abortion, and cause the future lives of their pregnant patients to disappear
from view.
Before embarking on this discussion, I will re-summarise some of the critical
background ‘information’ concerning abortion methods that was provided in the
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Intermission following Chapter Three. Through this summary I aim to illustrate that,
in Scotland, women have no choices concerning the method used to terminate their
pregnancy once they enter the second trimester of pregnancy.
7.3.1 The time-limited availability of surgical abortion
Guidelines from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (2004) state
that, if doctors possess the requisite skills, it is possible for them to perform surgical
abortions up to the legal time limit. From seven to fifteen weeks’ gestation, this
involves the use of a suction curette to aspirate the contents of the uterus (sometimes
aided by blunt forceps). After fifteen weeks, a woman’s cervix must be dilated more
extensively before a surgical abortion, because this involves the use of instruments to
dissect a larger fetus into smaller parts in utero, in order to make it possible to
remove it through the vagina. This procedure is known as dilation and evacuation.
However, I was informed that dilation and evacuation does not feature as part
of Scottish abortion practice. Moreover, at most hospitals, gynaecologists will not
conduct even conventional suction surgical abortions beyond approximately thirteen
weeks’ gestation. This means that most women are unable to have a surgical
procedure in the second trimester of pregnancy, and must undergo medical abortion
instead.
As described in the Intermission between Chapters Three and Four, the
medical method of abortion can be performed across the first and second trimester of
pregnancy and utilises two drugs – mifepristone and misoprostol – to induce
abortion. With increasing gestational time, greater quantities of misoprostol must be
administered to the patient, in order to generate the stronger uterine contractions and
greater degree of cervical dilation which are necessary in order for a larger fetus to
be expelled through the vagina. Unlike surgical abortion (which, in Scotland, is
performed under general anaesthesia), medical abortion requires the patient to be
conscious throughout.
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Gynaecologists often explained the time-limited basis of surgical abortion
provision by stating that second trimester surgical abortions are technically more
difficult to perform, as well as generating a higher risk of post-operative
complications. One Consultant also argued that, because later surgical procedures are
rarely performed, there are few specialists who can train other gynaecologists to do
them. However, other participants suggested that a more active rejection of later
surgical abortion provision also takes place in Scottish practice. For example:
P: So it’s more - but it’s also there’s the yuk factor, you know, chopping
up fetal parts at sixteen weeks is pretty horrible. I’ve seen it done once
for a woman who had um, she was about seventeen weeks and had, she
had a cervical suture in to prevent recurrent miscarriage. And the
Consultant um actually did a destructive procedure in order to get the
baby out without, cos she couldn’t, you couldn’t remove the suture cos it
was an abdominal suture, and otherwise she would have needed a
hysterotomy. And it’s not pleasant you know.
I: Yeah
P: So and, you know, good on him for doing it. Um but that, that was out
of a medical necessity. Um but you know I wouldn’t, I think it’s a
horrible thing to do, yes. [Consultant 7, male]
In her research into women’s experiences of amniocentesis and abortion in the US,
Rapp (2000) links the limited availability of second trimester surgical abortion to
hierarchies in the hospital workforce. She suggests that doctors are able to forgo the
training necessary to be able to perform later surgical abortions because they are in a
position to delegate medical abortion work to their nursing colleagues. Doctors’
refusal to perform surgical procedures also delegates work to the women undergoing
medical abortions, because their bodies are actively involved in this process (Rapp,
2000).
7.3.2 Demarcating ‘later’ medical abortion
Although the medical abortion method involves the same drugs across the first and
second trimesters (albeit in different quantities), my participants tended to emphasise
differences, rather than similarities, between earlier and later medical abortion. For
example, in explaining why it was better if patients requested an abortion earlier in
pregnancy, one GP characterised earlier medical abortion very matter-of-factly:
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And uh we try and get them earlier now because they get the medical
terminations done, you know, take your pills and the job’s done. [GP15,
male]
In contrast, he stated that he was more cautious about referring women beyond
twelve weeks’ gestation and placed an “embargo” on referrals at gestations of sixteen
weeks and over (see Chapter Five, p. 150) because:
I think in in, well in practice terms I mean if somebody comes in, you
know, a late termination, I suppose between sixteen and twenty, well I
suppose sixteen and twenty, you know, a young lassie with a concealed
pregnancy then there maybe some issues around, you know, whether she
requires to go through a mini-labour or whatever rather than just a
straight suction termination. I think that’s probably why we use the sort
of twelve, sixteen week, you know, cut off time. Cos the termination
technology is different if you like. You know, once you’ve gone past
sixteen it’s no longer just out with the suction machine and get on with
the job, it’s quite different, you know, intra-amniotic termination and so
on and so forth, it’s, it’s a different process altogether. So that’s why.
[GP15, male]
In GP15’s account second trimester medical abortion is characterised as a unique and
complex procedure in relation to the straightforward methods of earlier medical and
surgical abortion. Indeed, it is depicted as something so problematic that patients
must be prevented from going through it. Unfortunately, this interview was
conducted under considerable time pressure, and because of this, I did not follow up
precisely what GP15 considered to be so troubling about second trimester medical
abortion. However, his account suggests that his concerns stem from his definition of
the process that his patients will have to undergo, which is likened to childbirth (a
“mini-labour”).
This suggestion is supported by the emphasis which other HCPs placed on
the importance of informing their patients about the traumatic ‘nature’ of second
trimester medical abortion:
I: Ok. Um and the, the issue of time limits is something that I’ve come
across before and um, some GPs have said that they make a distinction
between first and second trimester terminations and is that something
you’re aware of or?
P: Um yes I mean I think because trimester, second trimester’s a bit more
traumatic to go through the procedure um people actually do have to
have almost like a mini-labour. When you explain that to people it
sometimes does affect their decision. But I don’t think it would affect my
decision, I mean I think I would counsel the person, but I would explain
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very carefully about the procedure so that they absolutely understood
what they were going to have to go through and more people do change
their mind, the later it is more people change their mind.
I: But for example if a woman was in the second, at some point in the
second trimester and she was adamant that that’s what she wanted, you
would still refer?
P: Yeah I would still, yep. I would explain very carefully what was
involved and make sure she did understand that there were higher risks
um that it was a more prolonged procedure, you know, more traumatic
for her, more pain involved, so I would explain that very carefully. But if
she still felt that was the right thing for her to do I would refer her.
[Consultant 1, female]
As I acknowledged in Chapter Five, HCPs do have a legal obligation to obtain
informed consent from patients before they conduct any medical intervention. At the
same time, I argued that, as they define what constitutes a decision that is
“informed”, or which has been “thought through”, HCPs are inevitably producing
particular definitions of the meaning of abortion. In the remainder of this section I
will consider the definitions produced by HCPs as they lay claim to expertise about
the method of second trimester medical abortion.
I was particularly struck by the frequency with which HCPs problematised
the second trimester medical procedure by describing it as like a “mini-labour” or
“delivery”. The first time that I encountered this expression, I barely heard the word
“mini” and what I imagined was full-blown childbirth. To me, this term connoted not
simply the (imagined) physical pain of labour, but simultaneously, the social
significance of this process as something which would normally result in the birth of
a new human person. Indeed, some HCPs’ unease about the ‘trauma’ caused by this
method slipped between a concern with the bodily pain of vaginal delivery, and
anxiety about the significance which their patients might attach to the fetus delivered
at the end of this process. The following extract is quoted at length, because the
Consultant provides a particularly detailed description of the information that she
deems relevant to decision-making about second trimester abortion:
I: Um and some GPs have described the medical, the second trimester
termination as a kind of like a mini-labour – is that um how you, you
would see it or describe it?
P: Yeah I mean I think, again I think you in some ways you have to be
quite explicit with people what that will actually involve um because they
206
have, people have to know what to expect before they agree to undergo a
procedure. Um I think uh, I mean I wouldn’t just say to someone it’s a
mini labour, I think I would qualify it with um probably more of a
discussion about what will actually happen. But I think that um is a
reasonable opening gambit to, to describe it to someone. And I think
people are often quite shocked when they realise that they are actually
going to have to deliver the fetus out through the vagina. I mean I would
say to them obviously it’s much, what you’re delivering is much smaller
than someone having a baby at the end of, end of a pregnancy. But the
process is not dissimilar to that and particularly if someone’s maybe
fifteen, sixteen weeks um or more I would be sort of explaining to them
that, you know, the [inaudible technical term] will come away and it’s
like someone’s waters going it’ll feel, feel wet and probably quite, and
explain to them it’s likely to be quite sore. Um I think they also have to,
uh don’t have to give a vast amount of detail but explain to people that if
you were to look at what you’re passing it is going to be recognisable as
a, a pregnancy. Because again, people will come with a belief, or some
people will come with the belief that there’s basically some, a bunch of
cells and some blood that you’re going to pass and if they then look at a
fifteen week fetus they’ll get the fright of their life if that’s not what
they’re expecting so, I use- I would normally say to people it will look
like what it is, a developing pregnancy, and it would be recognisable as
that. So if you don’t want to see something like that, you have to be very
sure that you don’t look at the point where you, where something’s
coming away from you. So I think, I usually say to people ‘I’m sorry to
give you this amount of detail, but you do have to know what to expect, I
can’t send you into hospital to have this done without having an
understanding about what we’re, we’re talking about.’ [Consultant 3,
female]
This extract reveals the complexity of the situation that HCPs are faced with when
consenting patients for medical abortion procedures. With surgical operations,
patients must be informed of likely ‘risks’ (the definition of which is, of course, also
situated), but while the abortion is happening they will be under general anaesthesia.
Because of this, there is no need to tell them what the procedure itself “will feel
like”. In contrast, when it comes to medical abortions, patients are conscious and will
experience the entire abortion from start to finish. As a result, the extent of the
information that must be provided is far greater, as is the potential for HCPs to
impose particular definitions of the meanings of pregnancy and abortion upon their
patients. Although she does not reflect explicitly on this potential, Consultant 3
seems to be aware of it throughout her account. On the one hand, she emphasises the
importance of ensuring that her patients are aware of what they will feel and see,
particularly if they are beyond fifteen to sixteen weeks’ gestation. On the other, she
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is apologetic and hesitant as she tries to find words to define what this experience
will be like.
However, Consultant 3 then went on to suggest that fetal ultrasound represents
a straightforward means of ensuring that patients are fully ‘informed’ before
undergoing abortion at later gestations:
And I think um quite a lot of people, not everyone but a number of
people um want to see the scan, they obviously scan everyone to check
their dates when they’re in the clinic, and they’ll have the machine set
such that the screen is turned away from the patient um but usually at the
end of the scan they’ll say, ‘I’m finished doing the scan measurements, if
you want to see the scan tell me and I’ll turn it round’. And it’s surprising
the number of people that do actually want to see it. And sometimes
that’s quite helpful, if someone is going to be, particularly a later
termination, because it’s then more obvious what you’re, you’re talking
about and you can say ‘now you’ve seen, on the image on the screen that,
you know, that’s going to be delivered through the, the vagina, so’. And
obviously for some people it won’t be the right thing to look at the scan,
and they’re quite clear they don’t want to see anything, that, that’s fine,
they don’t see it but…[does not finish sentence and changes topic]
[Consultant 3, female]
In this extract, it is unclear whether it is seeing the ‘size’ of what has to be delivered
through the vagina, or visualising what the fetus looks like that is being defined as
the crucial issue. However, what is clear is that the ultrasound image of the fetus is
positioned as an objective source of information upon which women should base
their decisions about whether or not to have an abortion. There is no
acknowledgement of the issue highlighted by a large body of feminist scholarship,
namely, that fetal imaging technologies produce a particular vision of the fetus, in
which it appears as an individual that ‘lives’ outside of a pregnant woman’s body
(Petchesky, 1987; Franklin, 1991; Duden, 1993; Hartouni, 1997; Stabile, 1998;
Taylor, 1998; Zechmeister, 2001). Moreover, the process of ultrasound scanning has
become ritualized as an important social event through which wanted fetuses are
welcomed into their prospective families (Petchesky, 1987; Mitchell & Georges,
2000; Draper, 2002). As I argued in Chapter Two, feminist analyses of these
processes are valuable because they demonstrate that the meanings of fetuses are
contingent upon human practices, and thus, negotiable.
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In contrast, the certainty with which many HCPs claimed to ‘know’ the fetus
and what seeing it would (or, should) mean to their patients, left no such discursive
space:
Obviously you do have to say it is, it is going to look like a baby and the
chances are you will see it um and that is going to make it more difficult
for you because it does seem more real than it just being a little ball of
cells. [Consultant 4, female]
What might hearing a doctor’s definition of the fetus as “like a baby”, or the
experience of watching its image move on an ultrasound screen mean for a woman
requesting a second trimester medical abortion? The lack of data on this topic (see
below) means that it is impossible to do more than speculate, but HCPs themselves
suggested that this, combined with the description of the procedure as “like a mini-
labour” often convinces women not to go through with it. It also seems important to
consider what these definitions might imply for a woman who does decide to have a
second trimester abortion. How might exposure to particular definitions of this
experience become interwoven with the experience itself?
In addition to considering how HCPs’ designation of second trimester
medical abortion as an unusually traumatic experience may impact upon individual
patients, it is also vital to draw attention to the broader process of issue definition
that is taking place in the accounts considered in this section. When HCPs insist that
the immediate trauma caused by second trimester medical abortion is the most
pertinent ‘fact’ in decision-making about abortion, they allow the futures of women
who are dissuaded or prevented from undergoing this procedure to disappear. In none
of the above extracts do HCPs acknowledge that such women will have to go
through full-term labour and become mothers, or else surrender their babies for
adoption.
7.3.3 Some alternative accounts of the medical abortion ‘experience’
As I have argued throughout this thesis, in considering the potential for HCPs to
shape women’s experiences of abortion, it is vital not to become complicit with them
by depicting their patients as ignorant and passive receptacles for their definitions of
‘relevant’ knowledge. The HCPs whose accounts I considered in the previous section
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make several claims about their patients. In suggesting that, as HCPs, they possess
specialist knowledge concerning the medical abortion procedure (both in terms of the
physical experience and in terms of what ‘seeing the fetus’ means) they suggest that
women have no access to this knowledge. In constructing women’s ‘ignorance’
about the procedure, they depict their own knowledge as an ‘objective’ source of
information, and imply that no alternative definitions are available to their patients.
Finally, although they insist that women need to be informed of the ‘facts’, they also
construct their patients as vulnerable individuals who must be protected from the
‘reality’ of medical abortion, e.g. through the injunction “not to look” at the aborted
fetus. In the following section, I will draw attention to some alternative accounts
(based upon my own and other’s data), in order to challenge these claims.
In a study of French women’s experiences of first trimester medical abortion,
Gerber (2002) reveals that some of her participants actively sought out medical
images of developing fetuses before arriving at the abortion clinic (e.g. through
medical guides to pregnancy, which are widely available). Others were already
familiar with these images from the media, or had encountered them through their
previous experiences of pregnancy and childbirth. In many cases, this prior
knowledge had made them very apprehensive about seeing aborted fetuses, but it
clearly did not deter them from pursuing what they identified as the best course of
action. Moreover, Gerber reveals that, through their embodied encounters with the
products of medical abortion, women were able to develop new definitions of its
meaning. In many cases, they described what they saw as “eggs”, as entities which
had some meaning but which were too developmentally “early” to represent a fetus
or baby. She concludes that listening to women’s experiences of medical abortion
may provide opportunities for “challenging previous notions of fetuses and
expanding the parameters of fetal discourse” (Gerber, 2002: 105).69
69 However, there is a fundamental difficulty with the approach that Gerber adopts towards her data.
Rather than simply acknowledging that her participants are able to produce alternative understandings
of abortion, she insists that, because of the “embodied” nature of these understandings, they are more
valid or authoritative than any other interpretation. As such, she falls into the trap identified in Chapter
Two, whereby feminists engage in the selective reification of female embodiment for political
purposes.
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Through a study of women’s and HCPs’ experiences during clinical trials of
RU486 in the US, Simonds et al. (1998) also draw attention to the fact that women
were able to define medical abortion differently from HCPs. Several of the HCPs
they interviewed depicted first trimester medical abortion as an invasive and
traumatic process, because, in contrast to surgical abortion (which was the only
technique that they were familiar with) it took far longer, often produced greater
pain, and required many more visits to the clinic. In contrast, women who chose
medical abortion characterised this technique as less violent and invasive than
surgical abortion, both in terms of the physical interventions directed at their own
bodies and in terms of what happened to their fetuses. Many seemed to take comfort
from the fact that the drugs they took to initiate the abortion mimicked a process that
might take place ‘naturally’, i.e. miscarriage, which occurs when the body can no
longer sustain a pregnancy (Simonds et al., 1998).
It is important to acknowledge that Gerber’s (2002) and Simonds et al.’s
(1998) interviewees were all less than nine weeks’ pregnant. Although their accounts
challenge HCPs’ constructions of women requesting abortion as ignorant and
passive/weak, and highlight the potential for women’s definitions of abortion
methods to diverge from HCPs’, they cannot be used to disrupt HCPs’ specific
claims concerning the ‘nature’ of later medical abortion. As noted above, I have been
unable to find any comparable literature concerning women’s accounts of second
trimester medical abortion. These absent voices urgently need to be addressed, and I
return to this issue as an important avenue for future research in the following
chapter.
Nevertheless, even as it stands, my data does offer the opportunity to
challenge HCPs’ claims to possess authoritative knowledge about the experience of
later medical abortion. This is because HCPs did not all characterise this procedure
in the same way:
P: …in Scotland practice is fairly uniform in the sense that very early
pregnancy, so between um about six and about nine weeks’ gestation
would um can be terminated either surgically or medically. Medically
giving drugs to induce what amounts to an early very heavy period. Um
in between nine weeks and about thirteen weeks’ gestation we tend to do
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a suction termination of pregnancy, a simple day case surgical operation.
Um and then beyond thirteen or fourteen weeks’ gestation um you would
do, again it’s a medical termination of pregnancy – the principles are the
same but the, the volume of tissue that the woman is having to um deliver
from her uterus is much greater. Um, to regard it as an induction or a
mini labour is quite wrong –
I: Right, ok
P: - because it’s, you know, even at sixteen or eighteen weeks a fetus is,
it’s big but it’s certainly not, you know, we’re not talking a seven pound
baby labour. [Consultant 2, male]
I: Um and the medical procedure I have heard also described as a sort of
mini induction of labour by some people. Is that an accurate way of
describing it?
P: I don’t know that I would, I don’t – we can take you down onto the
labour, well in fact we can’t but we could take you down onto the labour
ward which is, let’s think is that ward there. And in fact on a good day
we could open the windows here and you could hear the women scream.
I: Aha, sure.
P: Right. There is no comparison between that [gestures], and that.
However, it is sore. But there is no comparison between labour and uh
sub-twenty week abortion. And we cover it with morphine anyway.
[Specialist Registrar 2, male]
Whereas the extracts considered in the previous subsection emphasised the
similarities between later medical abortion and childbirth, these doctors focus on the
differences between these two experiences. Because of this, later medical abortion
emerges as a less distinctive type of procedure; it becomes categorised as part of a
continuum of medical abortion experiences, all of which are different from the birth
of a baby.
7.4 Expertise concerning the experience of providing later
abortion
The preceding sections have revealed two different claims to expert knowledge that
HCPs made when they problematised women’s requests for later abortion. In section
7.2, some doctors suggested that they possess privileged knowledge concerning the
status of later gestation fetuses, and the grounds on which they can legitimately be
aborted. In section 7.3, other doctors positioned their knowledge of the ‘trauma’ of
later abortion methods as the basis upon which abortion decisions should be made in
the second trimester of pregnancy. In this final section I will illustrate another form
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of knowledge which HCPs suggested was more relevant to decisions about the
provision of later abortion than women’s own definitions of their pregnancies. This
knowledge was said to be possessed by HCPs involved in carrying out second
trimester abortions.
As outlined earlier, the use of medical rather than surgical methods in the
second trimester of pregnancy means that it is nurses, rather than doctors, who are
responsible for this work. The suggestion that this places an unfair burden on nurses
was central to several doctors’ explanations of why women’s access to abortion
becomes less certain in the second trimester of pregnancy:
I: Um I had heard as well that it’s um a different procedure in the second
trimester – I mean you don’t do, there’s no surgical procedures in the
second trimester it would be-
P: Yeah that’s right. So beyond fourteen weeks and that, I mean that does
affect your thinking as a doctor as well because beyond fourteen weeks
you can’t do the surgical operation so you’re, they get medical
management and that means that nurses or, or midwives are looking after
them. And that is, it’s quite a um emotionally difficult thing for the staff,
you know, so. [Consultant 6, female]
When I first came across these kinds of account, I heard them simply as further
evidence of the ways in which HCPs were mobilising the emotional suffering of
others (in this case nurses, rather than pregnant women) in order to legitimate their
own practices.
Such accounts emerged regularly during the interviews. GPs often justified
their reluctance to refer their patients in the second trimester of pregnancy by
emphasising the emotional burden which this places on hospital staff.
Gynaecologists, who were themselves involved in performing surgical abortions,
sometimes contrasted their own, unemotional work with the distressing experiences
of the nursing staff involved in providing later medical abortions. For example, at the
end of the main interview, Specialist Registrar 2 advised me to try and interview the
nurses who worked in the clinic where second trimester medical abortions took
place, because they were the people who experienced the “really” difficult part of the
job. He suggested that the reason I had found it hard to recruit nurses to my study
(see Chapter Three) was because:
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They obviously have a very distasteful time of it so they’re not as open.
But I think it’s very important for you to get that side of it. [Specialist
Registrar 2, male]
In contrast, earlier in the interview he had made it clear that his own bodily
involvement in performing surgical abortions was not in any way “distasteful” or
distressing:
I: Um and as somebody who’s involved in the procedure – I know you’re
not involved in the medical ones, but the surgical ones. Could you just
say a bit about what that’s like?
P: Um I’ve got no doubt whatsoever you could probably come and watch
one. [discussion of ethics] But from a surgical point, it’s very simple, the
woman comes in, she’s under general anaesthetic, legs [open into] a
lithotomy. We grasp the cervix, pull it forward, dilate it up, suck out the
contents, make sure she doesn’t bleed. That’s it. Four minutes. If that.
I: And the, the tissue afterwards, would you be involved in disposing of
that?
P: Goes straight in the bin. It’s all very – it’s not a, it’s not an emotional
experience I don’t think for anybody. It’s just, cos we do so many. In,
bang, done, tissue. Rarely we send it for genetics in an extreme infertility
case. But otherwise, nothing. [Specialist Registrar 2, male]
While it is perfectly possible that Specialist Registrar 2 experiences surgical abortion
work as something routine and mechanical, the active way that he worked to exclude
emotion from his account is very interesting. One possibility is that he was rejecting
any association between emotion and surgery, where doctors are trained to approach
anaesthetised bodies in a detached, emotionless manner. However, I also wondered
whether he interpreted my questions as a suggestion that his work should be
emotionally difficult. In this case, his answers can be heard as an attempt to
normalise the practice of abortion, and to refute any suggestion that he (or his
profession) is engaged in disturbing or morally suspect work.
Listening to these kinds of account, I became more determined to interview
nurses who were involved in providing later medical abortions. I realised that in the
absence of this data, the meaning of nurses’ work would be defined entirely by
doctors. These HCPs seemed to be particularly keen to differentiate their own,
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‘unproblematic’ involvement in abortion from nursing work, which they constructed
as a site of emotional and moral turmoil.70
7.4.1 Hearing nurses’ accounts of later abortion
However, when I began to interview nurses, it appeared that doctors’ concerns about
the emotional burden created by later abortion work were, in some cases, well-
founded:
I: And what is it, how is it to, you know dealing with women who are
going through a sort of later termination, as opposed to an earlier one.
[The women sort of]?
P: They’re, they’re much, they’re sorer. They’ve got, you know when
they’re, when they’re about seven, eight weeks they’ve just got a
collapsed sac to deliver. When they’re at sixteen weeks you’ve got a
fully-formed fetus about the size of your, you know, the palm of your
hand. And then you’ve got to cut the cord, give an injection, deliver a
placenta. So the ones that go through the later terminations it’s much
more traumatic and it’s much more like a normal labour. The ones that
are under um nine weeks it’s more like a bad period, heavy period. But
[that’s early early ones]. And it’s really really distressing for the staff.
Picking up these small, perfectly formed fetuses. [Nurse 1, female]
Just as I have no way of knowing whether Specialist Registrar 2 ‘really’ experiences
surgical abortion as a mechanical, emotionless procedure, I cannot claim any access
to Nurse 1’s private feelings about picking up and handling later gestation fetuses
(see Chapter Three). However, I left this interview feeling shaken and disturbed by
the distress which I heard in her voice as she described this part of her job.
In a study of the provision of medical abortion for fetal abnormality in Canada,
Chiappetta-Swanson (2005) describes nursing experiences which resonate strongly
with Nurse 1’s account. Her participants were left entirely in charge of providing
medical abortions, and Chiappetta-Swanson argues that a complete lack of
institutional support for this work became interwoven with nurses’ negative
experiences of their jobs. Problems ranged from a lack of physical equipment (such
as adequate containers in which to dispose of fetuses) to the difficulties that nurses
had in obtaining doctors’ assistance with abortions. Many nurses resented the fact
70 Lawler (1991) argues that the construction of nursing work as difficult, dirty and morally suspect
contributes to its low status.
215
that they were given responsibility for emotionally difficult work, and that this work
was ignored by doctors, who were able to avoid the messy aftermath of prenatal
diagnosis (Chiappetta-Swanson, 2005).
While none of my nurse participants described this level of institutional
abandonment, their descriptions of the distressing nature of later abortion work did
seem to be linked to their resentment concerning doctors’ lack of involvement in the
procedure:
I don’t think that somebody that sits in an office counselling a patient, as
opposed to somebody who’s actually picking that baby up, you know,
should make that decision. So that’s the only thing that I feel aggrieved
about. That the doctor sometimes, I sometimes feel it would be good for
them actually to come in and deliver the babies. [Nurse 1, female,
gynaecology ward]
Throughout her account, Nurse 1 used the terms “perfectly” and “fully formed,” as
well as “babies” to characterise the later gestation fetuses (c. twelve-sixteen weeks)
that she was involved in delivering and then packaging for disposal. At one point,
she also described these fetuses as “perfectly healthy”. I do not want to suggest that
she drew upon these terms in a calculated way; it may be that Nurse 1 encounters
these fetuses as perfectly formed babies. However, it remains interesting to relate
this characterisation to the “fetal-centred” (Steinberg, 1991: 179) framework through
which later abortion is discussed in public, as well as by many doctors. As described
in section 7.2, doctors often focussed on the current or potential status of “healthy”
fetuses, and in doing so, eclipsed the personhood of the woman who requests an
abortion. This process was assisted through their critiques of the past ‘inaction’ of
these women, which allowed them to characterise later abortions as avoidable, and
thus, unjustifiable. Similarly, Nurse 1 also focussed on the possibility that later
abortions could be avoided:
Yeah on a daily basis we have patients who are um over twelve weeks
um gestation delivering. So that’s one thing I would like is to [for
women], if they’re gonna have a termination is to get themselves to that
GP and get it sorted sooner, rather than later. [Nurse 1, female]
However, for Nurse 1, the failings of pregnant women are compounded by the
ignorance of doctors who, she suggested, only give women access to later abortions
because they never have to confront the reality of “delivering babies”. While she
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concurred with doctors that women are not best placed to define the status of the
fetus involved in later abortions, Nurse 1 thus made a significantly different claim to
expertise concerning these fetuses. She argued that only those who are physically
involved in delivering and handling them possess the relevant experiential
knowledge to determine whether and how late abortion should take place.
Likewise, Nurse 8 also criticised doctors for their ignorance of second
trimester abortion work:
I: And from a nursing perspective is it any different caring for women
going through later ones as opposed to early ones?
P: Yeah it’s, it’s not nice to deliver a, a baby that, you know, you’re
delivering somebody that’s twenty weeks and you walk and there’s a two
week error in scans, plus or minus two weeks – so in theory they could
be twenty-two weeks. You walk up one flight of stairs and through to the
neonatal unit and they’re resuscitating babies at twenty-three weeks who
may be small for dates and this might be quite a chubby, and you’re
sometimes. So it’s quite distress- it’s more distressing and I don’t think
that people think of the effect it has on the staff. Don’t think the medical
staff think about it, they’re very much ‘oh well we’re only providing a
service’. But they’re not the ones delivering the babies. [Nurse 8, female]
Without dismissing the emotional significance of Nurse 8’s encounters with later
gestation fetuses, it is again useful to explore the discursive framework through
which she describes her relationship with these entities. Once more, later abortion is
constructed as an avoidable course of action; it is a situation which nurses are faced
with because of other people. While she does not blame women explicitly in her
account, they are implicitly rendered culpable as producers of the fetuses that she
finds so distressing to deliver.
Another interesting feature of Nurse 8’s account is the emphasis which she
places on the similarities between fetuses which are aborted and babies which are
born prematurely. The scenario that she describes has become a standardised
narrative form which dates back at least to the late 1980s, when David Alton
attempted to reduce the upper time limit on abortion to eighteen weeks. The Science
and Technology Subgroup (1991) draw attention to the way in which Alton’s
supporters juxtaposed the resuscitation of premature babies with the disposal of
fetuses aborted at comparable stages of gestation. However, as suggested in section
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7.2, the juxtaposition of fetuses which are aborted and babies which are resuscitated
only remains powerful if the relationship of these entities to the woman who delivers
them is rendered irrelevant. As I pointed out in section 7.2, some doctors insisted that
the relationships between fetuses and pregnant women cannot be so easily ignored
(see p. 194). In the following subsection I will reveal that some nurses who were
involved in provision of later abortion were also able to challenge fetal-centred
framings of this practice.
Before exploring these alternative nursing accounts however, it is important
to note that medical abortion methods may generate particularly acute similarities
between aborted fetuses and living babies for the nurses who are involved in
delivering the former. As described in section 7.2.1, the Royal College of
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists recommends that feticide be performed in all cases
where a medical abortion is being carried out beyond 21 weeks plus 6 days’ gestation
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2001; Vadeyar et al., 2005).
This ensures that fetuses which are old enough to be deemed ‘clinically viable’ with
medical assistance are not delivered showing any signs of ‘life,’ e.g. a heartbeat, or
respiratory attempts (Vadeyar et al., 2005). Below this threshold, feticide is not
essential, because even if aborted fetuses show signs of ‘life’ following delivery,
they are not deemed capable of sustained survival with medical assistance and HCPs
are not legally or professionally obligated to try and keep them alive (Royal College
of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2001; Vadeyar et al., 2005). However, they do
have to deal with them during the interim period while signs of life cease.
Additionally, regardless of gestational age, an aborted fetus which is delivered
showing ‘life’ signs must be registered as a live birth, and then as a neonatal death
when these signs cease (Vadeyar et al., 2005).
This scenario was described by one of my nurse participants, who talked
about her distress at having to deal with a second trimester fetus which “lived” for
some hours (as evidenced by a faint heart beat) following a medical abortion. This
fetus was aborted below eighteen weeks, i.e. several weeks below the threshold at
which an attempt could have been made to keep it alive ex utero. Because of this, the
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only option open to Nurse 9 and her colleagues was to wait for signs of fetal ‘life’ to
cease following the abortion before packaging the fetus for disposal.71
This was the only occasion on which one of my participants described a
medically aborted fetus as something that “lived” for a short time following the
procedure. However, it is unclear whether what Nurse 9 described was an unusual
occurrence, or whether it is in fact quite a normal aspect of being involved in second
trimester medical abortion work. This second possibility seems quite likely, given
that around half of Chiappetta-Swanson’s (2005) forty-one nurse participants had
witnessed this outcome of medical abortion at least once. Both the small size of my
nursing sample (only six of my nurse participants were/had been regularly involved
in medical abortion work), and nurses’ potential reluctance to discuss this issue with
a stranger may account for the fact that I was only told about one such incident.
7.4.2 Opening up nurses’ accounts of later abortion work
My nurse participants’ distress and resentment concerning the practice of later
medical abortion becomes particularly troubling when it is remembered that they
may find it difficult or impossible to avoid it by exercising their legal right to ‘opt
out’ of providing the procedure (see Chapter Four). However, there are several
reasons why it is important to be cautious in representing nurses as a powerless
group of HCPs.
In the first place, it is clearly wrong to imply that nurses are ‘forced’ to provide
abortions. While it may be difficult for them to opt out through the conscience
clause, nurses can choose to work in a job which doesn’t involve carrying out the
procedure. One of the nurses I interviewed had found later abortion work to be too
difficult. Because of this, she switched to working in the outpatient clinic where
patients were scanned and received counselling before being given a date for their
procedure:
71 Although this was an entirely legal course of action, I have decided not to include any extracts from
this interview in my thesis. This is because the specific details of Nurse 9’s account might make it
possible for her to be identified, for example, by her colleagues.
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Yeah, I worked here for maybe [number] years, just terminations but um
I didn’t like it very much! It was just too much. So I left. So no I don’t
have anything to do with that side of it. But then that was years ago it
wasn’t very nice, I used to have to take these babies you know, to a
fridge after the mother had terminated it, oh it was just […] I’m talking
about second trimester babies that are, from twelve weeks onwards. You
know they’re quite big babies. So that wasn’t very nice. [Nurse 3,
female]
As well as choosing jobs which do not involve providing the procedure, it
was clear that, in some settings, nurses were capable of imposing their claims to
expertise concerning the ‘reality’ of later abortion upon doctors. At one hospital, a
nurse explained to me that an absolute time limit of fifteen weeks was in operation,
owing to the total, co-ordinated refusal of the nursing staff to participate in abortions
beyond this point in gestation. This example provides an important reminder that
hierarchies in the hospital workforce are contextual and fluid, rather than universal
and fixed. It also points to the potential which nurses have to occupy a position of
power in relation to women with unwanted pregnancies, who, if they arrive later than
the agreed time limit, must attempt to access the procedure elsewhere, or continue
with their pregnancies.
A third reason that it is important not to depict nurses as a powerless group of
HCPs who are unable to mobilise support for their claims to expertise is that this
group has recently gained parliamentary representation in the form of Nadine
Dorries, Conservative MP. Dorries has spearheaded recent campaigns to lower the
upper time limit on abortion provision, and in doing so, has drawn extensively on
accounts of her own embodied involvement in later abortion provision:
I first became concerned about and interested in the issue of abortion
when I worked as a nurse. I worked for nine months on a gynaecology
ward, and assisted in many terminations and late terminations. I also
went to witness a late surgical abortion six weeks ago. I became
interested in abortion when it became apparent to me, as a nurse, that far
more botched late abortions were taking place than should. The first one
that I witnessed was a prostaglandin termination. A little boy was aborted
into a cardboard bedpan, which was thrust into my arms. When I looked
into the cardboard bedpan, the little boy was gasping for breath through
the mucus and amniotic fluid. I stood by the sluice with him in my arms,
in the bedpan, for seven minutes while he gasped for breath. A botched
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abortion became a live birth, and then, seven minutes later, a death. I
knew when I stood with that little boy in my arms that one day I would
have the opportunity to defend babies such as him. I thought that we
committed murder that day. [Nadine Dorries, Hansard Columns 258-259,
May 20th 2008]
Articulated from the floor of the House of Commons, a nurse’s claim to expertise
concerning the ‘reality’ of second trimester abortion suddenly gains the potential to
impact upon all British women’s access to the procedure.
Fortunately, however, my data, in combination with that from other studies,
provides a means to challenge nurses’ claims that their embodied involvement in
later abortion work gives them privileged insights into its ‘true’ meaning. As
Haraway (1991) argues, while the material world should be conceptualised as an
active presence in human life, this presence is never encountered outside of human
discourse. The ways in which the meanings of later gestation fetuses are shaped by
the discursive frameworks in which nurses situate them was suggested throughout
the analysis in the preceding sub-section. I argued that nurses were only able to
constitute aborted fetuses as ‘babies’ because they did not acknowledge the social
relationships between these entities and the women that produce them. In the
discussion that follows, I will go on to illustrate alternative frameworks through
which HCPs described their encounters with later gestation fetuses.
The interweaving of the ‘social’ or ‘discursive’ with HCPs’ encounters
with fetuses is implied by the findings of several existing studies. For example,
Casper (1998) reveals how the fetus is constituted as a different “work object” by
HCPs who specialise in different areas of medicine. While fetal surgeons are
primarily concerned with the health of the fetus, obstetricians argue that the fetus is
always a secondary “work object” in relation to the body and health of the woman
who is carrying it. In another study, Williams et al. (2001) reveal how individual
HCPs working in the arena of reproductive health constitute fetuses as different
entities depending on the particular contexts in which they encounter them, for
example, as part of fetal surgery, miscarriage, or abortion for fetal abnormality.
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However, neither Casper nor Williams et al. address the experiences of
HCPs who handle and dispose of aborted fetuses. This issue is considered by
Simonds (1996) in her ethnography of a feminist abortion clinic in the US. In this
clinic, later abortions (up to twenty-six weeks’ gestation) were performed using
surgical rather than medical methods. However, although doctors were brought in
specifically to perform these procedures, the clinic health workers (the subjects of
Simonds’s study) were faced with the task of checking the fetal parts following the
abortion, in order to ensure that it was complete. Health workers talked about their
visceral reactions to seeing and handling recognisable, baby-like fetal parts (e.g.
hands, feet, and faces), and criticised pro-choice rhetoric for failing to create space
for their messy and sometimes saddening work (Simonds, 1996). However, while
they may have found their work difficult at times, all of Simonds’s participants held
fast to their (self-defined) feminist beliefs that women should be able to determine
whether they became mothers, whatever their stage of gestation.
Simonds suggests that health workers were able to bring these principles to
bear on their involvement in later abortions and that, because of this, the aborted
fetuses that they handled never eclipsed the personhood or importance of individual
women. She argues that, through this feminist practice, the fetuses that health
workers encountered became quite literally, different entities from the fetal persons
of anti-abortion rhetoric:
The anti-abortionists have chosen to make fetuses central: take notice,
they say, fetuses look like babies; hence, they are babies. Centre workers
replied that there is a difference between looking like a baby and being a
baby. Fetuses get to be babies only if women choose motherhood.
(Simonds, 1996: 101)
Likewise, while some of the nurses that I interviewed clearly resented their
involvement in “delivering babies”, two of my participants characterised second
trimester medical abortion work so differently that it was almost as though they were
describing another practice. These nurses worked in different hospitals, each of
which had a time limit of twenty weeks’ gestation.
Nurse 4 worked on a ward which provided medical abortions and did not
want to be tape-recorded (see Chapter Three). She said that later abortions
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(particularly those which came right up against the twenty week cut-off point) could
be distressing, because of the baby-like fetus that had to be handled and disposed of.
However, as she described her work she returned repeatedly to women’s need for
later abortions, and highlighted the importance of being able to provide the
procedure. In doing so, she characterised later abortion work as difficult, but
ultimately worthwhile, because it involved providing help and support to women
who really needed it.
Nurse 6 articulated an even less “fetal centred” (Steinberg, 1991: 179)
account of later medical abortion practice. Throughout the interview, she only ever
discussed fetuses in relation to women going through abortion. She considered the
different ways in which her patients might respond to these entities (for example, the
circumstances in which they might want to see and hold their fetuses) but did not
suggest that fetuses had a particular meaning for her, as the person who routinely
delivered them. Likewise, in describing the difference between earlier and later
abortion work, she focussed simply on what the size of the fetus might mean for the
experience of the woman aborting it, and the level of nursing care that patients might
require as a result:
I: Ok. And you said when you were thinking about going back into it that
it was something that you thought about having to do the later ones. So is
it a diff- does it feel any different or?
P: Just because the fetus is bigger so the procedure for the woman is a bit
different, it can be more like going through a sort of labour for some
women but again not for all. A lot of women have, have no pain and you
think ‘how can that be?’ Um but then other women do go through
definite sort of contractions and you know, their cervix is dilating, even
though it doesn’t have to dilate very much. Um but you can sort of see
that process happening and their membranes can rupture and they’ll
deliver the fetus and sometimes you need to aid that delivery. So there is
a lot more to it from the nursing point of view I would say um.
I: Yeah
P: But and from the woman’s point of view as well, from the medical
side certainly we don’t, the doctors aren’t involved at all unless there’s a
major complication that I can’t deal with cos most things I can do um
within the unit. Um so it’s really only if the placenta gets completely
stuck and I can’t deliver it. Cos usually, usually I can get it! [laughs]
[Nurse 6, female]
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There is an interesting contrast between nurses’ earlier complaints that doctors do not
have to get their hands dirty with “delivering babies” and the way in which Nurse 6
describes the absence of doctors from the abortion procedure. She argues that there is
generally no need for doctors to become involved because she herself possesses the
skill necessary to care for women undergoing later abortions. Indeed, throughout her
account, the freedom that she had to exercise her own skills was depicted as a
positive source of pride and satisfaction. Chiappetta-Swanson (2005) suggests that
the isolation of nurses who are involved in later abortion work may, ironically,
become the basis for any satisfaction that they derive from their job. Such isolation
provides them with the opportunity to develop skills and determine the parameters of
their work in a way which is not always possible when nursing work is medically
supervised (Chiappetta-Swanson, 2005).
Although she did not describe any distress about handling fetuses, Nurse 6
did suggest that later abortion work could sometimes be “upsetting”. However, she
went on to normalise this response, and thus later abortion work, by linking it to
other areas of nursing:
So in general it’s much much much more um impact on the nursing staff
than the medical staff. So it was just that point of view really that I had to
think about. Cos it’s, you know, it’s it can - I don’t, it can be upsetting
sometimes um but then anything can, you know. If you’re looking after
somebody with cancer you can have days when you can look after lots of
people and not really be emotionally affected and then you’ll have one
day that you just get really sad and it really sort of hits home to you. So I
would say that from that point of view it’s just nursing, you know, it’s
just part of nursing and you’ll have the odd day when one person really
gets to you and other days you’re ok. [Nurse 6, female]
In describing the difficult aspects of later abortion work as simply part of the
experience of “nursing”, Nurse 6 went on to explain why she thought that later
abortion provision should fall within the parameters of nursing work:
But I don’t think you can do that without thinking about it and getting
your head round where you are um not as a person, well yeah as a person
a bit, but more as a nurse and I just, I was at a big abortion conference in
[omitted for anonymity], it was amazing and that really it was really good
in a way, oh that sounds really bizarre! [laughs] But you know that the
bottom line is that if there’s not access to safe abortion women die.
Bottom line. And you know, abortion happens, you know, where there’s
laws, where there’s not laws. If there’s not laws women’ll do it
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themselves or they’ll get somebody else to do it, you know, that was
really powerful message hearing round the world things that happened,
not just the negative but the sort of positive things that happened when
places did have good laws and good access to services. And so yeah, I
think, if I’m ever wavering I just think ‘no, women die and that, you
know that deprives kids of their mother or daughters or sisters or
whatever and that’s not right!’ [laughs]. [Nurse 6, female]
Nurse 6 was unusual in suggesting that she had actively sought out and thought
through a basis from which to rationalise her involvement in abortion work. In this
respect, her account shares a great deal with those of Simonds’s (1996) participants,
who claimed to bring their feminist principles to bear on their practice in the abortion
clinic.
While she acknowledges that good systems of abortion provision can have
positive results for women, Nurse 6 draws primarily on the negative legitimatory
framework of suffering/necessity which I have critiqued throughout this thesis. She
argues that the “bottom line” which enables her to continue with her work is the
belief that abortion is the outcome of absolute necessity; without it women with
unwanted pregnancies will be driven to desperate measures, and death.72 Listening to
her account led me to question my own certainty about the problems with this
discursive framing of abortion. If Nurse 6 is motivated to continue with later abortion
work because she believes she is helping women in desperate circumstances then this
framing of abortion clearly has positive, as well as problematic, implications.
However, it is again important to reflect upon the limits of the claims which
can be made about research participants’ emotions and experiences. Do Nurse 6 and
Nurse 4 ‘really’ get positive satisfaction out of their work because they believe that
they are helping women who desperately need later abortions? Or are they simply
positioning me as an outsider who must be convinced that the nursing profession is
engaged in worthwhile and important work, as opposed to a morally dubious
practice? There is no way of knowing. All that can be concluded is that, at least
within the interview setting, these nurses constitute later abortion work very
72 Interestingly, while many of Simonds’s (1996) participants characterised later abortion in positive
terms (e.g. as a matter of women’s right to determine when they become mothers), she also notes that
several seemed unable to justify the provision of later abortions without referring to the desperate
circumstances in which individual women requested the procedure, for example, following rape.
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differently from some of their colleagues. The ways that they do so are simply
suggestive of the possibility that nurses’ physical encounters with later gestation
fetuses might be transformed by the discursive frameworks in which they situate
these entities.
7.5 Conclusion
The preceding discussion has outlined three claims to expertise which HCPs
mobilised as they described the decision to terminate later gestation pregnancies. The
first claim centres on the passage of gestational time. HCPs argued that, as time
passes, they become better placed than pregnant women to assess the moral
significance of the fetus. HCPs defined the significance of this entity in terms of
medical knowledge about its development, including the likelihood that it will
eventually become a “healthy” human baby. The passage of gestational time is also
used by some HCPs as evidence that women lack commitment to ending their
pregnancies. This contributes to their depiction of later abortions as unnecessary in
the absence of medically-defined, ‘exceptional’ circumstances.
The second claim to expertise mobilised by HCPs concerns their knowledge
of the medical method used to conduct abortions at later stages of gestation. This is
constructed as potentially more damaging to a pregnant woman than carrying a fetus
to term. HCPs’ third claim to expertise is also related to the abortion method
employed at later gestations, and concerns the experiential knowledge of the nurses
involved in delivering and handling the fetuses produced through this method.
Doctors define nurses’ physical involvement in later abortion work as emotionally
difficult and cite this as a factor in their reluctance to give patients access to the
procedure at later gestations. Likewise, some nurses claim that their embodied
involvement in later abortion work gives them privileged insights concerning the
acceptability of the procedure, and argue that these insights should be taken into
account in decisions about whether to provide abortion.
I would suggest that the variation between the gestational cut-off points at
different hospitals might best be understood in terms of this third claim to expertise.
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The accounts of both gynaecologists and gynaecology nurses seemed to reflect
serious tensions produced through a division of labour which leaves nurses with sole
responsibility for carrying out later abortions. Two of my nurse participants
articulated major resentment about this situation, and most of the hospital doctors I
interviewed expressed concern about the fact that nurses were left to deal with later
medical abortions. One way of interpreting local hospital time limits on abortion
provision is thus as the outcome of negotiations between these two groups of HCPs.
In some sites it seems that nurses are particularly well organised, and that they may
act collectively to determine how ‘late’ their medical colleagues are able to offer the
procedure to their patients. Clearly, this has major implications for pregnant women,
whose access to later abortion then becomes entirely dependent on their geographical
area of residence.
Throughout this chapter, I have tried to do more than explain why HCPs
argue that “timing is everything”. To simply re-describe HCPs arguments would be
to uncritically reinforce their claims to expertise. Such reinforcement becomes
particularly problematic when set in the wider context of UK debate about abortion,
which looks increasingly to HCPs to decide when abortion becomes too late. In view
of this, throughout this chapter I have drawn on the critical approach to expertise
advocated by Wynne, by exploring knowledge claims in terms of the forms of
existence that they make possible and impossible. From this perspective, HCPs’ first
claim to expertise becomes a means by which, echoing broader public debate on the
subject, “women’s needs or lives” (Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991: 214)
are eclipsed by arguments about the status of the fetus. Through HCPs’ second claim
to expertise, women are allowed to re-enter the discussion, which centres on HCPs’
concerns about the experience of second trimester medical abortion. However,
women’s presence in these discussions remains extremely limited. They are depicted
as ignorant and vulnerable individuals who must be protected from the ‘trauma’ of
second trimester abortion, and no consideration is given to the futures of those who
are prevented or dissuaded from accessing this procedure. Finally, pregnant women
are once more made completely invisible by HCPs’ third claim to expertise, which
centres on the insights generated by the embodied experiences of nurses.
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As in previous chapters, during my analysis of the data I have tried to remain
sensitive to the contexts from which HCPs are speaking, and the ways that these
might be entangled with the accounts that they produce. For example, I have paid
attention to the medico-legal context in which the ‘viability’ of neonates has emerged
as a pressing issue, and the ways in which the medical abortion method complicates
questions of patient consent. Likewise, I have tried to give serious consideration to
the significance which HCPs may attribute to later gestation fetuses. This approach
has been facilitated by adopting a theoretical perspective which allows the material
world to be considered as an active presence in HCPs’ lives.
At the same time, in engaging with the emotions expressed by some nurse
participants as they describe their encounters with aborted fetuses, it becomes
tempting to treat their accounts too compassionately, thus allowing their claims to
expertise to go unchallenged. The recent use of such claims as part of parliamentary
attempts to curtail UK women’s access to abortion points to the dangers involved in
yielding to this temptation. Haraway’s (1991) arguments concerning the discursively
mediated basis of human encounters with ‘the world’, as well as her focus upon the
political ramifications of these encounters, have helped me to negotiate these
dangers. Mindful of her insights, I have tried to analyse nurses’ accounts in the same
manner as those of doctors’, i.e. in terms of the realities that they make possible for
pregnant women.
In doing so, I have also pointed out that participation in later abortion work is
characterised as more than one type of encounter with the material world. In some
cases, the aborted fetus is positioned as human kin, and the primary focus of later
abortion work. Simultaneously, pregnant women are depicted as responsible for
creating work that is constructed as distressing and unnecessary. In this context,
nurses argue that they have a right to contribute to decisions about whether or not the
procedure is provided. However, in other cases, nurses place women undergoing
abortion, rather than fetuses, at the centre of their accounts. In doing so, they are able
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to construct later abortion work as a positive and worthwhile occupation that
improves the lives of women.
Clearly, it is impossible to access nurses’ private realties concerning their
experiences of delivering and handling later gestation fetuses in the clinic. However,
when considered collectively, their accounts suggest that these experiences might be
shaped by their ability to approach later abortion in a “woman-centred”, rather than a
“fetal-centred” manner.
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Chapter Eight: Concluding discussion
8.1 Introduction
The current framework of UK abortion law has been subjected to extensive feminist
critique (e.g. Brookes, 1988; Fyfe, 1991; Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997; Lee, 2003b)
because of the relationship that it constructs between the medical profession and
women with unwanted pregnancies. In the first place, the law allows HCPs to opt out
of abortion provision on the grounds of conscience, thus implying that it is not
something which HCPs have an automatic duty to provide to their patients. In the
second place, the law gives doctors the authority to decide whether an abortion can
legally take place. The procedure is only legal if two doctors are prepared to sign a
certificate that states an abortion is necessary on the grounds of a pregnant woman’s
health or that of her fetus. By positioning doctors as experts who must regulate
women’s uses of abortion, the law suggests that pregnant women are not capable of
determining the circumstances in which they should become mothers (Boyle, 1997;
Sheldon, 1997). Moreover, in constructing women’s desire to terminate their
pregnancies as an intrinsically problematic decision which must be subjected to
medical scrutiny, the law depicts motherhood as the normal outcome of pregnancy
(Boyle, 1997; Sheldon, 1997).
However, while feminist analyses have highlighted a number of problems
with current UK law, little is known about how HCPs involved in contemporary
abortion practice position themselves in relation to women with unwanted
pregnancies. This thesis has addressed this gap in the literature by exploring the
subjectivities which Scottish HCPs construct for themselves and their pregnant
patients as they account for their day-to-day involvement in, or conscientious
objection to, abortion provision.
In this concluding discussion I aim to draw together, and reflect upon, the key
contributions of my thesis. My findings are grouped together in two separate
sections, each of which explores the relationships which HCPs construct between
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themselves and another key group of actors. The first section of the discussion
addresses HCPs’ depictions of their interactions with their pregnant patients. The
second section then moves on to consider HCPs’ portrayals of their relationships
with their colleagues. Through my discussion of these empirical findings, I argue that
my analysis has highlighted several key problems with the current system of abortion
provision in central Scotland. In addition to summarising these problems, I also make
recommendations about the routes through which they might be addressed in the
future. I will also reflect critically upon some of the limitations of my analysis.
In considering the potential for this research to be used as a means of
generating changes in Scottish abortion practice, I will also return to the question that
I posed at the end of Chapter Three. What position have I constructed for myself in
relation to my participants through my analysis, and how might this impact on the
future research interventions that I can engage in? I began this thesis by depicting
STS as an analytical tool that would enable me to challenge the epistemological
authority which is granted to the UK healthcare profession in decisions about the use
of abortion. I have drawn in particular on Wynne’s (e.g. 1996a; 1996b; 2001; 2003)
theorisation of ‘expertise’, which reveals that any claim to expert (i.e.
authoritative/legitimate) knowledge is entangled with normative definitions of
society, and thus represents an attempt to delineate the forms of existence available
to humans (and nonhumans). When this is acknowledged, it becomes possible to ask
critical questions about the subjectivities made possible through any knowledge
claim, including those articulated by practitioners of technoscience and medicine,
such as the HCPs in my study.
However, throughout this thesis I have also tried to draw attention to some of
the complexities involved in engaging in this kind of critical analysis. As
summarised in section 2.3.2, other analysts have argued that important insights and
opportunities are lost when social researchers set out to engage in the critical
theorisation of HCPs’ practices. For example, Mol (2002) argues that when social
researchers position HCPs as objects for critical study, they close down the
possibility of working collaboratively with HCPs to produce positive changes in
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clinical practice. In view of these insights, I have tried to avoid producing an account
that would antagonise and alienate HCPs, and which would make it impossible to
engage with them. In the following discussion, I will highlight my attempts to leave
open the possibility of future dialogue with HCPs. At the same time, I will reveal my
ongoing concerns about the dangers posed by engaging in entirely uncritical forms of
analysis which simply legitimate the discursive practices of HCPs.
During the discussion in the first two sections of this concluding chapter, I
will position my thesis as a piece of research which can contribute to attempts to
change abortion practice in accordance with feminist goals (i.e. opening up the
possibilities of female subjectivity). However, in the final section I will move on to
reflect upon the potentially unwanted repercussions of this study. Specifically, I will
consider whether I have created a useful resource for anti-abortion groups by
providing an arena for HCPs to voice various ‘objections’ to women’s uses of
abortion. In addressing this issue, I will defend my original decision to conduct a
study which centres upon the voices of HCPs, but will also point to the importance of
developing this research in alternative directions in the future.
8.2 HCP- patient relationships: Women’s (limited) legitimacy
as reproductive decision-makers
One of the key findings of this thesis is that, whether they opt in or out of abortion
work, Scottish HCPs often construct the provision of abortion to women who request
it as an obligation. In other words, although the law appears to grant complete
discretion over decisions about the provision of abortion to HCPs, those that I
interviewed suggested that their rights to determine pregnant women’s uses of
abortion are limited. The following discussion begins by summarising the evidence
from the empirical chapters which supports this assertion. It then goes on to argue
that, although they may have conceded a certain amount of authority to pregnant
women, HCPs also demarcated troubling limits around women’s legitimacy as
reproductive decision-makers. In summarising this process, I highlight a second
critical finding of this thesis, namely, the potential inequalities generated by the
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current system of Scottish abortion provision. I end this section by reflecting on the
types of intervention through which these problems might be addressed.
8.2.1 Constructing obligations
One of the rights granted to HCPs by UK law is the ability to opt out of involvement
in abortion provision on the grounds of ‘conscience’. Chapter Four argued that
HCPs’ discussions of the practice of ‘conscientious objection’ represent a useful
means to explore how they define their rights to act as individuals vs. their
obligations towards their patients as members of the healthcare profession. The
analysis in this chapter revealed that, although individual HCPs construct the
boundaries between these rights and obligations slightly differently, there is a broad
consensus that HCPs do not have unlimited rights to abstain from involvement in
abortion provision. Participants concurred that HCPs working in hospitals must
provide treatment for patients in an emergency situation and that GPs must facilitate
their patients’ access to an abortion.
The consensus concerning the first of these responsibilities is perhaps
unsurprising, given that the Abortion Act explicitly removes the right to
conscientiously object if a woman’s life or health is in immediate danger. However,
HCPs’ clear insistence upon the second of these responsibilities is intriguing, given
that the legal obligations of GPs who object to abortion remain ambiguous (Sheldon,
1997). In light of this ambiguity, it is also interesting that the GPs who described
themselves as conscientious objectors concurred that they had no right to impede
their patients’ access to abortion services.
However, it is important to acknowledge a weakness of this part of the data,
namely, that I only interviewed two GPs with self-proclaimed ‘conscientious
objections’ to abortion. It is clearly possible that other GPs who exercise their right
to act as ‘conscientious objectors’ interpret their responsibilities towards their
patients very differently. This possibility is underlined by the fact that, although the
two GPs I interviewed agreed that they could not impede a woman’s access to the
abortion clinic, they claimed very different degrees of involvement in facilitating this
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process. One of them stated that he would refer all patients directly to a hospital
clinic but refused to sign the legal documentation. The other said that he did not feel
able to give women direct access to hospital services and that he instead pointed
them in the direction of alternative primary care facilities.
The analysis in Chapter Five provided further evidence that, in the context of
twenty-first century Scottish practice, HCPs’ curtail their own rights to determine
women’s uses of abortion. The law appears to grant HCPs the right to “decisional
control” (Sheldon, 1997: 58) over whether or not an abortion takes place. However,
when my participants described the process of decision-making about abortion, they
frequently positioned themselves as illegitimate decision-makers in relation to
women with unwanted pregnancies. Section 5.2 revealed that, in adopting this
position, HCPs sometimes drew on feminist discourses. For example, some argued
that a pregnant woman’s social and embodied situation makes her best placed to
know whether an abortion should take place (sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2), and that this
situation also gives women moral ownership over the decision (section 5.2.3).
However, more commonly, HCPs’ attempts to grant legitimacy to women
with unwanted pregnancies took place within entirely de-politicised discursive
frameworks. One way in which HCPs depoliticised their obligation to provide
women with access to abortion was to argue that autonomous patient choice about
medical treatment is simply a normal part of contemporary medical practice (section
5.2.3). I have suggested that HCPs’ tendency to avoid representing abortion as a
positive political right should be understood in the context of the history of UK
abortion law. This has long framed abortion as a decision that should be made on the
basis of the threat that pregnancy poses to individual women’s ‘health’.
Although Chapter Five provided examples of HCPs’ attempts to grant
authority to women with unwanted pregnancies, I also argued that this process
cannot be treated as straightforward evidence that HCPs’ view pregnant women as
legitimate reproductive decision-makers. I suggested that HCPs’ claims concerning
their patients’ legitimacy can also be understood as a mechanism through which they
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devolve their own responsibility for abortion decision-making. This aspect of the
analysis echoes Davis and Davidson’s (2005) characterisation of the 1967 Abortion
Act as a piece of legislation which created responsibilities that were not always
welcomed by HCPs. It indicates that, like those working in the immediate aftermath
of the passage of this legislation (Davis & Davidson, 2005), HCPs involved in
contemporary abortion practice continue to try to find ways to avoid these
responsibilities.
A final aspect of the data that illustrates HCPs’ reluctance to claim the right
(and thus, responsibility) to determine pregnant women’s uses of abortion is that,
even in cases where participants questioned women’s decisions about abortion, they
were unwilling to state explicitly that they might refuse a woman’s request for the
procedure. Nevertheless, Chapters Five to Seven also revealed that, while (in most
contexts) HCPs avoid suggesting that they block women’s access to abortion, they
often do position themselves as experts who can assess their patients’ reproductive
decisions. In the following subsection, I will summarise the subjectivities that
become possible for pregnant women when HCPs lay claim to expert knowledge
about the correct use of abortion.
8.2.2 Constructing inequalities
As outlined in Chapter One, studies of women’s experiences of accessing abortion
reveal that their descriptions of ‘negative’ encounters with HCPs repeatedly centre
on situations where they are asked to explain the basis of their requests for abortion
(Macintyre, 1977; Allen, 1985; Harden & Ogden, 1999; Kumar et al., 2004; Lee,
2004). Lee (2004) suggests that most women approach HCPs simply to ask for
access to abortion, and do not want to have to account for, or receive advice
concerning, reproductive decisions which they made for themselves in non-clinical
contexts. In contrast, this thesis has provided evidence that some HCPs represent the
assessment of women’s requests for abortion as a routine aspect of abortion work
(section 5.4). I have argued that these HCPs positioned women with unwanted
pregnancies as intrinsically unreliable reproductive decision-makers who
235
automatically require their expert guidance. They thus perpetuate the problematic
constructions of femininity which are embedded in the terms of UK abortion law.
As described above, the discussion in Chapter Five also revealed that,
although some HCPs seem to favour the position of ‘expert’ as a default, others are
more likely to draw upon alternative subject positions which remove them from the
decision-making process (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Nevertheless, while most HCPs
suggested that they do not routinely assess or question their patients’ decisions about
abortion, this thesis has revealed that there are certain situations where HCPs are
particularly likely to position themselves as experts in relation to their pregnant
patients. By exploring HCPs’ claims to expertise in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I
have revealed troubling uniformities in the subjectivities that they construct for
women who are, or could become, pregnant.
As highlighted in Chapter Two, a key feature of my analysis of these claims
is that it has been informed by feminist STS research which illustrates the
importance of avoiding essentialisms and exploring how binary categories of
meaning, such as what is to count as ‘social’ or ‘medical’, are constructed in practice
(section 2.3.2). This has enabled me to avoid the pitfalls of several existing feminist
critiques of UK abortion law and provision (e.g. Macintyre, 1973; Boyle, 1997;
Sheldon, 1997). Such critiques reify what is to count as a ‘social/moral’ vs. ‘medical’
knowledge claim about abortion, in order to criticise the ease with which the law
allows doctors to step outside of the boundaries of their ‘actual’ (i.e. ‘medical’)
expertise about this practice. However, in reifying these categories, they perpetuate a
rhetorical binary which can itself be utilised by HCPs, e.g. to suggest that while
‘social/moral’ judgments can be made and contested by any member of society, they
alone have the epistemological authority to make and assess (what they define as)
‘medical’ knowledge claims.
As well as revealing the political problems perpetuated by this binary, in
Chapters One and Two I illustrated the theoretical difficulties involved in
demarcating ‘medical’ or ‘scientific’ knowledge as something that is not amenable to
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sociological analysis. STS illustrates that any knowledge claim can be analysed in
terms of the version of ‘society’ that it co-produces. Recognising this insight, this
thesis has eschewed attempts to classify what is to count as an ‘appropriate’ vs.
‘inappropriate’ (or ‘social’ vs. ‘medical’) claim to expertise on the part of HCPs.
Instead, I have explored all of HCPs’ claims to possess authoritative knowledge
about abortion in the manner illustrated by Wynne (e.g. 1996a; 1996b; 2001; 2003),
i.e. as political acts that co-produce normative visions of society.
One of the key knowledge claims articulated by HCPs is that abortion can
and should be prevented through patient education about the ‘correct’ use of
contraception (section 6.2). In describing this process of patient education, HCPs
constructed the control of fertility through contraception as something which is
technically possible, and depicted the achievement of such contraceptive control as a
reproductive obligation rather than a choice. Additionally, by emphasising the
importance of educating women about so-called ‘female’ methods (e.g. the pill,
hormonal implants, etc.), HCPs often suggested that this obligation is something that
falls naturally to women, rather than to men. Finally, in describing how they correct
patient ‘misunderstanding’ about the relative ‘risks’ of abortion and contraception,
they depicted abortion as a course of action which is automatically emotionally and
physically damaging. One important consequence of the construction of abortion as
an act that should be prevented wherever possible is that women who return to
request subsequent abortions become positioned as particularly ‘problematic’
patients. HCPs argue that these patients have failed to understand, or have
deliberately ignored, HCPs’ attempts to educate them concerning the unacceptable
‘risks’ of abortion.
HCPs’ concerns about ‘repeat’ abortion echo Luker’s (1975) analysis of the
depiction of this ‘problem’ within US family planning discourse in the 1970s. Luker
attempts to challenge the assumption that women who make repeated use of abortion
are ignorant or deliberately destructive individuals by illustrating the rational reasons
why women do not use contraceptive technologies to control their fertility. However,
in Chapter Six I argued that explanations of women’s reasons for constructing
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abortion as a lesser risk than contraception do not necessarily destabilise HCPs’
definitions of these reproductive practices. Using my participants’ accounts, I
illustrated their acceptance of women’s ‘alternative’ definitions of the relative risks
posed by contraception and abortion. I then demonstrated how this can become the
basis from which HCPs try to educate patients about the ‘correct’ (e.g. HCP-defined)
meanings of these practices.
HCPs’ constructions of abortion as an emotionally and physically damaging
procedure are often interwoven with another claim to expertise, namely, that they
know how women should feel about their decisions to end their pregnancies. Several
HCPs suggested that they expect their patients to display an appropriate level of
‘suffering’ when they request the procedure (Chapters Five and Six). In the absence
of such emotional display, some HCPs suggested that they attempt to educate
patients about how they should behave during a consultation about abortion.
Finally, HCPs made claims to expertise about the significance of gestational
timing, through which they constructed ‘later’ abortion as an entirely different kind
of decision from ‘earlier’ abortion (Chapter Seven). Some doctors argued that they
possess expert knowledge about the status of the fetus and that, beyond a certain
point in gestation, ‘healthy’ fetuses cannot legitimately be aborted. They also argued
that they possess important knowledge about the methods used to terminate later
gestation pregnancies, and constructed this process as something that is potentially
more risky to a woman than carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term. Finally, some
nurses argued that they gain important expertise through the experience of providing
later gestation abortions, which gives them legitimate grounds to be involved in
decisions about precisely how ‘late’ the procedure is offered to patients. I have
suggested that, through each of these claims about the unacceptability of ‘later’
abortions, HCPs co-produce a vision of society where pregnant women’s personhood
is eroded naturally by the passage of gestational time.
The above examples reveal how HCPs’ claims to expertise about abortion
construct normative femininities, i.e. they attempt to prescribe the subjectivities
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available to those whose bodies are categorised as female. However, the analysis in
Chapter Six revealed that HCPs’ claims to expertise about abortion perpetuate social
relations of inequality other than gender, specifically, those of socio-economic class,
ethnicity and age. I have argued that, in contrasting ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’
uses of abortion, HCPs are engaged in practices of “reproductive stratification”
(Ginsburg & Rapp, 1995), through which certain forms of motherhood become
valued more highly than others. Abortion is deemed to be an unproblematic course of
action for ethnic minorities from “other countries”, for women who are young, and
particularly, for those who live in poverty. In contrast, it seems that women who are
defined as members of the middle-class, or who are thought to be ‘running out of
time’ to reproduce are more likely to have their requests for abortion questioned.
8.2.3 Avenues for ‘real-world’ reform?
Throughout this thesis, I have pointed to the dangers involved in simply accepting
HCPs’ interview accounts of their attempts to assess and regulate their patients’
reproductive behaviour. To take such accounts at face value is to ignore the multiple
means by which women might refuse to comply with HCPs’ attempts to intervene in
their decisions. Such an approach also ignores a key aspect of the interview data,
specifically, that it was generated through HCPs’ attempts to account for their actions
to me, a professional outsider. The subjectivities which HCPs delineate for
themselves and their patients can thus be heard as an attempt to construct their
practice as ‘acceptable’, i.e. as in accordance with perceived norms. In this sense,
HCPs’ interview accounts could be said to provide an important opportunity to
witness the construction of these norms, rather than providing concrete evidence of
‘what actually happens’ in the abortion clinic.
However, although it is necessary to acknowledge this limitation of interview
data, it seems equally important to consider the possibility that HCPs’ accounts might
resemble the practices which they actually engage in during consultations with their
patients. If this is the case, then it seems that Scottish HCPs may be attempting to
prescribe the subjectivities available to their patients in a manner that has very
troubling implications for women’s access to and experience of abortion.
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One response to these findings would be to argue that I should try to persuade
HCPs to reflect upon and problematise the “prescriptive ontologies” (Wynne, 2001:
479) produced through their own and their colleague’s claims to expertise. For
example, I could illustrate how abortion is constructed as a ‘last resort’ course of
action, and suggest that this framing of the procedure leaves no space for those
patients who make repeated use of it. In arguing that ‘repeat’ abortion might be
conceptualised differently, I could point out that many HCPs already do accept the
repeated use of abortion in certain circumstances, i.e. for those who are young or
living in poverty. In turn, this finding raises further questions, for example, about the
distinctions which HCPs are making between different ‘classes’ of patient.
In spite of the logistical difficulties involved in organising them, focus groups
might represent a useful route through which to pursue the dissemination of these
findings. In this environment, HCPs could discuss and also respond to my analysis at
length. Alternatively, I could offer to present my work at hospital departmental
seminars, or GP practice meetings. However, whichever method I adopt, it is clear
that I will have to negotiate the problems highlighted in the introduction to this
chapter, i.e. attempting to engage in a ‘critique’ of HCPs’ current practices without
alienating those whom I am trying to convince.
With a view to the importance of this future dialogue, this thesis has
attempted to analyse HCPs’ accounts without engaging in a hyperbolic critique
which demonizes the practice of individuals. In addition to closing down the
possibilities for communication with HCPs, this kind of critique fails to acknowledge
how HCPs’ practices may be shaped by the discursive resources available to them. I
have tried to keep this issue at the forefront of the analysis by illustrating how HCPs’
accounts resonate with the way in which abortion is constructed in public discourse
(i.e. in law, in parliamentary debate and in the media).
For example, in Chapter Five, I suggested that the current law could be said
to encourage HCPs to act as ‘responsible experts’ in relation to pregnant women,
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whilst simultaneously providing them with justification for the adoption of this
subject position. In Chapter Six I argued that, in the UK, abortion is constructed as a
‘last resort’ method of fertility control, which can and should be prevented through
the use of contraception. I suggested that the public construction of HCPs as
gatekeepers to contraception and abortion means that they are often held accountable
when women use abortion in a way that does not accord with this normative
definition. Additionally, I pointed out that the discourse of ‘prevention through
contraception’ is materially entrenched in Scottish abortion practice, as evidenced by
the forms which HCPs must complete during abortion consultations (see p.166). In
Chapter Seven, I argued that HCPs’ tendency to focus on later abortion as a question
of their expert assessments of the status of the fetus cannot be separated from the fact
that this is the narrow discursive framework through which decisions about later
gestation abortion are depicted in UK law and debate. Finally, I have argued that the
overwhelmingly negative constructions of abortion (i.e. as a ‘desperate’ and/or
painful act) that emerge from HCPs’ accounts must be contextualised in relation to
the medicalised framework through which the procedure was legalised in the UK.
In acknowledging the discursive context within which HCPs are working, I
have been forced to question whether it is sufficient to try and generate positive
changes in abortion provision by encouraging individual HCPs to reflect upon their
practices. This point was first raised in Chapter Three, where I drew attention to
Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) analysis of Pākehā New Zealanders’ racist 
constructions of Māori identity. Wetherell and Potter (1992) argue that, while it is 
possible to hold individuals to account for engaging in racist practices, it is not
necessarily useful to focus on racism as a problem generated by individuals. To do so
is to de-politicise the issue, drawing attention away from broader social relations
which shape the discursive resources available for constructing human identity.
Likewise, while it might prove useful to encourage HCPs to reflect upon their
individual practices, it is vital not to ignore the fact that HCPs are working in a
society which shapes the subjectivities available to women, and thus, to those who
work as abortion providers. In this sense, my analysis of HCPs’ interview accounts
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illustrates the narrow range of resources available for constructing abortion in the
UK, and the correspondingly oppressive constructions of femininity (not to mention
socio-economic class, age and ethnicity) that are perpetuated in this discursive
context. It thus points to the continuing relevance of earlier feminist critiques
(Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991) of the narrow discursive space within
which abortion is discussed in the UK, and suggests that feminist campaigns should
be focussed upon attempts to open up this space.
One important direction for such campaigns is to challenge the construction
of abortion as an exceptional, deviant act by emphasising that it is an extremely
common event in women’s lives. If even those who support women’s access to
abortion continue to depict it as a controversial course of action that should be
prevented wherever possible, it seems unlikely that HCPs will refrain from trying to
persuade their patients to avoid it. Likewise, if pro-choice groups accept their
opponents’ framing of ‘later’ abortion as a distinctive act which requires special
justification, then why would HCPs treat this procedure any differently?
Another obvious avenue through which to challenge public discourses on
abortion would be to attack the framework of the current Abortion Act, which, as
outlined in Chapter One, has long been a focal point of feminist critique. Legal
reform could be used to destabilise the problematic femininities constructed through
the current Abortion Act. For example, both the construction of abortion as a
‘deviant’ act, and the notion that women requesting it are unreliable reproductive
decision-makers, could be challenged through the removal of the requirement that
doctors certify the legality of an abortion.
However, it is obvious that legal change should not be depicted as a
straightforward solution to the problems that I have highlighted in this thesis. As
Sheldon (1997) notes, although feminists can campaign to change the letter of the
law, they cannot control the ways in which new rules are then enacted in medical
practice. This problem would also be predicted by the Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge’s finitist account of scientific classification (Barnes et al., 1996).
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According to this account, no attempt to articulate a rule with which to classify the
world can determine how this rule will be interpreted on future occasions.
Similarly, my thesis has illustrated that, although Scottish HCPs are currently
acting within a common legal framework, this has not prevented localised
differences in practice from emerging. For example, I have shown that, while some
HCPs routinely position themselves as experts in relation to their pregnant patients,
others argue that it is inappropriate for them to attempt to assess women’s decisions
(in most circumstances). Another key difference between HCPs’ practices is the
gestational thresholds which they construct as relevant to decisions about abortion
provision. In the final section of this concluding discussion, I will return to this
localised construction of abortion ‘time limits’ as one of the most significant findings
of this thesis.
The discussion in this section has drawn attention to an important and
positive aspect of Scottish abortion practice, namely, that HCPs do accord a
considerable degree of legitimacy to their pregnant patients. At the same time, it has
highlighted the troubling subjectivities which are perpetuated by Scottish HCPs’
claims to expert knowledge about abortion. However, to what extent can I make
claims concerning the wider relevance of this research for the way in which abortion
is provided elsewhere in the UK? I have illustrated that Scottish HCPs’ accounts
resonate with public discourses on abortion that are not specific to Scotland. For
example, the current legal framework, as well as parliamentary discussion of it,
concerns the provision of abortion in Scotland, England, and Wales. On the basis of
this common discursive context, it seems likely that the accounts of HCPs working in
England and Wales would, at the very least, overlap with the ones that I have
explored in my study.
At the same time, as noted in Chapter Three, there are important geographical
differences in the way that abortion is provided across the UK. Historically, the
majority of abortions in Scotland have always been provided on the NHS (Abortion
Law Reform Association, 1997). In contrast, while abortion provision in England
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and Wales is primarily NHS-funded, it is carried out primarily on non-NHS
premises, i.e. the service is, by and large, not provided through the NHS but by
specialised charitable/private agencies (Abortion Law Reform Association, 1997).
The existence of these agencies also means that women have the option of bypassing
NHS gatekeepers entirely, and paying for their abortions. This key difference in
service provision does raise questions about the relevance of my analysis outwith
Scotland. For example, are Scottish HCPs’ concessions of legitimacy to their
pregnant patients related to the specifically Scottish framing of abortion as something
that should be provided as part of a free, and (relatively) equitable State healthcare
service? In the future, I hope to address this and other questions by conducting
comparative empirical work with HCPs working in England and Wales.
8.3 Relationships between HCPs
In the previous section, I explored the subjectivities which HCPs construct for
themselves and for women with unwanted pregnancies when they describe their
interactions with their patients. Although HCP-patient relationships represent the
primary focus of this thesis, I have also considered individual HCPs’ depictions of
their relationships with other members of the healthcare profession. The following
discussion aims to provide a summary of this aspect of the data, as well as
highlighting its potential implications.
8.3.1 Destabilising dichotomies
In giving HCPs the right to opt out of abortion provision, current UK law defines two
possible subject positions for HCPs; either they are opposed to abortion on the
grounds of conscience, or they are not. At first glance, it does seem that my
participants can be classified in this dichotomous manner. Indeed, in Chapter Four I
revealed that HCPs actively engage in this process of classification. I illustrated that
some HCPs claim that they opt out of abortion provision in order to exercise
important moral objections to this practice (section 4.2.2). By representing
themselves in this way, they often developed implicit or explicit critiques of those
HCPs who are involved in abortion provision, depicting the latter as morally lazy. In
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contrast, a second group of participants (the majority) distinguished themselves from
HCPs who hold ‘conscientious objections’ to abortion. This group of HCPs
characterised ‘conscientious objectors’ either as unusual individuals who possess
distinctive worldviews that must be tolerated within limits (sections 4.2.1 and 4.4), or
else as HCPs who fail to recognise their responsibilities to their patients and their
colleagues (section 4.3). Through both of these constructions of conscientious
objection, HCPs normalized their own participation in abortion provision.
Additionally, HCPs who criticised ‘conscientious objectors’ for failing to recognise
their responsibilities were able to position themselves as morally superior individuals
who did recognise these responsibilities.
However, although my participants clearly recognised and made rhetorical
use of a distinction between HCPs who ‘conscientiously object’ to abortion and those
who do not, my analysis also suggests that important complexities are concealed by
the construction of this binary. In the previous section, I described how HCPs who
participate in abortion provision articulate various claims to expertise about the
correct and incorrect uses of abortion. Although these HCPs do not claim to object to
abortion on the basis of their ‘consciences’, they nonetheless identify some uses of
abortion as ‘objectionable’ and suggest that they enact these objections (e.g. by
trying to dissuade women from certain practices). In many cases, the discourses
which they employ resonate strongly with the discourse of HCPs who state that they
opt out of abortion provision on the grounds of conscience.
For example, in explaining why he opts out of abortion provision, but accepts
the use of emergency contraception, GP7 draws on medical discourse concerning the
bodily functionality of fetuses in order to depict a six/seven week old fetus as an
entity that is morally different from the entity produced immediately after
fertilisation (see p.122-3 ). However, many HCPs who are involved in abortion
provision (particularly doctors), also draw on descriptions of fetal functionality (e.g.
concerning thresholds of ‘viability’ or definitions of fetal ‘health’) in order to explain
why abortion becomes less acceptable beyond a particular threshold. As the
quotations in Chapter Seven reveal, there is no consensus concerning this threshold;
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individual HCPs argued for significant thresholds as being twelve weeks, fourteen
weeks, fifteen weeks, sixteen weeks, eighteen weeks, twenty weeks, etc. When this
complexity is acknowledged, the notion that there is a clear distinction between those
HCPs who possess ‘conscientious objections’ to abortion and those who do not
becomes hard to sustain. Instead it could be argued that HCPs are drawing upon a
shared yet flexible discourse, through which abortion becomes constructed as an act
whose acceptability is dependent on (varying degrees of) gestational time.
Another important point of resonance between the discourse of those who
identify as conscientious objectors and of those who do not concerns the critiques
which HCPs developed of women with unwanted pregnancies. The most striking
overlap is between the account of Nurse 10, who opts out of abortion provision on
the grounds of conscience, and Specialist Registrar 2, who participates. Nurse 10
argues that some women “grossly abuse” the NHS by using abortion as a method of
fertility control, and suggests that women should not be allowed more than one NHS
abortion (p.109). Similarly, Specialist Registrar 2 argues that women should be
forced to “pay attention” to their contraception via the introduction of financial
penalties for those who request more than one abortion (p.170).
In addition to this specific example, the more general tendency of HCPs to
blame women for the way in which abortion is utilised in the UK seems to be an
approach adopted by those who identify as conscientious objectors and those who do
not. Both ‘groups’ of HCPs criticise women for failing to accommodate pregnancies
which they define as merely “inconvenient”. The key difference is that conscientious
objectors draw very broad boundaries around the kinds of pregnancy which women
should be able to accommodate (any pregnancy in the absence of immediate physical
danger – see p.106-7), whereas those who participate in abortion provision suggest
that only certain kinds of women should be carrying their pregnancies to term (see
Chapter Six).
On the basis of these findings, one implication of this thesis is to highlight the
extremely limited information generated by quantitative surveys that allow HCPs to
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articulate only one of two polarised ‘attitudes’ to abortion. A recent example of this
type of work is Francome and Freeman’s (2000) survey of GPs, which attempted to
measure the percentage who identified as “broadly anti-abortion” or “broadly pro-
choice”. Rather than engaging in research which simply reinforces the assumption
that there are some HCPs who object to abortion and some who do not, I would
argue that it is necessary to explore the multiple forms of ‘objection’ to abortion
which are expressed by HCPs, and to consider their implications for women
requesting the procedure.
8.3.2 Situating HCPs within the workplace
In addition to highlighting the multiple objections to abortion that are articulated by
HCPs, this thesis has also problematised the law’s construction of ‘the conscientious
objector’ as an individual who can exercise his/her right to ‘opt out’ independently of
social context. One aspect of this context was addressed earlier in this chapter; I
described how HCPs define limits around the ‘right’ to opt out of abortion provision
on the basis of their obligations to their patients. However, the analysis in Chapter
Four revealed that some HCPs also cite workplace relationships as a key factor that
shapes an individual’s ability to opt out of abortion provision. In the following
discussion I will reflect upon this aspect of the data.
Some of my participants argued that, although they would like to opt out of
abortion work, they could not do so because this would place an unfair burden upon
other HCPs. This comment was made regularly by those who worked in hospitals,
where HCPs have to co-operate to accomplish particular tasks, such as the timely
completion of surgery lists, or the provision of nursing care to patients in an
outpatient clinic or a ward. In this context, if an HCP tries to assert their individual
‘right’ to opt out of abortion provision, they risk being perceived as someone who is
not prepared to work as part of a team, and who creates extra work for other people.
Several of the conscientious objectors I interviewed noted spontaneously that this
accusation had been directed towards them by their colleagues.
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During the analysis in Chapter Four I acknowledged the rhetorical
dimensions of HCPs’ accounts of the difficulties generated by their relationships
with their colleagues. When HCPs emphasise the ways in which they are constrained
by their obligations to others, they depict themselves as individuals who face up to
their responsibilities by engaging in difficult work. Similarly, conscientious
objectors’ accounts of the hardships which they face in the workplace can be heard
as their attempts to assert their moral superiority; they are individuals who work hard
in order to be able to live up to their moral convictions.
At the same time, I have argued that my analysis does highlight the potential
difficulties that HCPs may face in enacting objections to abortion via the conscience
clause. In doing so, I have built upon the historical work of Davis and Davidson
(2005) by illustrating that, in contemporary Scottish practice, HCPs theoretical
‘rights’ as individuals continue to be constructed as co-existing uneasily alongside
the healthcare profession’s collective responsibilities for abortion provision.
Additionally, this thesis has also made a novel contribution by illustrating another
way in which HCPs’ relationships with one another might impact upon their ability
to enact individual objections to abortion. In Chapters Four and Seven, I suggested
that the scope for HCPs to determine their involvement in abortion provision is also
interwoven with power relations in the workplace.
For example, Nurse 10’s account of the problems that she experiences in
enacting her objection to abortion (p.109-10) draws attention to the situation of
trainee/junior HCPs as one in which individuals may be misinformed about and/or
feel unable to exercise their ‘rights’ to opt out of abortion provision. The potentially
more vulnerable position of trainees is also highlighted by an anecdote which
recurred during several of the interviews. My participants utilised stories of doctors
who performed abortions at more junior stages of their career and who ‘opted out’ at
a more senior level as a means of critiquing others’ lack of ‘moral consistency’ in
relation to abortion (see section 4.2). However, if ‘switching sides’ is indeed such a
regular occurrence, it could be argued that this is less a reflection of ‘inconsistency’,
than of the differential ability of junior gynaecologists vs. Consultants to insist that
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they will not conduct abortions. However, a major limitation of this study is that I did
not interview any junior HCPs who were still in training (i.e. all of my participants
were fully qualified doctors and nurses), and I was also unable to gain access to the
HCPs whom my participants criticised for ‘switching sides’. As such, it is impossible
to do more than speculate about the influence of seniority on HCPs’ ability to
exercise their objections to abortion, and to suggest that this represents an important
area for future research.
Stronger evidence for the influence of workplace hierarchies on HCPs’ ability
to enact objections to abortion is provided by HCPs’ interview accounts of later
abortion work. As described in Chapter Seven, gynaecologists offer several different
explanations for the fact that, in the second trimester, it is routine in Scottish practice
to offer the medical method of abortion rather than the surgical one. Whatever the
reason for this practice, it is clear that its outcome is the delegation of responsibility
to gynaecology nurses, who provide care for all medical abortion patients. Scottish
abortion provision is thus characterised by a division of labour that gives
gynaecologists an automatic ‘opt out’ from later abortion work, whilst ensuring that
this form of abortion is a routine part of nursing work. Several of my nurse
participants expressed major resentment about this work, arguing that it was
extremely distressing to deliver and handle fetuses that are aborted at later gestations.
They stated that they felt unable to avoid later abortions by opting out on individual
grounds of conscience because of the situation described previously, i.e. that they
would then place an impossible burden on their colleagues.
In describing their resentment about later abortion provision, nurses also
criticised the fact that, although they are the ones who have to carry out this
procedure, it is doctors who are empowered to decide how ‘late’ it is offered to
patients. Without dismissing the possibility that my participants are genuinely angry
about this situation, it is interesting to note that their accounts of their
‘powerlessness’ to determine how abortion is used reflect a pattern that emerged
elsewhere in the interviews. Members of all of the ‘groups’ of HCPs that I
interviewed (GPs, nurses and gynaecologists) minimised their own responsibility for
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the procedure by emphasising the roles played by other HCPs. For example, Chapter
Five revealed that when GPs describe referrals that they feel ambivalent about, they
position gynaecologists as the HCPs who are ultimately responsible for whether or
not the procedure takes place. In contrast, HCPs who work in hospitals often stress
the fact that every woman they see will already have had a previous consultation
with a primary care doctor/nurse, which makes it unnecessary for them to become
involved in assessing women’s reproductive decisions. Additionally, when hospital
gynaecologists discuss how they deal with women whom they consider ‘too late’ for
an abortion, they refer to the role played by yet another group of HCPs – those
working in abortion charities in England. Scottish gynaecologists argue that these
HCPs are ultimately responsible for decisions about the time limits that are placed
upon women’s access to abortion in the UK.
In noting that doctors and nurses utilise the same rhetorical mechanism to
“relocate responsibility” for decisions about abortion provision, it remains vital to
acknowledge that nurses expressed distress and anger about their lack of involvement
in the decision-making process in a way that doctors did not. Although I cannot
claim any access to participants’ private emotional realities, I have argued that it is
important not to dismiss the possibility that some nurses do feel unfairly burdened by
their colleagues’ actions. To treat these nurses’ accounts of the difficulties that they
face as ‘mere’ rhetoric would be highly insensitive and runs the risk of creating the
kind of alienation that would generate barriers to any future dialogue.
Furthermore, to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that some nurses face
emotional difficulties because of their involvement in abortion provision is to refuse
to try and address this situation. One means of doing so would be to disseminate my
findings concerning later abortion to doctors, in order to highlight the way that this
work impacts disproportionately on nurses. However, as I explained in Chapter
Seven, and will reiterate below, there are several problems with the suggestion that
the solution to current problems is to simply amplify the voices of nurses who
express objections about later abortion work.
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In the first place, it was clear from the interviews that many doctors are
already aware of these objections; concern about the impact on nursing staff was one
of the key explanations provided for decisions to impose particular gestational time
limits on women’s access to the procedure (see section 7.4). In other words, nurses
have already had some success in persuading their colleagues to listen to their claims
to expertise about the meaning of later abortion, with major ramifications for women
with unwanted pregnancies. A second, and related, difficulty with amplifying these
nurses’ accounts in an uncritical manner is that this implies my acceptance of their
claims to expertise, i.e. that they know the ‘true’ meaning of later abortion.
In Chapter Seven I argued that this treatment of the data can and should be
contested on theoretical, political and empirical grounds. Drawing on Haraway’s
(1991) theorisation of materiality, I have suggested that, while it is important to
conceptualise the material world as an active presence in human life, this presence is
always mediated through human discourse. As a result, it is impossible for anyone to
claim to speak the ‘truth’ about material entities such as fetuses. Historically,
however, those who have regulated abortion provision in the UK have failed to
recognise the contingency of human encounters with fetuses, and have allowed the
medical profession to act as the interpreter of their ‘true’ meaning. To concede the
same status to nurses involved in later abortion work is equally problematic, because
this silences the alternative perspectives of women with unwanted pregnancies, and
suggests that they should not be allowed to determine the circumstances in which
they should carry a pregnancy to term. Finally, I have argued that this treatment of
the data is empirically problematic because findings from my own and other studies
(Simonds, 1996) illustrate that not all HCPs construct their involvement in later
abortion work in the same way. While some nurses describe it as a job that centres on
the distressing process of handling aborted fetuses, others define this work as the
provision of a vital service through which they are able to help women out of
difficult circumstances.
This empirical finding points to an alternative means of framing the question
of ‘what to do?’ Rather than asking how best to remove the burden from nurses by
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making it easier for them to opt out of later abortion work, I would like to ask how it
could become easier for nurses to participate in this work. While acknowledging that
the more positive nursing accounts that I heard might represent participants’ attempts
to depict the nursing profession as engaged in worthwhile work, they do suggest that
there are circumstances in which this work becomes more rewarding. Although I do
not have sufficient data to make detailed claims about what these circumstances
might be, this seems to be a crucial avenue for future research. Are there particular
working environments (for example, in which nurses are granted greater professional
freedom and recognition in exchange for the work that they do) that enable nurses to
gain satisfaction from their involvement in later abortion work? Alternatively, are
there contexts in which this work becomes particularly difficult? What training do
nurses undergo concerning abortion provision and how does this training impact
upon their experiences of this work? For example, are trainee nurses encouraged to
view later abortion as a vital service that is necessary for the health and lives of
women (as described by Nurse 4 and Nurse 6), or as an unnecessary act which results
from the actions of women who fail to access hospital services earlier in pregnancy
(as implied by Nurse 1 and Nurse 8)?
Finally, rather than focusing on the ability of nurses to opt in or out of later
abortion work, an alternative means to address the difficulties highlighted in this
discussion would be to problematise the division of labour which places sole
responsibility for this procedure with nurses. As I pointed out in Chapters Three and
Seven, guidance from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (2004)
states that, if gynaecologists are sufficiently skilled in the technique, abortions can be
conducted surgically as well as medically throughout the second trimester of
pregnancy. Although my participants described this procedure as risky and
technically difficult, it is clear that there are doctors in the UK (particularly those
working for abortion charities in England) who are prepared to conduct it. In future
research, I aim to interview some of these doctors. I could then use this data in an
attempt to open up conversations with Scottish gynaecologists about the possibility
of providing second trimester surgical abortions to women in Scotland.
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8.4 Unwanted interventions? Speaking to ‘the time limit
debate’
Throughout this thesis I have positioned my research as something that is intended to
contribute to the fulfilment of a particular political goal, namely, the destabilisation
of oppressive co-constructions of abortion and femininity (not to mention age,
ethnicity, and socio-economic class). However, in this final discussion I want to
reflect upon an issue that I highlighted in the introduction to this thesis, namely, the
lack of control that an author has over her own text once it exists in the public
domain. While this clearly applies to any piece of research, the ease with which
feminist discourse on abortion can be subverted by those with oppositional political
goals (Science and Technology Subgroup, 1991) means that it is vital to reflect upon
the potentially unwanted political ramifications of my research.
In Chapter One, I justified my decision to study the voices of a group of
professionals who, in the UK, have been granted extraordinary epistemological
authority to determine the ways in which abortion should be used. I argued that,
precisely because of the potential for HCPs to exercise power over their pregnant
patients, it is vital to understand the roles which they are constructing for themselves.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, I also depicted my use of STS theory as
an analytical tool through which I could ensure that I critically analysed the
knowledge claims that HCPs make about abortion, rather than simply legitimating
these claims. However, even when HCPs’ claims to expertise are being critically
deconstructed, it could be argued that the publication of interview quotations
nonetheless amplifies these claims. This becomes especially problematic when HCPs
are voicing various objections to women’s uses of abortion; such ‘expert’ opinions
potentially provide important ammunition to groups who want to restrict women’s
access to the procedure. In the remainder of this discussion, I will reflect upon this
problem, with reference to the aspect of my data which seems most amenable to such
‘capture’.
Clearly, it is important not to overstate the impact which a piece of academic
research, published primarily in social science journals, might have on the world
beyond this immediate context. However, one aspect of my data seems to ‘speak’
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particularly easily to a debate about abortion which has re-opened in the UK in
recent years, namely, the dispute over the legal time limit on the procedure. The
arguments of those who wish to lower this time limit have gained increasing
momentum, as evidenced by the fact that the issue was subjected to full-blown
parliamentary debate during the passage of the 2008 Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Bill. In many cases, my participants’ accounts map smoothly onto the
arguments made by MPs and lobbyists who seek to reduce the current limit from
twenty-four weeks’ gestation. For example, when HCPs explain why they place
restrictions on women’s access to abortion in the second trimester, they often argue
that pre-twenty-four week fetuses are significant entities that should not be aborted.
Additionally, nurses define the significance of these entities in terms of their
embodied experiences of later abortion work. As noted in Chapter Seven, the first-
hand narratives of HCPs who find later abortion provision distressing are a favoured
rhetorical strategy utilised by those involved in current campaigns to lower the time
limit. Finally, some of my participants emphasise the ‘trauma’ that might be caused
to women by undergoing later abortion. Although the HCPs who make this argument
are emphasising their concerns about patient well-being, such supposedly woman-
centred discourse has long formed part of attempts to lower the legal time limit on
abortion (see Steinberg, 1991).
The resonance between some HCPs’ accounts of their concerns about later
gestation abortion, and the arguments put forward by anti-abortionists, continues to
concern me. However, having reflected deeply on the unwanted ramifications of
publishing my data, I have come to the conclusion that it remains important to
address HCPs’ accounts of the significance of gestational timing for several reasons.
In the first place, my analysis suggests that it is necessary to confront problems with
Scottish women’s current access to/experience of later abortion, rather than
focussing on attempts to defend an already-imperfect system from anti-abortion
attack. Chapter Seven revealed that, while UK law and public debate construct
‘twenty-four weeks’ as the nation’s upper time limit on abortion provision, this is a
theoretical maximum which is never reached in Scottish practice. Instead, what is to
count as an appropriate gestational time-limit on abortion provision is being
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constructed on an entirely localised basis, differing between GP consulting rooms
within the same building, as well as between hospitals within the same NHS Board.
A woman who goes to consult GP12 may be turned away if he thinks that she is
more than sixteen weeks’ pregnant, whereas GP11 would automatically refer any
patient to the hospital for a second opinion, even if she personally thinks that the
patient is ‘too late’. Likewise, if this patient is sent to hospital A for an abortion, she
will be provided with the procedure at up to twenty weeks’ gestation, whereas at
hospital B, she is already ‘too late’ if she is beyond fifteen weeks. Ultimately, all
women who are suspected of being more than twenty weeks pregnant are ‘too late’ to
have abortions in Scotland, and must travel to access the procedure from charitable
providers in England.
As well as revealing the inequalities generated by the current system of
Scottish abortion provision, my analysis provides a potentially useful resource to
those who are attempting to challenge anti-abortion attacks upon the current legal
time limit. One argument which anti-abortion MPs have made during recent debates
is that, if NHS doctors and nurses are not willing to provide abortions beyond certain
gestations, then we should reform the law so that the upper time limit accords with
‘current practice’. Obviously, this argument should, first of all, be challenged on the
grounds that it assumes that the healthcare profession should be allowed to determine
women’s uses of abortion. However, it can also be challenged because (as revealed
by my data) there is actually no consensus between HCPs concerning the threshold in
gestational time beyond which abortion becomes ‘unacceptable’. In other words
there is no “current practice”, but rather multiple (Mol, 2002), localised practices.
Moreover, I have revealed that, when HCPs explain why they, or their hospital, place
particular time limits on women’s local access to abortion, they often emphasise that
it is perfectly acceptable for someone else to conduct the procedure. In other words,
HCPs’ individual decisions about their willingness to be involved in later abortion
provision should not be treated as evidence that they want the State to prevent
women from accessing this procedure entirely. This echoes the findings of a survey
conducted by Savage and Francome (1989), who found that most gynaecologists
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accepted that abortion should be legally available at gestations at which they
themselves were not prepared to take part in it.
Another aspect of the data considered in Chapter Seven provides further
evidence that there is no professional consensus about the ‘unacceptability’ of later
abortion. Although HCPs tended to draw on one of three claims to expertise in order
to depict later abortion as a problematic decision that requires their assessment, I
illustrated counter-examples from the interview data which problematised each of
these claims. Some doctors argue that their assessments concerning the functionality
of developing fetal bodies are irrelevant to a woman’s decision about whether she
wants to continue with her pregnancy. Others undermined their colleagues’ claims to
possess ‘the facts’ about the trauma caused by undergoing a later gestation abortion.
Finally, as noted above, some of the nurses I interviewed constructed later abortion
provision as a vitally important service that they were glad to be able to provide to
their patients.
On the basis of this concluding discussion, I would continue to defend my
decision to conduct a study that addresses the accounts of a profession which is
granted enormous epistemological authority in public debates about the regulation of
abortion. I would argue that the opportunity to address the various problems which I
have highlighted throughout this thesis outweighs the dangers involved in publicising
HCPs’ troubling discursive practices.
Nevertheless, the process of reflecting upon these dangers has made me
aware of the need to develop my research in alternative directions in the future. In
particular, I have come to reconsider the importance of researching the perspectives
of women who have had, or have tried to access, abortion. When I embarked on this
project, I was aware that several recent empirical studies on this issue already
existed, and throughout this thesis I have drawn on this work in an attempt to
counterbalance the ‘voices’ of HCPs. However, during Chapter Seven I highlighted
an important gap in this literature. I have been unable to find any qualitative research
which addresses women’s experiences of attempting to access and/or undergo second
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trimester medical abortion in the absence of fetal abnormality. Whilst writing my
analysis of HCPs’ claims to expertise concerning this practice, I became acutely
aware of these absent voices, and the importance of addressing them. Given that
Scottish HCPs seem to be able to avoid confronting the repercussions of defining
patients as ‘too late’ for abortion, it seems vital to discover and publicise what
happens to women who are being refused access to and/or dissuaded from
undergoing the procedure.
For similar reasons, in future research I also intend to try and access the
accounts of women who have undergone second trimester medical abortion. As I
acknowledged in Chapter Seven, legally, HCPs have an obligation to ‘inform’ their
patients about what the experience of this procedure ‘will be like’ before they can
allow them to undergo it. However, it is clear that individual HCPs are constructing
this experience very differently, with some placing it on a continuum with earlier
medical abortion and others positioning it as a radically different and traumatic
‘type’ of abortion. Giving voice to women’s own experiences of this procedure, and
the meanings which they attach to it, might prove a useful basis from which to train
HCPs concerning the best way to provide such ‘information’ to their patients.
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Laws relating to abortion, c.1800-1990
Year Legislation Description
1803 The Malicious Shooting or
Stabbing Act.
This Act made abortion a
statutory offence for the first
time. A distinction was made
between the penalties for pre- and
post- quickening abortion, with
the latter being punishable by
death. (Keown, 1988)
This Act did not apply to
Scotland, where abortion
continued to be regulated under
Scottish common law until 1967
(see Chapter One).
1828 Lord Lansdowne’s Act (9 Geo. IV
c.31)
These Acts amended and clarified
the crime of abortion and its
punishment. The distinction
between pre- and post-
quickening abortions was
removed in 1837, as was the
death penalty. However, the
punishments for abortion
remained severe. The 1861 Act,
which currently regulates illegal
abortion in the UK, carries a
maximum penalty of life
imprisonment (Keown, 1988).
This legislation did not apply to
Scotland.
1837 The Offences Against the Person
Act
1861 The Offences Against the Person
Act
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1929 The Infant Life (Preservation) Act This Act created the offence of
‘child destruction’, which refers
to the destruction of a fetus
capable of being born alive.
(Brookes, 1988)
This law does not apply to
Scotland
1967 The Abortion Act This Act provided exemptions to
the 1861 Offences Against the
Person Act, and makes abortion
legal in certain circumstances.
This law applies to Scotland,
England and Wales.
1990 The Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act
This Act decoupled the Abortion
Act from the Infant Life
(Preservation) Act and removed
the upper time limit on all
abortions except those carried out
under ‘clause a’.




Schedule 1 of the Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991
The following is Schedule 1 of “Statutory Instrument 1991 No. 460 (S.41) - The Abortion
(Scotland) Regulations 1991”, which is reproduced from the Office of Public Sector
Information - http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ - (© Crown Copyright 1991).
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The following is reproduced from the Office of Public Sector Information -
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ - (© Crown Copyright 1991).
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Appendix C
Schedule 2 of the Abortion (Scotland) Regulations 1991
The following is Schedule 2 of “Statutory Instrument 1991 No. 460 (S.41) - The Abortion
(Scotland) Regulations 1991” and is reproduced from the Office of Public Sector Information
- http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ - (© Crown Copyright 1991).
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The following is reproduced from the Office of Public Sector Information -
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ - (© Crown Copyright 1991).
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The following is reproduced from the Office of Public Sector Information -
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ - (© Crown Copyright 1991).
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Appendix D
Letter of invitation/information pack.
It should be noted that slightly different versions of the following letter and associated
information were developed for different groups of HCPs, and that the practical details were
altered as the project progressed (for example, more time was requested from HCPs during
the initial round of recruitment).
Dear X.
Re: Healthcare practitioners and termination of pregnancy – Views on abortion practice and
regulation in central Scotland.
I am writing to ask if you would be willing to take part in the above study, which I am conducting for
my PhD at the Research Centre for Social Sciences at the University of Edinburgh.
Current UK law requires that women seeking termination of pregnancy obtain the signature of two
doctors who have decided that they have grounds for the procedure. However, research suggests that
many women seeking termination are not aware of this legal requirement, and that they believe they
have the right to decide to have the procedure. My PhD aims to use qualitative research methods to
explore healthcare practitioners’ (HCPs’) views about this situation, and their experiences of the way
that the law is managed in practice.
I am writing to members of all the groups of HCPs in central Scotland who are likely to encounter
patients seeking this procedure, in the hope that they will agree to be interviewed about their
experiences. I am keen to ensure that I address a wide range of viewpoints, and this includes HCPs
who object to termination on the grounds of conscience.
My PhD is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, and I have attached an
information sheet which provides further information about the study. If you have any questions about
it, please feel free to contact me on [contact details].
I appreciate that HCPs have extremely busy schedules, and am very flexible as to where and when the
interview would take place. I would be grateful if you could indicate your interest in taking part on the






Healthcare practitioners (HCPs) and termination of pregnancy -Views on
abortion practice and regulation in central Scotland.
Please read this information sheet carefully and take your time in deciding whether to
participate.
The purpose of the study
Current UK law requires that women seeking termination of pregnancy obtain the signature
of two doctors who have decided that they have grounds for the procedure. However,
research suggests that many women seeking termination are not aware of this legal
requirement, and that they believe they have the right to decide to have the procedure. My
PhD aims to explore healthcare practitioners’ (HCPs’) views about this situation, and their
experiences of the way that the law is managed in practice. I am keen to ensure that I address
a wide range of viewpoints, and this includes HCPs who object to termination on the grounds
of conscience.
I am interested in the following questions:
1) What role do HCPs see for the expertise of doctors in decision-making about termination?
2) What role do women seeking termination play in the decision-making process? What role
do HCPs think these women should play?
3) What impact does the current law have on HCPs’ interactions with women seeking
termination?
4) What are HCPs’ views about the law?
5) What are HCPs’ personal views about termination, and how do they manage these in their
professional practice?
To answer these questions, I’m planning to conduct interviews with HCPs in central Scotland
who encounter patients seeking termination. By making use of this qualitative research
method, I hope to gain a more in-depth understanding of HCPs’ perspectives than has
hitherto been possible using quantitative surveys.
What is involved in participation?
If you do decide that you would like to take part, you will be asked to participate in an
interview, which would primarily address the questions outlined above. The interview would
be audio-tape recorded, with your permission. Ideally, we would have around 40 minutes for
the interview, but if this is more time than you can spare then it can be shortened. I
appreciate that HCPs have very busy schedules, and the interview could take place at any
time that’s convenient to you, including evenings or weekends if these are more suitable. You
will also be able to choose where the interview takes place i.e. at your workplace, your home
etc.
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If you are interested in participating, please complete the expression of interest form and
return it to me in the prepaid envelope - I will then contact you to arrange an interview.
Alternatively, you can contact me directly either by phone or email.
Even if you decide to take part you will be free to withdraw from the study at any time
without giving a reason. If you decide to withdraw from the study, I will destroy any data
pertaining to you (e.g. audio tapes or transcripts) if you so wish.
Possible risks or disadvantages of participation?
Your involvement in the study will be treated with the strictest of confidence, as will any
information that I collect from you. All audio tapes and the written transcripts of them will be
given a code so that you cannot be identified from them, and they will be stored in a secure
location. Audio tapes will be wiped clean at the end of the study.
When I write up my PhD, I will use excerpts from the interviews in order to illustrate and
support my findings. However, as outlined above, all of the interviews are anonymised and
your name will not appear in connection with anything that you say to me. If I present
material from your interview in my PhD or in the publications which result from it, I will
ensure that it cannot be traced back to you.
Although my study is addressing HCPs’ views about abortion law, it will not attempt to
assess the legality or illegality of abortion practice. The only circumstances in which I would
feel obligated to break confidentiality would be in the unlikely event that I receive
information that patients are at risk.
You will not be asked to disclose any information about patient identity. However, during
interviews you may find it useful to draw upon real-life examples to illustrate a point. If this
occurred, I would make every effort to remove identifying details in publications that arise
from the study.
Possible benefits of participation?
Taking part in this research will not benefit you personally. However, by conducting this
research, I hope to shed light on the issues that are important to HCPs involved in providing
termination of pregnancy, and on the types of problems they encounter.
Results of the study
My PhD will not be completed until September 2009. When it has been written up, parts of it
will be published as articles and presented at conferences. All participants will receive a brief
summary of my findings by post.
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Organisation and funding
My PhD is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
I am based at: My supervisors are:





Advice was sought from the local NHS Research Ethics Committee, who decided that my
PhD did not require ethical approval from the NHS.
Contact details for further information
Siân Beynon-Jones [contact details]
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating
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Expression of interest form
Healthcare practitioners (HCPs) and termination of pregnancy -Views on
abortion practice and regulation in central Scotland.
Name:
Please complete as appropriate:
I have read the information sheet and I confirm that I am happy to be contacted
about participating in the study.
I do not wish to participate, but I will pass the details of the study on to others.
I do not wish to participate in the study.
If you are interested in participating, please complete:
Contact Telephone Number:









Guide 1 - GPs
Time? Any questions? Consent form? Tape recorder? Qs non-compulsory.
Background information: age/time in job/specialty/ where trained?
1)One of my aims is to understand what it is like for healthcare
practitioners to encounter termination as part of their work. I wondered if
you could begin by just telling me a bit, generally, about your experiences
with termination in your work?
Could you say roughly how often you come across requests for termination?
2) Could you give me an idea of some of the different ways that the subject
of termination might come up in a consultation?
If straight, very directly – How do you feel about this?
If mention difficult/sympathetic cases only, are there other women for whom it’s much more
straightforward?
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3) What kind of things do you talk about with a woman who requests a
termination?
WHY
Does what you talk about with different women vary much? i.e. women who are quite direct
that this is what they want?
Three possible routes with pregnancy?
If mention risks: What are these?
Importance to women: Do you think that the information women receive in the consultation
has an impact on their decision-making?
Relationship between 1st and 2nd consultations?
If mention ‘making sure women are really sure’: Why is this important? How do you go
about it?
Have you had patients who have come back with problems after terminations? What kind of
problems have they had? How do you deal with it? How do you go about identifying women
who are less sure about their decisions?
Do you ask women for their reasons for requesting a termination?
Can I ask why?
Obviously, there are many reasons why women request terminations, but I wondered if you
could give me some idea of the range of different reasons that you encounter?
Have you ever encountered reasons that you found problematic at all or?
Why was this?
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Do you discuss contraception with women in the consultation? Is it something that women
want to talk about?
Are you involved in prescribing emergency contraception? How do you feel about it?
Do you come across women who have had more than one termination?
If indicate that they find repeat terminations problematic: Can I ask why that is?
Do you think that for some women, termination is maybe just their way of controlling their
fertility?
4) Do you think that the law impacts at all on the consultation about
termination? For example, on your interactions with women?
Do you discuss the law at all with women? WHY? Any circumstances where you would?
5) One of the issues that I’m interested in is that the law seems to say that
doctors have to use their judgment to decide if a woman has grounds for a
termination. And I’m trying to understand what this means in practice?
How do you view the role of the knowledge you have as a doctor, in relation to the
knowledge women bring to the decision about whether a termination can take place?
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If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
Some people argue that the reason that termination can be seen as the woman’s decision is
because the woman is the person who has the expertise to kind of assess her situation. And I
wondered what your views would be about that?
How does this compare with the role that patients play in decision-making about other
medical procedures?
Would you always refer a woman if she requested a termination?
Do your feelings about referring women change at all depending on the stage of gestation of a
pregnancy, or is it just the same process?
PROBE definitions of LATE:
Several GPs I’ve spoken with have said that they make a distinction between first and second
trimester terminations - Is that a distinction you’re familiar with?
Why do you think this distinction gets made?
Why do you think some women request terminations later on?
Procedure in second trimester?
If mention termination for fetal abnormality: Are your feelings about later termination any
different in the cases when there’s a fetal abnormality.
THE CERTIFICATE A FORM:
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Do you always sign the certificate A form, the green form, when you refer women to the
hospital?
If no: Circumstances where wouldn’t.
If yes: Because I’ve come across a few people who will refer women, but they don’t sign the
green form, because they feel that signing it makes them much more involved in the process,
and I wondered what your views are about that?
How do you go about deciding which of the grounds to tick?
Some historians have suggested that the abortion law left doctors in a difficult position
because the reasons that women request terminations don’t necessarily relate very easily to
the medical grounds in the law. And I wondered what your views are about that?
[Although the law does allow you to conceptualise termination as the balancing of relative
risks, is that how you actually think about it, personally?]
Trying to get a sense of whether doctors still see the law as something that could have
repercussions for them, whether it could result in prosecution?
TRAINING?
First time you came across abortion?
THE REFERRAL PROCESS:
Could you tell me a bit about what is involved in the referral process?
Do you use a pro-forma to refer women?
What kind of information do you provide about a woman’s reasons for termination – WHY?
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Where do terminations take place? Views about the service?
6) Current debates about abortion
Upper time limit currently 24 weeks – some people have suggested it should be lowered.
Aware of this debate? Any views?
BMA have recently suggested that need for doctors’ signatures and for medical grounds
should be removed, but for first trimester abortion only – Any views?
The suggestion has been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led, including surgical terminations.
How would you feel about that?





Guide 2 – Gynaecologists
Time? Any questions? Consent form? Tape recorder? Qs non-compulsory.
[Background information: age, time in job/specialty/where trained?]
Could you begin by telling me a bit about your job, and why you chose originally to
specialise in this area?
1) One of my aims is to understand what its like for healthcare
professionals to encounter termination as part of their work. I wondered if
you could just tell me a bit, generally about your experiences with
termination in your work?
What this involves in terms of seeing patients i.e. at what point in the process of a termination
request would you be seeing women?
Involvement in carrying out terminations?
If yes - come back to.
2) If relevant: What kind of things do you talk about in a consultation
about termination?
Does what you talk about with different women vary much, for example, if women are quite
direct that this is what they want?
Discussion of 3 pregnancy options?
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If mention risks: What are these?
Importance to women: Do you think that the information women receive in the consultation
has an impact on their decision-making?
So far in my research GPs have often said that they see the second consultation at the hospital
as where the decision to terminate a pregnancy really takes place, and that they’re just
referring women on. So I’d be interested to know how you see the relationship between the
first and second consultations that women have?
If mention ‘making sure women are really sure’: How do you go about identifying if women
are sure of their decisions?
Do you ask women for their reasons for requesting a termination?
Can I ask why?
Obviously, there are many reasons why women request terminations, but I wondered if you
could give me some idea of the range of different reasons that you encounter?
Have you ever encountered reasons that you found problematic at all or?
Why was this?
Would you discuss contraception with women in the consultation?
Do you come across women who have had more than one termination?
If indicate that they find repeat terminations problematic: Can I ask why that is?
Do you think that for some women who have more than one termination, it’s maybe just their
way of controlling their fertility?
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3) Do you think that the law impacts at all on the consultation about
termination? For example, on your interactions with women?
Do you discuss the law at all with women? WHY? Any circumstances where you would?
4) One of the issues that I’m interested in is that the law seems to say that
doctors have to use their judgment to decide if a woman has grounds for a
termination. And I’m trying to understand what this means in practice?
How do you view the role of the knowledge you have as a doctor, in relation to the
knowledge women bring to the decision about whether a termination can take place?
If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
Some people argue that the reason that termination can be seen as the woman’s decision is
because the woman is the person who has the expertise to kind of assess her situation. And I
wondered what your views would be about that?
How does this compare with the role that patients play in decision-making about other
gynaecological procedures?
If a woman has been referred to you for an abortion, would you always agree to her request
for termination?
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Circumstances where haven’t? What happens to women requesting abortions later in second
trimester?
PROBE definitions of LATE:
Something else a lot of GPs have told me is that they make a distinction between first
trimester and second trimester abortion, and they’re more hesitant about referring women in
the second trimester? Is this a distinction you’re familiar with – why do you think it gets
made?
Why do you think some women request terminations later on?
Procedure in second trimester?
If mention termination for fetal abnormality: Are your feelings about later termination any
different in the cases when there’s a fetal abnormality –
5) Involvement in the procedure
a)Could you tell me a bit about what it’s like to be involved in carrying out the procedure ?
b)Do your feelings change at all depending on the methods used e.g. medical/surgical?
c)Would you be involved in disposal of the fetal tissue after the procedure?
Research using tissue?
LEGAL DOCUMENTATION
Were you/are you involved in signing the notification form after a termination?
The form seems to say that you have to put a specific indication for termination on the
form? What kinds of things might be written?
Some historians have suggested that the abortion law left doctors in a difficult position
because the reasons that women request terminations don’t necessarily relate very
easily to the medical grounds in the law. And I wondered what your views are about
that?
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[Although the law does allow you to conceptualise termination as the balancing of relative
risks, is that how you actually think about it, personally?]
Trying to get a sense of whether doctors still see the law as something that could have
repercussions for them, whether it could result in prosecution?
TRAINING?
First time you came across abortion?
Current abortion debates:
6) There’s been quite a lot of debate lately about the upper time limit for
terminations, and whether it should be lowered. So I’d be interested to
know whether you’re aware of this debate, and if you have any particular
opinions about it?
There’s also been a bit of debate about whether doctors should need to keep signing a form –
the BMA have said that they think first trimester terminations should be available without
doctors having to sign legal documentation. Views about this?
The suggestion has been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led, including performing surgical
terminations. How you would feel about that?
7)If not already addressed: What are your views about the fact that doctors
can choose to opt out of abortion provision through the conscience clause?




Guide 3 – Gynaecology Nurses
Any questions? Time available? Tape recorder? Consent form.
QUESTIONS DON’T HAVE TO BE ANSWERED
Could you tell me a bit about what your job is here, and why you wanted to specialise in this
area of nursing?
1) One of my aims is to understand what it is like for nurses to encounter
termination as part of their work. I wondered if you could just tell me a bit,
generally about your experiences with termination?
At what point in the process of a termination request would you be seeing women?
First consultation? Pre-operatively? Post-operatively?
Were you aware that TOP would be part of your job when you began working in this area?
How would you describe the work that nurses do in termination provision in relation to the
work that doctors do?
2) INTERACTIONS WITH WOMEN
If relevant: Decision-making
What kind of things might you talk about with a woman before a termination?
discussion of 3 routes/possible pregnancy outcomes?
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Does what you talk about with different women vary much, for example if a woman was
quite direct that that was what she wanted to do?
Do you think that the information women receive has an impact on their decision?
Everybody:
Would you talk about/be aware of women’s reasons for requesting a termination?
Obviously, there are many reasons why women request terminations, but I wondered if you
could give me some idea of the range of different reasons that you encounter?
Have you ever encountered reasons that you found problematic at all or?
Why was this?
Would you discuss contraception with women?
Are there some women who you’ll see back here more than once?
Do you think that for some women, who have more than one termination, it’s maybe just
their way of controlling their fertility?
Before/during the procedure if relevant:
Any involvement in the scanning process?
Would you be able to talk me through the process of a medical/surgical termination, and what
it involves? [ Probe: Stages/number hospital visits/staff involved at each]
Consent? Who is involved/what is involved?
Process of disposal: What happens? Is it something that is discussed with women?
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If relevant:
A major difference between surgical and medical terminations seems to be that women are
conscious during medical terminations. Could you say a bit about what it’s like providing
care for women who are going through a medical termination?
Do women ever change their minds during the process – how is this managed?
Everybody:
Something a lot of GPs have told me is that they make a distinction between first trimester
and second trimester terminations, and they’re more hesitant about referring women in the
second trimester? Is this a distinction you’re familiar with – why do you think it gets made?
Procedure in second trimester?
Why do you think some women request terminations later on?
Some of the people I’ve been speaking with have said that different women will feel quite
differently about having a termination, so there will be some who find the procedure difficult,
but others for who it’s quite straightforward because they are very clear that they don’t want a
baby. Does that reflect your experience of caring for women who are having terminations?
If talk about distress of staff – how is this managed? What sources of support are available?
Do you ever discuss your involvement with termination outside of the workplace? People’s
reactions?
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3) Access to terminations/current legal framework
One of the things that I’m interested in in my study is what doctors and nurses think about the
current law that regulates termination. So, at the moment, the law seems to say that two
doctors have to decide if a woman has grounds for a termination. And I’m just trying to
understand what that means in practice?
Who do you think should decide about TOP?
Views about the law and the suggestion that need for doctors’ signatures should be removed?
[If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
Some people argue that the reason that termination can be seen as the woman’s decision is because the woman
is the person who has the expertise to kind of assess her situation. And I wondered what your views would be
about that?]
Do doctors always agree to a woman’s request for TOP? What happens if they don’t?
Have there ever been cases where you think doctors should have refused a request for
termination? Why?




The suggestion has been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led. And I’d be interested to know how
you would feel about that?
Home terminations?
There’s been quite a lot of debate lately about the upper time limit for terminations, and
whether it should be lowered. So, at the moment it’s theoretically twenty-four weeks for most
terminations – I’d just be interested to know if you have any views about it?
If not already addressed – C.O:
I’d be interested to know what you think about the fact that nurses and doctors can, in theory,
opt out of termination provision?
Anything you would like to add, any questions?
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Age, time in specialty, where worked/trained.
CONSENT FORM!!! Further contacts
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Guide 4 – Conscientious objectors (GPs)
Any questions? Time available, tape recording, consent at end
QUESTIONS DON’T HAVE TO BE ANSWERED
Background info: Age, time in job, where trained?
1) One of my aims is to understand what it’s like for healthcare
practitioners to encounter termination as part of their work. I wondered if
you could begin by just telling me a bit about your experiences with
termination in your work?
Could you tell me a bit about why you choose not to be involved with abortion?
Have you always felt this way, or is it something that’s changed over time?
Different situations:
Are your views about abortion affected by the length of gestation of the pregnancy at all?
Do you feel any differently depending on the grounds on which a termination is being carried
out?
Ectopic pregnancies? Fetal abnormality?
If not addressed: Is religious belief something that impacts at all on your feelings about
termination?
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2) Although medical practitioners can opt out of providing terminations on
an individual basis, I’m interested to know how you feel, more generally,
about terminations being provided by the NHS?
3) Could you describe for me how the conscience clause works in practice -
for example do you have to formally declare your objection anywhere?
How do you respond if a woman consults you about an unwanted pregnancy?
What would you say? Do you declare your objection?
How do women tend to react? Ever any problems?
Do you refer them to someone else?
Does it happen often?
Do you follow up what happens to these women afterwards?
Have you ever come across women who come in at later stages of gestation, who are quite
near the time limit for legal abortion? What happened?
What about if a woman came in to request emergency contraception?
Do you prescribe this? How do you feel about it?
How about more routine contraceptive advice - are you involved in providing this? How do
you feel about it?
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4) Has your conscientious objection ever created any difficulties for you at
work?
How have your colleagues reacted to it?
Have you ever felt that it’s impacted at all on your career?
Do you [or have you ever] work with other HCPs who aren’t conscientious objectors?
What is that like?
Have you discussed your views with them?
Are there any guidelines for healthcare practitioners who hold conscientious objections to
termination?
Can you remember if you received any advice about what to do during your medical training?
5) Even though you’re not personally involved in provision, I’m interested
in what you think about the current abortion law in the UK?
One of the main issues that I’m interested in is that the law seems to say that doctors have to
use their judgment to decide if a woman has grounds for a termination. And I’m trying to
understand what this means in practice – I don’t know if you feel able to comment on that?
How do you view the role of doctors, in relation to women’s role, in the decision about whether a termination
can take place?
If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
How does this compare with the role that patients’ knowledge plays in decision-making about other medical
procedures?
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Some historians have suggested that the abortion law left doctors in a difficult position because the reasons
women request terminations don’t necessarily relate very easily to the medical grounds in the law. And I
wondered what your views are about that?
Trying to get a sense of whether doctors still see the law as something that could have repercussions for them,
whether it could result in prosecution?
6) Current debates
Recently there has been quite a lot of debate about the upper time limit for termination, which
some people have suggested should be lowered. Do you have any opinions about this?
BMA have suggested that, in the first trimester the requirement for doctors to sign legal
documentation should be removed – Views about this?
The suggestion has also been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led. And I’d be interested to know how
you would feel about that?
Views about who should have input into law?
Anything that you would like to add, or any questions?
CONSENT FORM/FURTHER CONTACTS
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Guide 5 – Conscientious objectors (Gynaecologists)
Any questions? Time available, tape recording, consent at end
QUESTIONS DON’T HAVE TO BE ANSWERED
Background info: Age, time in job, where trained?
Could you begin by telling me a bit about your job, and why you chose originally to
specialise in this area?
1)One of my aims is to get an understanding of what it’s like for healthcare
professionals to come across abortion in their work, so could you just tell
me a bit generally about what your experiences have been?
2) Could you describe why you choose not to be involved?
Have you always felt this way, or is it something that’s changed over time?
Different situations:
Are your views about abortion affected by the length of gestation of the pregnancy at all?
Do you feel any differently about abortion depending on the grounds on which it is being
carried out?
Ectopic pregnancies? Fetal abnormality?
If not addressed: Is religious belief something that impacts at all on your feelings about
termination?
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3) Although medical practitioners can opt out of providing terminations on
an individual basis, I’m interested to know how you feel, more generally,
about terminations being provided by the NHS?
4) Could you describe for me how the conscience clause works in practice -
for example do you have to formally declare your objection anywhere?
5) Has your conscientious objection ever created any difficulties for you at
work?
Have you discussed your views with your colleagues?
How have your colleagues reacted to it?
Have you ever felt that it’s impacted at all on your career?
Does your job involve you dealing with patients on the same wards where terminations are
being carried out? How do you feel about that?
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Are there any guidelines for healthcare practitioners who hold conscientious objections to
termination?
Can you remember if you received any advice about what to do during your medical training?
6) I’m also interested in how having a conscientious objection to abortion
might interact with other areas of your work, and if there are other parts
of reproductive medicine that it relates to?
For example, some doctors who hold conscientious objections to abortion would not be
involved in IVF provision, or screening for fetal abnormality?
Women who have infertility issues and links to abortion?
7) Even though you’re not personally involved with terminations, I’d be
interested to know what you think about the current abortion law in the
UK?
One of the main issues that I’m interested in is that the law seems to say that doctors have to
use their judgment to decide if a woman has grounds for a termination. And I’m trying to
understand what this means in practice – I don’t know if you feel able to comment on that?
How do you view the role of doctors, in relation to women’s role, in the decision about
whether a termination can take place?
If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
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[How does this compare with the role that patients’ play in decision-making about other medical procedures?
Some historians have suggested that the abortion law left doctors in a difficult position because the reasons
women request terminations don’t necessarily relate very easily to the medical grounds in the law. And I
wondered what your views are about that?
Trying to get a sense of whether doctors still see the law as something that could have repercussions for them,
whether it could result in prosecution?]
8) Current debates
BMA have suggested that, in the first trimester the requirement for doctors to sign legal
documentation should be removed – Views about this?
The suggestion has also been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led. And I’d be interested to know how
you would feel about that?
Recently there has been quite a lot of debate about the upper time limit for termination, and
some people have suggested it should be lowered from 24 weeks. Do you have any opinions
about this?
A more general question about debates, and the law – I’m interested in your views about who
should be involved in deciding what the law is – who should have an input into it.
Anything that you would like to add, or any questions?
If not already obtained: BACKGROUND INFO: Age, time in job, where worked/trained.
CONSENT FORM/ Further contacts
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Guide 6 – Conscientious objectors (Nurses)
Any qs? Time available? Tape recorder? Consent form.
QUESTIONS DON’T HAVE TO BE ANSWERED
1)Could you begin by telling me a bit about what your job is here, and why
you wanted to specialise in this area of nursing?
2)Could you describe why you choose not to be involved with abortion
provision?
Have you always felt this way, or is it something that’s changed over time?
e.g. have you ever been involved?
Are your views about abortion affected by the length of gestation of a pregnancy at all?
Do you feel any differently about abortion depending on the grounds on which it is being
carried out?
What about if a woman was having a termination because of an ectopic pregnancy?
Or for fetal abnormality?
If not addressed: Is religious belief something that impacts at all on your feelings about
termination?
3) Although healthcare professionals can opt out of providing terminations
on an individual basis, I’m interested to know how you feel, more
generally, about terminations being provided by the NHS?
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4) Could you describe for me how the conscience clause works in practice –
so do you have to formally declare your objection anywhere?
What happens when there are women on the ward who are here for terminations? Are you
involved with them at all? In what way?
Would you discuss your views with women at all?
What is it like for you to be working on a ward where terminations are also being carried out?
Are there any guidelines for healthcare practitioners who hold conscientious objections to
termination?
Can you remember if you received any advice about what to do during your training?
5) Has having a conscientious objection to abortion ever created any
difficulties for you at work?
Have you discussed your views with any of your colleagues?
How have your colleagues reacted to it?
Have you ever felt that it’s impacted at all on your career?
I’m also interested in whether having a conscientious objection to abortion might
interact with other areas of gynaecological work, and if there are other parts of
reproductive medicine that it relates to?
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Some people who object to abortion also don’t want to be involved in contraception provision
– so I’m just interested to know how you feel about contraception? Is contraception provision
or advice something you’re involved in?
6) Current debates
One of the things that I’m interested in in my study is what doctors and nurses think about the
current law that regulates termination. So, at the moment, two doctors have to sign to say that
they agree that a woman has grounds for a termination. And I’m just interested in what you
think about that, or if you have any views about it?
If say it is the woman’s decision – Can you say a bit about WHY that is?
The suggestion has been made that nurses could sign the legal documentation, and that
termination services could become essentially nurse-led, including surgical terminations. And
I’d be interested to know how you would feel about that?
Something else that has been discussed a lot recently is the upper time limit for termination,
which some people have suggested should be lowered from 24 weeks. Do you have any
views about that?
Anything that you would like to add, or any questions?
BACKGROUND INFO: Age, time in job, where worked/trained.
CONSENT FORM/ Further contacts
